Cwp/2606/2016 Of Attar Singh v. Income Tax Officer Gurgaon

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANAATCHANDIGARH CWP No.2606 of 2016Date of decision:9.2.2016. Attar Singh ...... Petiti Income lax Officer, Ward 1(2) 5[th]Floor, HSIIDC Building, VanijyaNijuny, Phase V, Gurgaon .... Responde CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICEK AJAY KUMAR MITTALHON’ BLE MRS. JUSTICK RAJ RAHUL GARG 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see thejudgment?2. To be referred to the Reporters or not?YES3. Whether the judgment should be reported 1n the Digest? Present: Mr. R.Santhanam, Advocate with Mr. Raj Kumar Narang,Advocate and Mr. Gagan Bajaj, Advocate for the petitioner. Ajay Kumar Mittal,J. ].This order shall dispose of CWP Nos.2606, 2422 and 2579of 2016 as learned counsel for the petitioner(s) 1s agreed that the issuesinvolved in all these petitions are identical. However, the facts arebeing extracted from CWP No.2606 of 2016, DIn CWP No.2606 of 2016, the petitioner prays for quashingthe notice dated 25.3.2015, Annexure P.8 issued by the respondent CWP No 2606 of 2016|under section 148 of the Income lax Act, 1961 (in short, “the Act”).Further prayer has been made to quash the ex parte order dated30.11.2015, Annexure P.17 rejecting all the objections of the petitionerwith regard to lack of jurisdiction to reopen the assessment undersection 148 of the Act and the order of assessment dated 16.12.2015,Annexure P.38, raising demand of=a7,/2,96,617/- under Section 156 ofthe Act. 3.A few facts relevant for the decision of the controversyinvolved as narrated in CWP No.2606 of 2016 may be noticed. Thepetitioner was employed in Delhi Police as ASI till 31.7.2014 and hadbeen drawing salary from Delhi police. For the assessment year 201 112, the petitioner filed his return of income on 5.3.2013 which waslater revised on 6.3.2013 to include the interest income which hadinadvertently not been included in the original return. Letters dated25.2.2013 and 14.3.2013 were issued by Income Tax Officer (Int.)Gurgaon to the petitioner. The petitioner through his counselfurnished the requisite information. It was also intimated by thepetitioner that a sum of=a16,10,57,231/- was received on sale ofagricultural land. The respondent issued notice under section 148 ofthe Act dated 25.3.2015 to the petitioner alleging that incomechargeable to tax had escaped assessment for the assessment year 2011-12 followed by another notice dated 16.4.2015. The petitioner objectedto the notice and sought reasons. The respondent called the counsel for CWP No 2606 of 2016 CWP No 2606 of 2016 for reopening of assessment. Similarly, another notice under section143(2) of the Act was issued to the petitioner to which he also objected.The respondent sent reply to the assessee's letter stating that he hadJurisdiction to make reassessment. Another letter dated 23.11.2015 wasissued to the petitioner proposing to adda15,61,76,676/- as incomechargeable to tax for which details, records and documents were notmade available to the petitioner. The petitioner sent another letter dated30.11.2015 questioning the jurisdiction of the ITO and time to fileobjections was also sought. The respondent rejected all the pleas of thepetitioner by its ex parte order dated 30.11.2015 holding that he hadJurisdiction over the petitioner because of his residential address beingof Gurgaon and the property sold was in Manesar. The respondent alsoissued notice dated 1.12.2015 alleging non compliance of noticesissued earlier and threatening action for prosecution of the petitionerunder section 276D of the Act. Another notice dated 4.12.2015 undersection 142(1) of the Act was also issued by him to the petitioner. Thepetitioner replied to the letter dated 30.11.2015 and summons undersection 131 of the Act objecting to the exercise of jurisdiction by therespondent. Without going through the letters sent by the petitioner,the respondent asked the petitioner to furnish details of assets andhabilities. After a lot of correspondence between the petitioner and therespondent authorities, ex parte order of assessment under sections 143(3)/147 of the Act dated 16.12.2015, Annexure P.38 was passed. The CWP No 2606 of 2016 dismissed as withdrawn on |.2.2016 with permission to file fresh oneto enable the petitioner to place on record certain documents. Hencethe instant writ petitions by the three petitioner-assessees.4AAfter perusing the averments made in the petitions andhearing learned counsel for the petitioners, we find that the orders ofassessment have been passed by the respondent authorities againstwhich the petitioners have alternative remedy of appeal. Evenotherwise, the petitioners have sought to raise certain disputedquestions of fact which cannot be adjudicated 1n writ jurisdiction underArticle 226 of the Constitution of Ind1a. 5.InTitaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa(1983) 2SCC 433, a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the questionwhether a petition underArticle 226otf the Constitution should beentertained in a matter involving challenge to the order of the assessmentpassed by the competent authority under theCentral Sales Tax Act, 1956and corresponding law enacted by the State legislature and answered thesame 1n negative by making the following observations: "Under the scheme of the Act, there 1s a hierarchy of authoritiesbefore which the petitioners can get adequate redress against thewrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right toprefer an appeal before the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) ofSection 23of the Act. If the petitioners aredissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer afurther appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) ofSection 23of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question oflaw for the opinion of the High Court under|Section 24of theAct.The Actprovides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment canonly be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not bya petition under|Article 226of the Constitution. It 1; now wellrecognised that where a right or liability is created by a statuteWhich gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedyprovided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule wasstated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton NewWaterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage: order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment canonly be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not bya petition under|Article 226of the Constitution. It 1; now wellrecognised that where a right or liability is created by a statuteWhich gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedyprovided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule wasstated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton NewWaterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage: "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may beestablished founded upon statute. ... But there 1s a third class,viz. where a liability not existing at common law Is created bya Statute which at the same time gives a special and particularremedy for enforcing it. . .the remedy provided by the statutemust be followed, and it 1s not competent to the party topursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. Theform given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to." The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House ofLords 1nNeville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd_ and hasbeen reaffirmed by the Privy Council 1n|Attorney-General ofTrinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co. Ltd.andSecretary of State v. Mask & Co.Ithas also been held to beequally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has beenfollowed by this Court throughout. The High Court was thereforeJustified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine." 6.Following the above judgment, the Apex Court inAssistantCollector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and others(1985) 1 SCC 260 observed as under: DArticle 2261S not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutoryprocedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as forinstance where the very vires of the statute 1s in question orwhere private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of publicJustice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226of theConstitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficientreason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute.Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remediesare available are not such matters. We can also take judicialnotice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions underArticle 226of the Constitution are filed solely tor the purposeof obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong theproceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainlyneeds to be strongly discouraged." JoFurther, the Apex Court 1nCommissioner ofIncome Tax andothers vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal,(2013) 357 ITR 357, considered thequestion of entertaining writ petition where alternative statutory remedywas available. After examining the relevant case law on the point, it wasrecorded as under:- “14. In the instant case, the only question which arises for ourconsideration and decision is whether the High Court wasJustified in interfering with the order passed by the assessingauthority underSection 148oft the Act in exercise of itsJurisdiction underArticle 226when an equally efficaciousalternate remedy was available to the assessee under the Act. 15. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice theprinciple of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law thatnon-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by theHigh Court when an efficacious alternative remedy 1s availableis a rule of self-imposed limitation. It 1s essentially a rule ofpolicy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law.Undoubtedly, it 1s within the discretion of the High Court togrant relief under Article 226despite the existence of analternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfereif there 1s an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available 15. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice theprinciple of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law thatnon-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by theHigh Court when an efficacious alternative remedy 1s availableis a rule of self-imposed limitation. It 1s essentially a rule ofpolicy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law.Undoubtedly, it 1s within the discretion of the High Court togrant relief under Article 226despite the existence of analternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfereif there 1s an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court withoutavailing the same unless he has made out an exceptional casewatranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds toinvoke the extraordinary jurisdiction underArticle 2726(See:State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 8&6Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa$(1983) 2 SCC433:Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2SCC 107;State of H.P. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd, (2005)6 SCC 499), 16. The Constitution Benches of this Court 1nK.S. Rashid andsons vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission$AIR 1954 SC207;sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC425;.Union of India vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882;State ofU_P.vs. Mohd. Nooh$AIR 1958 SC 86 andK.S. Venkataramanand Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State of Madras$AIR 1966 SC 1089 haveheld that thoughArticle 226confers a very wide powers in thematter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writabsolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court issatishied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate orsuitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise itsjurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, mayexercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there hasbeen a breach of principles of natural justice or procedurerequired for decision has not been adopted.(See:N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar$AIR 1959 SC422:Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2SCR 653;Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu_ Da, (1984) 2SCC 436;S.1. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan$(1988) 1 SCC 572;Rajasthan SRITC vs. Krishna Kan$(1995) 5 SCC 75; KeralaSEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293;A.Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. 8S. Chellappa, (2000) 7 SCC 695;L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P, (2001) 6 SCC 634;Shrisant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) SahakariDugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509;Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484andGKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) | SCC 72).17. In Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Assn. of India,(2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court has held that where hierarchy ofappeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust thestatutory remedies before resorting to writ Jurisdiction for reliefand observed as follows: 12.In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes$AIR 1964 SC1419 this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraintthat the writ petition will not be entertained 1f an effectiveremedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed:(AIR p. 1423, para 7).1419 this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraintthat the writ petition will not be entertained 1f an effectiveremedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed:(AIR p. 1423, para 7). “7. ... The High Court does not therefore act as a court appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correcterrors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction underArticle 226trench upon an alternative remedy provided bystatute for obtaining relief. Where it 1s open to the aggrievedpetitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in anotherJurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by astatute, the High Court normally will not permit byentertaining a petition under Article 226ot the Constitutionthe machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, andwill leave the party applying to it to seek resort to themachinery so set up.” “7. ... The High Court does not therefore act as a court appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correcterrors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction underArticle 226trench upon an alternative remedy provided bystatute for obtaining relief. Where it 1s open to the aggrievedpetitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in anotherJurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by astatute, the High Court normally will not permit byentertaining a petition under Article 226ot the Constitutionthe machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, andwill leave the party applying to it to seek resort to themachinery so set up.” 13.In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa$(1983) 2 SCC 433 this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) “II. ... It 1s now well recognised that where a right hability 1s created by a statute which gives a special remedyfor enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute onlymust be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity byWilles, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v.Hawkesford, 141 ER 486 in the following passage: (ER p.495) °... There are three classes of cases in whicha liabilitmay be established founded upona statute. ... But there 1s hability 1s created by a statute which gives a special remedyfor enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute onlymust be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity byWilles, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v.Hawkesford, 141 ER 486 in the following passage: (ER p.495) °... There are three classes of cases in whicha liabilitmay be established founded upona statute. ... But there 1s third class viz. where a liability not existing at common lawis created by a statute which at the same time gives a specialand particular remedy for enforcing it. ... The remedprovided by the statute must be followed, and it is notcompetent to the party to pursue the course applicable tocases of the second class. The form given by the statute mustbe adopted and adhered to.’ The rule laid down in thispassage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v.London Express Newspapers Ltd., 1919 AC 368 and hasbeen reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General ofTrinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd., 1935 AC53)2PC) and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC105 It has also been held to be equally applicable toenforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Courtthroughout. The High Court was therefore justified indismissing the writ petitions in limine.”14.In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC536 B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of thelarger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) “77. ... SO far as the jurisdiction of the High Court undArticle 226—or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this CourtunderArticle 32—is concermed, it 1s obvious that theprovisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It1s, however, equally obvious that while exercising the powerunderArticle 226=Article 32, the Court would certainly takenote of the legislative intent manifested 1n the provisions ofthe Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent withthe provisions of the enactment.’”’(SeeG. Veerappa Pillai v.Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192;CCE v. DunlopIndia Ltd.. (1985) 1 SCC 260;Ramendra Kishore Biswas v.State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472;Shivgonda Anna Patil v.State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5;C.A. Abraham v. ITO$(1961) 2 SCR 765;Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State ofOrissa$(1983) 2 SCC 433; H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312;Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrarotf Trade Mark, (1998) 8 SCC 1; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd.v. State of Bihar$(1998) 8 SCC 272;Sheela Devi v. Jaspalsingh$(1999) 1 SCC 209 and|Punjab National Bank v. O.C.Krishnan$(2001) 6 SCC 569)otf Trade Mark, (1998) 8 SCC 1; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd.v. State of Bihar$(1998) 8 SCC 272;Sheela Devi v. Jaspalsingh$(1999) 1 SCC 209 and|Punjab National Bank v. O.C.Krishnan$(2001) 6 SCC 569) sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312;Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrarotf Trade Mark, (1998) 8 SCC 1; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd.v. State of Bihar$(1998) 8 SCC 272;Sheela Devi v. Jaspalsingh$(1999) 1 SCC 209 and|Punjab National Bank v. O.C.Krishnan$(2001) 6 SCC 569)otf Trade Mark, (1998) 8 SCC 1; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd.v. State of Bihar$(1998) 8 SCC 272;Sheela Devi v. Jaspalsingh$(1999) 1 SCC 209 and|Punjab National Bank v. O.C.Krishnan$(2001) 6 SCC 569) 1S.In Union of India vs. Guwahati Carbon Ltd., (2012) 11 SCC651, this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle andobserved:651, this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle andobserved: ‘*8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned orderwe intend to remind ourselves the observations made by thisCourt 1nMunshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta$(1979) 3 SCC 83. In the said decision, this Court was pleasedto observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23).we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by thisCourt 1nMunshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta$(1979) 3 SCC 83. In the said decision, this Court was pleasedto observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23). “23. ... When a revenue statute provides for a persoagerieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedyto be sought 1n a particular forum, in a particular way, it mustbe sought in that forum and in that manner, and all the otherforums and modes of seeking [remedy] are excluded.’” 19. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognizedsome exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, 1.e., where thestatutory authority has not acted in accordance with theprovisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of thefundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted toinvoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order hasbeen passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice,the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, TitagarhPaper Mulls case and other similar judgments that the HighCourt will not entertain a petition under Article 226of theConstitution 1f an effective alternative remedy is available to theagerieved person or the statute under which the actioncomplained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism forredressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when astatutory forum 1s created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutorydispensation. 20. In the instant case, the Act provides complete machinery forthe assessment/re-assessment of tax, imposition of penalty andfor obtaining relief 1n respect of any improper orders passed bythe Revenue Authorities, and the assessee could not bepermitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke thejurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226of theConstitution when he had adequate remedy open to him by anappeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Theremedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not amere formality with no substantial relief.In Ram and ShyamCo. vs. State of Haryana$(1985) 3 SCC 267 this Court hasnoticed that if an appeal is from “Caesar to Caesar’s wife” theexistence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and anexercise 1n futility. In the instant case, neither has the assessee-writ petitioner described the available alternate remedy underthe Act as ineffectual and non-efficacious while invoking thewrit jurisdiction of the High Court nor has the High Courtascribed cogent and satisfactory reasons to have exercised itsJurisdiction in the facts of instant case.” S.This Court inLarsen and Toubro Limited vy. The State o Haryana and others$2012(2) 166 PLR 345, considering the question of entertaining writ petition where alternate statutory remedy was available,had in paras 6 and 7 observed thus :- “6.The following are the broad principles when a writpetition can be entertained without insisting for adoptingstatutory remedies:-petition can be entertained without insisting for adoptingstatutory remedies:- S.This Court inLarsen and Toubro Limited vy. The State o Haryana and others$2012(2) 166 PLR 345, considering the question of entertaining writ petition where alternate statutory remedy was available,had in paras 6 and 7 observed thus :- “6.The following are the broad principles when a writpetition can be entertained without insisting for adoptingstatutory remedies:-petition can be entertained without insisting for adoptingstatutory remedies:- 1) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of thefundamental rights;fundamental rights; 11) where there 1s failure of principles of natural justice; or 111) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without Jurisdiction or the vires of an Act 1s challenged. 7. We are not inclined to entertain this petition against theassessment order as it does not fulfil any of the broad outlinesnoticed herein above.....’’assessment order as it does not fulfil any of the broad outlinesnoticed herein above.....’’ Q_Examining the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India where disputed questions of facts are involved, aDivision Bench of this Court inN.C.Mahendra vy. Haryana StatElectricity Board and others, AIR 1984 Punjab 26 had laid down_ thatordinarily a writ would not issue in favour of a person where disputedquestions of facts are raised. The relevant portion reads thus:- “12. An identical legal position ensures within this countryand High Courts have repeatedly held that the exercise ofjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution 1sdiscretionary and not obligatory without being exhaustive, itis settled law that the Court would not ordinarily issue a writin favour of a person, who has (1) an adequate alternativeremedy, (11) who is guilty of delay which 1s unexplained, (111)who 1s guilty of conduct disentitling him to relief, (iv) wherethe interest of justice do not require that relief should begranted, (v)where the petitioner raises a disputed question offact,(v1) where the grant of writ would be futile, and (vil)where the impugned law has not come into force. It wouldfollow from the above that the grant or refusal of a writ 1swithin the judicial discretion of the Court and that indeed 1sthe line which divides the extra ordinary remedy from theordinary one by of a civil suit.”” (Emphasis supplied) The Hon'ble Supreme Court 1n|State Cadre Authority and another v. Kk.S.Bajpal and others(1990) (Suppl.) SCC 713,Bhagubhai Dhanabhal Khalasi and another v. [he State of Gujarat and others,(2007) 4 SCC241 and —Mukesh Kumar Agrawal v. State of UP and others,-2009) 13 CWP No 2606 of 2016 SCC 693 has held that wherever disputed question of fact 1s raised 1n writproceedings, the writ petition was not an appropriate remedy. Reference mayalso be made to the judgment of the Apex Court 1n_Dwarka PrasadAgarwal(D) by Lrs. and another vs. b.D.Agarwal and others,AIR 2003 SC 2686,wherein it was observed as under:- "We may, however, hasten to add that as at present advised wedo not intend to enter into the contention of the petitioners thattheir fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution ofIndia had been infringed. This Court would have entered intothe question, 1f the facts were undisputed or admitted. Thequestion as regard infringement of fundamental right and thattoo under Article 19 of the Constitution of India cannot be goneinto when the facts are disputed. Whether Dwarka PrasadAgarwal and consequently the substituted petitioners are ownersof the newspapers and if so to what extent being disputed, itcannot be said, that by reason of the impugned order dated3.9.1992 passed by the first respondent herein alone, thefundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19 had beeninfringed.” 10.In view of availability of alternative remedy and dispute onfacts, we do not find any ground to entertain this petition in writ jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, finding nomerit in the writ petitions, the same are hereby dismissed, (Ajay Kumar Mittal)Judge| February 9, 2016 @'!@ 10.In view of availability of alternative remedy and dispute onfacts, we do not find any ground to entertain this petition in writ jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, finding nomerit in the writ petitions, the same are hereby dismissed, (Ajay Kumar Mittal)Judge| February 9, 2016 @'!@ (Ra} Rahul Garg)Judge|