Db Income Tax Appeal v. M/S. Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd.gadepan, Kota

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHANBENCH AT JAIPUR. ORDER. DB INCOME TAX APPEAL NO.487/2011 The Commissioner of Income Tax, Kota VS. M/s. Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd.Gadepan, Kota. Date of order :- 22[nd] January,2013 PRESENT. HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NARENDRA KUMAR JAIN HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JAINENDRA KUMAR RANKA Mrs. Parinitoo Jain, for the appellant. By the Court:- ( Per Hon’ble Ranka),J. Instant appeal has been preferred by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Kota, for theAssessment Year 2000-2001, assailing the orderdated 28.02.2006 passed by the learned IncomeTax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur( In short the ‘ITAT’) for quashing the orderunder Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961,in short(’The Act’). The brief facts of the case are givenhere under:- The respondent-Company being a Ltd.Company,filed its return on 30.11.2000declaring nil income and paid taxes ofRs.17,17,98,327/- under (Minimum Alternate Tax)( in short 'MAT') on book profit under Section115JA of the Act. The return was processed under Section 143(1)(a) by the AssessingOfficer on 30.3.2001 and the tax/MAT was alsocomputed by Assessing Officer on the bookprofit disclosed by the respondent atRs.16,03,07,717/-. In view of the payment ofexcess tax paid under MAT at Rs. 17,17,98,327/-the Assessing Officer worked out a refund ofRs. 1,74,90,610/- (17,17,98,327-16,03,07,717)and directed for issuing a refund ofRs.1,95,89,482/-) to the respondent-Companyincluding interest under Section 244A of theAct, accordingly, the refund was issued alongwith interest. The respondent-company further movedan application under Section 154 of the Act on27.8.2001 claiming further interest underSection 244A for the period 1.4.2001 to18.7.2001. The Assessing Officer, beingsatisfied granted further interest underSection 244A amounting to Rs. 6,12,171/- forthe balance period as claimed. The learned Commissioner of IncomeTax, Kota, in short ('CIT) while issuing noticeunder Section 263 of the Act, had held that thetwo orders passed by the Assessing Officerdated 30.3.2001 as well as dated 13.6.2002 wereerroneous and prejudicial to the interest ofrevenue on the basis that tax has been paid bythe assessee under MAT on the book profit underSection 115JA of the Act, which cannot be equated with payment of the advance tax by therespondent on its total income/current incomewhich is chargeable to tax following thefinancial year under consideration and furtherthat proviso to Sub-section(2) of Section115JAA dealing with the tax credit in respectof tax paid on deemed income relating tocertain companies, clearly stated that nointerest shall be payable on the tax creditaloneunderSub-section(1)thereof.Accordingly, the CIT by invoking the provisionsof Section 263 of the Act directed theAssessing Officer to withdraw the interest sogranted under Section 244A of the Act,amounting to Rs. 21,98,872/- and further Rs.6,12,171/- respectively which was allowed videtwo orders dated 30.3.2001 and 13.06.2002referred to herein above. Aggrieved by the order passed by thelearned CIT, the respondent-company preferredan appeal before the learned ITAT who, afterdetailed examination of facts and variousJudgments and the Scheme of Section 115JA ofthe Act, allowed the appeal of the Respondent-company and quashed the order under Section 263of the Act passed by the Commissioner of IncomeTax, Kota. Being aggrieved by the said orderpassed by the learned ITAT the appellantpreferred the instant appeal under Section 260A of the Act. The appellant has raised and claimedthat the following substantial questions of lawarise out of the order of the learned ITAT:- Aggrieved by the order passed by thelearned CIT, the respondent-company preferredan appeal before the learned ITAT who, afterdetailed examination of facts and variousJudgments and the Scheme of Section 115JA ofthe Act, allowed the appeal of the Respondent-company and quashed the order under Section 263of the Act passed by the Commissioner of IncomeTax, Kota. Being aggrieved by the said orderpassed by the learned ITAT the appellantpreferred the instant appeal under Section 260A of the Act. The appellant has raised and claimedthat the following substantial questions of lawarise out of the order of the learned ITAT:- “(1). Whether on the facts andcircumstances of the case and inlaw the Tribunal was legallyjustified in setting aside theorder passed by the learned CITu/s. 263 by holding that thesame was not warranted? (2).whether the findings ofthe Tribunal are perverse inholding that the proviso toSection 115JAA(2) was notapplicable in the facts andcircumstances of the case? (3).whether the Tribunal waslegally justified in upholdingthe order of the AssessingOfficer of allowing interest u/s. 244A?and (4).whether the Tribunal was justified in holding thatSection 263 was not warranted asit was simply a case of wrongrecomputation of interest and anerror apparent from the face ofrecord?” Learned counsel for the appellant, Mrs. Parinitoo Jain, has drawn our attentionto the order of the learned ITAT as well as tothe order of learned CIT, Kota and has claimedthat substantial questions of law arise out ofthe order of learned ITAT and that learned ITATwas not justified in quashing the order undersection 263 passed by the learned CIT. At this juncture, it would be appropriateto refer relevant portion of Section 115JAand Section 115JAA of the Act, which reads as under:- “115JA(1)Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinanyotherprovisions of this Act, wherein the case of an assessee,being a company, the totalincome, as computed under thisAct in respect of any previousyear relevant to the assessmentyear commencing on or after the1[st] day of April, 1997 [butbefore the 1[st] day of April,2001] (hereafter in thissection referred to as therelevant previous year) is lessthan thirty per cent of itsbook profit, the total incomeof such assessee chargeable totax for the relevant previousyear shall be deemed to be anamount equal to thirty per centof such book profit. (2) Every assessee, being acompany,shall,forthepurposes of this sectionprepare its profit and lossaccount for the relevantprevious year in accordancewith the provisions of Parts IIand III of Schedule VI to theCompanies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956):” “S115JAA(1) Whereany amount of tax is paid undersub-section (1) of Section115JA by an assessee being acompany for any assessmentyear, then, credit in respectof tax so paid shall be allowedto him in accordance with theprovisions of this Section.(1A) Where any amount of tax ispaid under sub-section(1) ofSection 115JB by an assessee,being a company for theassessment year commencing onthe 1[st]day of April,2006 and anysubsequent assessment year,then, credit in respect of taxso paid shall be allowed to himinaccordancewiththeprovisions of this section.(2). The tax credit to beallowed under sub-section(1) shall be the difference of thetax paid for any assessmentyear under sub-section(1) ofsection 115JA and the amount oftax payable by the assessee onhis total income computed inaccordance with the otherprovisions of this Act: Provided that no interest shallbe payable on the tax creditallowed under sub-section (1). It would also be relevant here toquote relevant Sections relating to advance taxpayable by Assessee namely Sections 207 and 208 of the Act, which reads as under:- shall be the difference of thetax paid for any assessmentyear under sub-section(1) ofsection 115JA and the amount oftax payable by the assessee onhis total income computed inaccordance with the otherprovisions of this Act: Provided that no interest shallbe payable on the tax creditallowed under sub-section (1). It would also be relevant here toquote relevant Sections relating to advance taxpayable by Assessee namely Sections 207 and 208 of the Act, which reads as under:- “ Section 207. Tax shall bepayable in advance during anyfinancial year, in accordance withthe provisions of Section 208 to219 (both inclusive), in respectof the total income of theassessee which would be chargeableto tax for the assessment yearimmediatelyfollowingthatfinancial year, such income beinghereafter in this Chapter referredto as ‘Current Income”.” “Section 208. Advance tax shall bepayable during a financial year inevery case where the amount ofsuch tax payable by the assesseeduring that year, as computed inaccordance with the provisions ofthis Chapter, is ‘[ ten thouseand]rupees or more]” Section 209 of the Act, provides that for making calculation for the purpose ofadvance tax, the assessee shall first estimateits current income and apply that rate of taxof income on that current income. Section 207as quoted above, provides that advance tax ispayable in respect of the “total income” which is also referred as “current income”. In the case of respondent-companyitself, the appellant department in the earlieryears was charging interest under Section 234Band Section 234C of the Act, in respect ofdeemed income under Section 115JA of the Act,in case, there was short fall of taxes andwithout any demur, the respondent-company wasalso depositing the interest in cases there wasdelay/short fall in making of installments ofadvance tax. Therefore, on this analogy, theITAT has rightly come to the conclusion thatwhen interest under Sections 234B and 234C isleviable then on the same analogy interestunder Section 244A is equally allowable to theassessee-respondent. Ultimately, the ITAT after referringto certain Judgments came to the conclusionthat when the department is charging intereston the delayed payment of installments of MATwhich the assessee was under obligation todeposit in advance then the department is alsobound to pay interest on the excess/surpluspayment made by the assessee-respondent whichthe department has very well enjoyed. It isalso observed by the ITAT that when the amountin advance is deposited by the assessee, theassessee, may not be aware that at the end ofthe financial year, the assessee would fallunder Section 115JA of the Act or the amount Ultimately, the ITAT after referringto certain Judgments came to the conclusionthat when the department is charging intereston the delayed payment of installments of MATwhich the assessee was under obligation todeposit in advance then the department is alsobound to pay interest on the excess/surpluspayment made by the assessee-respondent whichthe department has very well enjoyed. It isalso observed by the ITAT that when the amountin advance is deposited by the assessee, theassessee, may not be aware that at the end ofthe financial year, the assessee would fallunder Section 115JA of the Act or the amount deposited as an advance tax shall take colourof MAT paid in advance. The liability ofdepositing MAT became payable only because ofthe legal fiction created by the said Section.It was further observed by the ITAT that as perits income, the respondent-company was notliable to pay regular tax as there was NILincome for the assessment year 2000-2001 and infact tax paid was payable as MAT on book profitas per Section 115JA of the Act. Ultimately,the ITAT came to the conclusion that the MATpayable, on book profit is subject todetermination by way of assessment under theprovisions of the Income Tax Actand the MATdeposit made in advance under Section 115JA onthe basis of book profit is nothing but bearingthe character of tax paid in advance and whenthe Department was charging interest underSection 234B and 234C of the Act, then on thesame analogy the interest ought to have beenallowed under Section 244A on the excessdeposit. Accordingly, the ITAT came to theconclusion that granting of interest underSection 244A of the Act, by the AssessingOfficer, as per the two orders were noterroneous and prejudicial to the interest ofthe revenue on the above analogy and thusquashed the order under Section 263. We have heard the learned counsel Mrs.Parinitoo Jain at length and after hearing her, come to the conclusion that no substantialquestion of law, arises out of the order of thelearned ITAT particularly, in view of the factthat the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case ofJoint Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs. RoltaIndia Ltd. (2011)330 ITR 470 had considered theissue with reference to interest under Section234B of the Act on applicability of MATprovisions under Section 115JA of the Act, andafter detailed analysis held at page 478 asunder:- “Thequestionwhichremains to be considered is whetherthe Assessee, which is a MATCompany, was not in a position toestimate its profits of the currentyear prior to the end of thefinancial year on 31[st][M]arch. Inthis connection the Assessee placedreliance on the judgment of theKarnataka High Court in the case ofKwality Biscuits Ltd. v. CITreported in (2000) 243 ITR 519 and,according to the Karnataka HighCourt, the profit as computed underthe Income Tax Act, 1961 had to beprepared and thereafter the bookprofit as contemplated underSection 115J of the Act had to bedetermined and then, the liabilityof the Assessee to pay tax underSection 115J of the Act arose, onlyif the total income as computedunder the provisions of the Act wasless than 30 percent of the bookprofit. According to the KarnatakaHigh Court, this entire exercise ofcomputing income or the bookprofits of the company could bedone only at the end of thefinancial year and hence theprovisions of Sections 207, 208,209and 210 predecessors of Sections234B and 234C) were not applicableuntil and unless the accounts stoodaudited and the balance sheet stoodprepared, because till then eventhe Assessee may not know whether the provisions of Section 115Jwould be applied or not. The Court,therefore, held that the liabilitywould arise only after the profitis determined in accordance withthe provisions of the CompaniesAct, 1956 and, therefore, interestunder Sections 234 and 234C is notleviable in cases where Section115J applied. This view of theKarnataka High Court in KwalityBiscuits Ltd. was not shared by theGauhati High Court in Assam BengalCarriers Ltd. v.CIT reported in(1999) 239 ITR 862 and MadhyaPradesh High Court in Itarsi Oiland Flours (P.) Limited v. CITreported in (2001) 250 ITR 686 asalso by the Bombay High Court inthe case of CIT v. Kotak MahindraFinance Ltd. reported in(2003) 130TAXMAN 730 which decided the issuein favour of the Department andagainst the Assessee. It appearsthat none of the Assesseeschallenged the decisions of theGauhati High Court, Madhya PradeshHigh Court as well as Bombay HighCourt in the Supreme Court.However, it may be noted that thejudgment of the Karnataka HighCourt in Kwality Biscuits Ltd. wasconfined to Section 115J of theAct. The Order of the Supreme Courtdismissing the Special LeavePetition in limine filed by theDepartment against Kwality BiscuitsLtd. is reported in (2006) 284 ITR434. Thus, the judgment ofKarnataka High Court in KwalityBiscuits stood affirmed. However,the Karnataka High Court hasthereafter in the case of JindalThermal Power Company Ltd. v. Dy.CIT reported in (2006) 154 TAXMAN547 distinguished its own decisionin case of Kwality Biscuits Ltd.(supra) and held that Section115JB, with which we are concerned,is a self-contained code pertainingto MAT, which imposed liability forpayment of advance tax on MATcompanies and, therefore, wheresuch companies defaulted in paymentof advance tax in respect of taxpayable under Section 115JB, it wasliable to pay interest underSections 234B and 234C of the Act.Thus, it can be concluded that interest under Sections 234 and234C shall be payable on failure topay advance tax in respect of taxpayable under Section 115JA/115JB.For the aforestated reasons,CircularNo. 13/2001 dated9.11.2001 issued by CBDT reportedin (2001) 252 ITR(St.)50 has noapplication. Moreover, in anyevent, para 2 of that Circularitself indicates that a largenumber of companies liable to betaxed under MAT provisions ofSection 115JB were not makingadvance tax payments. In the saidcircular, it has been clarifiedthat Section 115JB is a self-contained code and thus, allcompanies were liable for paymentof advance tax under Section 115Jand consequently provisions ofSections 234B and 234C imposinginterest on default in payment ofadvance tax were also applicable. Fortheaforestatedreasons CIT succeeds in the CivilAppeal arising out of S.L.P. (C)No. 25746 of 2009 (Jt. CIT v. RoltaIndia Ltd.) as also in the CivilAppeal arising out of S.L.P. (C)No. 18367 of 2010 (CIT-3 v. ExportCredit Guarantee Corporation ofIndia Ltd.). Consequently, CivilAppeal No. 459 of 2006 (NaharExports v. CIT) and Civil AppealNo. 7429 of 2008 (Lakshmi PrecisionScrews Ltd. v. CIT) stand dismissedwith no order as to costs.” This Authority of the Apex Court hasalready considered the Judgment rendered by theHon'bLe Apex Court in the Case of Commissionerof Income Tax Vs. Kwality Biscuits (2006)284ITR 434 (SC) which had dismissed the appeal ofthe revenue by affirming the Judgment of theHon'ble High Court in the Case of KwalityBiscuits Ltd. Vs.CIT (2000) 243 ITR 519(Karnataka). This Authority of the Apex Court hasalready considered the Judgment rendered by theHon'bLe Apex Court in the Case of Commissionerof Income Tax Vs. Kwality Biscuits (2006)284ITR 434 (SC) which had dismissed the appeal ofthe revenue by affirming the Judgment of theHon'ble High Court in the Case of KwalityBiscuits Ltd. Vs.CIT (2000) 243 ITR 519(Karnataka). In the Case of Commissioner of IncomeTax VS. APAR Industries Ltd. (2010)323 ITR 411(Bom), the Bombay High Court was consideringthe issue as to whether the Minimum AlternateTax (MAT) to which the assessee is un-disputedly entitled must be given beforecomputing interest payable by the assesseeunder Section 234B of the Act or whether ascontended by the Revenue, the credit isallowable after the liability to pay interestunder Section 234B as computed, afterconsidering the various judgments of variousCourts, the Bombay High Court, came to theconclusion that MAT credit is to be allowedfirst and then if at all and in case, eventhereafter, there is a short fall then theinterest under Section 234B of the Act, couldbe charged. In this very case, there is anotherissue which is before us and that is withregard to allowability of interest underSection 244A on account of excess payment ofTDS, advance tax, self-assessment tax etc. theCourt in this regard held at page 429 asunder:- “In so far the secondquestion is concerned, counselappearing on behalf of theRevenue has conceded before thecourt that it would beconsequentialtothe determination of the firstquestion. As already notedearlier in this judgment, asagainst the tax payable ofRs.2.46 crores, the tax paid by the assessee amounted to Rs.4.24 Crores after giving dueadjustment for MAT credit, TDS,advance tax and self-assessmenttax.Theassesseewas,therefore, entitled to a refundof excess tax paid for theassessment year 2000-01 over andabove the tax which was computedas being due and payable.Interest under Section 244A wasallowable. As we have alreadynoted, it has been stated onbehalf of the Revenue during thecourse of the hearing that theanswer to the second questionwould be consequential to thedetermination of the firstquestion. Consequently, thesecond question shall standanswered in favour of theassesseeandagainsttheRevenue.” The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court inthe Case of Commissioner of Income-Tax AndAnother vs. Vijaya Bank (2011) 338 ITR 489(Karn), under identical circumstances held thatMAT provisions were applicable and the Hon'bleCourt observed as under:- “Therefore, the objectbehind insertion of Section244A as understood by theDepartmentisthat,anAssessee is entitled topayment of interest for moneyremaining with the Governmentwhich would be ordered to berefunded. Therefore, if thatis the object behind theinsertion of Section 244A, thecontention of the Revenue thatif the case does not fallunder either of the clauses inSection 244A, no interest ispayable, is without anysubstance. Clauses (a) and (b)specifically refer to theinstances where interest is The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court inthe Case of Commissioner of Income-Tax AndAnother vs. Vijaya Bank (2011) 338 ITR 489(Karn), under identical circumstances held thatMAT provisions were applicable and the Hon'bleCourt observed as under:- “Therefore, the objectbehind insertion of Section244A as understood by theDepartmentisthat,anAssessee is entitled topayment of interest for moneyremaining with the Governmentwhich would be ordered to berefunded. Therefore, if thatis the object behind theinsertion of Section 244A, thecontention of the Revenue thatif the case does not fallunder either of the clauses inSection 244A, no interest ispayable, is without anysubstance. Clauses (a) and (b)specifically refer to theinstances where interest is paid under the Act. It is notexhaustive. It is possible, ina given case, that after theexpiry of the financial year,the Assessee may pay taxeither along with the self-assessment return or evenbefore the return is filed. Ifultimately the said payment isfound to be in excess and theDepartment chooses to refundthe said amount, then thequestion would be, from whatdate interest is payable sinceinterest is payable on suchrefunds under Section 244A. Inthe absence of an expressproviso as contained in Clause(a), it cannot be said thatthe interest is payable fromthe 1st of April of theassessment year. At the sametime, as the said payment oftax was not made in pursuanceof a notice of demand issuedunder Section 156, explanationto Clause (b) has noapplication. In such cases, asthe opening words of Clause(b) specifically referred to"as in any other case", theinterest is payable from thedates of payment of the tax.As Clause (b) expresslyprovides in any other case thepayment of tax subsequent tothe first day of April of theassessment year, either beforeor along with filing of thereturn would squarely fallunderClause(b)andtherefore, when the saidamount is ordered to berefunded, the interest is tobe calculated from the date ofsuch payment of tax. Havingregard to the scheme ofSection 244A, and the circularissued by the Board whichshows how the Department hasunderstood the Section coupledwith the fact that theprinciple underlying the saidsection is that, any excesspayment of tax paid by theAssessee is not only to berefunded but it has to berefunded with interest, if thecase of the Assessee does not fall under Clause (a) or theexplanation to Clause (b), theexcess tax paid shall berefunded with interest fromthe date of payment of suchtax. In the instant case, it isnot in dispute that theAssessee has paid a sum of Rs.15.5 crores on 29.06.2002,even before the date of filingof the returns. It is thatamount which is ordered to berefunded as excess paymentThough the occasion to orderfor refund arose after theassessment order in which thepayment of tax was adjustedtowards the tax liability, thecase does not fall underClause (a) or explanation toClause (b). The said excesspayment is to be refunded withinterest from the date ofpayment of such tax, that isfrom 29.06.2002, till the dateof refund. This is preciselywhattheAppellateCommissioner as well as theTribunal has said. It is inaccordance with law. Noillegality nor any case forinterference is made out. Thesubstantial question of law isanswered in favour of theAssessee and against therevenue.Appealstandsdismissed. No costs.” We have gone through the language ofSection 234A,234B and 234C of the Act as wellas the language of Section 244A and we feelthat the language is almost same in all theabove sections, in as much as, while inSection 234A,234B and 234C, the department isentitled to charge/levy interest in case,there is short fall of payment of advance taxor otherwise, however, in case, the assessee We have gone through the language ofSection 234A,234B and 234C of the Act as wellas the language of Section 244A and we feelthat the language is almost same in all theabove sections, in as much as, while inSection 234A,234B and 234C, the department isentitled to charge/levy interest in case,there is short fall of payment of advance taxor otherwise, however, in case, the assessee has deposited the excess amount by way ofadvance tax or TDS the assessee thus, becomeentitled to grant of interest under Section244A of the Act. Revisional powers conferred on theCommissioner under Section 263 of the Act iswide, it enables the CIT to call for andexamine the record of the case or pass anyorder under the Act and also empowers him tomake or cause to be made such an inquiry as hedeems fit and necessary in order to find out,if the order passed by the Assessing Officeris erroneous in so far as it is prejudicialto the interest of Revenue, however, he has tohave certain material to come to theconclusion. Once, he comes to the aboveconclusion that there is material, the CIT isempowered to pass an order as per thecircumstances of the case which may warrantas he is empowered to take recourse to anyof the three courses indicated in Section 263only. Therefore, it is clear that CIT does nothaveun-fatteredandun-chequereddiscretion/power to reverse the order. He cando so within the bounds of the law and has tosatisfy the need of fairness in action andfair play with due respect to the principle ofAudi Alteram Partem as envisaged in theConstitution. The law is well settled that theCIT cannot invoke the powers to correct each and every mistake or error committed by theAssessing Officer. Every loss to the Revenue,cannot be treated as prejudicial to theinterest of the Revenue and if the AssessingOfficer has adopted one of the coursepermissible under the law or where two viewsare possible and the Assessing Officer hastaken one view which the CIT does not agree,it cannot be treated as an order erroneous andprejudicial to the interest of the Revenue,the Assessing Officer exercises quasi judicialpower vested in him and if he exercises suchpowers in accordance with law, arrives at ajust conclusion such conclusion cannot betermed to be erroneous only because the CITdoes not feel satisfied with the conclusion. In view of the fact that in the caseof assessee respondent itself, while interestwas being charged in the past under Section s234B and 234C of the Act, therefore, theAssessing Officer rightly allowed the interestunder Section 244 A of the Act. Grantinginterest by the Assessing Officer undersection 244A was not erroneous in our view,two views are possible and when two viewsare possible even otherwise provisions ofSection 263 cannot be invoked. Further in viewof the catena of Judgments referred to above,the respondent company was even otherwiseentitled to interest under Section 244A of the Act. Thus, viewed from all angles, the learned ITAT had rightly come to the correctconclusion and rightly quashed the order ofthe CIT under section 263 of the Act. Thus, in so far as the issue involvedin the present appeal is concerned, when ithas been decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court inthe case referred to above(Supra), having beencovered, as such, the Assessiong Officer, wasquite justified in allowing the interest underSection 244A of the Act. Act. Thus, viewed from all angles, the learned ITAT had rightly come to the correctconclusion and rightly quashed the order ofthe CIT under section 263 of the Act. Thus, in so far as the issue involvedin the present appeal is concerned, when ithas been decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court inthe case referred to above(Supra), having beencovered, as such, the Assessiong Officer, wasquite justified in allowing the interest underSection 244A of the Act. We have extracted the proposedsubstantial questions of law herein above andin question (ii), the issue which has beenraised about applicability of proviso toSection 115 JAA(2) of the Act, however, thesaid Proviso is not applicable in so far asthis matter is concerned, firstly, the presentappeal relates to the Assessment Year 2000-2001 when Section 115JA was applicable andsecondly proviso to Section 115JAA itself,came to be introduced from 1.4.2006 therefore,even otherwise, the question No.(ii) is mis-conceived and not relevant to the year underappeal. Therefore, even otherwise, the CITwhile invoking the provisions of Section 263was not correct in drawing analogy of section115JAA and its proviso which even otherwise,was not applicable for the year under appeal.The legislatures in its own wisdom have not enacted such proviso or bar for payment ofinterest in excess deposit under Section 115JAof the Act, with which we are concerned inthis appeal. In view of the aforesaid Judgments of the Apex Court and various otherCourts, granting of interest under Section 244A of the Act, is justified, therefore, thelearned CIT had committed an error in invokingthe provisions of Section 263 of the Act andthe learned ITAT had rightly quashed theinvoking of the provisions of Section 263 ofthe Act. No substantial questions of law ariseout of the order of the ITAT in view of theabove judgments, the appeal, being devoid ofmerit is dismissed in limine. (J.K.Ranka),J. (Narendra Kumar Jain), J. All corrections made in the Judgment/Order have been incorporated in theJudgment/Order being emailed. RK BhattPSJW