Commissioner Of Income Taxtiruchirapalli v. M/S.muthuramalingam Modern Rice Mill305/5 Main Roadmelakasankudynedungadi Communekaraikal 609 603

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED: 20.02.2019 CORAM THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE VINEET KOTHARIANDTHE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE C.V.KARTHIKEYANTax Case Appeal Nos. 51 to 55 of 2009 Commissioner of Income TaxTiruchirapalli.... Appellant in all T.C.A.'s ..Vs.. M/s.Muthuramalingam Modern Rice Mill305/5 Main RoadMelakasankudyNedungadi CommuneKaraikal 609 603. ... Respondent in all T.C.A.'s Tax Case Appeals filed under Section 260A of the Income TaxAct, 1961 against the order of the Income Tax AppellateTribunal, Madras 'C' Bench, Chennai, dated 18.07.2008 made inI.T.A.Nos.2437 to 2441/Mds/2007 as against the order of theCommissioner of Income Tax Appeals, No.4, Williams Road,Cantonment, Tiruchirappalli-01, dated 27/06/2007 in ITA Nos.648to 652/06-07 dated 27/06/2017 against the order of the IncomeTax Department, Income Tax Officer, Ward I (1), Nagapattinamdated 29/12/2006 in PAN/GIR No.435-M respectively for theAssessment Year 1999-2000, 2000-01, 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04 inTCA Nos.51 to 55 of 2009. For Appellant : Mr.M.Swaminathan(in all T.C.A.'s) Senior Standing counsel Assisted by Ms.V.Pushpa Ms.Premalatha For Respondent : Mr.A.S.Sriraman(in all T.C.A.'s) for Mr.S.Sridhar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ C O M M O N J U D G M E N T (Delivered by DR.VINEET KOTHARI,J) The Revenue has filed these appeals under Section 260A ofthe Income Tax Act, 1961, (for short “the Act”) aggrieved by theorder dated 18.07.2008 passed by the learned Income TaxAppellate Tribunal (for short “the Appellate Tribunal”) for theassessment years 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003 and2003-2004. The learned Appellate Tribunal allowed the appealsof the Assessee and held that it is entitled to deduction underSection 80IA/80IB of the Act for the aforesaid assessmentyears. 2. The said provisions of the Act allowed a deduction oftotal income in case of Assessee being an industrial undertakingor enterprise engaged in infrastructure development, etc. anddeduction in respect of profits and gains from certainindustrial undertakings other than infrastructure developmentundertakings, also. 3. The crux of the matter and the substantial question oflaw raised in the present appeals filed by the Revenue is:"Whether in the facts and incircumstances of the case, the IncomeTax Appellate Tribunal was right inholding that conversion of Paddy intoRice is a manufacturing activity andtherefore, the Assessee is entitled todeduction u/s 80 IA/IB of the Act inrespect of the profit from suchactivity or not?" 4. The requirement stipulated in the said provision is thatthe Industrial undertaking should fulfil inter alia thefollowing condition: "It manufactures or produces any article or thing, not being any articleor thing specified in the list in theEleventh Schedule, or operates one ormore cold storage plant or plaints, inany part of India" (Section-80-IA) 5. Admittedly, the process of dehusking of Paddy, andconversion into Rice with the help of labour and machinesundertaken by the Assessee does not fall in the negativeEleventh Schedule, to the Act, but the question raised by theRevenue before this Court is that the process of dehusking of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Paddy for obtaining Rice does not amount to 'Manufacture' andtherefore, the Asseseee was not entitled to the said benefitunder Section 80 IA/IB of the Act during the aforesaid relevantAssessment Years. 6. Mr.M.Swaminathan, learned counsel for the Revenue reliedupon the following Judgments to support his aforesaidcontentions. 5. Admittedly, the process of dehusking of Paddy, andconversion into Rice with the help of labour and machinesundertaken by the Assessee does not fall in the negativeEleventh Schedule, to the Act, but the question raised by theRevenue before this Court is that the process of dehusking of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Paddy for obtaining Rice does not amount to 'Manufacture' andtherefore, the Asseseee was not entitled to the said benefitunder Section 80 IA/IB of the Act during the aforesaid relevantAssessment Years. 6. Mr.M.Swaminathan, learned counsel for the Revenue reliedupon the following Judgments to support his aforesaidcontentions. (i) Firstly he relied upon the Judgment of CESTAT, RegionalBench Chandigarh in the case of Dunar Foods Limited Vs.,Commissioner of Central Excise, Panchkula [2017 (346) 612 (Tri-Chan.)] wherein the learned CESTAT held that conversion of Paddyinto Rice did not amount to 'Manufacture' and therefore, theAssesee raised an objection by stating that dehusking of Paddywas not excisable goods. The learned Tribunal relied upon thedecision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofCommissioner of Income Tax Vs. Cynamid India Limited [CivilAppeal Nos.4403 and 4404 of 1996] with regard to the same forholding so in favour of the Assessee. Paragraphs 29 to 31 of thesaid order of the learned Tribunal are quoted below for readyreference. "29. Therefore, the decision in thecase of M/s.Cynamid India Ltd., isapplicable to the facts of this casewherein the Apex Court has observed asunder: "5. The High Court has answered thequestion in favour of the assessee andagainst the Revenue. Having referred tothedefinitionof`agriculturalproduct' in Black's Law Dictionary, theHigh Court has held that the operationof de-husking Paddy is not anindustrial or manufacturing operationascommonlyunderstood;itisessentially an agricultural operationand such changes as are brought aboutin the product are an outcome ofagricultural operation; Both Rice andhusk remain in their natural form as aresult of de-husking and are covered bythe term `agricultural product'. 5. The High Court has also formedan opinion that Section 35C of theIncome- tax Act, 1961 was designed toencourage development of agricultureand therefore gave a weighted deductionin respect of expenditure incurred in providingtotheagriculturistsservices and facilities specifiedthrein. The term `agricultural product'or `product of agriculture' is requiredto be constured liberally so as toinclude not merely the primary productas it actually grows, but also aproduct which undergoes a simpleoperation so as to make it moreSaleable or more useable. The Rice andthe husk though separated remain asthey were produced and hence continueto be `agricultural product' or`product of agriculture'. 30. As the Hon'ble Apex Court hasheld that conversion of Paddy into Riceis not a distinct operation and theRice and husk remain in their naturalform as a result of dehusking and arecovered by the term ' agriculturalproduct'. 31.Therefore, we hold that thetest of manufacture has been failed asthe goods are not manufactured goods asper Section 2 (f) of Central ExciseAct, accordingly the question ofexcisabilitydoesnotarise.Therefore, the Issue No. 1 is answeredin favour of the appellants." 7. The learned counsel further brought to the notice of theCourt that the SLP filed against the said order of CESTAT wasdismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 03.04.2017 in CivilAppeal No.D5237 of 2017 reported in [2017 (354) E.L.T. A57(S.C.)] . 8. Mr.M.Swaminathan, the learned counsel for theAppellant/Revenue also relied on the decision of the KarnatakaHigh Court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Vs. B.RaghuramaShetty & others [1975 43 CCH 0053 (Kar)], wherein, the DivisionBench of Karnataka High Court, in paragraphs 7 and 12 of theJudgment, held as follows: 7. The learned counsel further brought to the notice of theCourt that the SLP filed against the said order of CESTAT wasdismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 03.04.2017 in CivilAppeal No.D5237 of 2017 reported in [2017 (354) E.L.T. A57(S.C.)] . 8. Mr.M.Swaminathan, the learned counsel for theAppellant/Revenue also relied on the decision of the KarnatakaHigh Court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Vs. B.RaghuramaShetty & others [1975 43 CCH 0053 (Kar)], wherein, the DivisionBench of Karnataka High Court, in paragraphs 7 and 12 of theJudgment, held as follows: "7. .... The mere bestowal of labour on an article, even if appliedthrough machinery, will not make anarticle manufactured goods, unless thetreatment has progressed so far thattransformation ensues and an article https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ different from the original product isbrought into existence. When skin of aplantain is peeled before eating, canit be said that the peeled plantainfruit is a manufactured article ? Nonew substance which was not existinghas been brought into existence.Similarly, if an orange is peeled andthe fruit is taken out, no new articleis brought into existence and the fruittaken out cannot be said to be amanufactured product. Rice is fashionedby nature in the form of Paddy andobtaining of Rice is a mere liberationof the natural product. In getting theRiceimbeddedinPaddynotransformation takes place and nomanufactured article is got. ""12.As Paddy does not suffer anytransformation and a new and differentarticle does not emerge when it ismilled or hulled, the process ofmilling or hulling cannot be called aprocess of manufacture and Rice cannotbe called as a manufactured article.The use of the expression "convert" inobtaining Rice from Paddy is itself, inour opinion, inappropriate and inaccurate, because, by removing the huskby whatever process it may be, onething is not converted into anotherthing. There is, therefore, noconsumption of Paddy in the manufactureof other goods for sale or otherwise.The view taken by the Tribunal in thisbehalf must, therefore, be upheld. " The Court, therefore, concluded that the respondentswere not liable to pay tax on the purchase turnover of the Paddymilled in their Mills either on the ground that they hadconsumed Paddy in the 'manufacture of other goods for sale orotherwise' or 'disposed of such goods in any manner other thanby way of sale in the State'. 9. The learned counsel for the Revenue thus submitted thatthe assessee was not engaged in any manufacturing activity andtherefore, he is not entitled to the benefit under Section 80IA/80 IB of the Act. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The Court, therefore, concluded that the respondentswere not liable to pay tax on the purchase turnover of the Paddymilled in their Mills either on the ground that they hadconsumed Paddy in the 'manufacture of other goods for sale orotherwise' or 'disposed of such goods in any manner other thanby way of sale in the State'. 9. The learned counsel for the Revenue thus submitted thatthe assessee was not engaged in any manufacturing activity andtherefore, he is not entitled to the benefit under Section 80IA/80 IB of the Act. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the AssesseeMr.A.S.Sriraman, urged before us that the provisions of 80 IA/80IB of the Act are not restricted to the word of 'Manufacture'but it employs the words “Manufacture or production”. Hesubmitted that the word "production" is wider in ambit and scopeand it has a wider connotation than the word "manufacture" andif any different commercial article comes into existence by theprocess of industrial activity undertaken by the Assessee, thenthe Assessee would be entitled to such benefit under Section 80IA/80 IB of the Act. He also submitted that even dehusking ofPaddy with the help of labour and machinery brings intoexistence, a different commercial article and one could not eatthe Paddy as such in the place of Rice, without dehusking thesame. Therefore, as soon as a different commercial article isbrought into existence, the same falls in the definition“Manufacture”. He drew the attention of this Court to thedefinition of the word “Manufacture” as inserted in the Act bythe Finance (No.2) Act, 1998, with effect from 01.04.2009,which reads as under: '(29BA) "manufacture" with itsgrammatical variations means a changein a non-living physical object orarticle or thing,- (a) resulting in transformation ofthe object or article or thing into anew and distinct object or article orthing having a different name,character and use; or(b) bringing into existence of anew and distinct object or article orthing with a different chemicalcomposition or integral structure;] 11. The learned counsel for the Assessee also reliedupon the following Judgments to support his contentions. 12. Firstly, he relied upon the decision of GaneshTrading Company Vs. State of Haryana (1974 3 SCC 620), wherein,the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the same question as towhether the Paddy and Rice can be considered as identical goodsfor the imposition of sales tax. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of the saidJudgment are quoted for ready reference."2. The only question that arisesfor decision in these appeals iswhether Paddy and Rice can beconsidered as identical goods for thepurpose of imposition of "sales tax".Under the concerned Sales Tax Actexemption from payment of sales tax isprovided if the very Paddy in respect https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 11. The learned counsel for the Assessee also reliedupon the following Judgments to support his contentions. 12. Firstly, he relied upon the decision of GaneshTrading Company Vs. State of Haryana (1974 3 SCC 620), wherein,the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the same question as towhether the Paddy and Rice can be considered as identical goodsfor the imposition of sales tax. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of the saidJudgment are quoted for ready reference."2. The only question that arisesfor decision in these appeals iswhether Paddy and Rice can beconsidered as identical goods for thepurpose of imposition of "sales tax".Under the concerned Sales Tax Actexemption from payment of sales tax isprovided if the very Paddy in respect https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of which purchase tax was levied wassold and not if that Paddy is convertedinto Rice and sold. It is contended onbehalf of the appellants that Paddy andRiceareidenticalgoodsand,therefore, when the law grants anexemption in respect of Paddy, thatexemption is also available totransactions relating to Rice. Theargument proceeded on the basis thatRice was nothing but dehusked Paddy.Both Rice and Paddy are identicalgoods. When Paddy was dehusked, thereis no change in the identity of thegoods. 3. In support of their contention,the appellants cited to us certaindictionary meanings of the word "Paddy"to show that Rice is nothing butdehusked Paddy. This Court has firmlyruled that in finding out the truemeaning of the entries mentioned in aSales Tax Act, what is relevant is notthe dictionary meaning, but how thoseentries are under stood in commonparlance, specially in commercialcircles. Sales tax primarily deals withdealers who are engaged in commercialactivity. Therefore, what is of theessence is to find out whether incommercial circles, Paddy is consideredas identical with Rice. In thisconnection reference may be usefullymade to the decision of this Court inRamavatar Budhaiprasad v. AssistantSales Tax Officer, Akola ., whereinthis Court was called upon to considerwhetherbetelleavescouldbeconsidered as vegetables. Dictionarymeaning showed that betel leaves are aclass of vegetables, but yet this Courtruled that the word "vegetable" shouldbe construed in its popular sense,meaning that sense which peopleconversant with the subject-matter withwhich the statute is dealing, wouldattribute to it. On that basis thisCourt came to the conclusion that betelleaves could not be considered as vegetables. In Commissioner of SalesTax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore v. JaswantSingh Charan Singh ., this Court heldthattheword"coal"included"charcoal" on the ground that inordinary parlance "coal" includes"charcoal". In State of Punjab v.Chandu Lal Kishori Lal [1970] 25 S.T.C.52 (S.C.); ., the question was whether"cotton" included "cotton seeds". ThisCourt held that they were two distinctcommercial goods though before theseeds were separated both the cottonand the seeds were part of onecommodity. 4. In support of their contentionthat the meaning given in thecommercial circles is not of theessence and what is of essence is theidentity of the goods, the learnedCounsel for the appellants relied onthe decision of this Court in Stale ofMadhya Bharat (now State of MadhyaPradesh) v. Hiralal [1966] 17 S.T.C.313 (S.C.). There the relevant entryread "iron and steel". The question waswhether when a dealer purchased scrapiron locally and imported iron platesfrom outside and after converting theminto bars, flats and plates in hismills, sold them in the market, theycontinued to be "iron and steel". ThisCourt ruled that in spite of the changeeffected because of the process thegoods had undergone, the goods sold inthe market did not cease to be "ironand steel". We do not think that thisdecision is of any assistance to theappellants because both the goodspurchased as well as sold were "ironand steel". 5. It was contended on behalf ofthe appellants that the essentialquestion that we have to decide iswhether the goods sold differed inidentity from the goods purchased. Itwas urged that merely because Paddy wasdehusked and Rice produced, there wasno change in the identity of the goods. Identity of goods is one of theessential elements to be borne in mindin deciding the nature of thetransaction. It was so decided inTungabhadraIndustriesLtd.v.Commercial Tax Officer, Kurnool [1960]11 S.T.C. 827 (S.C.) : . In that casethe question arising for decision waswhether hydrogenated oil continued tobe groundnut oil. This Court held thatthehydrogenatedgroundnutoilcontinued to be groundnut oil. Inarriving at that conclusion this Courttook into consideration that theessential nature of the goods had notchanged after the groundnut oil hadbeen subjected to chemical process.Similar view was taken by this Court inState of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers[1967] 19 S.T.C. 24 (S.C). Therein thequestion whether patasa, harda andalchidana could be considered as"sugar". This Court held that whensugar was processed into patasa, hardaand alchidana, it did not change itsessential characteristic. Its identitycontinued to be the same. Now, thequestion for our decision is whether itcould be said that when Paddy wasdehusked and Rice produced, itsidentity remained. It was true thatRice was produced out of Paddy but itis not true to say that Paddy continuedto be Paddy even after dehusking. Ithad changed its identity. Rice is notknown as Paddy. It is a misnomer tocall Rice as Paddy. They are twodifferent things in ordinary parlance.Hence quite clearly when Paddy isdehusked and Rice produced, there hasbeen a change in the identity of thegoods. In this view it is not necessaryfor us to refer to the decisions ofsome of the High Courts read to us atthe time of hearing. " 13. He further relied upon the decision of the Hon'bleSupreme Court in Income Tax Officer Vs. Arihant Tiles & MarblesP Ltd.,[2010 320 ITR 79 (SC)], wherein a three Judge Bench ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of Section https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 13. He further relied upon the decision of the Hon'bleSupreme Court in Income Tax Officer Vs. Arihant Tiles & MarblesP Ltd.,[2010 320 ITR 79 (SC)], wherein a three Judge Bench ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of Section https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 80-IA itself and dealt with the activity of the conversion ofmarble blocks into slabs and tiles. While holding that theprocess undertaken by the Assessee, to be eligible for suchdeduction, the Supreme Court relied upon its earlier views inthe case of CIT Vs. Sesa Goa Ltd., [ (2004) 271 ITR 331 SC] andalso CIT Vs.N.C.Budharaja and Company and another [1993 114 CTR(SC) 420] and held that the word "production" is wider in ambitand it has a wider connotation than the word "manufacture". Itwas held that while every manufacture can constitute production,but every production need not amount to manufacture. The word"production", when used in juxtaposition with the word"manufacture", it mean bringing into existence new goods by aprocess which may or may not amount to manufacture. The word"production" takes in all the byproducts, intermediate productsand residual products which emerge in the course of manufactureof goods. The Court also relied upon all the earlier decisionin the case of Aman Marble Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. CCE 2003[(157) ELT 393 (SC)]. 14. On the consideration of case laws relied upon by boththe sides and the provisions of the Act itself, we are of theconsidered opinion that the benefit of Deduction under Section80IA/ and 80IB of the Act was intended to promote theindustrial activity in the field of infrastructural developmentand other sectors and those engaged, in the process ofmanufacture or production of articles or things not included inthe Eleventh schedule of the Act, were held entitled to availsuch deduction. 15. The words “manufacture” or “production” employed jointlyin the said provisions do not permit us to take a narrow orpedantic approach in the matter. On the other hand, apragmatic and purposive interpretation deserves to be put tothese words of wider connotations. 16. These words "Manufacture or production" cover withintheir ambit any activity by which, a different commercialarticle, having a different commercial value, is brought intoexistence by the process of 'Manufacture or Production'. Whenthe Paddy in the husk is converted into Rice by the process ofdehusking, by manual or mechanical process it cannot be said, byany stretch of imagination that there is no transformation ofarticle. A husked Paddy is not a de-husked Rice, and not onlythe form undergoes a change but also the value addition happensby such process. A different commercial article undoubtedlycomes into being. The industrial activity by employing men andmachine in the industrial undertaking of the Assessee is noteven doubted by the Revenue. It is also not in dispute that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Rice and Paddy are two different things, but the only contentionwhich the Revenue seeks to raise before us is that the saidprocess of dehusking is not covered by the terms "Manufacture".We cannot accept this submission for the simple reason thatwhile the investment in the Industry is made by the Assessee andcarrying of industrial activity is not disputed and the articlein question viz., husked Paddy and Rice are two differentarticles having different value, what can be the reason to denythem the benefit under Section 80 IA and 80 IB of the Act. Wesee no reason, much less any justifiable reason, for denial ofthe said benefit to the Assesee before us. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Rice and Paddy are two different things, but the only contentionwhich the Revenue seeks to raise before us is that the saidprocess of dehusking is not covered by the terms "Manufacture".We cannot accept this submission for the simple reason thatwhile the investment in the Industry is made by the Assessee andcarrying of industrial activity is not disputed and the articlein question viz., husked Paddy and Rice are two differentarticles having different value, what can be the reason to denythem the benefit under Section 80 IA and 80 IB of the Act. Wesee no reason, much less any justifiable reason, for denial ofthe said benefit to the Assesee before us. 17. We find that the definition of the word “Manufacture”though was not available in the Assessment Years before us upto2003-2004, but the said definition embodies the concept oftransformation of object or article into different commercialarticle as was discussed in several judicial pronouncements fromtime to time. If a different commercial article comes intoexistence as understood by the persons who deal with thosethings, a different approach need not be taken by the Courts oflaw to hold otherwise. The dehusked Paddy and Rice obviouslyare not sold on the same rate nor can they be consumed for samepurpose in the same form. Therefore, the process of dehuskingof Paddy into Rice with the aid of labour and machinery isdefinitely an industry activity undertaken by the Assessee. Thecases relied on by the learned counsel for the Revenue are notonly in different contexts but finally resulted in givingbenefit to the Assessee, depending upon the context of theconcerned enactment. Even in case before the CESTAT, in thecase of Dunar Foods Limited (supra) it was held that Rice andthe husk remain in the natural form and both of them continueto be covered by the term "agricultural product" as was held bythe Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s.Cynamid India Ltd.,(supra). In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thatthe conversion of Paddy into Rice is not a industrial operationand the Rice and husk remain in their natural form as a resultof dehusking and are covered by the term 'agricultural product'and therefore, the Assessee was entitled to the benefit underSection 35 of the Income Tax Act, which was designed fordevelopment of agricultural research specified thereunder.Similarly, the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court, in thecase of B.Raghurama Chetty case (supra) held that the saidprocess of dehusking and milling of Paddy did not bring aboutnew and different article and therefore, Paddy could not be saidto have been consumed in the process of manufacture of Rice andhence, it will not amount to violation of the provision ofSection 6 (1) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act and the Assesseewould not be liable to pay Additional Sale Tax. 18. Therefore, we are of the opinion that it would dependupon the context in which the words “Manufacture or production”have to be interpreted by the Court of law. In the presentcase, the context is whether the industrial activity in the formof dehusking of Paddy into Rice amounts to Industrialundertaking engaged in the ' Manufacture or production' of Riceor not. 19. In the said context, in view of the aforesaid cases, wefind no reason to hold that the activity of dehusking of Paddyinto Rice will not amount to "manufacture or production". Wedo not find justification to give a narrower meaning to theseterms, which, by themselves independently or jointly as employedin the said provisions of Section 80IA are wide enough to coverthe industrial activity undergone by the Assessee. 18. Therefore, we are of the opinion that it would dependupon the context in which the words “Manufacture or production”have to be interpreted by the Court of law. In the presentcase, the context is whether the industrial activity in the formof dehusking of Paddy into Rice amounts to Industrialundertaking engaged in the ' Manufacture or production' of Riceor not. 19. In the said context, in view of the aforesaid cases, wefind no reason to hold that the activity of dehusking of Paddyinto Rice will not amount to "manufacture or production". Wedo not find justification to give a narrower meaning to theseterms, which, by themselves independently or jointly as employedin the said provisions of Section 80IA are wide enough to coverthe industrial activity undergone by the Assessee. 20. We do not find any merit in the appeals filed by theRevenue and the same are accordingly dismissed and the, Questionof law framed, above is answered in favour of the Assessee andagainst the Revenue. As a sequel, the Assessee is entitled tothe benefit of deduction under Section 80 IA for the assessmentyear viz.,1999-2000 and Deduction under Section 80IB of theAct for remaining Assessment years i.e, 2001-2002, 2002-2003 and2003-2004. No order as to costs. Sd/- Assistant Registrar(CS IV) //True Copy// Sub Assistant Registrar arr To 1.Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras 'C' Bench, Chennai. 2.The Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals, No.4, Williams Road,Cantonment,Tiruchirappalli-01. 3.The Income Tax officer,The Income Tax Department,Ward I (1),Nagapattinam. +1cc to Mr.M.Swaminathan, Advocate Sr.15533 TCA Nos.51 to 55 of 2009spd[co]srg 01/04/2019