Cwp/1384/2019 Of Labh Singh v. Principal Income Tax Commissioner & Anr

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLACWP No.1384 of 2019Decided on: 07.08.2019Labh Singh...Petitioner Versus Principal Income Tax Commissioner & Anr. ..Respondents CoramThe Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Ramasubramanian, Chief JusticeThe Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anoop Chitkara, JudgeWhether approved for reporting? V. Ramasubramanian, Chief Justice(Oral) Challenging an order passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 119(2)(b) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961, (for short ‘the Act’), condoning the delay onthe part of the 2[nd] respondent in filing the income tax returns forthe assessment year 2014-2015 to 2017-2018, a third party hascome up with the above writ petition. 2.Heard Mr.Peeyush Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr.Devi Singh Verma, Advocate, takes notice forrespondent No.1. 3.The 2[nd] respondent is stated to have been elected to the Lok Sabha from the Mandi Constituency in the election that concluded in May 2019. It appears that just before the election,he filed the tax returns for the assessment year 2014-2015 to2017-2018 along with an application under Section 119(2)(b) ofthe Act on 18.04.2019 for the condonation of delay in filing thereturns. The 1[st] respondent herein passed an order condoningthe delay. 4.Contending that the order was completely arbitraryand that there were no grounds for the condonation of delay, thepetitioner, who is a voter in the Constituency, has come up withthe above writ petition. 5.Obviously, what has driven the petitioner to take thisstep is that if the delay is not condoned, the 2[nd] respondent wouldbe deemed to be a person who has not complied with law, invitingcivil and penal consequences. In the event of penalconsequences getting attracted his very entitlement to contestwould have come to be in question. This is the motive behind thepresent writ petition. 6.De-horse the motive, what is important for this Courtto consider is as to whether a third party can take up such anissue at all. Section 119(2)(b) confers powers upon the 1[st]respondent, to admit an application or claim for any exemption,deduction, refund or any other relief under this Act after the expiry of the period specified by or under this Act for making suchapplication or claim and deal with the same on merits inaccordance with law. The only sine qua non for the exercise ofthe power under the said clause, is to see whether there was anygenuine hardship for the applicant to be avoided. Section 119(2)(b) of the Act reads as follow: “119(1)xxxxxxxxx2)Without prejudice to the generality of theforegoing power,- (a) xxxxxxxxx (b) The Board may, if it considers itdesirable or expedient so to do for avoidinggenuine hardship in any case or class of cases,by general or special order, authorize {anyincome tax authority, not being aCommissioner (Appeals)} to admit anapplication or claim for any exemption,deduction, refund or any other relief under thisAct after the expiry of the period specified by orunder this Act for making such application orclaim and deal with the same on merits inaccordance with law.” 7.All that is required for the 1[st] respondent is toconsider whether it is desirable or expedient to allow thepetitioner to file the returns for avoiding any genuine hardship. 8. In the case on hand, the 1[st] respondent has considered whether there was a genuine hardship. Once thediscretion available under Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section119 has been exercised, there is no scope for this Court tointerfere with such discretion, especially at the instance of a thirdparty. Therefore, we find that the petitioner has no locus standi tochallenge the impugned order. Hence, the writ petition isdismissed along with pending application(s), if any. ( V. Ramasubramanian ), Chief Justice Chief Justice August 7, 2019 ( vt ) ( Anoop Chitkara), Judge