Dilip Singhvi v. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room

D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2689/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachhraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years,R/o D-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. ----Appellant Versus 1. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Rajasthan.Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 2. Shri Ramjiyavan S/o Shri Bekaru, R/o Village Phoolpur,Post Kalwari, District Basti, Uttar Pradesh.Post Kalwari, District Basti, Uttar Pradesh. ----Respondents Connected With D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2686/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachhraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years, R/o D-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur,raj. ----Appellant Versus 1. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur,raj.Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur,raj. 2. Shri Ramjiyavan S/o Shri Bekaru, R/o Village Phoolpur,Post Kalwari, Dist. Basti, Uttar PradeshPost Kalwari, Dist. Basti, Uttar Pradesh ----Respondents D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2687/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years, R/oD-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur,raj. ----Appellant Versus 1. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur,raj.Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur,raj. 2. Shri Ramjiyavan S/o Shri Bekaru, R/o Village Phoolpur,Post Kalwari, Dist. Basti, Uttar PradeshPost Kalwari, Dist. Basti, Uttar Pradesh ----Respondents D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2688/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachhraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years,R/o D-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur,raj. ----Appellant Versus 1. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room No. 103, Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur,raj.Room No. 103, Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur,raj. 2. Shri Ramjiyavan S/o Shri Bekaru, R/o Village Phoolpur,Post Kalwari, Dist. Basti, Uttar PradeshPost Kalwari, Dist. Basti, Uttar Pradesh ----Respondents D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2691/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachhraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years,R/o D-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. ----Appellant Versus 1. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Rajasthan.Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 2. Shri Ramjiyavan S/o Shri Bekaru, R/o Village Phoolpur,Post Kalwari, District Basti, Uttar Pradesh.Post Kalwari, District Basti, Uttar Pradesh. ----Respondents D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2692/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachhraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years,R/o D-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. ----Appellant Versus 1. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Rajasthan.Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 2. Shri Ramjiyavan S/o Shri Bekaru, R/o Village Phoolpur,Post Kalwari, District Basti, Uttar Pradesh.Post Kalwari, District Basti, Uttar Pradesh. ----Respondents D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2693/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachhraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years,R/o D-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. ----Appellant Versus 1. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Raj.Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Raj. 2. Shri Ramjiyavan S/o Shri Bekaru, Village Phoolpur, PostKalwari, Distt. Basti, Uttar Pradesh.Kalwari, Distt. Basti, Uttar Pradesh. ----Respondents D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2694/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachhraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years,R/o D-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur, Raj. ----Appellant Versus ----Respondents D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2693/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachhraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years,R/o D-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. ----Appellant Versus 1. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Raj.Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Raj. 2. Shri Ramjiyavan S/o Shri Bekaru, Village Phoolpur, PostKalwari, Distt. Basti, Uttar Pradesh.Kalwari, Distt. Basti, Uttar Pradesh. ----Respondents D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 2694/2024 Dilip Singhvi S/o Shri Bachhraj Singhvi, Aged About 60 Years,R/o D-160, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur, Raj. ----Appellant Versus 1. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax (Bpu), Jaipur,Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Raj.Room No. 103-Na, New Central Revenue Building, StatueCircle, Jaipur, Raj. 2. Shri Ramjiyavan S/o Shri Bekaru, Village Phoolpur, PostKalwari, Distt. Basti, Up.Kalwari, Distt. Basti, Up. ----Respondents For Appellant(s): Mr. Nikhil DungawatFor Respondent(s): Mr. K.K. BissaFor Respondent(s): Mr. K.K. Bissa HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA PRAKASH SHRIMALI 03/02/2025 Order 1.Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Nikhil Dungawatsubmits that all the appeals pertain to the proceedings initiatedunder the Prohibition of Benami Properties Transactions Act, 1988(for short, ‘the PBPT Act’) by the respondent No.1 - Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (BPU), Jaipur while acting asInitiating Officer. 1.1. Mr. Dungawat also submits that the controversy involved inthe present appeals pertains to the provisional attachment orderspassed by the Appropriate Authorities under Section 24(5) of thePBPT Act in the year 2019, which were subsequently revoked bythe Adjudicating Authorities under Section 26(3) of the PBPT Actin the year 2021. 1.2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that suchrevocation orders were challenged by the respondents herein byfiling a joint appeal in November 2021 before the AppellateTribunal; however, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the saidappeal on 15.02.2023 while granting liberty to them to fileseparate appeals for each reference, recognizing the distinctnature of the attachment orders and ensuring separateexplanation of the factual matrix for each. 1.3. Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellant submits thatones the specific order dated 15.02.2023 was there, it was theduty of the respondents to file separate appeals; however, withoutdoing so, they sought and were granted time extension of threeweeks’ on 27.07.2023, which set a deadline of 17.08.2023, butdespite this, they failed to do so and even then, all the appealswere brought before the Appellate Tribunal after a delay runningfrom 50 to 200 days. 1.4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that theapplication for condonation of delay does not constitute anyreasons as to why the delay has been caused and, thus, it is a fitcase where the strict interpretation of the limitation law must be taken. He also submits that the reasons of delay are vague,unspecific and misleading. 1.5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the transfersorder of the Initiating Officer has been mentioned but such orderhas not been brought on record. He also submits that there was aspecific deployment of the Officers assigned to such duties has notbeen placed on record. He further submits that the failure toconsult and obtain opinion of Office of the SPP is an ambiguousaverment because the dates of such requests sent to the SPP forconsideration have not been given. 1.6. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed relied on thefollowing decisions :- (i)Judgment dated 24.02.2012 rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Office of the Chief Post Master taken. He also submits that the reasons of delay are vague,unspecific and misleading. 1.5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the transfersorder of the Initiating Officer has been mentioned but such orderhas not been brought on record. He also submits that there was aspecific deployment of the Officers assigned to such duties has notbeen placed on record. He further submits that the failure toconsult and obtain opinion of Office of the SPP is an ambiguousaverment because the dates of such requests sent to the SPP forconsideration have not been given. 1.6. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed relied on thefollowing decisions :- (i)Judgment dated 24.02.2012 rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (CivilAppeal Nos.2474-2475 of 2012) reported in AIR 2012 SC 1506, wherein it is held as under:- “8) Though the learned ASG heavily relied on the abovesaid decisions and the principles laid down, on goingthrough all the factual details, we are of the view thatthere is no quarrel about the propositions inferred therein.However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstancesof each case, this Court either condoned the delay orupheld the order of the High Court condoning the delay infiling appeal by the State. While keeping those principles inmind, let us consider the reasonings placed by the PostalDepartment with regard to the same. 9) In view of the stand taken by the Postal Department asto the reasons for the delay and the serious objections ofthe respondents, it is desirable to extract the entirestatement as placed in the form of “better affidavit” by theofficer of the appellant-Department:- “I, Aparajeet Pattanayak presently posted as SSRM, AirMail Sorting Division, New Delhi, do hereby solemnlyaffirm and state as under:- 1) In the official capacity mentioned above, I amacquainted with the facts of the case on the basis ofthe information derived from the record. 2) On the last date of hearing i.e. 05.12.2011 thisHon’ble Court was pleased to allow the petitions to filebetter affidavit in support of the application forcondonation of delay in filing Special Leave Petition. 3) It is submitted that the delay is not intentional but ison account of the departmental/administrativeprocedures involved in for filing the petition for SpecialLeave Petition. It is submitted that unlike the privatelitigant the matters relating to government arerequired to be considered at various levels and thenonly a decision is taken. 4) In the present case it would be evident from thefollowing that delay has been caused due tounavoidable circumstances:-11.09.2009 Date of judgment in LPA Nos. Date of judgment in LPA Nos.418/2007 and 1006/2007.418/2007 and 1006/2007. 29.10.2009 Certified copy of judgment notreceived from the Governmentcounsel and hence copy ofjudgment was downloaded fromthe web site of Delhi High Courtand office note was put by ASP(Court) proposing to refer thematter to Postal Directorate foropinion and further course ofaction for approval of the ChiefPostmaster General, Delhi.received from the Governmentcounsel and hence copy ofjudgment was downloaded fromthe web site of Delhi High Courtand office note was put by ASP(Court) proposing to refer thematter to Postal Directorate foropinion and further course ofaction for approval of the ChiefPostmaster General, Delhi. 12.11.2009Chief Postmaster General Delhiapproved to refer the matter toDirectorate.approved to refer the matter toDirectorate. 16.12.2009Directorate desired to submit legalopinion and certified copy ofjudgment. opinion and certified copy ofjudgment. 12.11.2009Chief Postmaster General Delhiapproved to refer the matter toDirectorate.approved to refer the matter toDirectorate. 16.12.2009Directorate desired to submit legalopinion and certified copy ofjudgment. opinion and certified copy ofjudgment. 08.01.2010The counsel appearing on behalf ofthe petitioner had applied for thecertified copy of the impugnedjudgment and order and the samewas received by the Departmenton 08.01.2010.the petitioner had applied for thecertified copy of the impugnedjudgment and order and the samewas received by the Departmenton 08.01.2010. 11.01.2010 The desired documents supplied toDirectorate.Directorate. 25.01.2010Directorate desired to submitcopies of original writ petition filedby the party, counter affidavitthereto, copies of appeals filed byDOP & counter reply thereto.copies of original writ petition filedby the party, counter affidavitthereto, copies of appeals filed byDOP & counter reply thereto.12.02.2010The desired documents supplied toDirectorate.Directorate. 17.02.2010Directorate desired to send anofficial/officer well conversant withthe case. official/officer well conversant withthe case. 14.01.2011 Shri A.K. Sharma was requested toarrange to collect the abovemagazines from the record of DelhiHigh Court. 31.01.2011 SSRM Delhi Sorting Division wasauthorized to sign the affidavit onbehalf of the respondent. 10.02.2011 Special Leave Petition filed inSupreme Court. 5. It is submitted that it is evident from the foregoingreasons that the delay caused in filing the petition wasresult of all the necessary and unavoidable officeformalities and was bonafide and not deliberate orintentional and the petitioner was prevented bysufficient cause from filing the petition within theperiod of limitation. 6. It is further submitted that the petitioner humblyseeks leave to draw the kind attention of this Hon’bleCourt to the views expressed by this Hon’ble Court thatliberal approach may be adopted and that the Courtshould not take too strict and pedantic stand which willcause injustice while considering the application forcondonation of delay, in terms of its judgments in thecase of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs.Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Bhag Singh & Anr. Vs. MajorDaljeet Singh & Ors. It is submitted that the principlesfor condonation of delay laid down in the above citedcases may therefore be adopted in the present casealso. 7. This Hon’ble Court in G. Ramegowda Vs. SpecialLand Acquisition Officer, (1998) 2 SCC 142 laid downthat the expression sufficient cause in Section 5 of theLimitation Act, 1963 must receive a liberal constructionso as to advance substantial justice where no grossnegligence or deliberate inaction of lack of bonafide isimputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. 8. In the matter of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani,reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132, this Hon’ble Courtobserved and laid down as follows:- 7. This Hon’ble Court in G. Ramegowda Vs. SpecialLand Acquisition Officer, (1998) 2 SCC 142 laid downthat the expression sufficient cause in Section 5 of theLimitation Act, 1963 must receive a liberal constructionso as to advance substantial justice where no grossnegligence or deliberate inaction of lack of bonafide isimputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. 8. In the matter of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani,reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132, this Hon’ble Courtobserved and laid down as follows:- “when the State is an applicant, praying forcondonation of delay, it is common knowledge thaton account of impersonal machinery and theinherited bureaucratic methodology imbued withthe note- making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is lessdifficult to understand but more difficult toapprove, but the State represents collective causeof the community. It is axiomatic that decisions aretaken by officers/agencies proverbially at slowpace and encumbered process of pushing the filesfrom table to table and keeping it on the table forconsiderable time causing delay - intentional orotherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay ofprocedural red-tape in the process of their makingdecision is a common feature. Therefore, certainamount of latitude is not impermissible. If theappeals brought by the State are lost for suchdefault, no person is individually affected but whatin the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest.The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism injustice- oriented approach rather than thetechnical detection of sufficient cause forexplaining every day’s delay. 9. This Hon’ble Court in Union of India vs. Manager,Jain and Associates, 2001 (3) SCC 277 decided on06.02.2011 has held that delay ought to becondoned when sufficiently explained particularlywhere party seeking condonation is the Government.It is further submitted that the Hon’ble High Courtought to have condoned the delay in considering thepublic revenue involved and also because of thegenuine difficulties and circumstances beyond thecontrol of the petitioner, on account of which SpecialLeave Petition could not be filed within the time.”10) … … … 11) We have already extracted the reasons as mentionedin the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak,SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant tonote that in the said affidavit, the Department has itselfmentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of theDivision Bench of the High Court in LPA Nos. 418 and 1006of 2007 as 11.09.2009. Even according to the deponent,their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the saidjudgment only on 08.01.2010 and the same was receivedby the Department on the very same day. There is noexplanation for not applying for certified copy of theimpugned judgment on 11.09.2009 or at least within areasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copywas applied only on 08.01.2010, i.e. after a period ofnearly four months. In spite of affording anotheropportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequatematerial, neither the Department nor the person in-chargehas filed any explanation for not applying the certified copywithin the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned inthe affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly showthat there was delay at every stage and except mentioningthe dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, thereis no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned.Though it was stated by the Department that the delay wasdue to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties,the fact remains that from day one the Department or theperson/persons concerned have not evinced diligence inprosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriatesteps. 12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned werewell aware or conversant with the issues involved includingthe prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matterby way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. Theycannot claim that they have a separate period of limitationwhen the Department was possessed with competentpersons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence ofplausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing aquestion why the delay is to be condoned mechanicallymerely because the Government or a wing of theGovernment is a party before us. Though we are consciousof the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay whenthere was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lackof bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted toadvance substantial justice, we are of the view that in thefacts and circumstances, the Department cannot takeadvantage of various earlier decisions. The claim onaccount of impersonal machinery and inheritedbureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannotbe accepted in view of the modern technologies being usedand available. The law of limitation undoubtedly bindseverybody including the Government. 13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all thegovernment bodies, their agencies and instrumentalitiesthat unless they have reasonable and acceptableexplanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort,there is no need to accept the usual explanation that thefile was kept pending for several months/years due toconsiderable degree of procedural red-tape in the process.The government departments are under a specialobligation to ensure that they perform their duties withdiligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is anexception and should not be used as an anticipated benefitfor government departments. The law shelters everyoneunder the same light and should not be swirled for thebenefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was noproper explanation offered by the Department for the delayexcept mentioning of various dates, according to us, theDepartment has miserably failed to give any acceptableand cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a hugedelay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissedon the ground of delay.” (ii)Judgment dated 03.04.2024 rendered by Hon’ble theSupreme Court in Union of India & Anr. Vs. JahangirByramji Jeejeebhoy (D) Through His LR [Arising out ofSLP (Civil) No.21096/2019] :2024 INSC 262, whereinit is held as under:- “26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which thecourt must take into consideration while consideringwhether the delay should be condoned or not. From thetenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears thatthey want to fix their own period of limitation for institutingthe proceedings for which law has prescribed a period oflimitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right tohave the matter considered on merits because of his owninaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, hecannot be heard to plead that the substantial justicedeserves to be preferred as against the technicalconsiderations. While considering the plea for condonationof delay, the court must not start with the merits of themain matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain thebona fides of the explanation offered by the party seekingcondonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned bythe litigant and the opposition of the other side is equallybalanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of thematter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is notmerely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation arebased on the principles of sound public policy andprinciples of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword ofDamocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent forindefinite period of time to be determined at the whimsand fancies of the appellants.28. … … … 29. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v.Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5SCC 459, this Court rejected the application forcondonation of delay of 4 years in filing an application toset aside an exparte decree on the ground that the explanation offered for condonation of delay is found to benot satisfied. 30. In Postmaster General and others v. Living MediaIndia Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, whiledismissing the application for condonation of delay of 427days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held thatcondonation of delay is not an exception and it should notbe used as an anticipated benefit for the governmentdepartments. In that case, this Court held that unless theDepartment has reasonable and acceptable reason for thedelay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need toaccept the usual explanation that the file was kept pendingfor several months/years due to considerable degree ofprocedural red tape in the process cannot be accepted. InPara Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 respectively, this Courtdealt with the scope of ‘sufficient cause’ and held asfollows: “25. We have already extracted the reasons asmentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr.Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division,New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the saidaffidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and isaware of the date of the judgment of the DivisionBench of the High Court in Office of the ChiefPostmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. [(2009) 8 AD201 (Del)] as 11-9-2009. Even according to thedeponent, their counsel had applied for the certifiedcopy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and thesame was received by the Department on the verysame day. There is no explanation for not applying forthe certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The factremains that the certified copy was applied for only on8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to filebetter affidavit by placing adequate material, neitherthe Department nor the person-in-charge has filed anyexplanation for not applying the certified copy withinthe prescribed period. The other dates mentioned inthe affidavit which we have already extracted, clearlyshow that there was delay at every stage and exceptmentioning the dates of receipt of the file and thedecision taken, there is no explanation as to why suchdelay had occasioned. Though it was stated by theDepartment that the delay was due to unavoidablecircumstances and genuine difficulties, the factremains that from day one the Department or theperson/persons concerned have not evinced diligencein prosecuting the matter to this Court by takingappropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concernedwere well aware or conversant with the issues involvedincluding the prescribed period of limitation for takingup the matter by way of filing a special leave petitionin this Court. They cannot claim that they have aseparate period of limitation when the Department waspossessed with competent persons familiar with courtproceedings. In the absence of plausible andacceptable explanation, we are posing a question whythe delay is to be condoned mechanically merelybecause the Government or a wing of the Governmentis a party before us. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concernedwere well aware or conversant with the issues involvedincluding the prescribed period of limitation for takingup the matter by way of filing a special leave petitionin this Court. They cannot claim that they have aseparate period of limitation when the Department waspossessed with competent persons familiar with courtproceedings. In the absence of plausible andacceptable explanation, we are posing a question whythe delay is to be condoned mechanically merelybecause the Government or a wing of the Governmentis a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in amatter of condonation of delay when there was nogross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides, a liberal concession has to be adopted toadvance substantial justice, we are of the view that inthe facts and circumstances, the Department cannottake advantage of various earlier decisions. The claimon account of impersonal machinery and inheritedbureaucratic methodology of making several notescannot be accepted in view of the modern technologiesbeing used and available. The law of limitationundoubtedly binds everybody, including theGovernment.29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all thegovernmentbodies,theiragenciesandinstrumentalities that unless they have reasonable andacceptable explanation for the delay and there wasbona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usualexplanation that the file was kept pending for severalmonths/years due to considerable degree of proceduralred tape in the process. The government departmentsare under a special obligation to ensure that theyperform their duties with diligence and commitment.Condonation of delay is an exception and should not beused as an anticipated benefit for the governmentdepartments. The law shelters everyone under thesame light and should not be swirled for the benefit ofa few.” 31. In the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs v. State of Andhra Pradesh & others, (2011) 4 SCC 363, this Court made the following observations: “20. In N. Balakrishnan, [(1998) 7 SCC 123] this Courtagain reiterated the principle that: (SCC p. 127, para11)again reiterated the principle that: (SCC p. 127, para11) “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroythe rights of parties. They are meant to see that[the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, butseek their remedy promptly.” the rights of parties. They are meant to see that[the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, butseek their remedy promptly.” 21 to 27......… 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale,which could have impelled the High Court to condonethe delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable.The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justiceoriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot beemployed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroythe rights of parties. They are meant to see that[the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, butseek their remedy promptly.” the rights of parties. They are meant to see that[the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, butseek their remedy promptly.” 21 to 27......… 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale,which could have impelled the High Court to condonethe delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable.The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justiceoriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot beemployed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the court concludes thatthere is no justification for the delay. In our opinion,the approach adopted by the High Court tends to showthe absence of judicial balance and restraint, which aJudge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating anylis between the parties. We are rather pained to noticethat in this case, not being satisfied with the use ofmere intemperate language, the High Court resorted toblatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strongintemperate or extravagant language in a judgmenthas been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in anumber of cases. Whilst considering applications forcondonation of delay under Section 5 of the LimitationAct, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridleddiscretionary powers. All discretionary powers,especially judicial powers, have to be exercised withinreasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretionhas to be exercised in a systematic manner informedby reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices orpredilections cannot and should not form the basis ofexercising discretionary powers.” 32.… … … 33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. ManagingCommittee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, this Court made the followingobservations: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles thatcan broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with anapplication for condonation of delay, for the courts arenot supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged toremove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should beunderstood in their proper spirit, philosophy andpurpose regard being had to the fact that these termsare basically elastic and are to be applied in properperspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount andpivotal the technical considerations should not be givenundue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached todeliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence onthe part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken noteof. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a partyseeking condonation of delay is a significant andrelevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence tostrict proof should not affect public justice and causepublic mischief because the courts are required to bevigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is noreal failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has toencapsulate the conception of reasonableness and itcannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinatedelay and a delay of short duration or few days, for tothe former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereasto the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, thefirst one warrants strict approach whereas the secondcalls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of aparty relating to its inaction or negligence are relevantfactors to be taken into consideration. It is so as thefundamental principle is that the courts are required toweigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of bothparties and the said principle cannot be given a totalgo by in the name of liberal approach. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinatedelay and a delay of short duration or few days, for tothe former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereasto the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, thefirst one warrants strict approach whereas the secondcalls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of aparty relating to its inaction or negligence are relevantfactors to be taken into consideration. It is so as thefundamental principle is that the courts are required toweigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of bothparties and the said principle cannot be given a totalgo by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted orthe grounds urged in the application are fanciful, thecourts should be vigilant not to expose the other sideunnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one getsaway with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation bytaking recourse to the technicalities of law oflimitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to becarefully scrutinised and the approach should be basedon the paradigm of judicial discretion which is foundedon objective reasoning and not on individualperception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entityrepresenting a collective cause should be given someacceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some moreguidelines taking note of the present day scenario.They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delayshould be drafted with careful concern and not in ahaphazard manner harbouring the notion that thecourts are required to condone delay on the bedrock ofthe principle that adjudication of a lis on merits isseminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delayshould not be dealt with in a routine manner on thebase of individual philosophy which is basicallysubjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid downregard being had to the concept of judicial discretion,yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency andcollegiality of the adjudicatory system should be madeas that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay asa non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisicalpropensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant mannerrequires to be curbed, of course, within legalparameters.” 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to theconclusion that the High Court committed no error muchless any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisoryjurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.” (iii)Judgment dated 08.04.2024 rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)[Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248/2018] :2024INSC 286, wherein it is held as under:-[Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248/2018] :2024INSC 286, wherein it is held as under:- “26.On a harmonious consideration of the provisions ofthe law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by thisCourt, it is evident that:the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by thisCourt, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policythat there should be an end to litigation byforfeiting the right to remedy rather than theright itself;that there should be an end to litigation byforfeiting the right to remedy rather than theright itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not beenexercised or availed of for a long time mustcome to an end or cease to exist after a fixedperiod of time;exercised or availed of for a long time mustcome to an end or cease to exist after a fixedperiod of time; “26.On a harmonious consideration of the provisions ofthe law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by thisCourt, it is evident that:the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by thisCourt, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policythat there should be an end to litigation byforfeiting the right to remedy rather than theright itself;that there should be an end to litigation byforfeiting the right to remedy rather than theright itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not beenexercised or availed of for a long time mustcome to an end or cease to exist after a fixedperiod of time;exercised or availed of for a long time mustcome to an end or cease to exist after a fixedperiod of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to beconstrued differently, such as Section 3 has tobe construed in a strict sense whereas Section5 has to be construed liberally;construed differently, such as Section 3 has tobe construed in a strict sense whereas Section5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice,though liberal approach, justice-orientedapproach or cause of substantial justice maybe kept in mind but the same cannot be usedto defeat the substantial law of limitationcontained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;though liberal approach, justice-orientedapproach or cause of substantial justice maybe kept in mind but the same cannot be usedto defeat the substantial law of limitationcontained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretionto condone the delay if sufficient cause hadbeen explained, but that exercise of power isdiscretionary in nature and may not beexercised even if sufficient cause isestablished for various factors such as, wherethere is inordinate delay, negligence and wantof due diligence;to condone the delay if sufficient cause hadbeen explained, but that exercise of power isdiscretionary in nature and may not beexercised even if sufficient cause isestablished for various factors such as, wherethere is inordinate delay, negligence and wantof due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similarmatter, it does not mean that others are alsoentitled to the same benefit if the court is notsatisfied with the cause shown for the delay infiling the appeal;matter, it does not mean that others are alsoentitled to the same benefit if the court is notsatisfied with the cause shown for the delay infiling the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to beconsidered in condoning the delay; andconsidered in condoning the delay; and(viii) Delay condonation application has to bedecided on the parameters laid down forcondoning the delay and condoning the delaydecided on the parameters laid down forcondoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have beenimposed, tantamounts to disregarding thestatutory provision. 27. … … … 28.… … … 29. The other decision relied upon in this regard is thecase of Imrat Lal & Ors. vs. Land AcquisitionCollector & Ors.[10]. In this case also the matter wasregarding determination of compensation for theacquired land and there was a delay of 1110 days infiling the appeal for enhancement of compensation.Despite findings that no sufficient cause was shownin the application for condoning the delay, this Courtcondoned the delay in filing the appeal as a largenumber of similarly situate persons have beengranted relief by this Court. 30. … … … 31. for the reason that the conditions have beenimposed, tantamounts to disregarding thestatutory provision. 27. … … … 28.… … … 29. The other decision relied upon in this regard is thecase of Imrat Lal & Ors. vs. Land AcquisitionCollector & Ors.[10]. In this case also the matter wasregarding determination of compensation for theacquired land and there was a delay of 1110 days infiling the appeal for enhancement of compensation.Despite findings that no sufficient cause was shownin the application for condoning the delay, this Courtcondoned the delay in filing the appeal as a largenumber of similarly situate persons have beengranted relief by this Court. 30. … … … 31. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submittedon the basis of additional documents that inconnection with the land acquisition in some otherSpecial Leave Petitions, delay was condoned taking alenient view and the compensation was enhancedwith the rider that the claimants shall not be entitledfor statutory benefits for the period of delay inapproaching this Court or the High Court. The saidorders do not clearly spell out the facts and thereasons explaining the delay in filing the appeal(s)but the fact remains that the delay was condoned bytaking too liberal an approach and putting conditionswhich have not been approved of by this Court itself.In the absence of the facts for getting the delaycondoned in the referred cases, vis-à-vis, the factsof this case, it cannot be said that the facts or thereasons of getting the delay condoned are identicalor similar. Therefore, we are unable to exercise ourdiscretionary power of condoning the delay in filingthe appeal on parity with the above order(s). 32. Moreover, the High Court, in the facts of this case,has not found it fit to exercise its discretionaryjurisdiction of condoning the delay. There is nooccasion for us to interfere with the discretion soexercised by the High Court for the reasonsrecorded. First, the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing theproposed appeal. Secondly, most of the claimantshave accepted the decision of the reference court.Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not beensubstituted and made party to the reference beforeits decision, they could have applied for proceduralreview which they never did. Thus, there isapparently no due diligence on their part in pursuingthe matter. Accordingly, in our opinion, High Court isjustified in refusing to condone the delay in filing theappeal. In the above situation, we do not deem it proper andnecessary to interfere with the decision of the HighCourt refusing to condone the inordinate delay infiling the proposed appeal.” (iv)Order dated 14.02.2022 rendered by the Division Bench ofthis Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. M/s. Devthis Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. M/s. Dev Ganga Enterprises (D.B. Special Appeal WritNo.493/2019), wherein it is held as under:- “Though the case is listed for order we find thatthere is long and unexplained delay of 318 days in filingthe appeal. In order to explain delay, all that has beenstated in the application is as below "2. The the obtaining the copy of the order dated16.02.2018 legal opinion of the Government Counselwas given, which accordingly was forwarded to higherauthorities.16.02.2018 legal opinion of the Government Counselwas given, which accordingly was forwarded to higherauthorities. 3.That the matter was then considered by theCommittee and it was decided to file appeal in theorder dated 16.02.2018. 4.That after grant of sanction the officer in-chargewas appointed in the matter. Ganga Enterprises (D.B. Special Appeal WritNo.493/2019), wherein it is held as under:- “Though the case is listed for order we find thatthere is long and unexplained delay of 318 days in filingthe appeal. In order to explain delay, all that has beenstated in the application is as below "2. The the obtaining the copy of the order dated16.02.2018 legal opinion of the Government Counselwas given, which accordingly was forwarded to higherauthorities.16.02.2018 legal opinion of the Government Counselwas given, which accordingly was forwarded to higherauthorities. 3.That the matter was then considered by theCommittee and it was decided to file appeal in theorder dated 16.02.2018. 4.That after grant of sanction the officer in-chargewas appointed in the matter. 5.That the officer-in-charge after receiving theinformation conta