Dwaraka Nath v. Income Tax Officers[[1]]In The Following Words

HON’BLE SHRI G.S. SINGHVI, THE CHIEF JUSTICEAND HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE G.V. SEETHAPATHY WRIT APPEAL NO.796 OF 2006 BETWEEN Ch. Vasudeva Rao And The State of Andhra PradeshRep. by Additional Director General of Police,Hyderabad & others :: JUDGMENT :: ……… Appellant ………Respondents Counsel for the Appellant: Shri Sriram Counsel for the Respondents: Government Pleader for Home Dated: 28.07.2006 Per G.S. SINGHVI, CJ The ambit and reach of the power vested in the HighCourts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very wide. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can issueorders or directions or writs including the one in the nature ofmandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo-warranto and habeascorpus for protecting the legal and constitutional rights ofindividuals and for undoing injustice done to any person. Thelimitations applicable to English Courts, which are entrusted withthe power to issue prerogative writs, are not applicable to the HighCourts in India. This was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Dwaraka Nath v. Income Tax Officers[[1]]in the following words: “Article 226 is couched in comprehensivephraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on theHigh Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. A widelanguage in describing the nature of the power, the purposesfor which and the person or authority against whom it can beexercised was designedly used by the Constitution. TheHigh Court can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writsas understood in England; but the scope of those writs alsois widened by the use of the expression “nature”, whichexpression does not equate the writs that can be issued inIndia with those in England, but only draws an analogy fromthem. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions,orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. The HighCourts are enabled to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiarand complicated requirements of this country. To equatethe scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs isto introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grownover the years in a comparatively small country likeEngland with a unitary form of Government to a vast countrylike India functioning under a federal structure. Such aconstruction would defeat the purpose of the article itself. But this does not mean that the High Courts can functionarbitrarily under this Article. There are some limitationsimplicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct thearticle through defined channels.” The power of judicial review vested in the High Courtunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been furtherexpanded by the judgments of the Supreme Court in ManekaGandhi v. Union of India[[2]], Anandi Mukta Sadguru ShreeMuktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav SmarakTrust v. V.R.Rudani[[3]]a n d Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union ofIndia[[4]]. Likewise, the ambit and reach of the High Court’s inherentpowers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(for short, the Cr.P.C.’) to pass appropriate orders to give effect toany order made under the Cr.P.C or to prevent abuse of theprocess of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice is The power of judicial review vested in the High Courtunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been furtherexpanded by the judgments of the Supreme Court in ManekaGandhi v. Union of India[[2]], Anandi Mukta Sadguru ShreeMuktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav SmarakTrust v. V.R.Rudani[[3]]a n d Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union ofIndia[[4]]. Likewise, the ambit and reach of the High Court’s inherentpowers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(for short, the Cr.P.C.’) to pass appropriate orders to give effect toany order made under the Cr.P.C or to prevent abuse of theprocess of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice is also very wide. In R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab[[5]]the SupremeCourt considered the question whether in exercise of its powerunder Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898(Section 482 Cr.P.C. is pari materia to Section 561A of the 1898Code), the High Court could quash criminal proceedings registeredagainst the appellant who along with his mother-in-law wasaccused of committing offences under Section 420, 109, 114 and120B of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant unsuccessfully fileda petition in the Punjab High Court for quashing the investigation ofthe First Information Report (FIR) registered against him and thenfiled appeal before the Supreme Court. While confirming the HighCourt’s order, which had refused to quash the report submitted bythe police under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court laid downthe following proposition: “The inherent power of High Court under Section561A, Criminal P.C. cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of theCode. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can beexercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either toprevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwiseto secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminalproceedings instituted against an accused person must betried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Courtwould be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings atan interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable orexpedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would governthe exercise of this inherent jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court then carved out the followingcategories of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction could beexercised by the High Court: (i)Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal baragainst the institution or continuance of the criminalproceedings in respect of the offences alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance,furnish cases under this category;against the institution or continuance of the criminalproceedings in respect of the offences alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance,furnish cases under this category; (ii)Where the allegations in the First Information Reportor the complaint, even if they are taken at their facevalue and accepted in their entirety, do not constitutethe offence alleged; in such cases no question ofappreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely oflooking at the complaint or the First InformationReport to decide whether the offence alleged isdisclosed or not; (iii) Where the allegations made against the accusedperson do constitute an offence alleged but there iseither no legal evidence adduced in support of thecase or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestlyfails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class ofcases it is important to bear in mind the distinctionbetween a case where there is no legal evidence orwhere there is evidence which is manifestly andclearly inconsistent with the accusation made and (iii) Where the allegations made against the accusedperson do constitute an offence alleged but there iseither no legal evidence adduced in support of thecase or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestlyfails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class ofcases it is important to bear in mind the distinctionbetween a case where there is no legal evidence orwhere there is evidence which is manifestly andclearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on itsappreciation may or may not support the accusationin question. In exercising its jurisdiction underSection 561-A the High Court would not embark uponan enquiry as to whether the evidence in question isreliable or not. That is the function of the trialmagistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to anyparty to invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdictionand contend that on a reasonable appreciation of theevidence the accusation made against the accusedwould not be sustained.” I n State of Haryana v Bhajanlal[[6]], the Supreme Courtconsidered the scope of the High Court’s power under Section 482of Cr.P.C and Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIRregistered against the respondent, referred to several judicialprecedents including those of R.P.Kapoor v. State of Punjab(supra), State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha[[7]]and State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha[[8]]and ruled that the High Courtshould not embark upon an enquiry into the merits and demerits ofthe allegations and quash the proceedings without allowing theinvestigating agency to complete its task. The Supreme Courtalso identified the cases in which power under Article 226 of theConstitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be used for quashing theproceedings. These are: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first informationreport or the complaint, even if they are taken at their facevalue and accepted in their entirety do not prima facieconstitute any offence or make out a case against theaccused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report andother materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do notdisclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code exceptunder an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR orcomplaint and the evidence collected in support of the samedo not disclose the commission of any offence and makeout a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute acognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizableoffence, no investigation is permitted by a police officerwithout an order of a Magistrate as contemplated underSection 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint areso absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of whichno prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion thatthere is sufficient ground for proceeding against theaccused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any ofthe provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (underwhich a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institutionand continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is aspecific provision in the Code or the Act concerned,providing efficacious redress for the grievance of theaggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended withmala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciouslyinstituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance onthe accused and with a view to spite him due to private andpersonal grudge.” In State of Bihar v. P.P.Sharma[[9]], a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Kuldip Singh andK.Ramaswamy, JJ in their separate but concurring opiniondisapproved judicial intervention in the investigation of criminalcases. Kuldip Singh, J expressed his opinion in the following words: (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended withmala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciouslyinstituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance onthe accused and with a view to spite him due to private andpersonal grudge.” In State of Bihar v. P.P.Sharma[[9]], a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Kuldip Singh andK.Ramaswamy, JJ in their separate but concurring opiniondisapproved judicial intervention in the investigation of criminalcases. Kuldip Singh, J expressed his opinion in the following words: “When the information is lodged at the police stationand an offence is registered, the mala fides of theinformation would be of secondary importance. It is thematerial collected during the investigation which decides thefate of the accused person. The question of mala fideexercise of power assumes significance only when thecriminal prosecution is initiated on extraneousconsiderations and for an unauthorized purpose. “ K.Ramawamy, J observed as under: “Entertaining the writ petitions against charge-sheetand considering the matter on merit on the guise of primafacie evidence to stand an accused for trial amounts to pre-trial of a criminal trial under Article 226 and 227 even beforethe competent Magistrate or the Sessions Court takescognizance of the offence. The charge-sheet and theevidenced placed in support thereof form the base to take orrefuse to take cognizance by the competent court. Expeditious trial of a criminal case is the cardinalrule. Delay feeds injustice to social order and entertainingwrit petitions would encourage to delay the trial by diversetricks. It is not to suggest that under no circumstances awrit petition should be entertained. But an accused with aview to delay the trial, resorts to writ proceedings, raisesseveral contentions including one on merit and have theproceedings kept pending. The result would be that thepeople would lose faith in the efficacy of rule of law.” In large number of other judgments, the Supreme Courthas repeatedly cautioned the High Courts against entertaining ofthe petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR or complaint and observed thatthe judicial process should not be allowed to be used forfrustrating the investigation of crimes and prosecution of thosewho are accused of committing crimes. We do not want to burden this judgment with plethora of judicial precedents, but deem itproper to mention a few. I n State of Maharashtra v. IshwarPiraji Kalpatri[[10]]the Supreme Court held that if a prima faciecase is made out on the basis of allegations made in thecomplaint, then the High Court cannot quash the proceedings onthe ground of mala fides or animus of the complainant orprosecution. In State of Karnataka v. M.Devendrappa[[11]], the Supreme Court recognized the necessity of protecting the innocent citizensagainst harassment caused due to registration of frivolous criminalcases, but also emphasized that the High Court should exercisejudicial restraint and avoid interlocutory interventions in theinvestigation and trial of criminal cases. The propositions laiddown in that case are as under: this judgment with plethora of judicial precedents, but deem itproper to mention a few. I n State of Maharashtra v. IshwarPiraji Kalpatri[[10]]the Supreme Court held that if a prima faciecase is made out on the basis of allegations made in thecomplaint, then the High Court cannot quash the proceedings onthe ground of mala fides or animus of the complainant orprosecution. In State of Karnataka v. M.Devendrappa[[11]], the Supreme Court recognized the necessity of protecting the innocent citizensagainst harassment caused due to registration of frivolous criminalcases, but also emphasized that the High Court should exercisejudicial restraint and avoid interlocutory interventions in theinvestigation and trial of criminal cases. The propositions laiddown in that case are as under: “1) It is important to bear in mind the distinction betweena case where there is no legal evidence or where there isevidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusationsmade, and a case where there is legal evidence which, onappreciation, may or may not support the accusations.When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code,the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquirywhether the evidence in question is reliable or not orwhether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation wouldnot be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge.Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression,or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect andjudicious in exercising discretion and should take allrelevant facts and circumstances into consideration beforeissuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the handsof a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass anyperson needlessly. At the same time the section is not aninstrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit aprosecution and bring about its sudden death. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimateprosecution. 2) The High Court being the highest court of a Stateshould normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision ina case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy,more so when the evidence has not been collected andproduced before the Court and the issues involved, whetherfactual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen intheir true perspective without sufficient material. Of course,no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases inwhich the High Court will exercise its extraordinaryjurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. Courtmust be careful to see that its decision in exercise of thispower is based on sound principles. It would not be properfor the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant inthe light of all probabilities in order to determine whether aconviction would be sustainable and on such premisesarrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to bequashed. It would be erroneous to assess the materialbefore it and conclude that the complaint cannot beproceeded with. 3) In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise ofthe inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called foronly in a case where the complaint does not disclose anyoffence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If theallegations set out in the complaint do not constitute theoffence of which cognizance has been taken by theMagistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same inexercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of theCode. It is not, however, necessary that there should bemeticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find outwhether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. Thecomplaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that onconsideration of the allegations in the light of the statementmade on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of theoffence or offences are disclosed and there is no material toshow that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious,in that event there would be no justification for interferenceby the High Court. 4) When an information is lodged at the police stationand an offence is registered, then the mala fides of theinformant would be of secondary importance. It is thematerial collected during the investigation and evidence ledin court which decides the fate of the accused person. Theallegation of mala fides against the informant is of noconsequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashingthe proceedings.” In A.V.Mohan Rao v. M.Kishan Rao[[12]]the SupremeCourt considered the correctness of order passed by this Courtrefusing to quash the summons issued against the appellants bythe Special Judge for Economic Offences, Hyderabad. The factsof that case shows that respondent No.1 filed a complaint in theCourt of Special Judge, Economic Offences at Hyderabad with theallegation that accused persons by making false, deceptive andmisleading statements and by suppressing facts induced variouspersons to pay them money for purchase of shares of the PowerCompany; raised millions of dollars from Non-Resident Indians(NRIs); siphoned off the money into bogus companies exclusivelyowned by them and purchased shares of the Power Company inIndia in the names of bogus offshore companies owned andcontrolled by them. According to the complainant, all this came tohis notice when some of the prospective NRI investors madecorrespondence with the Power Company demanding sharecertificates for which they had paid substantial amounts to theaccused. The complainant alleged that the accused hadcommitted fraud on the Power Company in whose name theycollected money and invested the same in their own companies. The Special Judge for Economic Offences, Hyderabad issuedsummons to the accused persons requiring them to appear before the Court. On receipt of the summons, the appellants filed petitionunder Section 482 Cr.P.C. This Court refused to quash theproceedings. While approving the order of the High Court, theSupreme Court referred to the earlier judgments in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan[[13]], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra),Mahavir Prasad Gupta v. State of National Capital Territory ofDelhi[[14]]and held: “Reading of the complaint petition and the materialsproduced by the complainant with it in the light of provisionsin the aforementioned sections, it cannot be said that theallegations made in the complaint taken in entirety do notmake out, even prima facie, any of the offences alleged inthe complaint petition. We refrain from discussing the meritsof the case further since any observation in that regard mayaffect one party or the other. The allegations made areserious in nature and relate to the Power Companyregistered under the Act having its head office in thiscountry. Whether the appellants were or were not citizens ofIndia at the time of commission of the offences alleged andwhether the offences alleged were or were not committed inthis country, are questions to be considered on the basis ofthe evidence to be placed before the Court at the trial of thecase. The questions raised are of involved nature,determination of which requires enquiry into facts. Suchquestions cannot be considered at the preliminary stage forthe purpose of quashing the complaint and the proceedinginitiated on its basis.” In State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo[[15]]the Supreme Court reviewed various judicial precedents on the subject and laiddown the following propositions: “1) The exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC is theexception and not the rule. The section does not confer anynew powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherentpower which the Court possessed before the enactment of In State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo[[15]]the Supreme Court reviewed various judicial precedents on the subject and laiddown the following propositions: “1) The exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC is theexception and not the rule. The section does not confer anynew powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherentpower which the Court possessed before the enactment of CrPC. It envisages three circumstances under which theinherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to giveeffect to an order under CrPC, (ii) to prevent abuse of theprocess of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends ofjustice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down anyinflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherentjurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedurecan provide for all cases that may possibly arise. 2) While exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,the High Court does not function as a court of appeal orrevision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, thoughwide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and withcaution and only when such exercise is justified by the testsspecifically laid down in the section itself. It is to beexercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantialjustice for the administration of which alone the courts exist.Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice andif any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as toproduce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse.It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow anyaction which would result in injustice and prevent promotionof justice. In exercise of the powers the court would bejustified to quash any proceeding if it finds thatinitiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the processof court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwiseserve the ends of justice. 3) The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle alegitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highestcourt of a State should normally refrain from giving a primafacie decision in a case where the entire facts areincomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has notbeen collected and produced before the Court and theissues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitudeand cannot be seen in their true perspective withoutsufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can belaid down in regard to cases in which such power can beexercised can be laid down.” The ratio of the above noted judgments is that in exercise 3) The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle alegitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highestcourt of a State should normally refrain from giving a primafacie decision in a case where the entire facts areincomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has notbeen collected and produced before the Court and theissues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitudeand cannot be seen in their true perspective withoutsufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can belaid down in regard to cases in which such power can beexercised can be laid down.” The ratio of the above noted judgments is that in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482of Cr.P.C., the High Court should be extremely slow to interferewith the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should notstall the investigation and/or prosecution except when it isconvinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR does notdisclose commission of any offence or that the allegationscontained in the FIR do not constitute any cognizable offence orthat the prosecution is barred by law. In dealing with such cases,the High Court has to bear in mind that judicial intervention at thethreshold of the legal process initiated against a person accusedof committing offence is highly detrimental to the larger public andsocietal interest. The people and the society have the right to seethat those committing offences either against an individual or thesociety are expeditiously brought to trial and, if found guilty,adequately punished. Therefore, while deciding a petition filedunder Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C., forquashing the FIR or complaint or restraining the competentauthority from investigating the allegations contained in the FIR orcomplaint or for stalling the trial of the case, the High Court shouldbe extremely careful and circumspect. If the allegations containedin the FIR or complaint discloses commission of some crime, thenthe High Court must keep its hands off and allow the investigatingagency to complete the investigation without any fetter. The HighCourt should not go into the merits and demerits of the allegationssimply because the petitioner alleges malus animus against theauthor of the FIR or the complainant. The High Court must alsorefrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of possibleharassment which may be caused to the petitioner on account ofinvestigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course will result in miscarriage of justice and would encourage those accused ofcommitting crimes to repeat the same. Interim orders passed bythe High Court in such matters, as a matter of course, have greatadverse impact on the society. Those accused of committingcrimes get emboldened and majority of citizens are forced to thinkthat the judicial process can be used and abused by the lawbreakers to their advantage. We have prefaced disposal of this appeal filed by theappellant for setting aside order dated 6-3-2006 passed by thelearned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.14168 of 2005 because,after hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing therecord, we are convinced that the learned Single Judge did notcommit any error by refusing to entertain the appellant’s prayer forquashing the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 149 of 1999registered by I Town Police Station, Kadapa. We have prefaced disposal of this appeal filed by theappellant for setting aside order dated 6-3-2006 passed by thelearned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.14168 of 2005 because,after hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing therecord, we are convinced that the learned Single Judge did notcommit any error by refusing to entertain the appellant’s prayer forquashing the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 149 of 1999registered by I Town Police Station, Kadapa. A perusal of the record shows that the appellant is workingas District Treasury Officer, Kadapa. While he was posted asSenior Accountant in the office of Deputy Director, DistrictTreasury Office, Kadapa, a complaint was received that certainforged documents have been created for withdrawing pension. Thereupon, the Deputy Director concerned lodged FIR at I TownPolice Station, Kadapa. This resulted in registration of CrimeNo.149 of 1999 under Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the IndianPenal Code against Sarvasri S. Prem Kumar, Sohandas and RajKumar Singh, who claimed pension on the basis of forgeddocuments. Subsequently, the matter was transferred to theInspector of Police, CBCID, Tirupathi, Chittoor for investigation. During the course of investigation, the officer concerned recordedthe statements of the Deputy Director concerned and the appellant. The appellant stated that he is only a forwarding officerand has nothing to do with the fraudulent withdrawal of pension. However, in the report submitted by the Inspector of Police beforethe Magistrate concerned, the appellant’s name was also includedas an accused. Immediately thereafter, the appellant applied foranticipatory bail, which was granted by the competent court on 24-9-2002. In the meanwhile, the State Government ordereddepartmental enquiry into the allegation of withdrawal of pensionon the basis of forged documents. The enquiry officer submittedreport dated 22-12-2000 with an observation that the appellant wasguilty of certain procedural lapses. The government accepted theenquiry report and issued show cause notice to the appellant on 18-12-2003. However, no final order has so far been passedapparently because of pendency of investigation of Crime No.149of 1999. In the writ petition filed by him, the appellant prayed forquashing the proceedings of Crime No.149 of 1999 by contendingthat the abnormal delay in finalization of the investigation hascaused serious injury to him and has also resulted in violation ofhis constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of theConstitution. The learned Single Judge made detailed reference to thefactual matrix of the case and recorded an unequivocal conclusionthat the writ petitioner’s cause has not been prejudiced on accountof the so-called delay in finalization of the prosecution. Thelearned Single Judge also noted the fact that as per memo dated28.02.2004 issued by Additional Director General of Police (CID),Section 13(1) (c) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is proposed to be added qua the writ petitioner and refused to issuedirection for quashing the proceedings. The learned Single Judge made detailed reference to thefactual matrix of the case and recorded an unequivocal conclusionthat the writ petitioner’s cause has not been prejudiced on accountof the so-called delay in finalization of the prosecution. Thelearned Single Judge also noted the fact that as per memo dated28.02.2004 issued by Additional Director General of Police (CID),Section 13(1) (c) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is proposed to be added qua the writ petitioner and refused to issuedirection for quashing the proceedings. We entirely agree with the learned Single Judge that thepetitioner has failed to make out a case for exercise of power bythis Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We mayadd that while the Courts would protect rights of the citizens andpass appropriate order on being convinced that the right of thepolice to investigate the offence or prosecute a person is beingabused, the Courts will also take care of the fact that those whocommit crime are brought to book and adequately punished. Interference by the Court at the threshold of investigation not onlyfrustrates the process initiated by the competent authority but attimes results in a situation in which the persons committing crimego scot-free on account of loopholes which occur on account ofdelay caused as a result of pendency of cases before the superiorcourts. We can take judicial notice of the fact that a large numberof petitions instituted in various High Courts in the country remainpending for two to six years. This long interregnum results invirtual frustration of the investigation. By the time the petition isdecided by the High Court, most of the evidence is lost. Theofficer, who initiates the investigation, is transferred on more thanone occasion and the whole purpose of registering the case isfrustrated. In the present case, the appellant was arrayed as accusedonly in September 2002. Therefore, as on the date of filing the writpetition, the investigation had remained pending qua him only for aperiod of two years. During the course of hearing, learned counselfor the appellant admitted that his client has not been summonedby the police so far. We fail to see how his cause has at all been prejudiced on account of the delay in the conduct of investigation.Rather, the delay has benefited him and others who are accusedof committing crime and defrauding the public. With the above observations, the appeal is dismissed. However, in order to ensure that the investigation is not delayedany more, we direct that if investigation has not already beencompleted, the concerned authority must complete it within aperiod of two months from today. G.S. SINGHVI, CJ G.V. SEETHAPATHY, J 28.07.2006ksld/svs Note:The Court Officer is directed to give an attestedCopy of this judgment to the Government Pleaderfor being forwarded to the concerned authorties.(By order) svsPS to HCJ [1]AIR 1966 SC 81 [2]AIR 1978 SC 597 [3]AIR 1989 SC 1607 [4]AIR 2005 SC 2677 = (2005) 4 SCC 649 [5]AIR 1960 SC 866 [6]1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 [7](1980) 1 SCC 554 [8](1982) 1 SCC 561 [9](1992) Supp. 1 SCC 222 [10](1996) 1 SCC 542 [11](2002) 3 SCC 89 [12](2002) 6 SCC 174 [13](1988) 4 SCC 655 [14](2000) 8 SCC 115[15](2005) 13 SCC 540