Crma/253/2019 Of The Income Tax Department, Rep. By Its Asst. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Panaji v. Dattaraj Vassudeva Salgaoncar

Meena IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOACRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO.253 OF 2019 IN STAMP NUMBER MAIN NO.1342 OF 2019 (FILING NO.) The Income Tax Department.....Applicant Represented by its Asst. Commissionerof Income Tax, Circle – 2(1), Panaji, 1[st] Floor,Aayakar Bhavan, EDC Complex, Patto,Panaji- Goa. v/s. Sri. Dattaraj Vassudeva Salgaoncar, Salgaoncar House, Dr. F.L. Gomes Road,Vasco-Da Gama,…..RespondentGoa. Ms. Amira Razaq, Standing Counsel for the Applicant. Mr. Vikram Nankani, Senior Advocate with Mr. R. Badlani, Mr.Sumeet Nankani and Mr. S. Nasnolkar, Advocate for theRespondent. CORAM:BHARAT P. DESHPANDE, J RESERVED ON:25[th] July, 2024. PRONOUNCED ON:12[th] August, 2024. O R D E R : 1.This is an application filed for condonation of delay in filing an application for special leave to appeal, is taken up forfinal disposal. 2.Heard Ms. Amira Razaq, learned Standing Counsel for theApplicant and Mr. Vikram Nankani, learned Senior Advocatewith Mr. R. Badlani, Mr. Sumeet Nankani and Mr. S. Nasnolkar,learned Counsel for the Respondent. 3.The Applicant is the Assistant Commissioner of IncomeTax, preferred present application for condonation of delay of480days in filing leave to appeal thereby challenging the orderdated 07/10/2017 passed by the learned Magistrate at Vasco indismissing the complaint in default and acquitting theApplicant/Accused. 4.Ms Razaq would submit that a complaint was lodgedbefore the learned Magistrate which was registered as CR CaseNo. AOA/415/INC-TAX/2017 for the offence punishable underSections 277 and 277A of the Income Tax Act against theRespondent/Accused. The process was issued against theAccused/Respondent and accordingly the matter was posted forhearing arguments. However, an order was passed on17/10/2017 by the learned Magistrate dismissing the saidcomplaint and acquitting the Accused since neither theComplainant nor Advocate for the Complainant appeared before the said Court. The learned Magistrate proceeded under Section256 of the CrPC while dismissing the complaint and acquittingthe Accused. 5.Ms Razaq would submit that the Applicant on a legaladvice and bonafidely believing that the revision ismaintainable, approach the learned Sessions Court by filing arevision and that too within limitation. The Respondentappeared and raised objections regarding maintainability of thesaid revision on the ground that since the Respondent wasacquitted the remedy available is only by filing appeal and not byrevision. 6.The learned Counsel appearing before the trial Court thenintimated the Department about the said objection and alsoopined that the appeal is required to be filled. Accordingly, thepapers were called out from the concern Advocate and thereafter decision was taken to file appeal before the Court howeversince there is a delay, an application is filed for condoning thedelay for filing an application for special leave to appeal. 7.Ms Razaq would submit that revision was filed within time and once it was observed that revision is not maintainable steps were taken to file an appeal along with the delay application andonly thereafter the revision file before the District Court waswithdrawn. She would submit that the reasons for delay aredisclosed in the application which are clearly disclosingsufficient cause and exercise of due diligence. She submits thatsome time was consumed for the purpose of processing of thefile and since the Applicant is the Department , the decision wasrequired to be taken by the competent authority for the purposeof filing an appeal and withdrawal of the revision. Theapplication is filed on affidavit of the concerned officer whichclearly goes to show that revision was filed with a bonafide beliefand on the instructions of the concerned Standing Counsel butsince the objections were raised, the matter was re-examinedand accordingly appeal is filed along with the presentapplication. 8.Ms Razaq would submit that there is no deliberate attempton the part of the Applicant to file the appeal after the period oflimitation however the circumstances were such that theApplicant was under the bonafide belief that the remedy againstimpugned order was before the Sessions Court by filing arevision. She submits that the Applicant is having a good case on merits and if a delay is not condoned the Applicant will notbe able to pursue the matter as the Complainant failed to appearbefore the learned Magistrate. 9.Ms Razaq placed reliance on the following decisions: Director of Income Tax (InternationalTaxation) v/s. Western Union FinancialServices Inc. [2023] 153 taxmann.com 704 (SC) 10.Per Contra, Mr Nankani would submit that the argumentraised are beyond pleadings and no provisions have been citedin the application. He submits that the application forcondonation of delay is filed in a casual manner, contains vaguestatements and nowhere discloses sufficient cause. He wouldfurther submits that the pleadings with regard to sufficientcause must be precise and give the relevant details which aremissing in the present application. 11.Mr Nankani would further submit that the order of theJMFC is dated 07/10/2017 whereas the revision was filed on15/11/2017. There is no statement in the entire application thatsuch revision was filed on a wrong advice. There are no details including the dates above the notes of the concerned Officer ofthe Department while processing the file. 12.Mr Nankani would submit that only because theRespondent raised objection to the tenability of revision wouldnot in any manner give any opportunity to the Applicant torethink about the maintainability of such proceeding. He wouldsubmit that when there is a statutory bar on filing any revisionagainst order of acquittal pursuing such remedy would not inany manner give any reason for the Applicant to seek forcondonation of delay. He submitted that when the remedy ofrevision was itself barred by statute and more particularlySection 401 (4) of CrPC the contention of the Applicant that hewas bonafidely pursuing such remedy is itself not tenable. 13.Mr Nankani would submit that the reasons that theApplicant was waiting for the records is again a lame excuse asthe entire record was with the Standing Counsel and inordinatedelay of 5 months for submitting such record and thereafterconsuming time of 2 months without any explanation cannot beconstrued sufficient cause. He submits that the applicationalong with the appeal was presented before this Court on 01/04/2019 and there is absolutely no sufficient cause tocondone such delay. He would submit that in criminal mattersthe Applicant ought to have shown seriousness in contesting thematter so also filing of the proceeding in case of adverse orders.He submits that a valuable right accrued in favour of theRespondent who was acquitted by the learned Magistrate andtherefore such valuable right cannot be taken away lightly andcasually. 14.Mr Nankani would submit that mere filing of the revisionbefore the District Court is not a good ground as ignorance oflaw cannot be an excuse. Besides he would submit that there areno pleadings about wrong advice given by the Standing Counselfor the purpose of filing a revision. 15.Mr Nankani placed reliance on the following decisions: Set I Maqbul Ahmad vs Onkar Pratap Narain Singh , State of Maharashtra v. Vithu Kalya Govari [2008(6) Mah. LJ 239], Lanka Venkateshwarlu vs State ofAndhra Pradesh & Ors. [(2011) 4 SCC 363], Postmaster 14.Mr Nankani would submit that mere filing of the revisionbefore the District Court is not a good ground as ignorance oflaw cannot be an excuse. Besides he would submit that there areno pleadings about wrong advice given by the Standing Counselfor the purpose of filing a revision. 15.Mr Nankani placed reliance on the following decisions: Set I Maqbul Ahmad vs Onkar Pratap Narain Singh , State of Maharashtra v. Vithu Kalya Govari [2008(6) Mah. LJ 239], Lanka Venkateshwarlu vs State ofAndhra Pradesh & Ors. [(2011) 4 SCC 363], Postmaster General and Ors. vs Living Media India Ltd and Anr[(2012) 3 SCC 563], Amalendu Kumar Bera and Ors. vsState of West Bengal [(2013) 4 SCC 52], Basawaraj & Anr.Vs Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81],Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer ](2013) 10 SCC 765], Chandrakant v. State of Maharashtra[2014 SCC OnLine Bom 367], Brijesh Kumar & Ors. vsState of Haryana & Ors. [(2014) 11 SCC 351], Addl.Commr. of Sales Tax v. Kayani Bakery [2016 SCC OnLineBom 5121], State of Maharashtra v. Jasodabai [2017 SCCOnline Bom 6528], State of MP and Anr. vs ChaitramMaywade [(2020) 10 SCC 667], Govt of Maharashtra vsBorse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt Ltd[(2021) 6 SCC 460], Lingeswaran v. Thirunagalingam[2022 SCC OnLine SC 2233] and Pathapati Subba Reddy vsLAO [2024 SCC OnLine SC 513]. Set II Ketan V. Parekh v. Enforcement Directorate (2011) 15SCC 30, Bharat Electronics Ltd. v. IBEX IntegratedBusiness Express (P) Ltd. 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2776, Deena v. Bharat Singh (2002) 6 SCC 336, Rabindra Nath Samuel Dawson v. Sivakasi(1973) 3 SCC 381,Management of Associated Industries Ltd. v. BipinBehari Singh[1971 SCC OnLine Gau 51], Radhe ShyamKhemka v. Raju Yadav [2020 SCC OnLine Chh 879],Radheshaym Mohanlal Kaitan v. Maharashtra RevenueTribunal [1969 SCC OnLine Bom 7], Sakhichand Sahu v.Ishwar Dayal Sahu[1966 SCC OnLine Pat 111], Paras Ramv. Sheoji Ram[2010 SCC OnLine Del 1683]. Set III The State of Mysore Vs. Laxman SharanappaShiraguppi & Anr. [(1964) SCC Online Kar 55], Ajit SinghThakur Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat [(1981) 1Supreme Court Cases 495], Municipal Corporation of DelhiVs. Amrit Lal[1980 SCC Online Del 304],V.Gopalkrishnan Nair, Assistant Commissioner ofIncome-Tax v/s/ Babarao Narhari Keshtwar andAnother[1992 Mh.L.J.742],The State vs. ShriMohammed Tahir [2018 SCC Online Cal 213] 16.In rejoinder, Ms. Razaq would submit that the matterpertains to the Income Tax Act and therefore it involves publicinterest. She submits that filing of revision itself withinlimitation shows a due diligence and bonafide attempt on thepart of the Applicant to challenge the impugned order andamounts to sufficient cause. 17.After considering the rival contentions and the decisionscited as disclosed about, the point for determination is whethersufficient cause is disclosed by the Applicant to condone thedelay of 480 days in filing the appeal? 18.Various decisions have been cited on behalf of theRespondents however the ratio in most of the decisions wouldconstitute sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning delay. Itis also discretion of the Court which has to be exercisedjudiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.Sufficient cause cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence,inaction or lack of bona fide is attributed to the party. Similarlythe Courts do not have power to extend period of limitationbased on equitable grounds. If the party is involved innegligence, lack of bonafide or in action then there cannot be 18.Various decisions have been cited on behalf of theRespondents however the ratio in most of the decisions wouldconstitute sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning delay. Itis also discretion of the Court which has to be exercisedjudiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.Sufficient cause cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence,inaction or lack of bona fide is attributed to the party. Similarlythe Courts do not have power to extend period of limitationbased on equitable grounds. If the party is involved innegligence, lack of bonafide or in action then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay. It is also held inmost of the decisions that each application for condonation ofdelay will have to be decided within the framework as laid downby the Apex Court. The distinction between “sufficient cause”and “good cause” is explain in the case of Basawaraj(supra)wherein the Apex Court held that sufficient cause is the cause forwhich defendant could not be blamed for his absence. Themeaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough",inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.The word "sufficient" embraces no more than that whichprovides a platitude, which when the act done suffices toaccomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstancesexisting in a case, duly examined from the view point of areasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,"sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted ina negligent manner or there was want of bona fide on its part inview of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot bealleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remainedinactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each casemust afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned toexercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Courtexercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The Applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless asatisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allowthe application for condonation of delay. The court has toexamine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a deviceto cover an ulterior purpose. 19.In the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag& Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors (1987 (2) SCC 107), the ApexCourt observed that: “1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand tobenefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in ameritorious matter being thrown out at the verythreshold and cause of justice being defeated. Asagainst this when delay is condoned the highestthat can happen is that a cause would bedecided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" doesnot mean that a pedantic approach should bemade. Why not every hour's delay, everysecond's delay? The doctrine must be applied ina rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technicalconsiderations are pitted against each other,cause of substantial justice deserves to bepreferred for the other side cannot claim to havevested right in injustice being done because of anon-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay isoccasioned deliberately, or on account ofculpable negligence, or on account of mala fides.A litigant does not stand to benefit by resortingto delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respectednot on account of its power to legalize injusticeon technical grounds but because it is capable ofremoving injustice and is expected to do so.” 4. When substantial justice and technicalconsiderations are pitted against each other,cause of substantial justice deserves to bepreferred for the other side cannot claim to havevested right in injustice being done because of anon-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay isoccasioned deliberately, or on account ofculpable negligence, or on account of mala fides.A litigant does not stand to benefit by resortingto delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respectednot on account of its power to legalize injusticeon technical grounds but because it is capable ofremoving injustice and is expected to do so.” 20.The matter in hand would clearly go to show that thecomplaint filed under Section 200 CrPC by the Officer of theIncome Tax Department for the offences punishable underSection 277 and 277A of the Income Tax Act came to bedismissed for non-appearance of the complainant and hisAdvocate and accordingly the order is that therespondent/accused is acquitted. 21.It is also admitted fact that while challenging the saidorder, a revision under Section 397 under CrPC was filed beforethe learned Sessions Court. 22.Mr Nankani heavily relied upon the provisions of Section401(4) of CrPC to buttress his submissions that where an appealis provided but no such appeal is filed, the proceeding by way ofrevision shall not to entertained. 23.At this stage, it is necessary to note that revision underSection 397 of CRPC was filed before the Sessions Courtwherein there is no mention of any provision as found in section401(4) of CrPC. Though the powers under section 397 of CrPCcould be exercised by High Court as well as by the SessionsCourt, such powers could be exercised only for the purpose ofsatisfying itself as to the correctness or illegality or propriety orfor final sentence or order passed by the Courts below howeverno such revision could be entertained against any interlocutoryorder. 24.Section 401 of CrPC specifically deals with the powers ofrevision of High Court wherein sub-Section 4 deals with theaspect where under the Code an appeal lies and no appeal isPage 14 of 33 brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained atthe instance of the party who could have appealed. 25.Thus when the revision was filed before the SessionsCourt under Section 397 of CrPC, the provision of section401(4) of CrPC cannot be made applicable to it. Section 397 ofCrPC nowhere contains as provided in sub Section 4 of section401 of CrPC. That apart, the fact remains that such revision wasadmittedly filed within time of limitation. 26.The appeal under Section 378 of CrPC is required to befiled within a period of 6 months along with leave to file appealas provided under sub Section 4 of section 378. 27.The revision under Section 397 of CrPC was filed on15/11/2017 thereby challenging the order of the Magistratedated 07/10/2017. Thus, it is clear that the Applicantbonafidely believing that revision lies against the impugnedorder, filed it within the limitation, as provided under section378(5) of CrPC for filing appeal. 28.The application filed for condonation of delay before thisCourt which is supported by the affidavit of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax would clearly reveal in paragraphNo.2 that the Applicant bonafidely preferred criminal revisionchallenging the impugned order dated 07/10/2017 as thecomplaint was dismissed for default of appearance of thecomplainant and his Counsel. Thus when revision is filed underSection 397, the contention of Mr Nankani that such revisionwas statutorily barred under section 401(4) of CrPC, will have tobe rejected firstly that such revision was not filed under section401 of CrPC but was filed under section 397 of CrPC wherein thelegislature did not think it fit to include the contents of sub-section 4 of section 401 of CrPC. 28.The application filed for condonation of delay before thisCourt which is supported by the affidavit of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax would clearly reveal in paragraphNo.2 that the Applicant bonafidely preferred criminal revisionchallenging the impugned order dated 07/10/2017 as thecomplaint was dismissed for default of appearance of thecomplainant and his Counsel. Thus when revision is filed underSection 397, the contention of Mr Nankani that such revisionwas statutorily barred under section 401(4) of CrPC, will have tobe rejected firstly that such revision was not filed under section401 of CrPC but was filed under section 397 of CrPC wherein thelegislature did not think it fit to include the contents of sub-section 4 of section 401 of CrPC. 29.The application for condonation of delay would then statethat notices were issued to the respondents who appeared beforethe Sessions Court and raised the objection that revision is notmaintainable since the order of the Magistrate is clear therebyacquitting the accused. The contention of Respondent is thatwhen there is acquittal order passed, the only option is to file anappeal under section 378 of CrPC. 30.The Applicant further discussed in the application thatsince objections were raised by the respondent, the special public prosecutor appearing for the Applicant intimated theDepartment about the objections raised and accordingly wasrequested to provide the copies of relevant records. It also showsthat the special public prosecutor appearing for the Applicantfurnished part of the copies of records to the Department on04/01/2019 whereas the remaining copies of the recordspertaining to the Court of JMFC were provided on 15/03/2019.Immediately thereafter the Standing Counsel for theDepartment was provided with records and was requested todraft an appeal together with an application for leave to appeal. 31.The application further disclosed that the StandingCounsel for the Department submitted the drafts by e-mail on30/03/2019 and after due approval the present applicationalong with the appeal and leave to appeal was filed on01/04/2019. 32.The Applicant would then state in paragraph 5 thatrevision was filed before the Sessions Court with a bonafidebelief and only after objection raised by the respondent, thematter was examined and only thereafter the decision was takento prefer the present appeal. It is also stated that only after filing of the present application for condonation of delay with theappeal and leave to appeal, the revision file before the SessionsCourt was withdrawn. The Applicant claimed that the delay wasonly because of the fact that the revision was filed with thebonafide belief and only after objections, steps were taken to filethe appeal. 33.Mr. Nankani, appearing for the respondent, forcefullysubmitted that only because objections were raised about themaintainability of the revision would not in any mannernecessary to consider the opportunity for the Applicant torethink. He submits that ignorance of law cannot be consideredas ground for condoning the delay. Though he claims that thereis statutory power under section 401(4) of CrPC, such an aspectis already discussed and cannot be accepted. However it isadmitted fact that the revision was filed under section 397 ofCRPC before the learned Sessions Court, within time. Ittherefore shows that the Applicant was under the bonafide beliefthat a revision lies. Once such matter is filed and diligentlyprosecuted, it is presumed that the Applicant was under suchbonafide belief about the maintainability of such proceedings. Itcannot be argued that when no revision lies, filing of such revision would not be considered as bonafide attempt. Therecould be incorrect advise given to the Applicant who is anOfficer of the Department and who is totally dependent on theadvice of the legal team of the Department. The question here isnot of wrong advise but whether the Applicant was underbonafide belief. Since the revision was filed challenging theimpugned order and accordingly the Court has issued notice tothe respondents, it clearly presumed that the Applicant wasunder the bonafide belief that revision lies. 34.As observed in the case of Collector Land Acquisition,Anantnag(supra) ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefitby lodging a case before the wrong forum and by choosingwrong provision. Similarly, once an objection was raised aboutthe maintainability of revision, the Special Public Prosecutorappearing for the Applicant before the Sessions Court,immediately inform the Department. Para 3 of the applicationwould go to show that on receipt of such information from theSpecial Public Prosecutor, the Department requested him toprovide copies of relevant records. Part of the records wasfurnished to the Department on 04/01/2019 and the remainingrecord from the Court of JMFC was made available on 15/03/2019. The Standing Counsel of the Department was thenprovided with the records who drafted the appeal and theapplication within 2 weeks and forwarded it to the Departmenton 30/03/2019 and on the next day by obtaining approval, thepresent application along with appeal was filed. 35.Above explanation in paragraph Nos.2, 3 and 4 of theapplication would clearly reveal that first of all there was abonafide belief that revision lies and when such a fact wasobjected, the Department was asked to verify it. On receiving thedocument, a draft for the appeal and application were preparedwithin a short time and then the same were presented to thisCourt. 36.The contention of Mr Nankani is that the averments in theapplication are vague and Applicant failed to explain as to whogave wrong advise. He also contended that the documentsregarding the notes of the official of the Department are notproduced to show the dates. He also submitted that there is noexplanation as to why records were called again when therevision was filed on the basis of the same records. 37.It is necessary to note that the Applicant is a Departmentof Government of India and operates through its variousofficials. It contains a Legal Department which is required to beconsulted on legal issues. The Special Public Prosecutorintimated the Department about the objections raised andthereafter the consultation took place on the receipt of therecords available with the Special Public Prosecutor and also therecord available with the JMFC who dismissed the complaint.Thus to my mind, the Applicant has satisfactorily disclosed thereasons for the purpose of consulting the Legal Department andthereafter forwarding the file to the Standing Counsel forpreparing an appeal. It is necessary to note here that evenduring the above process, the revision file before the SessionsCourt was pending. The Sessions Court did not pass any orderon the revision with regard to its maintainability. Thus, therecords show that though the revision was pending, theApplicant processed the file on the objection of themaintainability of the revision raised by the Respondents andthen decided to file an appeal. 38.Since the Applicant is a Department and the decision hasto be taken in consultation with the various officers including 38.Since the Applicant is a Department and the decision hasto be taken in consultation with the various officers including the Legal Department, it is expected that some time is requiredto be consumed. However the application clearly goes to showthat all the papers were furnished to the Department by15/03/2019 and thereafter such papers were forwarded to theStanding Counsel who prepared the draft and forward it by e-mail to the Department on 30/03/2019 that is within 2 weeks.The appeal along with the present application was immediatelyfiled on the next day. 39.With these factual matrix, the decisions referred on behalfof the respondents will have to be considered. The first set ofdecisions referred by Mr Nankani are in respect of powers of theCourt under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There is no need torefer to all the 15 decisions provided in the first set however thesettled principle of law could be considered as under: (A) The Court would exercise its discretion in condoningor declining to condone delay judiciously and ensure thatno serious prejudice is caused to either of the parties tothe proceedings. (B)When an appeal becomes barred by time becauseof negligence or default of one of the parties, valuablerights accrue to the others which normally are not being taken away in a routine manner and too liberalisedexercise of discretionary power. (C) It is equally true that the period of limitation andobject of prescribing periods is not intended to destroyrights but is founded on public policy fixing a life spanfor legal remedy for general welfare. (D)Length of delay per se may not be a ground forrejecting an application but if a satisfactory explanationhas been furnished by the parties which can be acceptedby the Court in consonance with the settled norms forexercise of such discretion. (E)The rules of limitation are not meant to destroythe rights of the parties. They are meant to see that theplaintiff does not take dilatory tactics but seeks remedypromptly. (F)The laws of procedure are meant to regulateeffectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantialand real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudicationon merits of substantial rights of citizens under personalproperty and other laws. (G)The Courts have to adopt a justice orientedapproach dictated by the uppermost consideration thatordinary a litigant ought not to be denied an opportunityof having a lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akinto misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking theindulgence of the Court. (H)The expression “sufficient cause” should,therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection ofsufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. (I)Sufficient cause cannot be liberally interpreted ifnegligence, inaction or lack of bonafides is attributed to aparty. (J) The meaning of the word “sufficient” is“adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessaryto answer the purpose intended. The word sufficientembraces no more than that which provides a platitude,which when the act done suffices to accomplish thepurpose intended in the case, duly examined from theviewpoint of reasonable standard of a cautious man. Inother words “sufficient cause” means that the partyshould not have acted in a negligent manner or there wasa want of bonafide on its part in view of the facts andcircumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that theparty has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. (J) The expression “sufficient cause” contained insection 5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to yield different results depending upon the object and contextof a statute. (K) It is very elementary and well understood thatcourts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approachin dealing with the applications for condonation of thedelay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic lineto advance substantial justice. (J) The expression “sufficient cause” contained insection 5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to yield different results depending upon the object and contextof a statute. (K) It is very elementary and well understood thatcourts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approachin dealing with the applications for condonation of thedelay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic lineto advance substantial justice. (L)The Courts have to adopt a very liberal approachin construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay toenable the Courts to do substantial justice and to applylaw in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends ofjustice. 40.Applying the above settled prepositions of law as laiddown in various decisions as found in set- I as relied upon by MrNankani, to matter in hand it would clearly support thecontention raised by the Applicant. Firstly, the explanation givenin the application would clearly go to show that the revision wasfiled with a bonafide belief that the same is maintainable.Secondly, when the objections were raised, the Special PublicProsecutor intimated the Department and thereafter thedocuments were collected and the draft of the appeal along withdelay application were prepared. Thus there is sufficient cause disclosed by the Applicant in approaching this Court beyond theperiod of limitation. 41.It is a fact that the Department would not be benefited byfiling the proceedings before the wrong Forum deliberately. It isadmitted fact that the complaint filed by the complainant wasrejected only on the ground that the Applicant along withCounsel unable to remain present. The complaint was notdecided on merits. Thirdly, action was taken when theRespondent raised objections to the tenability of the revisionand by corrective measure, an appeal was filed before this Courteven when the revision was pending before the Sessions Court.Such revision was later on withdrawn, which again showbonafides on the part of the Applicant to prosecute the matterbefore the correct Forum. 42.The contention of the Respondents that from January tillMarch, there is no explanation as to why the documents werenot furnished or collected, will have to be answered on theground that every day's delay cannot be explained. TheDepartment functions on the basis of its officials and some timeis expected to be consumed regarding communication as well as handing over all documents. First set of documents werefurnished by the Special Public Prosecutor which were availablewith him. The second set was required about the documentswhich were presented before the learned Magistrate along withthe complaint. Thus a contention of every day's delay, everyhour delay, is not required to be explained, however, thesufficient cause must be satisfactorily explained. The Court hasto take a pragmatic view in order to do substantial justice.Technicalities and other considerations can not pitted againstsubstantial justice. 43.Second set of decisions referred to by Mr Nankani arebasically with regard to powers under Section 14 of the LimitedAct. It is not the case of the Applicant that the entire delay wasoccasioned because the Applicant was bonafidely litigatingbefore the wrong Forum. Admittedly, revision was filed withintime and when it is pointed out to the Applicant that the revisionis not tenable, suitable action was taken and appeal was filedwith the application for condonation of delay. 44.Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads thus: 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in 43.Second set of decisions referred to by Mr Nankani arebasically with regard to powers under Section 14 of the LimitedAct. It is not the case of the Applicant that the entire delay wasoccasioned because the Applicant was bonafidely litigatingbefore the wrong Forum. Admittedly, revision was filed withintime and when it is pointed out to the Applicant that the revisionis not tenable, suitable action was taken and appeal was filedwith the application for condonation of delay. 44.Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads thus: 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing theperiod of limitation for any suit the time during whichthe plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligenceanother civil proceeding, whether in a Court of firstinstance or of appeal or revision, against thedefendant shall be excluded, where the proceedingrelates to the same matter in issue and is prosecutedin good faith in a Court which, from defect ofjurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unableto entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for anyapplication, the time during which the applicant hasbeen prosecuting with due diligence another civilproceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or ofappeal or revision, against the same party for thesame relief shall be excluded, where such proceedingis prosecuted in good faith in a court which, fromdefect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, isunable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 ofOrder XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, theprovisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation toa fresh suit instituted on permission granted by theCourt under rule 1 of that Order, where suchpermission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction ofthe court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (a) in excluding the time during which a former civilproceeding was pending, the day on which thatproceeding was instituted and the day on which itended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appealshall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall bedeemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect ofjurisdiction. 45.A perusal of this provision would go to show that the partyis entitled to seek exclusion of time of the proceeding bonafidelyfiled in a Court having no jurisdiction. 46.It is not the case of the Applicant that they were aware thatthe revision is not maintainable and that the appeal is requiredto be filed. The impugned order passed by the Magistrate wouldclearly go to show that the complaint was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant and the Standing Counsel for theDepartment. Such a decision was not on merit but on the defaultPage 29 of 33 of appearance. Thus, the contention of Applicant that they wereunder bonafide belief and accordingly advised to file revisioncannot be doubted with. 47.The appeal was filed along with the delay application evenwhen the revision was pending and only after filing of the appealthe said revision was withdrawn. The revision was filed withintime. Thus, the contention of the Applicant that he is entitled forthe exclusion of such time litigating before the wrong Forumneeds to be considered. 48.In the case of Deena versus Bharat Singh [(2002) 6SCC 336], the Apex Court observed that in order to claimbenefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the ingredientswhich are required to be made are as under: (1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civilproceedings prosecuted by the same party; (2) the prior proceeding had been prosecuted with duediligence and good faith; (3) the failure of the prior proceeding was due todefect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature; (4) the earlier proceeding and the later proceedingmust relate to the same matter in issue, and 48.In the case of Deena versus Bharat Singh [(2002) 6SCC 336], the Apex Court observed that in order to claimbenefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the ingredientswhich are required to be made are as under: (1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civilproceedings prosecuted by the same party; (2) the prior proceeding had been prosecuted with duediligence and good faith; (3) the failure of the prior proceeding was due todefect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature; (4) the earlier proceeding and the later proceedingmust relate to the same matter in issue, and (5) both the proceedings are in a court. 49.The above ingredients as observed by the Apex Court aresquarely applicable to the matter in hand. Therefore, thecontention of the Applicant even on this count will have to beconsidered that the Applicant was bonafidely litigating beforethe wrong Forum. 50.Though the present matter deals with a criminal complaintand more specifically the order of the Magistrate shows that theAccused/Respondent is acquitted, the fact remains that suchacquittal is without any full-fledged trial and only on theabsence of the complainant. In such circumstances, the Courtmust adopt a pragmatic approach specifically when the case is ofunwarranted acquittal which could result in failure of justice andcan also consider the concept of sufficient cause liberally.Accordingly, the third set of decisions relied upon by theRespondent will also go to show that the same principles willhave to be applied to the criminal appeal filed beyond limitation challenging the acquittal and that too on a technical groundwherein a Court is required to take a lenient view. 51.In the present matter, the record shows that the Applicanthas diligently prosecuted the matter by filing revision and thattoo within a period of limitation. Once an objection was taken,the matter was re-examined and accordingly a decision wastaken to file an appeal even during the pendency of the revisionproceedings. The learned Sessions Court was not called upon bythe Respondents to decide on its own jurisdiction or themaintainability of revision. The documents and opinions werefurnished and accordingly the appeal was drafted within 2 weeksfrom the date of receipt of all the records. Immediately on thenext date of receipt of the draft of an appeal, it was filed beforethis Court. This clearly shows the bonafide attempt and the duediligence adopted by the Applicant in prosecuting the matter.Thus, the reasons disclosed in the application and that too onaffidavit must be construed as sufficient cause to condone thedelay. 52.For the above reasons, the application stands allowed. Thedelay in filing an application for leave to appeal along with amemo of appeal stands condoned. BHARAT P. DESHPANDE, J.