Both The Appellants Are v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax (Benami Prohibition), Room

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR Judgment Reserved on 23.01.2020Judgment Delivered on 06.02.2020 NAFR Writ Appeal No. 29 of 2020 {Arising out of order dated 15.11.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No. 3819 of 2019} 1. Tulsiram, S/o Shri Ghaneshram, aged about 68 years. 2. Manki Bai, W/o Shri Tulsiram, aged about 59 years. Both the Appellants are R/o Village Barekel, P.S. & Tehsil-Pithora, District Mahasamund (C.G.)Mahasamund (C.G.) ---- Appellants Versus 1. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Benami Prohibition), Room No. 201,First Floor, Central Revenue Building, Civil Lines, Raipur (C.G.)First Floor, Central Revenue Building, Civil Lines, Raipur (C.G.) 2. Initiating Officer, PBPT Act, Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (BenamiProhibition), Room No. 201, First Floor, Central Revenue Building, Civil Lines,Raipur (C.G.)Prohibition), Room No. 201, First Floor, Central Revenue Building, Civil Lines,Raipur (C.G.) 3. Union of India, through its Secretary, Ministry of Finance (Department ofRevenue) Government of India, New Delhi (wrongly typed as Income TaxDepartment, Government of India, New Delhi.)Revenue) Government of India, New Delhi (wrongly typed as Income TaxDepartment, Government of India, New Delhi.) 4. Adjudicating Officer under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act,1988, Room No. 26, 4[th] Floor, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, NewDelhi. 1988, Room No. 26, 4[th] Floor, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, NewDelhi. ---- Respondents For Appellants:Shri Surfaraj Khan, Advocate. For Respondents No.1,2&4:Shri Amit Choudhary, Smt. Naushina Afrin Ali and Shri Ajay Kumrani, Advocates. Hon'ble Shri P. R. Ramachandra Menon, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu, JudgeCAV Judgment Per P. R. Ramachandra Menon, Chief Justice 1.Writ Petitioners are the Appellants. Grievance is against the verdict passed bythe learned Single Judge, whereby the challenge raised against the Annexuresthe learned Single Judge, whereby the challenge raised against the Annexures P/1 & P/2 notices/proceedings under the Prohibition of Benami PropertyTransactions Act, 1988 (for short, 'Act of 1988') has been repelled, holding thatit is rather premature as the matter is still pending before the competentauthority and only 'provisional attachment' of the property has been ordered tillthe final adjudication. 2.Heard Shri Surfaraj Khan, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of theAppellants and Shri Amit Choudhary and Smt. Naushina Afrin Ali, the learnedcounsel representing the Respondents No. 1, 2 and 4. Appellants and Shri Amit Choudhary and Smt. Naushina Afrin Ali, the learnedcounsel representing the Respondents No. 1, 2 and 4. P/1 & P/2 notices/proceedings under the Prohibition of Benami PropertyTransactions Act, 1988 (for short, 'Act of 1988') has been repelled, holding thatit is rather premature as the matter is still pending before the competentauthority and only 'provisional attachment' of the property has been ordered tillthe final adjudication. 2.Heard Shri Surfaraj Khan, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of theAppellants and Shri Amit Choudhary and Smt. Naushina Afrin Ali, the learnedcounsel representing the Respondents No. 1, 2 and 4. Appellants and Shri Amit Choudhary and Smt. Naushina Afrin Ali, the learnedcounsel representing the Respondents No. 1, 2 and 4. 3.The Appellants are husband and wife and they own different extents ofproperties in different villages acquired by utilizing the funds allegedly from theirown sources. Ever since purchase/acquisition of the properties, they are statedas enjoying the same with absolute ownership, exclusive possession and clearand marketable title. While so, the Petitioners were served with Annexure P/1notice dated 31.07.2019 issued by the 1[st] Respondent to the effect that, as perthe information gathered by the said Respondent, the above properties were tobe held as 'benami properties' and hence the said properties were provisionallyattached, till final adjudication.properties in different villages acquired by utilizing the funds allegedly from theirown sources. Ever since purchase/acquisition of the properties, they are statedas enjoying the same with absolute ownership, exclusive possession and clearand marketable title. While so, the Petitioners were served with Annexure P/1notice dated 31.07.2019 issued by the 1[st] Respondent to the effect that, as perthe information gathered by the said Respondent, the above properties were tobe held as 'benami properties' and hence the said properties were provisionallyattached, till final adjudication. 4.On receipt of Annexure P/1, the Appellants submitted Annexure P/5 reply,explaining the facts and figures. It was pointed out that all the propertiesmentioned in the notice, except those items which were specifically pointed outas belonging to somebody else (as disclosed from Annexure P/4), werepurchased prior to the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016(for short, 'Amendment Act, 2016') which came into force only from 01.11.2016and hence they cannot be proceeded against. The title deeds of the propertiesowned by the Appellants are produced as Annexure P/3. However, the 2[nd]Respondent, without any regard of the explanation offered by thePetitioners/Appellants issued Annexure P/2 order dated 27.08.2019, wherebyexplaining the facts and figures. It was pointed out that all the propertiesmentioned in the notice, except those items which were specifically pointed outas belonging to somebody else (as disclosed from Annexure P/4), werepurchased prior to the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016(for short, 'Amendment Act, 2016') which came into force only from 01.11.2016and hence they cannot be proceeded against. The title deeds of the propertiesowned by the Appellants are produced as Annexure P/3. However, the 2[nd]Respondent, without any regard of the explanation offered by thePetitioners/Appellants issued Annexure P/2 order dated 27.08.2019, whereby Annexure P/1 provisional order was confirmed. This made the writ Petitioners toapproach this Court by filing the writ petition seeking for a direction to quashAnnexures P/1 and P/2 notices/proceedings. 5. Annexure P/1 provisional order was confirmed. This made the writ Petitioners toapproach this Court by filing the writ petition seeking for a direction to quashAnnexures P/1 and P/2 notices/proceedings. 5. The main challenge raised before the learned Single Judge was that the 2[nd]Respondent was proceeding to 'confiscate' the property and that the power toconfiscate the property has been brought into force only as per the AmendmentAct, 2016. Earlier, on establishing the facts and figures as to the benami natureof the property, the course of action available was only to have the propertyacquired without any compensation. The provision to 'confiscate' the propertywas brought in, as per the Amendment Act, 2016, which came into force onlyfrom 01.11.2016. This being the position, the above property cannot beattached even provisionally in connection with any proceeding, as noconfiscation of the property is possible. Reliance was also sought to be placedon the verdict passed by the Apex Court in Mangathai Ammal (Died) throughL.Rs. and Others vs. Rajeswari and Others reported in AIR 2019 SC 2918and on the ruling rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan HighCourt in Civil Writ Petition No. 2915 of 2019 and connected cases holding thatthe amendment is only having prospective effect. 6.The prayers were opposed from the part of the Respondents pointing out thatthe writ petition was premature, insofar as Annexures P/1 and P/2 are only inrespect of provisional attachment till the matter is finally adjudicated by the 2[nd]Respondent. It is only with intent to see that no third party right is created overthe properties concerned, which are prima facie found as benami properties inview of the incriminating materials/evidence collected. It was also pointed outthat the judgment sought to be relied on by the writ Petitioners were not havingapplication insofar as the question whether the property had to confiscated ornot, was yet to be decided. After hearing both the sides, the learned SingleJudge declined interference, holding that Annexures P/1 and P/2 proceedings were only provisional and it was open for the writ Petitioners to raise all thecontentions before the adjudicating authority, where the matter was pending.This is put to challenge in this appeal. 7.Shri Surfaraj Khan, the learned counsel appearing for the Appellants submitsthat Annexure P/3 title deeds clearly reveal that all the said properties werepurchased by the Appellants themselves utilizing their funds much prior to01.11.2016; i.e., the date on which Amendment Act, 2016 was brought intoforce. The provision for 'confiscation' of the property is a substantive law, whichcan have only prospective application and cannot be of any retrospective effect.This is the law declared by the Rajasthan High Court referring to all the relevantprovisions of law and the binding precedents. Reliance is also sought to beplaced on Mangathai Ammal (supra). The learned counsel submits thatsubstantial changes have been introduced to the old Act, which earliercontained only 9 provisions/sections. The drastic changes brought about as perAmendment Act, 2016 cannot be called as 'procedural' in nature and hence notretrospective. 8.It is pointed out that the Appellants had purchased the said properties usingtheir own money and particulars of the sources and funds have already beenpassed on to the 2[nd] Respondent. Even in a case where the above propertiesare held to be benami, the proceedings can only be for 'acquisition' under theold Act and not for 'confiscation' under the Amendment Act, 2016. These vitalaspects were omitted to be properly noted by the learned Single Judge whointerpreted Sections 3, 5 and 8 as retrospectively amended, which is not correctas discernible from the very terminology used in the provision by using 'presenttense' and not in past tense (with reference to Section 3). Under Section 5 ofthe old Act, the benami property could have been proceeded against only for'acquisition', though without compensation; whereas a substantive change hasbeen brought about as per the Amendment Act, 2016 which provides fortheir own money and particulars of the sources and funds have already beenpassed on to the 2[nd] Respondent. Even in a case where the above propertiesare held to be benami, the proceedings can only be for 'acquisition' under theold Act and not for 'confiscation' under the Amendment Act, 2016. These vitalaspects were omitted to be properly noted by the learned Single Judge whointerpreted Sections 3, 5 and 8 as retrospectively amended, which is not correctas discernible from the very terminology used in the provision by using 'presenttense' and not in past tense (with reference to Section 3). Under Section 5 ofthe old Act, the benami property could have been proceeded against only for'acquisition', though without compensation; whereas a substantive change hasbeen brought about as per the Amendment Act, 2016 which provides for 'confiscation' which is applicable only in respect of properties purchased afterthe date on which the amended statute came into force i.e. on 01.11.2016.When the authority has no power to proceed against the old properties, theproperties purchased prior to 01.11.2016 are not liable to be proceeded againstand the Appellants are being unnecessarily harassed. Hence it requires to beinterdicted, submits the learned counsel. 9.The learned counsel for the Respondents reiterates the submissions as alreadymade before the learned Single Judge, as taken note of in the judgment. It ispointed out that serious lacunae and inadequacies were felt by the law makersin giving effect to the Act in the manner as actually intended and it wasaccordingly, that the ways and means were carved out, providing for a moreeffective procedure to deal with the situation. The learned counsel also pointsout the instances of violation of the statutory provisions were segregated,providing for appropriate punishment in respect of the violation of the provisionsunder the old Act and higher extent of punishment in respect of such violationsafter the commencement of the Amendment Act, 2016 from 01.11.2016. Sincethe penal provisions are not having any retrospective effect, the enhancedpunishment will be applicable only prospectively; i.e. after 01.11.2016. Thecircumstance under which a conscious decision was taken to bring out theamendment to the existing statute, instead of repealing the same and bringing anew enactment, is highlighted with reference to the proceedings held on thefloor of the Parliament to the effect that the old Act, if repealed and a new Actwas introduced, there was a chance to have all the wrong-doers/offenders to goscot-free. Specific reference is also made to Section 65 of the Act (asamended), which refers to transfer of the pending cases, pointing out the factthat the present Act is applicable in respect of old transactions i.e. prior to01.11.2016 and also in respect of subsequent transactions, as the case maybe. 10.The salient features of the statutory provisions, as pointed out by the learnedcounsel for the Respondents in this regard by way of “Written Synopsis”(supported by affidavit) are as given below: 10.The salient features of the statutory provisions, as pointed out by the learnedcounsel for the Respondents in this regard by way of “Written Synopsis”(supported by affidavit) are as given below: “i) Sub section 1(3) of the PBPT Act, which remainsunaltered by the Amendment Act, 2016, specificallymake the provisions of sections 3, 5 and 8 of thePBPT Act from 05.09.1988 and states that theremaining provisions shall be deemed to havecome into force on 19.05.1988. ii) Further, Section 3 of the PBPT Act imposes apunishment of imprisonment upto three yearsand/or fine for entering into a benami transactionprior to the date of commencement of theAmendment Act, 2016 and, thereafter punishmentshall be in accordance with Chapter VII, containingsection 53, 54 and 55, that enhanced penalconsequences of entering into a benami transactionafter the date of commencement of the AmendmentAct, 2016 have consciously been made prospectiveby that amendment statue. Iii) Section 5 of the Benami Transaction(Prohibition) Act, 1988 as applicable from 1988clearly lays down that all properties held benamishall be subject to a acquisition by such authority, insuch manner and after following such procedure asmay be described. It has been further clarified, forthe removal of doubts, that no amount shall bepayable for the acquisition of any property. Hence,provisions for acquisition without compensation, ineffect confiscation, were already in existence since1988 and the Amendment Act, 2016 has onlyprescribed the procedure for the same. As such, byproviding elaborate procedure for confiscation ofbenami property instead of acquisition of suchproperty without compensation, no additional abilityis proposed to be imposed on the Benamidar and/orbeneficial owner of the property. “Acquisitionwithout compensation” [Section 5 of the pre-amendment PBPT Act, 1988] is nothing butconfiscation [Section 5 of the amended PBPT Act,1988], iv) Similarly, section 65 of the PBPT Act stipulatesthat every suit or proceeding in respect of a benamitransaction pending before any forum on the date ofthe commencement of this Act shall standtransferred to the Adjudicating Authority or theAppellate Tribunal, as the case may be. Thissection also make it explicit that there could beproceedings initiated under the original Benami Actof 1983 and that such proceedings were to be continued in accordance with the provisions of theAmendment Act, 2016 from the stage they werebefore the commencement of the Amendment Act. v) As regards the intention of the Legislature, whileenacting the Amendment Act of 2016, theclarification given by the Hon'ble Finance Minister inthe Lok Sabha on 27.07.2016 while recommendingthe Amendment Bill, 2016 to the House. He statedthat “.... if we brought in a new Bill, propertiesacquired benami between the period of 1988onwards would have all gone scot free. So, it wasconsidered necessary that the old law be allowed toremain, and the new amendments be inserted intothe old law itself.” vi) The specific lacuna sought to be remedied was,in the words of the Hon'ble Finance Minister, “... thisAct (Benami Act of 1988) had to be operationalizedthrough rules, and the rules were never framed” viii) It is a fact that the various procedures forconfiscation of properties held benami wereinserted for the first time into the stature through theAmendment Act, 2016, to that extent they would beretrospective in their application being curative innature. In order to understand as to whether thepresent amendment is a curative legislation, theobservations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the caseofR Rajgopal Reddy vs. PadminiChandrasekharran reported in (1995) 2 SCC 630can be seen at para 17, 18: vi) The specific lacuna sought to be remedied was,in the words of the Hon'ble Finance Minister, “... thisAct (Benami Act of 1988) had to be operationalizedthrough rules, and the rules were never framed” viii) It is a fact that the various procedures forconfiscation of properties held benami wereinserted for the first time into the stature through theAmendment Act, 2016, to that extent they would beretrospective in their application being curative innature. In order to understand as to whether thepresent amendment is a curative legislation, theobservations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the caseofR Rajgopal Reddy vs. PadminiChandrasekharran reported in (1995) 2 SCC 630can be seen at para 17, 18: “17. As regards, reason No-3, we are of theconsidered view that the Act cannot be treated tobe declaratory in nature. Declaratory enactmentdeclares and clarifies the real intention of thelegislature in connection with an earlier existingtransaction or enactment, it does not create newrights or obligations. On the express language ofSection 3, of the Act cannot be said to bedeclaratory but in substance it is prohibitory innature and seeks to destroy the rights of the realowner qua properties held benami and in thisconnection it has taken away the right of the realowner both for filing a suit or for taking such adefence in a suit by benamidar. Such an Act whichprohibits benamis transactions and destroys rightsflowing from such transaction as existing earlier isreally not a declaratory enactment. With respect,we disagree with the line of reasoning whichcommanded to the Division Bench. In thisconnection, we may refer to the followingobservations in 'Principles of StatutoryInterpretation' 5[th] Edition 1992, by Shri G.P. Singh,at page 315 under the caption 'Declaratory statues'. The presumption against the retrospectiveoperation is not applicable to declaratory statutes.As states in CRAIES and approved by the SupremeCourt: “For modern purposes a declaratory Act maybe defined as an Act to remove doubts existing asto the common law, or the meaning or effect of anystatue. Such Acts are usually held to beretrospective. The usual reason for passing adeclaratory Act is to set aside what Parliamentdeems to have been a judicial error whether in theStatement of common law or in the interpretation ofthe statutes. Unusually, if not invariably, such anAct contains a preamble, and also the worddeclared' as well as the word enacted”. But the useof the words 'it is declared' is no conclusive that theAct is declaratory for these words may, at times beused to introduce new rules of law and the Act inthe later case will be amending the law and will notnecessarily be retrospective. In determining,therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be hadto the substance rather than to the form. If a newAct is to explain an earlier Act, it would be withoutobject unless construed retrospective. Anexplanatory Act is generally passed to supply anobvious omission or to clear up doubts as to themeaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that ifa statute is curative or merely declaratory of theprevious law retrospective operation is generallyintended. The language shall be deemed always tohave meant' is declaratory, and is in pain termsretrospective. In the absence of clear wordsindicating that the amending Act is declaratory, itwould not be so when the pre-amended provisionwas clear and unambiguous. And amending Actmay be purely clarificatory to clear a meaning of aprovision of the principal Act which was alreadyimplicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature willhave retrospective effect are therefore if theprincipal Act was existing law when the constitutioncame into force the amending Act also will be partof the law. In Mithilesh Kumari V. Prem BihariKhare, Section 4 of the Benami Transactions(Prohibition) Act, 1988 was, it is submitted, wronglyheld to be an Act declaratory in nature for it was notpassed to clear any doubt existing as to thecommon law or the meaning of effect of anystatute. The conclusion however that Section 4applied also to past benami transactions may besupportable on the language used in the Section. 18. No exception can be taken to theaforesaid observations of learned author which inour view can certainly be pressed in service forjudging whether the impugned section isdeclaratory in nature or not. Accordingly, it must beheld that Section 4 or for that matter the Act as awhole is not a piece of declaratory or curative legislation. It creates substantive rights in favour ofbenamidars and destroys substantive rights of realowners who are parties to such transactions and forwhom new liabilities are created by the Act. viii) Even on the aspect relating to whether aprocedure can be prescribed for reaching an objectwhich was earlier intended to, the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in the case of Kapur Chand Pokhraj vs Stateof Bombay reported in AIR 1958 SC 993 at Para 9held as under: “9. ….... In Maxwell's Interpretations of Statutes, thefollowing passage appears at Page 225: “Although to make a law punish that which, atthe time when it was done, was not punishable, iscontrary to sound principle, a law which merelyalters the procedure may, with perfect propriety, bemade applicable to past as well as futuretransactions.” Therefore by virtue of the above decision, theproduce now initiated for confiscating the propertywhich was contemplated either also is retrospectivein nature. viii) Even on the aspect relating to whether aprocedure can be prescribed for reaching an objectwhich was earlier intended to, the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in the case of Kapur Chand Pokhraj vs Stateof Bombay reported in AIR 1958 SC 993 at Para 9held as under: “9. ….... In Maxwell's Interpretations of Statutes, thefollowing passage appears at Page 225: “Although to make a law punish that which, atthe time when it was done, was not punishable, iscontrary to sound principle, a law which merelyalters the procedure may, with perfect propriety, bemade applicable to past as well as futuretransactions.” Therefore by virtue of the above decision, theproduce now initiated for confiscating the propertywhich was contemplated either also is retrospectivein nature. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court inBuckingham and Carnatic Vs. Venkataiah reportedin AIR 1964 SC 1272 had also noted that, “... If thewords used in the section are capable of twoconstructions one of which is shown patently toassist the achievement of the object of the Act,courts would be justified in preferring thatconstruction to the other which may not be able tofurther the object of the Act.” viii) The object of the Act was clearly stated by thethen Finance Minister while introducing theAmendment Act, 2016 as “.... the principal objectbehind this bill is that a lot of people who haveunaccounted money invest and buy immovableproperty in the name of some other person or anon-existent person or a fictitious person or abenami person. So these transaction are to bediscouraged...... It is predominantly an anti-blackmoney measure that any transaction which isbenami is illegal and the property is liable to beconfiscated. x) The Amendment Act, 2016 to the extent of theprocedural mechanism including the appellateforums set out therein, would also be governed bythe Supreme Court decision in Rao Shiv BahadurSingh Vs The State of Vindhya Pradesh (1953)SCR 1188 wherein it is stated that, “.... a personaccused of the commission of an offence has novested right to be tried by a particular court or a particular procedure..... There is no principleunderlying Art. 20 of the Constitution which makesa right to any course of procedure a vested right.” xi) As regards the 'enhanced punishment'introduced by the Amendment Act, 2016, referred toin the impugned judgment, the same, contained inthe provisions of sections 53, 54 and 55 of theAmended Act have specifically been madeprospective in the statute by the provisions ofsection 3(3) and could not be a valid basis fordeclaring the other procedural provisions of theAmendment Act, 2016 to be capable of prospectiveapplication alone. Xii) Any law which makes engaging in certainactivity a punishable offence, cannot be givenretrospective effect because of the constitutionalbar on retrospective criminal law. Therefore,Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (theoriginal act, 1988) was amended and not repealed.The consequence of this is that all benamitransactions which have taken place between 1988and the commencement of the Benami Transaction(Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016 (i.e. AmendmentAct, 2016) can be proceeded against. Since theoriginal Act already prohibits benami transactionsand makes it a punishable offence, benamitransaction which have taken place from 1988 to31.10.2016 will be proceeded against the originalAct, 1988. Punishment in such cases will be to theextent provided by the law in force at time when theoffence of benami transaction was committed andin the original Act, a maximum punished ofimprisonment up to three years and/or fine hasbeen provided. Xiii) In the context of the challenge to theretrospective application of the prescribedprocedure brought into the statute by theAmendment Act, 2016, it is relevant to note that theHon'ble Calcutta High Court while deciding a similarchallenge in the Writ Petition No.25872/2017 in thecase of Macro Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union ofIndia had held that, “..... Section 1(3) of the 1988Act itself provides for perspectivity of its operativeportions, viz. Its penal clauses, in contra distinctionto its definition/defining provisions. Furthermore,this Court has no reason to accede to Prayer (a) ofthe writ petition upon noticing that the stepscontemplated under Section 24(supra) follow thenotice of IO and, being procedural apply in seriatimto the notice for the purpose of identifying a benamitransaction prohibited in the statute book w.e.f. 19[th]May, 1988. …... Accordingly, no jurisdictionalviolation of exercise of powers under the 1988 Act(as amended) is occurred.” 11.As per the above “Written Synopsis” (supported by affidavit) filed on behalf ofthe Respondents, reference is also made to the clarification given by theFinance Minister in the Lok Sabha on 27.07.2016 while recommending theAmendment Bill, 2016. It is the contention of the Respondents that theamendment made with effect from 01.11.2016 is 'substantive', insofar as the'punishment' is concerned; whereas it is only 'procedural', in respect of thevarious steps to be pursued. It is also pointed out that, with regard to the fate ofthe property, once it is established that it is 'benami property', there is no muchdifference; as, even under the old Act it was to be acquired withoutcompensation. After the amendment, the property is liable to be confiscated,which is more or less equal in effect. In any view of the matter, a finding has tobe rendered on conclusion of the adjudication and hence the challenge nowraised is premature in all respects. the Respondents, reference is also made to the clarification given by theFinance Minister in the Lok Sabha on 27.07.2016 while recommending theAmendment Bill, 2016. It is the contention of the Respondents that theamendment made with effect from 01.11.2016 is 'substantive', insofar as the'punishment' is concerned; whereas it is only 'procedural', in respect of thevarious steps to be pursued. It is also pointed out that, with regard to the fate ofthe property, once it is established that it is 'benami property', there is no muchdifference; as, even under the old Act it was to be acquired withoutcompensation. After the amendment, the property is liable to be confiscated,which is more or less equal in effect. In any view of the matter, a finding has tobe rendered on conclusion of the adjudication and hence the challenge nowraised is premature in all respects. 12.It is seen from Annexure P/1 dated 31.07.2019 that, as per the informationgathered by the 2[nd] Respondent, one Laxmi Narayan Agrawal @ Punnu Seth ofresiding in the District Mahasamund had allegedly purchased benami propertiesof more than 200 acres of land in different villages/Tehsil in the name of theAppellants herein, as detailed therein. After conducting the verification and onfinding the necessity to take further steps, approval was obtained under Section23 of the Act of 1988 from the competent authority on 14.09.2018 to conductfurther investigation. Documents were called for from the Land RevenueAuthorities and Bank statements were obtained from the Banks concerned,besides recording the statements of the Appellants herein. gathered by the 2[nd] Respondent, one Laxmi Narayan Agrawal @ Punnu Seth ofresiding in the District Mahasamund had allegedly purchased benami propertiesof more than 200 acres of land in different villages/Tehsil in the name of theAppellants herein, as detailed therein. After conducting the verification and onfinding the necessity to take further steps, approval was obtained under Section23 of the Act of 1988 from the competent authority on 14.09.2018 to conductfurther investigation. Documents were called for from the Land RevenueAuthorities and Bank statements were obtained from the Banks concerned,besides recording the statements of the Appellants herein. 13.The outcome of the scrutiny done with reference to above materials has beengiven in Annexure P/1, to the effect that the Appellants were not havingsufficient income to purchase the above properties. It was even beyond theknowledge of the Appellants that some of such properties were registered intheir names. Show cause notice was issued to the Appellants on 02.05.2019,given in Annexure P/1, to the effect that the Appellants were not havingsufficient income to purchase the above properties. It was even beyond theknowledge of the Appellants that some of such properties were registered intheir names. Show cause notice was issued to the Appellants on 02.05.2019, which was served on 09.05.2019 and pursuant to their request, notice was alsoserved on the Appellants in 'Hindi', by post, on 04.06.2019. On submitting areply to the show cause notice, it was considered and the 2[nd] Respondent foundthat the particulars furnished by the Appellants did not reconcile with thematerials on record. It was accordingly, that a prima facie finding was renderedto the effect that the matter required to be proceeded further; thus passingAnnexure P/1 order of provisional attachment in terms of the mandate underSection 24 (5) of the Act of 1988. Annexure P/1 provisional attachment waslater confirmed, pending final adjudication, vide Annexure P/2 dated27.08.2019. which was served on 09.05.2019 and pursuant to their request, notice was alsoserved on the Appellants in 'Hindi', by post, on 04.06.2019. On submitting areply to the show cause notice, it was considered and the 2[nd] Respondent foundthat the particulars furnished by the Appellants did not reconcile with thematerials on record. It was accordingly, that a prima facie finding was renderedto the effect that the matter required to be proceeded further; thus passingAnnexure P/1 order of provisional attachment in terms of the mandate underSection 24 (5) of the Act of 1988. Annexure P/1 provisional attachment waslater confirmed, pending final adjudication, vide Annexure P/2 dated27.08.2019. 14.Considering the sequence of events and the nature of challenge raised by theAppellants/writ Petitioners, in the light of the version put forth by theRespondents as discussed by the learned Single Judge, it is evident that noprejudice has been caused to the Appellants/Petitioners in any manner,because of the 'provisional attachment'. This is more so, in view of thesubmissions made by the learned counsel for the Appellants during the courseof hearing, that the Petitioners/Appellants would undertake that they would notalienate the properties till the adjudication is finalized. If the Appellants do nothave any intention to alienate the property, they need not feel worried aboutAnnexures P/1 and P/2 'provisional attachment'. What will be the course ofaction to be ordered by the 2[nd] Respondent on culmination of the adjudicationproceedings, is a matter which is still to be ascertained. How the properties ofthe Appellants/Petitioners, covered by the Annexure P/3, are going to be dealtwith by 2[nd] Respondent is yet to be decided. Whether any provisions of thestatute which are 'substantive' in character would be applied retrospectively bythe 2[nd] Respondent, is also not known; which can be considered only afterpassing the final order. The very purpose of passing 'provisional order ofattachment', pending adjudication, is only to see that no third party interest is created over the property. When the Appellants concede that they do not haveany intent/idea to alienate the properties, there cannot be any genuinegrievance in this regard as well. The Annexures P/1 and P/2 order passed bythe proceedings issued by the 2[nd] Respondent are only of interim measure;which is only to sub-serve the final verdict and always subject to the outcome ofthe adjudication. 15. In the said circumstances, this Court finds that the interference declined by thelearned Single Judge is not liable to be assailed under any circumstance. It isopen for the Appellants to raise all contentions, legal and factual, before the 2[nd]Respondent. The appeal stands dismissed, making it clear that this Court hasnot expressed anything with regard to the merits of the case. No costs. Sd/- Sd/- (P. R. Ramachandra Menon)(Parth Prateem Sahu) Chief Justice Judge