D Only After Survey Operation Conducted Under Section 133A Of The Act And During The Said Period, The Incriminating Material Was Found By The Department Which L v. On Hakam Singh V. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Meerut[[7]] ~~.~~

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE DILIP B. BHOSALEANDTHE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO WRIT PETITION No.14088 of 2004 ORDER:(Per Hon’ble Sri Justice A.Ramalingeswara Rao) Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learnedStanding Counsel for the respondents. The petitioner is an assessee and a survey in the businesspremises of the petitioner was conducted under Section 133A of theIncome Tax Act, 1961 (for short, the Act) on 19.12.2001. Consequent tothe said survey, the petitioner filed a revised return of income admittingan additional income of Rs.50.00 lakhs. The revised return was filed on11.02.2002. The case was taken up for scrutiny after issuance of anotice under Section 143(2) of the Act and the assessee cooperated withthe Department during the course of assessment proceedings. Theassessment was completed on 28.03.2002 accepting the income asstated in the revised return of income. The balance of tax payable wasdetermined at Rs.12,92,805/- after adjusting the prepaid tax ofRs.10,96,448/-. The assessing officer charged interest under Section234B of the Act amounting to Rs.3,04,017/- and under Section 234Camounting to Rs.1,08,788/-. The petitioner paid the entire tax portion ofthe demand but did not pay the interest. The petitioner submitted an application before the ChiefCommissioner of Income Tax-I, Hyderabad, requesting for waiver ofinterest levied under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act by invokingSection 119(2)(a) of the Act. The Chief Commissioner of Income Taxrejected the application by his order dated 12.12.2003 holding that therevised return of income was filed only after survey operation conductedunder Section 133A of the Act and during the said period, theincriminating material was found by the Department which led theassessee to file the revised return disclosing the additional income. He held that the filing of revised return cannot be construed as filing itvoluntarily or due to fear. It appears that the assessee filed anapplication before the Central Board of Direct Taxes seeking the samerelief and specifically stating that the revised return was filed voluntarilyto avoid litigation and the case falls within the purview of circular dated21.05.1996. But, the Central Board of Direct Taxes rejected theapplication on the ground that it is not empowered to review an orderpassed by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. In thosecircumstances, the assessee/petitioner filed the above Writ Petitionchallenging the orders of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax dated12.12.2003 for the assessment year 2001-2002. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the revised returnwas filed voluntarily for the assessment year 2001-2002 declaring theincome of Rs.50.00 lakhs and the order of the Chief Commissioner doesnot indicate the so-called incriminating material found by theDepartment. He also submits that since the revised return wasaccepted in toto, the observation of the Chief Commissioner of IncomeTax that incriminating material was found, has no basis. He relied on thedecisions in Rohit Kumar and Co. v. F.J.Bahadur, CIT[[1]], KakumanuSudershan Rao v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax[[2]], TushaarMehta v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax[[3]], Commissioner ofIncome Tax v. Suresh Chandra Mittal[[4]],Commissioner of IncomeTax v. Suresh Chandra Mittal[[5]], V.V.Projects and Investments P.Ltdv. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax[[6]]and an order of the DivisionBench of this Court in The Commissioner of Income Tax, Vijayawadav. M/s.Chennupati Tyre & Rubber Products, Vijayawada (ITTA No.190of 2003, dated 21.10.2014). Learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,supported the order of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and relied on Hakam Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Meerut[[7]]. The points that arise for consideration in this case are whether therevised return was filed voluntarily and whether the Chief Commissionerof Income Tax has to disclose the incriminating material as observed inhis order dated 12.12.2003. Learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,supported the order of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and relied on Hakam Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Meerut[[7]]. The points that arise for consideration in this case are whether therevised return was filed voluntarily and whether the Chief Commissionerof Income Tax has to disclose the incriminating material as observed inhis order dated 12.12.2003. We have noticed that Sections 234A, 234B and 234C of the Actwere introduced by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 fromthe assessment year 1989-1990 and there was no provision for reductionor waiver of penal interest unlike Section 273A of the Act, whichprovides for waiver and reduction of penalty. But, the Central Board ofDirect Taxes issued a circular in exercise of powers conferred underSection 119(2)(a) of the Act on 23.05.1996, providing for reduction orwaiver of interest. The above cases cited on behalf of both sides by theCounsel relate to the cases arising out of Section 273A of the Act. In theabsence of a specific provision in the Act, the only source of power isthe notification dated 23.05.1996 in F.No.400/234/95-IT(B) . In the saidnotification a direction was issued to the Chief Commissioner of IncomeTax and the Director General of Income Tax to reduce or waive interestscharged under Section 234A or 234B or 234C of the Act in the classes ofincome specified in paragraph 2 of the said order. Paragraph 2 of thesaid notification reads as follows: “2. The class of incomes or class of cases in which thereduction or waiver of interest under section 234A or section 234B, or,as the case may be, section 234C can be considered, are as follows: (a) Where during the course of proceedings for search and seizureunder section 132 of the Income Tax Act, or otherwise, thebooks of account and other incriminating documents havebeen seized and for reasons beyond the control of theassessee, he has been unable to furnish the return of incomefor the previous year during which the action under section132 has taken place, within the time specified in this behalfand the Chief Commissioner or, as the case may be,Director-General is satisfied having regard to the facts andcircumstances of the case that the delay in furnishing suchreturn of income cannot reasonably be attributed to theunder section 132 of the Income Tax Act, or otherwise, thebooks of account and other incriminating documents havebeen seized and for reasons beyond the control of theassessee, he has been unable to furnish the return of incomefor the previous year during which the action under section132 has taken place, within the time specified in this behalfand the Chief Commissioner or, as the case may be,Director-General is satisfied having regard to the facts andcircumstances of the case that the delay in furnishing suchreturn of income cannot reasonably be attributed to the assessee. (b) Where during the course of search and seizure operation undersection 132 of the Income Tax Act, cash is seized which isnot allowed to be utilized for payment of advance taxinstalment or instalments as they fall due after the seizure ofcash and the assessee has not paid fully or partly advancetax on the current income and the Chief Commissioner or theDirector General is satisfied that the assessee is unable topay the advance tax.section 132 of the Income Tax Act, cash is seized which isnot allowed to be utilized for payment of advance taxinstalment or instalments as they fall due after the seizure ofcash and the assessee has not paid fully or partly advancetax on the current income and the Chief Commissioner or theDirector General is satisfied that the assessee is unable topay the advance tax. (b) Where during the course of search and seizure operation undersection 132 of the Income Tax Act, cash is seized which isnot allowed to be utilized for payment of advance taxinstalment or instalments as they fall due after the seizure ofcash and the assessee has not paid fully or partly advancetax on the current income and the Chief Commissioner or theDirector General is satisfied that the assessee is unable topay the advance tax.section 132 of the Income Tax Act, cash is seized which isnot allowed to be utilized for payment of advance taxinstalment or instalments as they fall due after the seizure ofcash and the assessee has not paid fully or partly advancetax on the current income and the Chief Commissioner or theDirector General is satisfied that the assessee is unable topay the advance tax. (c) Where any income chargeable to income tax under any head ofincome, other than “capital gain” is received or accrues afterthe due date of payment of the first or subsequent installmentsof advance tax which was neither anticipated nor was in thecontemplation of the assessee and the advance tax on suchincome is paid in the remaining installment or installments andthe Chief Commissioner or Director General is satisfied on thefacts and circumstances of the case that this is a fit case forreduction or waiver of interest chargeable under section 234Cof the Income Tax Act.income, other than “capital gain” is received or accrues afterthe due date of payment of the first or subsequent installmentsof advance tax which was neither anticipated nor was in thecontemplation of the assessee and the advance tax on suchincome is paid in the remaining installment or installments andthe Chief Commissioner or Director General is satisfied on thefacts and circumstances of the case that this is a fit case forreduction or waiver of interest chargeable under section 234Cof the Income Tax Act. (d) Where any income which was not chargeable to income tax onthe basis of any order passed in the case of an assessee bythe High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable toincome tax, and as a result, he did not pay income tax inrelation to such income in any previous year andsubsequently, in consequence of any retrospectiveamendment of law or, as the case may be, the decision of theSupreme Court in his own case, which event has taken placeafter the end of any such previous year, in any assessment orreassessment proceedings the advance tax paid by theassessee during the financial year immediately preceding therelevant assessment year is found to be less than the amountof advance tax payable on his current income, the assesseeis chargeable to interest under section 234B or section 234Cand the Chief Commissioner or Director General is satisfiedthat this is a fit case for reduction or waiver of such interest.the basis of any order passed in the case of an assessee bythe High Court within whose jurisdiction he is assessable toincome tax, and as a result, he did not pay income tax inrelation to such income in any previous year andsubsequently, in consequence of any retrospectiveamendment of law or, as the case may be, the decision of theSupreme Court in his own case, which event has taken placeafter the end of any such previous year, in any assessment orreassessment proceedings the advance tax paid by theassessee during the financial year immediately preceding therelevant assessment year is found to be less than the amountof advance tax payable on his current income, the assesseeis chargeable to interest under section 234B or section 234Cand the Chief Commissioner or Director General is satisfiedthat this is a fit case for reduction or waiver of such interest. (e) Where a return of income could not be filed by the assessee dueto unavoidable circumstances and such return of income isfiled voluntarily by the assessee or his legal heirs withoutdetection by the Assessing Officer.”to unavoidable circumstances and such return of income isfiled voluntarily by the assessee or his legal heirs withoutdetection by the Assessing Officer.” In the light of the order of the Central Board of Direct Taxes, nowit is urged that the revised return filed by the assessee is voluntary andhence the assessee is entitled for the benefit of waiver of penal interest. Though the decision in Hakam Singh (supra) arises out of a decision under Section 273A of the Act, the meaning of “voluntary” wasconsidered and relied on a notification issued by the Central Board ofDirect Taxes dated 30.09.1969, whereunder the word “voluntary” wasexplained in paragraph 7 as follows: “The word 'voluntary' in its primary sense means 'proceedingfrom one's own free will' or 'without compulsion'. In its secondary senseit implies 'without any legal obligation' or 'not prompted by fear orinducement' depending upon the context in which it is used. In thecontext in which the word 'voluntary' has been used it is not possible totake the view that it means 'without any legal obligation'. Section 139places a legal obligation on all persons having taxable income todisclose their income in the prescribed form. If the word 'voluntary' isinterpreted to mean 'without legal obligation' no disclosure under Section271(4A) would be voluntary. This interpretation has, therefore, to berejected. Therefore, in the context in which the word 'voluntary' has beenused in Section 271(4A) it is only reasonable to infer that the disclosureshould be one which is not prompted by fear or inducement of any kind.If there is seizure of incriminating material in the course of a search andpenalties and prosecutions are imminent and the disclosure is a sequelto such a search, it would not be possible to treat the disclosure as avoluntary one. The compulsion of such a situation is even more real thanany legal compulsion. Similarly, if a disclosure is made by an assesseeafter obtaining an assurance that the penalty would be waived, thedisclosure would be clearly prompted by inducement.....” In the case before the Allahabad High Court, consequent to thesearch, the books of accounts of the petitioners were seized on22.11.1973 and the return for several years was filed after elevenmonths on 07.10.1974. A counter affidavit was filed stating that thereturns were filed because the petitioners were prompted to sufferthemselves from the consequences of not filing the return and they wereprompted by a sense of fear and the said statement was accepted by theCourt. By construing the wording of Section 273A of the Act, theAllahabad High Court found that the return was not voluntary byobserving as follows: “The question is whether a return, filed out of a sense of fear ofpenalty or prosecution, is voluntary. The I.T. Act does not define theterm "voluntarily". The word "voluntary" has been denned in ShorterOxford Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 2371, as performed or done of one's ownfree will, impulse or choice not constrained, prompted or suggested byanother, proceeding from the free unprompted or unconstrained will of aperson. A return filed under the constraint of exposure to adverse action “The question is whether a return, filed out of a sense of fear ofpenalty or prosecution, is voluntary. The I.T. Act does not define theterm "voluntarily". The word "voluntary" has been denned in ShorterOxford Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 2371, as performed or done of one's ownfree will, impulse or choice not constrained, prompted or suggested byanother, proceeding from the free unprompted or unconstrained will of aperson. A return filed under the constraint of exposure to adverse action by the I.T. department, in our opinion, will not be voluntary within themeaning of s. 273A. The action of the petitioners in filing the returns afterthe books of account had been seized at a raid was impelled by thecompelling circumstance that the petitioner was likely to be dealt withunder the penal provisions of the I.T. Act. The action of the petitioner infiling the returns under such a constraint cannot be said to be voluntary.In Mool Chand Mahesh Chand v. CIT [1978] 115 ITR 1 (All), the ITOstarted investigation by asking for details in respect of several matterswhile conducting the assessment proceedings for the year 1969-70.Thereafter, the assessee filed returns for the years 1964-65 to 1970-71.It was held that since the investigation had started and concealedincome had come to light, it was a case covered by the word "detection"occurring in s. 273A. It was further observed that in thesecircumstances the returns were filed after the assessee felt that thegame was up because the investigation initiated by the ITO exposed himto a situation that he had assessable income in respect of other years; itcannot be said that the filing of the return was voluntary. This decisionshows that the term "voluntary" under Section 273A has been used toindicate an action free of any constraint. A return filed in order to saveoneself from a possible penal action cannot be termed "voluntary".” This decision of the Allahabad in Hakam Singh (supra) wasconsidered by the Bombay High Court in Rohit Kumar and Co. (supra),wherein the conditions necessary for invoking the Commissioner’sexercise of discretion was considered. The said decision observed thatthe same view as in Hakam Singh (supra) was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Mool Chand Mahesh Chand v. CIT[[8]], but a contrary viewwas taken in Jakhodia Brothers v. CIT[[9]]. The Bombay High Courtfurther observed as follows: “The Karnataka High Court, in the cases of S.R.Jadav Desai v.WTO ((1980) 121 ITR 531) and B.Anjanappa v. CWT ((1980) 124 ITR433),the Gujarat High Court in the case of Madhukar Manilal Modi v.CWT ((1978) 113 ITR 318) and the Punjab and Haryana High Court inthe case of Hira Singh v. CWT ((1982) 134 ITR 438),took the view thatthe word ‘voluntary’ meant in contradiction to compulsion and the words“good faith” meant with due care and caution. If return was filed exceptin response to a notice requiring the assessee to file a return, it will be acase of a return filed voluntarily. It will be a case of filing the return ingood faith, if what is filed is with due care and caution, that issubstantially correct to the best of the information and belief of theassessee. Since most of these cases and some more cases also havebeen considered by the aforesaid Division Bench of our High Court inLaxman v. CIT ((1988) 174 ITR 465, it is really not necessary to refer tothe individual cases in detail as observed by the Division Bench of our Court in 174 ITR 465 (at.p.472): Court in 174 ITR 465 (at.p.472): “The term ‘good faith’ is not defined under the Act but is definedunder section 2(22) of the General Clauses Act. Either under the GeneralClauses Act or in ordinary parlance, an act done in good faith means anact done honestly even if it is tainted with negligence or mistake. All thatis required is that disclosure of income must be full and true according tothe honest belief of the assessee….. ‘voluntary’ means ‘withoutcompulsion’. What was the compulsion in the instant case? The so-calledvisit of the Inspector to the house in the course of general surveyoperations. In the first place, there is no material whatsoever to come tothe conclusion that any Inspector visited the petitioner’s premises andmade inquiries about the source of funds with which the building was beingconstructed… Assuming that some Inspector did visit the premises of thepetitioner and made inquiries about the source of funds, it is difficult tocome to the conclusion that such visit and the inquiry by itself amountedto compulsion or constraint on the petitioner to file the returns due to fearof detection and inevitable follow-up action…” ” The facts in the case before Bombay High Court were that anamount of Rs.22,87,000/- was seized from one Sri K.C.Mehta on30.04.1981 and thereafter the petitioner brought to the notice of theDeputy Director of Inspection (Intelligence) as well as the Commissionerthat the amount belonged to it and should be treated as income for theassessment year 1981-1982, the previous year for the relevantassessment year had not ended. There was no question of concealmentin the hands of the assessee far less a case of detection and the returnsfiled cannot but be held to be voluntary and in good faith. In thosecircumstances, the Commissioner was directed to dispose of theapplication under Section 273A of the Act afresh. This Court had also an occasion to consider the meaning of“voluntary” disclosure of income in Sujatha Rubbers v. Income TaxOfficer[[10]], wherein the order of the Commissioner dismissing theapplication for waiver of interest under Section 273A of the Act waschallenged. The facts of the said case are that the Government of Indiaintroduced a scheme called amnesty scheme to encourage assessees tofile returns voluntarily and it was in force from 15.11.1984 to31.03.1987. During the currency of the said scheme, the petitioner filedrevised returns for the assessment years 1982-1983, 1983-1984 and1984-1985. The interest was levied and the same was sought to be waived under Section 273A of the Act. This Court elaboratelyconsidered the various decisions and held that the Commissionerapproached the issue from a wrong perspective. This court opined thathis rejection of request on the ground that the returns were not voluntaryas they were filed after the survey operations were completed waserroneous as it was without considering the effect of survey operations and the conduct of the assessee. It observed as follows: waived under Section 273A of the Act. This Court elaboratelyconsidered the various decisions and held that the Commissionerapproached the issue from a wrong perspective. This court opined thathis rejection of request on the ground that the returns were not voluntaryas they were filed after the survey operations were completed waserroneous as it was without considering the effect of survey operations and the conduct of the assessee. It observed as follows: “We are, therefore, inclined to think that the expression"voluntarily" occurring in sub-section (1) of section 273A could not beconstrued in isolation with reference to the general animus or state ofmind of the assessee. From the legal obligation to file a return, noelement of fear could be either attributed or inferred. The word"voluntarily", in the context of section 273A(1), therefore, has to beconstrued as filling of the return by the assessee without being promptedby the animus to avoid or preempt adverse exposure or penal action.The Commissioner, before rejecting the returns as not voluntary, musthave material based upon which it is reasonable to infer that, in allprobability, but for the filling of the "voluntary" return, the assessee wouldhave been subjected to penal action or adverse exposure. In otherwords, "out of fear, an assessee has made full disclosure", by itself,without anything more, cannot be a ground for not exercising thediscretion under section 273A. The fear must be traceable to theimminent or proximate exposure of the assessee to penal action but forthe filing of the voluntary return under section 273A and, in order toenquire into this subjective element, there must be in existence objectivefacts warranting such an inference.” Accordingly, it held that the three revised returns filed by thepetitioner were voluntary returns within the meaning of Section 273A(1)of the Act and the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax was setaside. Another Division Bench of this Court in Kakumanu SudershanRao (supra), cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, consideredthe issue in the light of the circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxesdated 23.05.1996 and held that the ground of rejection by the ChiefCommissioner was contrary to the note put up before him and wasvitiated by non-application of mind to the relevant aspects placed beforehim and also the nature of the return was a debatable point. Since theChief Commissioner has not passed a reasoned order, the impugned order set aside and the case was remanded. Yet another Division Bench of this Court in K.S.N.Murthy v. Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes[[11]]considered the sameword in the light of the facts of that case and set aside the order on theground that the Commissioner has not taken into account the relevantfactors and did not apply his mind to the facts of the case. In coming tothe said conclusion, this Court relied on an earlier Division Benchjudgment on Sujatha Rubbers (supra). The decision of this Court in V.V.Projects and Investments P.Ltd(supra) was based on the acceptance of the assessing officer in hisorder dated 16.03.2001 that the revised return and the explanationsubmitted along with it was to buy peace with the department and toavoid protracted litigation. In the case before us no such explanation was filed along with therevised return and such explanation was given only to the ChiefCommissioner of Income Tax, obviously taking a cue from the saiddecision. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on Suresh ChandraMittal (5 supra) of the Supreme Court affirming the decision of theMadhya Pradesh High Court in Suresh Chandra Mittal (4 supra). TheHigh of Madhya Pradesh found that the declaration of income made bythe assessee in his revised returns and his explanation that he had doneso to buy peace with the department and to come out of vexed litigationshould be treated as bona fide in the facts and circumstances of thecase. In the case before us no such explanation was filed along with therevised return and such explanation was given only to the ChiefCommissioner of Income Tax, obviously taking a cue from the saiddecision. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on Suresh ChandraMittal (5 supra) of the Supreme Court affirming the decision of theMadhya Pradesh High Court in Suresh Chandra Mittal (4 supra). TheHigh of Madhya Pradesh found that the declaration of income made bythe assessee in his revised returns and his explanation that he had doneso to buy peace with the department and to come out of vexed litigationshould be treated as bona fide in the facts and circumstances of thecase. The other decision of the Division Bench of this Court in D.RamaRao v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (ITTA No.180 of 2003dated 17.09.2014) relates to penalty and its effect on the future prosecution and the appeal of the assessee was allowed with thefollowing observations: “The levy of penalty cannot be resorted to as a matter of course. By their very nature, the returns are bound to be at variance from what iscontemplated under the Act or the estimates of the Assessing Officers. Many a time, the understanding of a given provision in a particular way,itself would lead to a considerable difference as to the income or thecorresponding tax. The very fact that quite large number of remedies inthe form of appeals at various stages is provided for, discloses that eventhe understanding of the assessing or adjudicatory authorities; notabsolute. The levy of penalty is not going to leave the matter at that. Itwould expose the assessee to prosecution also by treating him as aneconomic offender. An assessee can be made to suffer such farreaching consequences, if only facts of the case support, and itemerges that the assessee had a clear intention to suppress theincome. We do not find such elements in the instant case. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the Tribunal isset aside. There shall be no order as to costs.” The said order was followed by the same Division Bench inM/s.Chennupati Tyre & Rubber Products, Vijayawada (supra). But,such is not the case in the instant case before us and this is a case ofpenal interest. In the case before us, the learned Counsel for the petitioner didnot file the copy of the order of assessment, but filed only a copy of theapplication filed before the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax dated27.11.2003. In the said application the reason stated was that theincome was declared with a bona fide intention not to protract anylitigation with the department and also with a genuine belief and oralassurance of the authorities conducting the survey operations that suchoffer and the payment of taxes thereon will save the petitioner from anypenal proceedings and also entitle the petitioner for waiver of interestunder Section 234B and 234C of the Act. The pleas of genuine beliefand oral assurance stated in the said application are without any basisand evidence. On the other hand, the observation of the ChiefCommissioner of Income Tax that during the period of survey, incriminating material was found by the department, which led to theassessee to file the revised return disclosing the additional income,cannot be said to be without any basis as the Chief Commissioner wouldhave an opportunity to go through the file. The assessee did not file therevised return with any covering letter stating the circumstances underwhich the assessee was filing the revised return, so that the assesseecould get the benefit of waiver of penal interest. In the absence of any material, we have to assume that theobservations made by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax withregard to the reasons of revised return, whether it was voluntary orotherwise, have to be upheld and we hold that the Chief Commissioner ofIncome Tax was right in holding that the return was not ‘voluntary’. Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner isrejected. In the absence of any material, we have to assume that theobservations made by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax withregard to the reasons of revised return, whether it was voluntary orotherwise, have to be upheld and we hold that the Chief Commissioner ofIncome Tax was right in holding that the return was not ‘voluntary’. Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner isrejected. With regard to the other point raised by the learned Counsel forthe petitioner that no evidence was furnished to the assessee by theChief Commissioner of Income Tax pursuant to the observation that‘incriminating material’ was found during the survey operations, we canreject the said plea as it was only an oral plea raised by the learnedCounsel during the course of arguments and no whisper is made in theaffidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. If the petitioner had madebasis for such a ground of attack, we would have called for records andverified whether any incriminating material was found during the surveyoperations. In the absence of any allegation in the affidavit, we have totake that the observation made by the Chief Commissioner of IncomeTax was bona fide and made after perusing the record. In view of the above facts, the Writ Petition is liable to bedismissed, and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. The miscellaneouspetitions, if any, shall stand disposed of. There shall be no order as tocosts. ______________________ (DILIP B. BHOSALE, J) ________________________________ (A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO, J) 22.01.2015 vs [1](1991) 190 ITR 0093 [2](1998) 234 ITR 0444 [3](2004) 189 CTR (Mad) 550 [4](2000) 241 ITR 0124 [5](2001) 251 ITR 0009 [6](2008) 300 ITR 0040 [7](1980) 124 ITR 228 (All) [8](1978) 115 ITR 1 (All) [9](1978) 115 ITR 61 [10](1992) 194 ITR 0355 [11](2001) 252 ITR 0269