Commissioner Of Income Tax-I, Jaipur-Ii,Jaipur v. M/S Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Parsaran Nigam Ltd., Vidyutbhawan, Janpath, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH ATJAIPUR D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 172 / 2010 Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Jaipur-II,Jaipur ----Appellant Versus M/S RAJASTHAN RAJYA VIDYUT PARSARAN NIGAM LTD., VIDYUTBHAWAN, JANPATH, JYOTI NAGAR, JAIPUR ----Respondent Connected With D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 79 / 2012 COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, JAIPUR-II, JAIPUR ----Appellant Versus M/S STATE BANK BIKANER 7 JAIPUR, HEAD OFFICE, TILAK MARG, JAIPUR F ----Respondent Connected with D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 159 / 2011 COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, JAIPUR-II, JAIPUR ----Appellant Versus RAJASTHAN RAJYA VIDYUT UTPADAN NIGAM LTD., VIDYUT BHAWAN, JANPATH MARG, JYOTI NAGAR, JAIPUR ----Respondent Connected With D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 288 / 2011 COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, JAIPUR-II, JAIPUR ----Appellant Versus JAIPUR VIDYUT VITARAN NIGAM LTD., JANPATH MARG, JYOTI NAGAR, JAIPUR ----Respondent _____________________________________________________ For Appellant(s) : Mr. R.B. Mathur alongwith Mr. Prateek Kedawat and Ms. Meenal Ghiya Mr. Sameer Jain For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sanjay Jhanwar alongwith Ms. Archana Mr. P.K. Kasliwal Mr. Gunjan Pathak alongwith Ms. Ishita Rawat _____________________________________________________ HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S. JHAVERI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH Judgment 21/08/2017 1.In all these appeals, common questions of law and factsarises therefore, they are decided by this common judgment. 2.By way of this appeals, the appellant has challenged thejudgment and order of the tribunal whereby the tribunal hasdismissed the appeal of the department and partly allowed theappeal of the assessee. 3.At the time of admission of the appeals, following questions were framed: D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 172 / 2010 “Whether, contribution made by employer toSuperannuation Fund upto Rs.1,00,000/- for eachemployee not liable to Fringe Benefit Tax, u/s115WB(1)(c) is exempted retrospectively orprospectively vis-a-vis amendment made byFinance Act 2007?” D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 79 / 2012 “Whether in the facts and circumstances of thecase and in law the ITAT was justified in deletingaddition made on account of depositing the PFpayment beyond the prescribed time despite thefact that as per Section 36(1)(va) employeescontribution should have been deposited in time aprescribed in the relevant law. Section 43Bpermits delayed payment if paid before filing ofROI as per Section 139(1) in case of employer’scontribution not in the case of employee’scontribution?” D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 159 / 2011 “Whether, contribution made by employer toSuperannuation Fund upto Rs.1,00,000/- for eachemployee not liable to Fringe Benefit Tax, u/s115WB(1)(c) is exempted retrospectively orprospectively vis-a-vis amendment made byFinance Act 2007?” D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 288 / 2011 “Whether, contribution made by employer toSuperannuation Fund upto Rs.1,00,000/- for eachemployee not liable to Fringe Benefit Tax, u/s115WB(1)(c) is exempted retrospectively orprospectively vis-a-vis amendment made byFinance Act 2007?” 4.Mr. Sameer Jain has taken us to the provisions of Section 115WC sub Clause (b) (1) of the Act which reads as under:- (1) (a) Cost at which the benefits referred to in115WB(1)(b) are provided by the employer to thegeneral public as reduced by the amount, if any,paid by, or recovered from, his employee oremployees In a case where the expenses of the naturereferred to 11 5WB( I)(b) are included in any otherclause of Sub-Section-(2) of the said section, thetotal expenses included under such other clause shallbe reduced by the amount of expenditure referredto in the said clause (b) for computing the value offringe benefits 4.Mr. Sameer Jain has taken us to the provisions of Section 115WC sub Clause (b) (1) of the Act which reads as under:- (1) (a) Cost at which the benefits referred to in115WB(1)(b) are provided by the employer to thegeneral public as reduced by the amount, if any,paid by, or recovered from, his employee oremployees In a case where the expenses of the naturereferred to 11 5WB( I)(b) are included in any otherclause of Sub-Section-(2) of the said section, thetotal expenses included under such other clause shallbe reduced by the amount of expenditure referredto in the said clause (b) for computing the value offringe benefits (b) The amount of contribution referred to insection 115 WB (1)(c), which exceeds one lakhrupees in respect of each employee. (ba) The fair market value of the SpecifiedSecurity or Sweat Equity shares on thedate on which the option vests with theemployee as reduced by the amountactually paid by, or recovered from theemployee in respect of such security orshares. (c) 20% (Twenty per cent) of the expenses referred to in section 11 5WB (a) to (1) (d) Fifty per cent, of the expenses referred u/s 1 15WB(2)(1) to (m). (e) Five per cent of the expenses referred in clause (Q) of section 1 15WB(2). 5.He contended that in view of the clear provisions and thespeech which has been reproduced by the Tribunal which reads as under:- “However, the another contention of the assesseethat amendment made to section 115 WC(1)(b)from A Y 2007-08 is clarificatory and appliedretrospectively has merit. The Finance Minister inhis budget speech while introducing thisamendment reported at 281 ITR 58-59 (Statute),para 172 has stated as under:- “Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) wasintroduced as a revenue raisingmeasure. FBT can be justified on theprinciples of horizontal equity andvertical equity. Nevertheless I havereviewed it with an open mind. I havealso taken on board the viewsexpressed by the apex chambers ofcommerce. I propose to make thefollowing changes in Chapter XII H ofthe Income Tax Act (relevant paraonly). Prescribe a threshold of Rs.1,00,000/- under Section 115WB(1)(c) so that only acontribution by an employer toan approved superannuationfund in excess of Rs. 1,00,000/-per year per employee will attract FBT. Under section 80C,there is already an exemptionuptoRs.1,00,000/-forcontribution by an employee toan approved superannuationfund. Hon’ble Members will notthat under these two provisions,there can not be a tax exemptcontribution upto Rs.2,00,000/-per year for the benefit ofemployee. This allowance, Ibelieve is generous enough inthe case of an overwhelmingmajority of employees.” With these changes, I am confident that thedebate on FBT will draw to a close. Let me remindeveryone concerned once again that FBT isjustified on the principle of equity.” In the superannuation explaining the provisionsof Finance Bill 2006 reported in 281 ITR 213-214(Statute) it is explained as under (relevant para): “Clause (b) of sub section (1) of section115WC provides that the actual amount ofcontribution by the employer to anapproved superannuation fund foremployees shall be the value of fringebenefits. It is proposed to amend the said clause(b) so as to provide that contribution byanemployertoanapprovedsuperannuation fund to the extent it doesnot exceed Rs.1,00,000/- per employee inrespect of whom contribution is madeshall not be liable for fringe benefit tax. These amendments will take effect from1[st] April 2007 and will accordingly apply inrelation to assessment year 2007–08 insubsequent years.” 6. He contended that provisions are clear that it has to beunderstood to apply prospectively and cannot be appliedretrospectively as interpreted by the tribunal. He has also taken usto Para 8, 9 and 10 of the Tribunal which reads as under:- It is proposed to amend the said clause(b) so as to provide that contribution byanemployertoanapprovedsuperannuation fund to the extent it doesnot exceed Rs.1,00,000/- per employee inrespect of whom contribution is madeshall not be liable for fringe benefit tax. These amendments will take effect from1[st] April 2007 and will accordingly apply inrelation to assessment year 2007–08 insubsequent years.” 6. He contended that provisions are clear that it has to beunderstood to apply prospectively and cannot be appliedretrospectively as interpreted by the tribunal. He has also taken usto Para 8, 9 and 10 of the Tribunal which reads as under:- “8. From the combined reading of the speech ofFinance Minister and the memorandum explaining the provisions of the bill, we are of the view thatthe above amendment was made as a welfaremeasure for overwhelming majority of employeesto make it parallel with the deduction providedu/s 80C read with section 80CCD. We find thatwith effect from 1.4.2004, contribution made bythe employer under a pension scheme ischargeable to tax as salary u/s 17(1)(vii) and thesame is allowed deduction u/s 80CCD within theoverall limit of Rs.1,00,000/-. To make provisionsof section 115WB align to section 80CCDamendment was made in section 115WC not toconsider the contribution upto Rs.1,00,000/- inrespect of each employee liable for fringe benefittax. Section 17(1)(viii) read with section 80 CCDwas inserted w.e.f. 1.4.2004 and the limit fordeduction under section 80CCD was limited uptoRs. 1,00,000/- u/s 80CCE w.e.f 1.4.2006.Considering this the amendment is made u/s115WC(1)(b) by Finance Act, 2006. This showsthat amendment is only clarificatory andtherefore this amendment needs to be appliedfrom assessment year 2006-07 when the tax onfringe benefit was introduced in the statute. 9.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of AlliedMotors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (supra), whileinterpreting the proviso to section 43B insertedw.e.f 1.4.1988 has been pleased to hold that theproviso is inserted to remove unintendedconsequences and therefore has a retrospoctiveefiect. The Hon'ble Court at page 686 has held as"The rule of reasonable construction must beapplied while construing statute. Literalconstruction should be avoided if it defeats themanifest object and purpose of the Act. A provisowhich is inserted to remedy unintendedconsequences and to make the provisionworkable, a proviso which supplies an obviousomission in the section and is required to be readinto the section, to give the section a reasonableinterpretation, requires to be treated asretrospective in operation, so that a reasonableinterpretation can be given to the section as awhole." Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in thecase of CIT Vs. Suresh N. Gupta (supra) whileinterpreting the provisions to section 113 insertedw.e.f 1.6.2002 has been pleased to hold thesame as having retrospective effect. Hon'bleCourt in para 24 to 26 held that the said provisowas clarificatory in nature. In taxation, thelegislation of the type indicated by the provisohas to be read strictly. There is no question ofretrospective effect. The proviso only clarifies that out of the four dates, Parliament has optedfor the date, namely the year in which the searchis initiated, which date would be relevant forapplicability of particular Finance Act. Therefore,one has to read the proviso as it stands. Prior tolst June, 2002, in several cases, tax wasprescribed sometimes in the 1961 Act andsometimes in the Finance Act and often in both.This made liability uncertain. In the present case,however the rate of tax in case of blockassessment at 60 per cent was prescribed byS.113 but the year of the Finance Act imposingsurcharge was not stipulated. This resulted in theambiguities. Therefore, clarification was needed.The proviso was curative in nature. Hence, theproviso inserted in s. 113 merely clarifies that outof the above four dates, the relevant date forapplicability of the Finance Act would be the yearin which the search stood initiated under s.158BC. Again in case of CIT vs. Gold Coin HealthFood P. Ltd. (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Courtwhile considering that amendment made byFinance Act 2002 w.e.f 1.4.2003 in section271(1)(c) wherein clause (iii) to section 271(1),the words 'in addition to tax, if any payable' wasinserted in place of the words 'in addition to anytax payable' held the amendment to beclarificatory in nature having retrospective effectby observing that the circumstances under whichan amendment was brought into existence andthe consequences of the amendment will have tobe taken care of while deciding whether theamendment was clarificatory or substantive innature and whether it will have retrospectiveeffect or it was not so. If it is a necessaryimplication from the language employed that theLegislature intended particular section to haveretrospective operation, the courts will give itsuch an operation. Hon'ble Supreme Court incase of CIT vs Vegetable Products Ltd. (Supra)held that concession provision should be liberallyconstrued so as to sub serve the purpose forwhich it is intended. 10. The above principle of interpretation laid downin various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Courtwhen read in context with the purpose andintention for which the amendment was made u/s115WB (1)(c) leaves no scope of debate that thesaid amendment was to remedy the unintendedconsequences and therefore, it is required to beconsidered as retrospective in operation so that areasonable interpretation can be given to thescheme of levy of fringe benefit tax on contribution to superannuation fund as a whole.We, therefore, hold that the contribution tosuperannuation fund in present case being lessthan Rs. 1 Lac per employee, is not liable forfringe benefit tax. In the result this ground of theassessee is allowed.” 7. He contended that the Tribunal has seriously committed an errorin allowing the appeal of the assessee and he relied on thedecision of the Supreme Court as under:- 1. State of Jharkhand and Ors. vs. Ambay Cements and Anr. 2004 (178) E.L.T. 55 (S.C.) contribution to superannuation fund as a whole.We, therefore, hold that the contribution tosuperannuation fund in present case being lessthan Rs. 1 Lac per employee, is not liable forfringe benefit tax. In the result this ground of theassessee is allowed.” 7. He contended that the Tribunal has seriously committed an errorin allowing the appeal of the assessee and he relied on thedecision of the Supreme Court as under:- 1. State of Jharkhand and Ors. vs. Ambay Cements and Anr. 2004 (178) E.L.T. 55 (S.C.) 21. It is a matter of fact that the respondent hasset up its establishment in the year 2000 andstarted its commercial production from 2.4.2001only. It is seen from the Bihar Industrial PolicyResolution, 1995 and the statutory Notificationissued by the Commercial Tax Department, thenew industrial units was defined as thoseindustrial units which went into productionbetween 1.9.1995 and 31.8.2000 and which havebeen granted license/memorandum/letter ofintent or registration certificate from thecompetent industries Department or IndustrialArea Development Authority or Directorate ofIndustry or competent authority of theGovernment of India. As already noticed, thestatutorynotificationswereamendedretrospectively vide S.O. 57 and 58 dated2.3.2000. It will thus be seen from the aforesaidamended Notifications that three conditions arestipulated for pipeline industries to be treated asnew industrial units for the purposes of exemptionunder S.O. 478 & 479 which read as follows: "(I) Industrial unit should obtainregistrationcertificatefromthecompetent Authority of the IndustriesDepartment. (II) It should also have obtained priorpermission from the State Government inthe Industries Department before 31[st]August, 2000. (III) Industrial unit should commenceproduction within 5 years from the dateof obtaining prior permission." 8. He contended that the amendment which was made is onlyprospective and cannot be taken into with retrospective effect. 9.Counsel for the assessee has supported from the judgment ofthe Supreme Court inasmuch as it is contended that it is curativeamendment qua clarification or any other amendment. He hasrelied upon following decisions:- 1. Commissioner of Income Tax Kolkata-III vs. Alom Extrusions Limited, (2009) 319 ITR 306 (SC) (II) It should also have obtained priorpermission from the State Government inthe Industries Department before 31[st]August, 2000. (III) Industrial unit should commenceproduction within 5 years from the dateof obtaining prior permission." 8. He contended that the amendment which was made is onlyprospective and cannot be taken into with retrospective effect. 9.Counsel for the assessee has supported from the judgment ofthe Supreme Court inasmuch as it is contended that it is curativeamendment qua clarification or any other amendment. He hasrelied upon following decisions:- 1. Commissioner of Income Tax Kolkata-III vs. Alom Extrusions Limited, (2009) 319 ITR 306 (SC) “9. We find no merit in these civil appeals filed bythe Department for the following reasons: firstly,as stated above, Section 43B [main section],which stood inserted by Finance Act, 1983, witheffect from 1st April, 1984, expressly commenceswith a non-obstante clause, the underlying objectbeing to disallow deductions claimed merely bymaking a Book entry based on Mercantile Systemof Accounting. At the same time, Section 43B[main section] made it mandatory for theDepartment to grant deduction in computing theincome under Section 28 in the year in which tax,duty, cess, etc., is actually paid. However,Parliament took cognizance of the fact thataccounting year of a company did not always tallywith the due dates under the Provident Fund Act,Municipal Corporation Act [octroi] and other Taxlaws. Therefore, by way of first proviso, anincentive/relaxation was sought to be given inrespect of tax, duty, cess or fee by explicitlystating that if such tax, duty, cess or fee is paidbefore the date of filing of the Return under theIncome Tax Act [due date], the assessee(s) thenwould be entitled to deduction. However, thisrelaxation/incentive was restricted only to tax,duty, cess and fee. It did not apply tocontributions to labour welfare funds. The reasonappears to be that the employer(s) should not siton the collected contributions and deprive theworkmen of the rightful benefits under SocialWelfare legislations by delaying payment ofcontributions to the welfare funds. However, asstated above, the second proviso resulted inimplementation problems, which have beenmentioned hereinabove, and which resulted in theenactment of Finance Act, 2003, deleting the second proviso and bringing about uniformity inthe first proviso by equating tax, duty, cess andfee with contributions to welfare funds. Once thisuniformity is brought about in the first proviso,then, in our view, the Finance Act, 2003, which ismade applicable by the Parliament only with effectfrom 1st April, 2004, would become curative innature, hence, it would apply retrospectively witheffect from 1st April, 1988. Secondly, it may benoted that, in the case of Allied Motors (P) Limitedv. Commissioner of Income Tax reported inMANU/SC/0317/1997 : [1997] 224 I.T.R. 677, theScheme of Section 43B of the Act came to beexamined. In that case, the question which arosefor determination was, whether sales tax collectedby the assessee and paid after the end of therelevant previous year but within the time allowedunder the relevant Sales Tax law should bedisallowed under Section 43B of the Act whilecomputing the business income of the previousyear? That was a case which related toAssessment Year 1984-1985. The relevantaccounting period ended on June 30, 1983. TheIncome Tax Officer disallowed the deductionclaimed by the assessee which was on account ofsales tax collected by the assessee for the lastquarter of the relevant accounting year. Thededuction was disallowed under Section 43Bwhich, as stated above, was inserted with effectfrom 1st April, 1984. It is also relevant to notethat the first proviso which came into force witheffect from 1st April, 1988 was not on the statutebook when the assessments were made in thecase of Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra).However, the assessee contended that eventhough the first proviso came to be inserted witheffect from 1st April, 1988, it was entitled to thebenefit of that proviso because it operatedretrospectively from 1st April, 1984, when Section43B stood inserted. This is how the question ofretrospectivity arose in Allied Motors (P) Limited(supra). This Court, in Allied Motors (P) Limited(supra) held that when a proviso is inserted toremedy unintended consequences and to makethe section workable, a proviso which supplies anobvious omission in the section and which provisois required to be read into the section to give thesection a reasonable interpretation, it could beread retrospective in operation, particularly togive effect to the section as a whole. Accordingly,this Court, in Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra),held that the first proviso was curative in nature,hence, retrospective in operation with effect from1st April, 1988. It is important to note once again that, by Finance Act, 2003, not only the secondproviso is deleted but even the first proviso issought to be amended by bringing about anuniformity in tax, duty, cess and fee on the onehand vis-a-vis contributions to welfare funds ofemployee (s) on the other. This is one morereason why we hold that the Finance Act, 2003, isretrospective in operation. Moreover, thejudgment in Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra) isdelivered by a Bench of three learned Judges,which is binding on us. Accordingly, we hold thatFinance Act, 2003, will operate retrospectivelywith effect from 1st April, 1988 [when the firstproviso stood inserted] Lastly, we may point outthe hardship and the invidious discriminationwhich would be caused to the assessee(s) if thecontention of the Department is to be acceptedthat Finance Act, 2003, to the above extent,operated prospectively. Take an example - in thepresent case, the respondents have deposited thecontributions with the R.P.F.C. after 31st March[end of accounting year] but before filing of theReturns under the Income Tax Act and the date ofpayment falls after the due date under theEmployees' Provident Fund Act, they will bedenied deduction for all times. In view of thesecond proviso, which stood on the statute bookat the relevant time, each of such assessee(s)would not be entitled to deduction under Section43B of the Act for all times. They would lose thebenefit of deduction even in the year of account inwhich they pay the contributions to the welfarefunds, whereas a defaulter, who fails to pay thecontribution to the welfare fund right upto 1stApril, 2004, and who pays the contribution after1st April, 2004, would get the benefit of deductionunder Section 43B of the Act. In our view,therefore, Finance Act, 2003, to the extentindicated above, should be read as retrospective.It would, therefore', operate from 1st April, 1988,when the first proviso was introduced. It is truethat the Parliament has explicitly stated thatFinance Act, 2003, will operate with effect from1st April, 2004. However, the matter before usinvolves the principle of construction to be placedon the provisions of Finance Act, 2003. 10. Before concluding, we extract hereinbelow therelevant observations of this Court in the case ofCommissioner of Income Tax. Bangalore v. J.H.Gotla reported in MANU/SC/0126/1985 : [1985]156 I.T.R. 323, which reads as under: We should find out the intention from thelanguage used by the Legislature and if strict literal construction leads to an absurd result, i.e.,a result not intended to be subserved by theobject of the legislation found in the mannerindicated before, then if another construction ispossible apart from strict literal construction, thenthat construction should be preferred to the strictliteral construction. Though equity and taxationare often strangers, attempts should be made thatthese do not remain always so and if aconstruction results in equity rather than ininjustice, then such construction should bepreferredtotheliteralconstruction. For the afore-stated reasons, we hold thatFinance Act, 2003, to the extent indicated above,is curative in nature, hence, it is retrospective andit would operate with effect from 1st April, 1988[when the first proviso came to be inserted]. Forthe above reasons, we find no merit in this batchof civil appeals filed by the Department which arehereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Civil Appeal No. 7755/2009 @ S.L.P. (C) No.20581/2008 and Civil Appeal No. 7757/2009 @S.L.P. (C) No. 18380/2009: 2. Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Delhi,(1997) 224 ITR 677 (SC) Civil Appeal No. 7755/2009 @ S.L.P. (C) No.20581/2008 and Civil Appeal No. 7757/2009 @S.L.P. (C) No. 18380/2009: 2. Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Delhi,(1997) 224 ITR 677 (SC) “10. Therefore, in the well known words of JudgeLearned Hand, one cannot make a fortress out ofthe dictionary; and should remember that statuteshave some purpose and object to accomplishwhose sympathetic and imaginative discovery isthe surest guide to their meaning. In the case ofR.B Jodha Mai Kuthiala v. Commissioner ofIncome-Tax, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir andHimachal Pradesh MANU/SC/0389/1971 : [1971]82 ITR 570 (SC) , this Court said that one shouldapply the rule of reasonable interpretation. Aproviso which is inserted to remedy unintendedconsequences and to make the provisionworkable, a proviso which supplies an obviousomission in the section and is required to be readinto the section to give the section a reasonableinterpretation, requires to be treated asretrospective in operation so that a reasonableinterpretation can be given to the section as awhole. 11. This view has been accepted by a number ofHigh Courts. In the case of Commissioner ofIncome-Taxv.ChandulalVenichandMANU/GJ/0074/1994 : [1994]209ITR7(Guj) , theGujarat High Court has held that the first proviso to Section 43B is retrospective and sales-tax forthe last quarter paid before the filing of the returnfor the assessment year is deductible. Thisdecision deals with assessment year 1984-85. TheCalcutta High Court in the case of Commissionerof Income-Tax v. Sri Jagannath Steel CorporationMANU/WB/0138/1990 : [1991]191ITR676(Cal) ,has taken a similar view holding that the statutoryliability for sales-tax actually discharged after theexpiry of the accounting year in compliance withthe relevant statute is entitled to deduction underSection 43B. The High Court has held theamendment to be clarificatory and, therefore,retrospective. The Gujarat High Court in the abovecase held the amendment to be curative andexplanatory and hence retrospective. The PatnaHigh Court has also held the amendment insertingthe First proviso to be explanatory in the case ofJamshedpur Motor Accessories Stores v. Union ofIndia and Ors. MANU/BH/0055/1990 :[1991]189ITR70(Patna) . It has held theamendment inserting first proviso to beretrospective. The special leave petition from thisdecision of the Patna High Court was dismissed.The view of the Delhi High Court, therefore thatthe first proviso to Section 43B will be availableonly prospectively does not appear to be correct.As observed by G.P. Singh in his Principles ofStatutory Interpretation, 4th Edn. Page 291, "It iswell settled that if a statute is curative or merelydeclaratory of the previous law retrospectiveoperation is generally intended." In fact theamendment would not serve its object in such asituation unless it is construed as retrospective.The view, therefore, taken by the Delhi High Courtcannot be sustained.” 10.He also relied upon decision of Gujarat High Court wherein ithas observed as under:- Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS) vs. Oiland Natural Gas Corporation (India) Ltd.(2015) 61 taxmann.com 105(Gujarat) “12. Mr. Bhatt has made an endeavour that theTribunal has not decided the issues as contendedby the Department that uniform allowance is partof the salary under section 17(1), and even if it isconsidered to be perquisite, in view of thestatutory provisions, the same will be part of the salary, and therefore, TDS was required to bededucted.” 11.We have gone to the provisions of the Act. The purpose is tohave a harmonious relation between the employer and theemployee and when the statute has put interpretation, therecannot be an interpretation which create doubt inasmuch as hemade the payment for the benefit of the employer. He is also to betaxed. “12. Mr. Bhatt has made an endeavour that theTribunal has not decided the issues as contendedby the Department that uniform allowance is partof the salary under section 17(1), and even if it isconsidered to be perquisite, in view of thestatutory provisions, the same will be part of the salary, and therefore, TDS was required to bededucted.” 11.We have gone to the provisions of the Act. The purpose is tohave a harmonious relation between the employer and theemployee and when the statute has put interpretation, therecannot be an interpretation which create doubt inasmuch as hemade the payment for the benefit of the employer. He is also to betaxed. 12.In that view of the matter, when the court has to interpret thelaw, taxing statute has to see whether the object for which theprovisions are brought in to give benefit to the employees to beachieved or to be discontinued by interpreting the same which isnot beneficial to the employer-assessee. 13.In that view of the matter, in the backdrop of the aboveclarification, we are of the opinion that the view taken by theSupreme Court in Allied Motors (supra) and Alom (supra), it is clearthat it is a curative amendment which has to be given retrospectiveeffect and the contention which has been raised by Mr. Jhanwarthat it is for subsequent year and previous years and it was notrestricted only for one year, should be accepted and we accept thesame. 14.In view of the above, the issue is answered in favour of theassessee against the department. 15.The appeals stand dismissed. (INDERJEET SINGH),J. (K.S. JHAVERI),J. // bm gandhi Jyoti Item No.65-66, 79-80