Commissioner Of Income Tax, Udaipur v. Hindustan Zinc Ltd

[ 1 ] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN ATJODHPUR :JUDGMENT: (1) Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur Vs.Hindustan Zinc Ltd. D.B.Income Tax Appeal No. 139/2007 ::: (2) Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur Vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. D.B.Income Tax Appeal No.35/2008 ::: (3) Commissioner of Income Tax, UdaipurVs.Vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. D.B.Income Tax Appeal No. 31/2008 ::: (4) Commissioner of Income Tax, UdaipurVs.Vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. D.B.Income Tax Appeal No. 117/2008 ::: (5) Commissioner of Income Tax, UdaipurVs.Vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. D.B.Income Tax Appeal No. 70/2008 ::: (6) Commissioner of Income Tax, UdaipurVs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. D.B.Income Tax Appeal No.142/2008 27[th] April 2012 Date of Judgment :::: PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. M. TOTLA Mr.K.K.Bissa for the appellant Mr.Anjay Kothari for the respondent BY THE COURT:(per Hon'ble Dinesh Maheshwari,J.) These six income-tax appeals by the revenue under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [‘the Act of 1961’] in relation tothe same assessee, arising out of similar nature and inter-relatedorders, and involving similar nature substantial question of law, havebeen considered together; and are taken up for disposal by thiscommon judgment. Put in a nutshell, these appeals, relating to the assessmentyears 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1981-82, have their genesis in theorders dated 29.04.2004 wherein the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals), Udaipur [‘the CIT(A)’] found that the Assessing Officer[‘the AO’] had failed to carry out the directions given by the IncomeTax Appellate Tribunal [‘ITAT’] in the orders passed in the earlierround of the proceedings when the matters were restored to the fileof the AO for decision afresh; and whereby the CIT(A) directed theAO to deal with the issue regarding claim of higher rate ofdepreciation on the building allegedly forming the part of plant andmachinery in accordance with the directions of the ITAT. Therespective appeals filed by the revenue against the aforesaid orderdated 29.04.2004 were dismissed by the ITAT by a common orderdated 20.02.2007. First three of the present appeals by the revenue(ITA Nos. 139/2007, 35/2008, 31/2008) arise out of this commonorder dated 20.02.2007. The revenue also made the respectiverectification applications under Section 154 of the Act of 1961 beforethe CIT(A) who proceeded to reject the same by the common orderdated 12.08.2004. The appeals filed by the revenue against this order dated 12.08.2004 were also dismissed by the ITAT by anotherorder of the even date i.e.,20.02.2007. Next three appeals by therevenue (ITA Nos. 117/2008, 70/2008, 142/2008) arise out of thisother order dated 20.02.2007. The sum and substance of the matter remains that in therespective orders dated 20.02.2007, the ITAT found the CIT(A)perfectly justified in issuing directions to the AO for compliance of itsorder as made in the earlier round of the same proceedings. TheITAT, thus, found no case for interference. Assailing the orders sopassed by the ITAT and CIT(A) in these appeals, the revenue seeksto contend that in an appeal filed after the amendment to clause (a)of sub-section (1) of Section 251 of the Act of 1961, as made w.e.f.01.06.2001, the Commissioner (Appeals) has no power to remandthe matter to the Assessing Officer; and hence, the order dated29.04.2004, as passed by the CIT(A), remains wholly unauthorised. Only the question of power of the Commissioner (Appeals)after the aforesaid amendment being in question in these appeals,we need not elaborate on all the factual aspects. A brief reference tothe background aspects would suffice. Only the question of power of the Commissioner (Appeals)after the aforesaid amendment being in question in these appeals,we need not elaborate on all the factual aspects. A brief reference tothe background aspects would suffice. The relevant background aspects in ITA No.139/2007pertaining to assessment year 1979-80 are as follows: Theassessment in this case was earlier completed by the AO on20.01.1983 at nil income. The appeal against this order was decidedby the CIT(A) on 08.03.1994. The assessee's appeal [ITA No.1232 (JP)/94] against this order was decided by the ITAT on 22.11.2001.In its order dated 22.11.2001, the ITAT restored essentially twoissues to the file of AO for consideration afresh namely, the issueregarding disallowance of the provision for bad debts and written offadvances; and regarding the assessee's claim for higherdepreciation on the building, said to be the part of plant andmachinery, after inspection of the building by the AO. Such relevant background aspects in ITA No.35/2008 inrelation to the assessment year 1980-81 are as follows: The AOpassed the assessment order dated 24.01.1984 at nil income. Theappeal was decided by the CIT(A) on 09.03.1994; and theassessee's appeal [ITA No.1233(JP)/94] against this order wasdecided by the ITAT on 23.11.2001. In this matter, pertaining toassessment year 1980-81, the ITAT restored three issues to the fileof AO for consideration afresh namely, regarding non-allowancetowards bad debts; the claim under Section 80J; and the same issueregarding assessee's claim for higher depreciation towards thebuilding after inspection of the same by the AO. Similar are the background aspects relating to ITA No.31/2008pertaining to assessment year 1981-82 wherein the assessment wasmade on 06.03.1985, the appeal by the CIT(A) was decided on09.03.1994, and the ITAT considered the appeal of the assessee[ITA No.1234(JP)/94] in its similar nature order dated 23.11.2001. Inthis case, pertaining to assessment year 1981-82, the ITAT restored the three issues of same nature to the file of AO. In all theseappeals, the issue regarding higher depreciation for the buildingremains the bone of contention. It is borne out that the AO proceeded to decide all theremanded cases by the different orders of the even date i.e.,10.03.2003. The AO rejected the claim of higher depreciationessentially with the observations that the assessee did not file therequisite details for inspection despite granting of sufficient time.Against the aforesaid orders dated 10.03.2003, separate appealswere filed by the assessee on 22.04.2003 before the CIT(A). Allthese appeals were decided by separate but similar nature ordersdated 29.04.2004. So far the issue at hands is concerned, regardingthe claim of depreciation, the CIT(A) found that the AO failed tocarry out the requirements of the orders as earlier passed by theITAT on 22.11.2001 and 23.11.2001 restoring the issue to the file ofAO. Thus, the CIT(A) did not approve of the order passed by the AOand directed that the AO, after inspecting the constructed buildingand keeping in view the directions of ITAT, should come to a findingas to whether the building was a part of the plant and allowdepreciation accordingly. For ready reference, the observations asmade by the CIT(A) in the order pertaining to assessment year 1979-80 could be noticed as under:- “3.2 I have considered the observations of the AO and thecontentions of the appellant. The Hon'ble ITAT, Jodhpur Benchvide its order in ITA No.1232(JP)/94 dated 22-11-01, looking to [ 6 ] the nature of buildings claimed as plant restored the matter backto the AO for considering the matter afresh with the followingdirections: “3.2 I have considered the observations of the AO and thecontentions of the appellant. The Hon'ble ITAT, Jodhpur Benchvide its order in ITA No.1232(JP)/94 dated 22-11-01, looking to [ 6 ] the nature of buildings claimed as plant restored the matter backto the AO for considering the matter afresh with the followingdirections: “A characteristic of plant is that it is anadjunct to the carrying on of a business and not theessential site or core of the business itself.Keeping in view the facts of the case it isnecessary to restore this issue to the file of the AOwith direction that after proper appraisal of factsand inspection of the building constructed andkeeping in view the various judgments discussedabove, he should decide this issue afresh as towhether the building is a plant or not.”. As per the direction of the Hon'ble ITAT, the AO was todecide whether the buildings are plant or not after properappraisal of the facts and inspection of the buildings constructedand keeping in view the various judgments discussed in the order.From the facts as discussed above it is clear that the AO has notfollowed the directions of the Hon'ble ITAT. The appellantcompany had submitted that name and address of the unitswhere the buildings were constructed as also photographs of thebuildings. The appellant company also offered its assistance forinspecting the buildings at units. Therefore, the AO was notjustified in stating that the appellant did not furnish properinformation for inspecting the buildings. In view of the above, theAO is directed to comply with the directions of the Hon'ble ITAT ascontained in its order dated 22-11-01. The AO after inspecting thebuildings constructed and keeping in view the above directions ofthe Hon'ble ITAT should come to a finding whether the buildingsare plant or not and accordingly allow the depreciation on thesame.” Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders dated 29.04.2004, therevenue preferred respective appeals which have been dismissed bythe ITAT alongwith other appeals in its common order dated20.02.2007. The relevant part of the said order dated 20.02.2007reads as under:- “ITA NO.372 to 375/JU/2004(A.Y.1979-80 to 1981-82 & 1992-93) 7. Following solitary effective common ground has beenraised by the Revenue in these appeals: “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case,the ld. CIT(A) has erred in directing the Assessing Officerto decide the matter afresh after inspecting the building toascertain whether it is forming part of plant ignoring thematerial and other facts brought on record by the [ 7 ] Assessing Officer.” 8.Briefly stated, the facts of this ground are that theassessee claimed building to be eligible for higher depreciation. Inthe absence of the assessee having assisted properly byfurnishing necessary details, the Assessing Officer came to holdthat higher rate of depreciation was not eligible. The ld. CIT(A)directed the Assessing Officer to decide the matter afresh afterinspecting the building to ascertain whether or not it is formingpart of plant. “On the facts and in the circumstances of the case,the ld. CIT(A) has erred in directing the Assessing Officerto decide the matter afresh after inspecting the building toascertain whether it is forming part of plant ignoring thematerial and other facts brought on record by the [ 7 ] Assessing Officer.” 8.Briefly stated, the facts of this ground are that theassessee claimed building to be eligible for higher depreciation. Inthe absence of the assessee having assisted properly byfurnishing necessary details, the Assessing Officer came to holdthat higher rate of depreciation was not eligible. The ld. CIT(A)directed the Assessing Officer to decide the matter afresh afterinspecting the building to ascertain whether or not it is formingpart of plant. 9.Having heard the rival submissions and perused therelevant material on record, we find that the ld. CIT(A) has notdecided the issue in assessee's favour. Rather, the matter hasbeen restored to the Assessing Officer for deciding it afresh. TheHon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Prem AgenciesVs. CIT [1988] 173 ITR 110 [Raj.] has held that no infirmity can betraced in the restoration of the matter to the lower authorities. Weobserve that the ld. CIT(A) has given a simple direction that theAssessing Officer should make inspection of the buildingconstructed and then decide as to whether it should beconsidered as plant. In our considered opinion, there is no causeof grievance at the Revenue's end because the issue is open atlarge before the departmental authorities. We are, therefore, notinclined to disturb the finding of the first appellate authority on thiscount. 10.Similar ground raised on similar facts and finding of the ld.CIT(A) has been assailed by the Revenue in the other years.Both the sides are in agreement that the facts and circumstancesof this ground are mutatis mutandis similar to all the other years.We, therefore, uphold the impugned order as it is not sufferingfrom any infirmity.” As noticed above, the first three appeals herein (ITANos.139/2007, 35/2008 and 31/2008) have been filed against theaforesaid common order dated 20.02.2007 whereby the ITAT hasaffirmed the order passed by CIT(A) on 29.04.2004 whileessentially contending that the CIT(A) had no authority to remand thematter to the AO after the amendment to Section 251 (1) (a) of theAct of 1961 with effect from 01.06.2001 taking away his powers ofremand. For completion of background aspects, it could be noticed thatas against the order dated 29.04.2004, the revenue made the respective rectification applications under Section 154 of the Act of1961 before the CIT(A) who proceeded to reject the same by thecommon order dated 12.08.2004. The appeals preferred against thisorder dated 12.08.2004 were dismissed by ITAT by the commonorder of even date i.e., 20.02.2007. The next three appeals herein(ITA Nos.117/2008, 70/2008 and 142/2008) relate to this otherorder dated 20.02.2007. Coming to the matters concerning rectification applicationslater, appropriate it shall be to take up for consideration at the firstthe three appeals (ITA Nos.139/2007, 35/2008, 31/2008) arising outof the basic similar nature orders dated 29.04.2004 as passed by theCIT(A) in the respective appeals filed on 22.04.2003. Similar naturesubstantial question of law as formulated in these three appealsrelating to the assessment years 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1981-82respectively reads as under:- “Whether the learned Commissioner had the power to send thematter back to the Assessing Officer to decide the matter afreshin view of the amendment made in Section 251 (1) (a) takingaway such power, which was made with effect from 1.6.2001,while the appeal in the present case before the learnedCommissioner was filed on 22.04.2003?” “Whether the learned Commissioner had the power to send thematter back to the Assessing Officer to decide the matter afreshin view of the amendment made in Section 251 (1) (a) takingaway such power, which was made with effect from 1.6.2001,while the appeal in the present case before the learnedCommissioner was filed on 22.04.2003?” The learned counsel for the appellant has questioned theorders impugned essentially with the submission that for the appealsfiled on 22.04.2003 i.e., after amendment to Section 251 (1) (a), theCIT(A) was having no power or authority to remand the matter to theAO. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent assesse hasreferred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.Shanmugavel Nadar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.: (2003) 263ITR 658 to submit that the orders earlier passed by the AO mergedin the orders passed by the ITAT on 22.11.2001 and 23.11.2001.According to the learned counsel, the AO was, thereafter, dutybound to carry out the compliance of the directions of the ITAT and ifhe failed to do so, the CIT(A) cannot be faulted at directing him tocarry out the compliance of the order of ITAT that had become final.The learned counsel also referred to the decision in the case ofUnion of India Vs. Umesh Dhaimode: (2002) 176 CTR (SC) 97 tosubmit that the appellate authority has power to annul the order andthe order of remand necessarily annuls the decision which is underappeal. The learned counsel yet further referred to the decision ofthe Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Commissioner ofCentral Excise, Ahmedabad-I Vs. Medico Labs.: 2004 (173)E.L.T.117 (Guj.) to submit that in relation to Section 35A of theCentral Excise Act, 1944, similar nature amendment was made bythe Finance Act, 2001 in regard to the powers of Commissioner(Appeals); and the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, with reference to thedecision in Umesh Dhaimode (supra), held that even afteramendment, such powers of remand have not been taken awayspecifically. The relevant provision i.e., Section 251(1) (a) of the Act of 1961 reads as under:- “251. Powers of the Commissioner (Appeals) (1)In disposing of an appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) shall havethe following powers-the following powers- [ 10 ] (a) in an appeal against an order of assessment, he may confirm,reduce, enhance or annul the assessment;” Noticeable it is that earlier, there existed an expression aftersemicolon in the above-quoted clause (a), which conferred otherpowers on the Commissioner (Appeals); and which was deleted bythe Finance Act, 2001 with effect from 01.06.2001. The saiddeleted portion as occurring in clause (a) after semicolon was asunder:- “or he may set aside the assessment and refer the case back tothe Assessing Officer for making a fresh assessment inaccordance with the directions given by the Commissioner(Appeals) and after making such further inquiry as may benecessary, and the Assessing Officer shall thereupon proceed tomake such fresh assessment and determine, where necessary,the amount of tax payable on the basis of such freshassessment;” The only question is whether for such deletion of the aforesaid wordings in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 251, the CIT (A)was not justified in restoring the matter to the file of AO in thepresent cases. Taking into comprehension the factual scenario andparticularly the background aspects, it is, at once, clear that the CIT(A) in his impugned orders dated 29.04.2004 has not passed anorder as if he was setting aside the order of assessment andreferring the matter back to the AO for making fresh assessment inaccordance with his directions. The fact of the matter had been thatthe order as passed by the AO earlier had already been subjected toappeal before the CIT(A) and then before the ITAT. As noticed, theITAT in its orders dated 22.11.2001 and 23.11.2001 restored the [ 11 ] wordings in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 251, the CIT (A)was not justified in restoring the matter to the file of AO in thepresent cases. Taking into comprehension the factual scenario andparticularly the background aspects, it is, at once, clear that the CIT(A) in his impugned orders dated 29.04.2004 has not passed anorder as if he was setting aside the order of assessment andreferring the matter back to the AO for making fresh assessment inaccordance with his directions. The fact of the matter had been thatthe order as passed by the AO earlier had already been subjected toappeal before the CIT(A) and then before the ITAT. As noticed, theITAT in its orders dated 22.11.2001 and 23.11.2001 restored the [ 11 ] question of claim of higher depreciation to the file of AO for decisionafresh after inspection of the building. In the orders dated29.04.2004, the CIT(A) found that such directions of ITAT had notbeen complied with. The directions of ITAT were in any caserequired to be complied with by the AO. The CIT(A), in fact, haddone nothing more than issuing directions for implementation of theorder of the ITAT. In this position, when the CIT(A) was hearing theappeal against an order of assessment passed after the directions ofITAT, his power to annul the assessment order if found contrary tothe ITAT's directions and directing the AO to carry out therequirements of the order of ITAT cannot be denied. In the case of Umesh Dhaimode (supra) in relation to theappeal under the Customs Act, 1962, the Hon'ble Supreme Courthas observed as under:- “The then Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman and Diu, took theview that s.128(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, as it then read, didnot vest the appellate authority with the power to remand.Accordingly, he set aside such order and the Revenue is inappeal. 2. As the order under appeal itself notes, the aforesaid provisionvested the appellate authority with powers to pass such order asit deemed fit confirming, modifying or annulling the decisionappealed against. An order of remand necessarily annuls thedecision which is under appeal before the appellate authority.The appellate authority is also invested with the power to passsuch order as it deems fit. Both these portions of the aforesaidprovision, read together, necessarily imply that the appellateauthority has the power to set aside the decision which is underappeal before it and to remand the matter to the authority belowfor fresh decision.” Even if the amendment in the aforesaid clause (a) of Section 251 (1) has been made so as to provide that the Commissioner ( Appeals) may not set aside the assessment and refer the case [ 12 ] back to the AO for making fresh assessment with a view to helpbringing an early finalisation of the assessment, it cannot beassumed that the CIT(A) is divested of the power to annul theassessment and then to pass appropriate consequential order. This apart, in the present case, as observed hereinbefore,the factual aspect has been that the order as passed by the AO,which was subject of appeal before the CIT(A), was not an originalorder of assessment but was an order of assessment passed afterremand by the ITAT. The directions in remand order having notbeen complied with, the course as adopted by the CIT(A) cannot besaid to be dehors the powers available to him under the statute. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present cases,we are clearly of the view that even if the appeal had been filed afteramendment to Section 251(1) (a) of the Act of 1961, the order aspassed by the CIT(A) directing the AO to decide the matter inaccordance with the directions of the ITAT cannot be said to beunauthorised. These first three appeals (ITA Nos.139/2007, 35/2008and 31/2008) deserve to be dismissed. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present cases,we are clearly of the view that even if the appeal had been filed afteramendment to Section 251(1) (a) of the Act of 1961, the order aspassed by the CIT(A) directing the AO to decide the matter inaccordance with the directions of the ITAT cannot be said to beunauthorised. These first three appeals (ITA Nos.139/2007, 35/2008and 31/2008) deserve to be dismissed. In view of what has been discussed and held hereinabove, theissues raised in other three appeals (ITA Nos. 117/2008, 70/2008and 142/2008) are rendered rather academic. There being noillegality or infirmity in the principal order dated 29.04.2004, the CIT(A) was justified in rejecting the rectification applications by thecommon order dated 12.08.2004; and the ITAT was also justified in dismissing the appeals filed by the revenue by the other commonorder dated 20.02.2007. The ITAT, in fact, decided four appealstogether, three of them relating to the present appeals and anotherone relating to the assessment year 1992-93 with a short commonorder that is reproduced in extenso as under:- “This is a bunch of four appeals, which have been filed by theRevenue in relation to Assessment Years 1979-80, 1980-81,1981-82 and 1992-93. For three assessment years, viz., 1979-80to 1981-82, there is a common appellate order, which is dated12.08.2004. For A.Y.1992-93, there is separate appellate orderdated 04.08.2004. In all these appeals, however, exactly identicalissue is involved. Therefore, for the sake of convenience andbrevity, we are deciding them all by a common order. 2.The relevant facts are that the ld. CIT(A) set aside theissue of depreciation on building, forming part of plant andmachinery, by giving a direction to Assessing Officer as per thedirections of the Hon'ble ITAT, to decide whether the buildings inquestion are plant or not after proper appraisal of facts andinspection of the buildings constructed, in view of the variousjudgments discussed in the order. This order of the Tribunal isdated 22.11.2001. Section 251(1)(a) came into effect from01.06.2001, according to this amended provision, the power of theld. CIT (A) to set aside the assessment and refer the case back tothe Assessing Officer for making a fresh assessment inaccordance with his directions, has been withdrawn. In view ofthese amended provisions the ld. ACIT, Circle-2, Udaipur filedpetition u/s 154 of the Act to rectify the order by calling the orderback. The ld. CIT(A), however, rejected the application so filed u/s154, by observing that the specific directions given by him are inconsonance and in compliance with the direction of the Hon'bleITAT so his order was very well within the four-corners of law, andthese directions could not be considered as simple set aside ofthe issues or that of the assessment order. This finding of the ld.CIT (A), is the subject-matter of all these four appeals. The factsand issues involved in all these appeals are, mutatis-mutandis,identical. 3.We have heard the rival submissions and perused theevidence available on record. 4.The department has raised similar plea as was raisedbefore the ld. CIT (A). The subject matter of all the above appealis exactly similar. Having gone through the orders of the CIT (A),the applications u/s 154 so filed, the provisions of section 250 asamended upto date and the ITAT order referred to in this regard,we are of the considered opinion that the ld. CIT(A) has given hisdirection in compliance of the order of Hon'ble ITAT. The ld. CIT(A) is perfectly correct when he says that this set aside is not a [ 14 ] 3.We have heard the rival submissions and perused theevidence available on record. 4.The department has raised similar plea as was raisedbefore the ld. CIT (A). The subject matter of all the above appealis exactly similar. Having gone through the orders of the CIT (A),the applications u/s 154 so filed, the provisions of section 250 asamended upto date and the ITAT order referred to in this regard,we are of the considered opinion that the ld. CIT(A) has given hisdirection in compliance of the order of Hon'ble ITAT. The ld. CIT(A) is perfectly correct when he says that this set aside is not a [ 14 ] simplicitor set-aside as has been envisaged by the amendedprovisions of section 251(1) (a) of the Act. We are totally inagreement with the ld. CIT(A), who has done nothing more thangetting the order of the Tribunal implemented in its letters andspirit. This is not a simple set aside, which is barred now.Therefore, we confirm the finding of the ld. CIT(A), for all the fouryears. The grounds taken in all these years, thus, have to fail.This order was pronounced in the open Court, at the end of thehearing. 4.In the result, all the appeals of the Revenue forAssessment Years 1979-80 to 1981-82 and 1992-93, standdismissed.” We may observe that these three appeals arising out of theaforesaid order of the ITAT, whereby the order passed by the CIT(A)on 12.08.2004 in rejection of the rectification application wasaffirmed (ITA Nos. 70/2008, 117/2008 and 142/2008), have beenadmitted on the lines of the other three appeals and whileformulating similar nature substantial question of law with change of date of filing of appeal as under:- “Whether the learned Commissioner had the power to send thematter back to the Assessing Officer to decide the matter afreshin view of the amendment made in Section 251 (1) (a) takingaway such power, which was made with effect from 1.6.2001,while the appeal in the present case before the learnedCommissioner was filed on 29.4.2004?” There appears to be an obvious error in the questionabovementioned because none of the appeals in question was filedbefore the CIT(A) on “29.04.2004” . In fact, this date i.e., 29.04.2004has been date of the basic order passed by the CIT(A), as noticedand discussed hereinbefore. Be that as it may, the core question asto whether the CIT(A) was right in passing the order dated29.04.2004 has already been answered against the revenue. As a mk [ 15 ] necessary consequence, it follows that the CIT(A) has rightlyrejected the rectification applications and the ITAT has rightlydismissed the appeals relating thereto. Hence, these appeals alsodeserve to be dismissed. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, all these appeals failand are dismissed. No costs (C.M.TOTLA), J.(DINESH MAHESHWARI), J.