Income Tax Appeal v. Mantra Tantra Yantra Vigyan

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR -------------------------------------------------------- (1)INCOME TAX APPEAL No. 24 of 2004 V/S MANTRA TANTRA YANTRA VIGYAN (2)INCOME TAX APPEAL No. 25 of 2004 MANTRA TANTRA YANTRA VIGYAN (3)INCOME TAX APPEAL No. 26 of 2004 V/S MANTRA TANTRA YANTRA VIGYAN (4)INCOME TAX APPEAL No. 27 of 2004 MANTRA TANTRA YANTRA VIGYAN (5)INCOME TAX APPEAL No. 28 of 2004 MANTRA TANTRA YANTRA VIGYAN (6)INCOME TAX APPEAL No. 29 of 2004 MANTRA TANTRA YANTRA VIGYAN (7)INCOME TAX APPEAL No. 30 of 2004 MANTRA TANTRA YANTRA VIGYAN (8)INCOME TAX APPEAL No. 31 of 2004 V/S MANTRA TANTRA YANTRA VIGYAN (9)INCOME TAX APPEAL No. 53 of 2004 C I T JODHPUR V/S MANTRA TANTRA YANTRA VIGYAN Mr. K.K. Bissa, for the appellant / petitioner. Mr. ANJAY KOTHARI, for the respondent. HON'BLE SHRI N P GUPTA,J. HON'BLE SHRI DEO NARAYAN THANVI,J. ORDER ----- These nine appeals, arise in identical circumstances,and involve common questions, and are, therefore, beingdecided by this common order. Before proceeding further, it may be observed, that inone of the appeals, being Appeal No.53/2004, the appeal wasadmitted by framing two substantial questions of law asunder: “1) Whether the learned Tribunal has erred in law inaffirming the order of the CIT (A) deleting theaddition made by the Assessing Officer on account oflife membership subscriptions received by the assesseetreating the same as income and whether the finding of 2) Assuming that the subscription received by theassessee was a capital receipt by way of deposit andthe subscription of the subscriber was to be adjustedagainst the income arise out of the said deposit,whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding thatinterest which the assessee has shown accrued on thesaid deposits also does not form part of the income tothe assessee merely on the ground that the assessee hasnot chosen to charge interest from the members of thepartnership to whom the money had been advanced?” While the other appeals have been admitted by framingonly one substantial question of law, however, it ispointed out by the learned counsel for the Revenue, that inthe remaining appeals, applications have been filed by theRevenue, for framing additional question, in line of theQuestion No.2, framed in Appeal No.53/2004. In suchcircumstances, instead of standing to ceremony, we haveheard learned counsel for either side, on both thequestions. The facts, relevant for deciding the questions aboveare, that the assessee, a Firm, was involved in thebusiness of selling yantras to customers, after beingtreated by Havan and Puja, and was also selling publicationof monthly journal on the astrology, named as “MantraTantra Yantra Vigyan”, and was having huge number ofsubscribers. He was receiving Rs.1500/-, according to theRevenue, by way of subscription for the life membership,which sum received was directly shown in the balance sheet in liability side. Thus, this amount of Rs.1500/- receivedby the assessee, from various persons, during the variousnumber of years, comprised in these appeals, is the precisesubject matter of the controversy. The facts, relevant for deciding the questions aboveare, that the assessee, a Firm, was involved in thebusiness of selling yantras to customers, after beingtreated by Havan and Puja, and was also selling publicationof monthly journal on the astrology, named as “MantraTantra Yantra Vigyan”, and was having huge number ofsubscribers. He was receiving Rs.1500/-, according to theRevenue, by way of subscription for the life membership,which sum received was directly shown in the balance sheet in liability side. Thus, this amount of Rs.1500/- receivedby the assessee, from various persons, during the variousnumber of years, comprised in these appeals, is the precisesubject matter of the controversy. The Assessing Authority noted, that though thesum received from the life members, is directly shown inthe balance sheet in the liability side, and it is pointedout by the assessee, that the sum received is by way ofdeposit from members, and is refundable, as and whendemanded by customers/life members. But then, according tothe learned Assessing Authority, the scrutiny showed, thatcost of journal issued to life members, is shown asbusiness expenses, of the assessee. Then, the learnedAssessing Authority proceeded to consider variousjudgements, cited on either sides, and observed, that inorder to decide, whether or not, the amount is a revenuereceipt, or capital receipt, its true nature and effectshould be looked into. The form, in which it is expressed,is not deciding factor, and that, it is also not relevant,as to whether the assessee, for his accounting purposes, istreating the receipt as deposit, as the assessee maycamouflage the real nature of income, by using differentphraseology or nomenclature, but the nature of the receiptis to be decided by the circumstances of the receipt. Then,it was held, that since the money, received by theassessee, in the name of life subscription account, is for providing monthly journals to the subscribers, it is areceipt in the nature of revenue. The contention of theassessee, about the subscribers being entitled to withdrawthe deposit, was also considered, and it was found, thatonly two instances have come to light, being of Shri PramodKumar and Dr. Vijay Kumar Rai. Thus, only sum of Rs.3000/-was refunded, while the fact is, that an amount ofRs.69,95,988/- remained with the assessee, accumulated till31.3.1992, and no part of it, has been shown by theassessee as receipts, in lieu of services, being renderedthe assessee, by providing the monthly journals to thesubscribers, year after year. It was also considered, thatin a business of any trader, or any publisher, there alwaysexisted the contingencies of refunding the money to thepurchasers, if they were not satisfied with the material,they purchased, and in such cases, the trader or apublisher is free to claim deductions, on account of theserefunds, as sales returns, and thus, the assessee was foundentitled to claim refund of Rs.3000/-, but it was found,that the amount received, was the income of the assessee.Then, it was also considered, that the amounts received,were advanced to the three partners of the Firm, interestfree, and on being asked, it was given out by the assessee,that since the advances were interest free, and, therefore,the assessee Firm was not under any obligation to chargeinterest from them and, therefore, no interest can be addedon this ground. However, the Assessing Authority found, that the partners have further advanced these funds to thefamily members, interest free, and the family members haveultimately advanced these funds on interest, to varioussundry debtors, and to various interest bearing accounts,like bank, NSC etc. Then, the accounts of various suchrelations were seen. It showed substantial income, whilenone of them was doing any business, rather they hadadvanced the money received through Shri Narain DuttSrimali, from the Firm, at various places, on interest, andthus, the interest attributable on the amount was arrivedat. Then, the contention of notional income was alsoconsidered, and considering provisions of Section 5(1) ofthe Act, it was found, that since the money shown indifferent hands of family members, is owned by the Firm,the income arising out of that money in the hands of thevarious family members, is the income of the Firm, andliable to be included in the income of the assessee Firm.Accordingly, the assessment was made. This assessment was challenged in appeal by theassessee, and the learned Commissioner found, that thedeposits against subscription, are refundable to theconstituents, and the assessee is also supplying freecopies of magazines against the same, and that the interestincome on these deposits, is being shown in the hands ofthe partners, in their returns, which is the procedureadopted by the assessee, for the last so many years, and the department has accepted the same, without raising anyeyebrow, therefore, the addition was deleted from theincome. Against this order, the Revenue filed the appealsbefore the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and the learnedTribunal considered various judgments, cited before it. Italso took into consideration the second writtensubmissions, furnished on 20.3.2003, by way of rejoinder tothe written submissions of the Revenue, and also consideredthe three Supreme Court judgments, cited from the side ofthe assessee. Then, relying upon various judgments, it wasfound by the learned Tribunal, that in the circumstances ofthe case, as also on the legal position, the subscriber hasthe right to withdraw the amount and, thus, put an end tolife membership, and the amount of deposit of lifemembership, will obviously remain with the assessee, as arefundable amount of deposit, i.e. a deposit, attached withthe liability of being refundable to the customer/constituent, on demand, by notice, after ten years. It wasnot found to be a colourable device, to have been involvedin the matter under consideration. The Tribunal furtherfound, that the mere fact, that only one or two subscribersalone have withdrawn the amount, does not change the natureof receipts of the amounts, and the same remains with theassessee as a refundable deposit, as the condition,regarding its being refundable, does subsist. Thus, it was found, that the deposit cannot become the money of theassessee, nor can it be said to be the income of assessee.Thus, the deletion ordered by the CIT (A) was found to bejustified. found, that the deposit cannot become the money of theassessee, nor can it be said to be the income of assessee.Thus, the deletion ordered by the CIT (A) was found to bejustified. Then, regarding the contention about treating theincome of interest, earned by the partners, and familymembers to be treated as income of the Firm, requiring tobe added, it was considered, that the partners can withdrawfunds authorisedly/legally from the funds of the Firm, andthe partnership deed does not provide for charging ofinterest from the partners on their debit balances, andthat no interest is being paid on their credit balance. Insuch circumstances, it was found, that non-charging ofinterest by the assessee, from the partners, on the amountswithdrawn by partners from the Firm, will not justifiablymake, the interest earned by partner on such amounts,income of the assessee firm, so as to make addition of theamount, in income of the assessee Firm, as it willtantamount to addition, on account of notional/hypothetical interest income, and not real interest income,earned by assessee. Thus, this part of the finding of thelearned Commissioner was also upheld. Arguing the appeals, various case laws were citedon behalf of either side. We have heard the learnedcounsel, and have gone through the orders of the learned authorities below, so also the various case law cited atthe bar. To start with, we take up the case of Dr. K.George Thomas v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in156 I.T.R.412. In this case, the assessee was receivingdonations, through the Indian Christian Crusade, from hisfriends in U.S.A., who believed in the cause, the assesseewas sponsoring, and for helping the movement. It was found,that the receiving of donation, was for furtherance of theobjects of vocation. There was link between the activitiesof the appellant assessee, and the payments received byhim, which link was close enough. Then, those receiptsarose to the assessee, from the carrying-on of hisvocation, and they were not casual, and non-recurringreceipts, and were found to be taxable, obviously because,the amounts of donations, received were donations, notliable to be refunded back by the assessee, to the persons,named. Another judgment on the same question is Dr. K. GeorgeThomas v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 159I.T.R.851. Obviously, this judgment also being of the sameassessee, for different years, will not help the case ofthe Revenue. Then, Sir Kikabhai Premchand v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 24 I.T.R.506, is a case entirely ondifferent aspect, viz., during the relevant year ofaccount, the assessee had withdrawn some silver bars, andshares from business, and settled them on certain trusts,in which he was the managing trustee. In his books,assessee credited the business with the cost price of thebars and shares, so withdrawn. However, the Income taxauthorities found, that the assessee had derived incomefrom the stock in trade, thus transferred, and assessed himon a certain sum, being the difference between the costprice of the silver bars, and shares, and their marketvalue, at the date of their withdrawal, from the business.In our view, it will suffice to say, that this case has nobearing on the case in hand. Income Tax, reported in 24 I.T.R.506, is a case entirely ondifferent aspect, viz., during the relevant year ofaccount, the assessee had withdrawn some silver bars, andshares from business, and settled them on certain trusts,in which he was the managing trustee. In his books,assessee credited the business with the cost price of thebars and shares, so withdrawn. However, the Income taxauthorities found, that the assessee had derived incomefrom the stock in trade, thus transferred, and assessed himon a certain sum, being the difference between the costprice of the silver bars, and shares, and their marketvalue, at the date of their withdrawal, from the business.In our view, it will suffice to say, that this case has nobearing on the case in hand. Then Union of India v. Gosalia Shipping P.Ltd.,reported in 113 I.T.R.307, is again a different case,inasmuch the ship was hired, and certain fixed monthly rentwas agreed to be paid, on the basis of dead weight carryingcapacity of the ship, at $. 4.5 per ton, while the ship wascalled at an Indian Port, and was loaded with the Company'sgoods, the question arose about the income, being onaccount of the carriage of goods. Obviously, the questioninvolved was, as to whether the amount paid was hirecharges, paid on the carriage of goods, or not, whichobviously, has nothing to do with the controversy, involvedin the present case. Then, National Cement Mines Industries Ltd. v.Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 42 I.T.R.69, isagain a case, off the mark, where the amount was relatableto the production, and consumption of raw material, and thepurchaser Company was to pay the amount, on that basis, toother Company. This judgment obviously, has nothing to dowith the controversy, involved in the present case. The judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, in Mcdowell& Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, reported in 154I.T.R.148, does take the view, that the tax planning may belegitimate, provided it is within the framework of the law,and colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning, andit is wrong to encourage, or entertain the belief, that itis honourable to avoid the payment of tax, by dubiousmethods, and that it is the obligation of every citizen topay the taxes honestly, without resorting to subterfuges.This legal principle, propounded by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt, does not admit of any dispute or doubt, werespectfully bow to it. Then, we come to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court,in P.H. Divecha v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in48 I.T.R.222. In this case, a Firm was appointed asdistributor for specified area with monopoly rights, itworked as such for 16 years. However, thereafter, the manufacturer took over the distribution in those areas andserved a notice upon the Firm, terminating the agreement.In those circumstances, it was also agreed, that as agesture of goodwill, the manufacturer agreed to pay ininstalments Rs.40,000/- per annum, to each of the partnersof the Firm. This amount was found by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt, to be not a taxable amount, by giving variousreasons as under: “(i) that the agreement between the firm and PhilipsElectrical Co. created a monopoly right of purchasefor and a monopoly right of sale in certain areas. Itsecured to the firm an advantage of an enduring natureand was not an ordinary trading agreement. (ii) That in the absence of any proof that the amountpayable to the partners represented the likely profitsof the firm that would have arisen if the agreementhad not been terminated, it could not be said that itreplaced those profits. Although the amount was largethere was nothing to show that it was an adequatemeasure of the profits that were expected to be madeduring the three years in which the amount was to bepaid. “(i) that the agreement between the firm and PhilipsElectrical Co. created a monopoly right of purchasefor and a monopoly right of sale in certain areas. Itsecured to the firm an advantage of an enduring natureand was not an ordinary trading agreement. (ii) That in the absence of any proof that the amountpayable to the partners represented the likely profitsof the firm that would have arisen if the agreementhad not been terminated, it could not be said that itreplaced those profits. Although the amount was largethere was nothing to show that it was an adequatemeasure of the profits that were expected to be madeduring the three years in which the amount was to bepaid. (iii) That the payment could not be regarded aspayment for any services rendered even though it wasdescribed as remuneration in addition to the ordinaryprofits of trading. The payment was made out of regardfor the qualities of the three partners who had builtup a vast net work of sales organisation of which thecompany would obtain the benefit when it entered onthe business of selling for itself. (iv) That as it was not related to any business doneor to loss of profits and it was not recompense forservices, past or future, the payment did not bear thecharacter of income taxable under the Income Tax Act,1922. (v) That the payment not being income, profits orgains, section 4(3)(vii) of the Act had no application. (vi) That the payment did not fall within section I0 (5A) (d) of the Act and was not liable to tax underthat section.” It was further held that - “In determining whether a payment amounts to a returnfor loss of a capital asset or is income, profits orgains liable to income-tax, one must have regard to thenature and quality of the payment. If the payment wasnot received to compensate for a loss of profits ofbusiness the receipt in the hands of the recipientcannot properly be described as income, profits orgains as commonly understood. To constitute income,profits or gains, there must be a source from which theparticular receipt has arisen, and a connection mustexist between the quality of the receipt and thesource. If the payment is by another person, it must befound out why that payment has been made. It is not themotive of the person who pays that is relevant. Morerelevance attaches to the nature of the receipt in thehands of the person, who receives it though in tryingto find out the quality of the receipt one may have toexamine the motive out of which the payment was made.Generally, the fact that the amount involved was largeor that it was periodic in character has no decisivebearing upon the matter. A payment may even bedescribed as “pay”, “remuneration”, etc., but that doesnot determine its quality, though the name by which ithas been called may be relevant in determining its truenature, because this gives an indication of how theperson who paid the money and the person who receivedit viewed it in the first instance. The periodicity ofthe payment does not make the payment a recurringincome because periodicity may be the result ofconvenience and not necessarily the result of theestablishment of a source expected to be productiveover a certain period.” Then, we come to another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Siddheshwar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd.v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 270 I.T.R. p.1.The facts of this case were, that the assessee was a co-operative society, which carried on the business of Then, we come to another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Siddheshwar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd.v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 270 I.T.R. p.1.The facts of this case were, that the assessee was a co-operative society, which carried on the business of manufacturing sugar. Its members were predominantlysugarcane farmers. The share capital of the society wascontributed, not only by the members, but also by the StateGovernment. Its bye-laws provided for deduction of amounts,towards refundable, and “non-refundable” deposits, from thecane price, payable to the grower members. Under bye-lawNo.61-A(i) the non-refundable deposits were not to berefunded, till the Government share capital, and the termloans taken from IFCI and other financial institutions forcapital expenditure, were repaid fully, (ii) the board ofdirectors of the society may convert such deposits intoshares, after repayment of the loans taken towards capitalexpenditure, and long term loans taken from banks forcapital expenditure, (iii) the amount standing to thecredit of a member could be transferred at his option tothe account of another, (iv) after one year of his ceasingto be a member, the amount could be refunded to him subjectto approval of the Board, and (v) on his death, the amountcould be paid to his heirs, with the approval of the board.Until repayment, the deposits so collected, were to beutilized for repaying the term loans, taken for capitalexpenditure. Interest was payable on the deposits. Theamounts, so deducted, were credited to the individualaccounts of the members. The assessee was also entitled tocollect, by deduction from the cane price payable to themembers, term deposits for a period, not exceeding fiveyears, on which interest, not exceeding 12 percent, was payable. Pursuant to instructions, issued by the Directorof Sugar, certain amounts, at prescribed rates, were alsodeducted by the assessee from the cane price, and creditedto certain Funds, viz., the Chief Minister's Relief Fund,Late Shri Y.B. Chavan Memorial Fund, Hutment Fund, AreaDevelopment Fund, and Cane Development Fund. The AppellateTribunal held, that the amounts, collected by the assessee,towards the non-refundable deposits, and the refundabledeposits (term deposits) could not be treated as the incomeof the assessee, and the amounts deducted for beingcredited to the funds, were not trading receipts of theassessee. The High Court held, that the amounts collectedtowards the non-refundable, and refundable deposits weretrading receipts of the assessee, but the amounts deductedtowards the funds, were diverted by overriding title, andwere not its income. On these facts, the Hon'ble SupremeCourt held as under: “… … … that the line of enquiry, in order to determinethe true nature and character of the receipts, did notstop at ascertaining the mere fact whether therealization was in the course of trading. Although theuse of the expression “deposit” did not conclude theissue, the expression was used in the bye-laws to meanjust what it said. The repayment of loans taken forcapital expenditure and the share capital of theGovernment were two specified events which were by nomeans uncertain, though the time of repayment wasindefinite. On the occurrence of the two events, theright to demand refund would accrue to the member-depositor. Such a right, though contingent in natureinitially, inhered in the depositor from the beginning.The word “may” in the bye-laws had to be construed as“shall” and the board was bound to allot shares to themembers in relation to the deposits, after full repayment to the Government and the financialinstitutions. The existence of the other features suchas transferability of the deposit to another member andthe provision for refund of the deposited amount to themember in case of cessation of membership or to hislegal heirs in case of death indicated that thedeposited amount could not be treated as moneybelonging to the assessee-society. The payment ofinterest at a specified rate from year to year wasconsistent only with the fact that the deposited amountstill belonged to the members. And the fact that thedeposited amounts were credited to the individualaccounts of the members corroborated the circumstancethat the deposits belonged to the members. The amountsdeducted from the cane price towards the non-refundabledeposits were not trading receipts of the assessee.” It was further held as under: “It is not any and every receipt linked to the tradingactivity that acquires the quality of revenue receipt.The tribunal or the court should go further and delveinto the true nature, character and purpose of therealizations. If the amounts are meant to be held bythe assessee as deposits liable to be returned to thedepositor at a specified point of time or on thehappening of specified contingencies which are by nomeans uncertain or are otherwise treated as thedepositor's money – the depository having nounfettered dominion over the said funds, then, it isdifficult to characterize them as the income of theassessee. Though the manner in which the sums aretreated by the assessee in its accounts is neitherconclusive nor a sure indication of the nature andcharacter of the receipt, yet it is not an irrelevantfactor.” Then, we take up the judgment in U.P. Bhumi SudharNigam v. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 280 I.T.R.p.197. In this case, the Government had given grant-in-aidto the assessee for implementation of various specificprojects. According to the assessee, the grants were with the stipulation, that the sum, so provided by the StateGovernment, should be placed in the personal ledger accountwith the treasury, and in case the funds were placed withcommercial banks in any form, then the interest earned onsuch funds, shall belong to the Government. The State hadbeen issuing instructions/ notifications from time to time,in order to regulate the said stipulations. The assesseehad invested the amount of grant received by it, in fixeddeposits with commercial banks, on which interest hadaccrued. On those facts, it was contended before theAssessing Officer, on behalf of the assessee, that theinterest on fixed deposits, which had not been shown in theincome of the assessee, but in the footnote of the balancesheet as income of the State Government, was not the incomeearned by the assessee, but it belonged to the StateGovernment. This stand was not accepted by the AssessingOfficer, which was upheld by the Tribunal and in appeal,the Allahabad High Court found, that the amount was taxablein the hands of the assessee. This judgment, in our view,ofcourse, is a judgment for the purpose of deciding aquestion about the taxability of the interest part of theincome, and does not throw any light on the taxability partof the principal receipts by the assessee. From the above discussion of the case law, the best andnearest case, we find, is the one reported in Siddheshwar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd's case (supra), and accordingto the ratio, propounded therein, the amounts, received bythe assessee, as subscription for life membership, cannotbe said to be amounting to revenue receipts, liable to tax,rather, they are in the nature of capital receipts, liableto be returned to the subscriber/member constituent. Thus, first question is, accordingly, answered againstthe Revenue, and in favour of the assessee. From the above discussion of the case law, the best andnearest case, we find, is the one reported in Siddheshwar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd's case (supra), and accordingto the ratio, propounded therein, the amounts, received bythe assessee, as subscription for life membership, cannotbe said to be amounting to revenue receipts, liable to tax,rather, they are in the nature of capital receipts, liableto be returned to the subscriber/member constituent. Thus, first question is, accordingly, answered againstthe Revenue, and in favour of the assessee. Coming to the second question, which is very complex,inasmuch as the Firm being the assessee as such, is notshown to have earned any income as interest from the socalled security amount, refundable, but then, it has comeon record, that the amount was passed on to the variousfamily members of the partners of the Firm, and on overallcomprehension of the things, it gives a clear picture, thatpartnership was only a disguise, rather, it was absolutelya family affair. In such circumstances, the question isrequired to be examined by the Assessing Officer in detail,on facts, and on legal provisions, as to whether income ofthe interest, on the aforesaid principal amount, can betaxed, and if yes, to what extent? Yet, another aspect of this question is, that theassessee (Firm) claims, that in consideration of intereston the amount, the assessee had been sending monthly journals to the respective members, obviously, he would nothave sent those journals, but for the amounts said to havebeen received by the assessee, and, therefore, the regularmonthly subscription being received by the assessee, fromsubscribers, other then such life members, can also bereasonably taken to be accrued usufruct, in the hands ofthe assessee. In this regard, it is also significant tonote, that as found by the authorities below, that theassessee had been claiming deduction under the head ofbusiness expenses, with respect to the journals, sent tosuch life members. Meaning thereby, that on one hand, theassessee is enjoying the principal amount, and is notpaying tax on the usufruct thereof, and on the other hand,is also claiming deduction, under the head of businessexpenditure, for the publication, sent to such lifemembers. This cannot be permitted on any parameters. Accordingly, the Question No.2 is answered as above. The net result is, that the appeals are partly allowed.It is held, that the subscription amount received by theassessee, from life members, claimed by the assessee assecurity/Dharohar, is not found to be revenue receipt,liable to tax, as held by the learned Commissioner, and theTribunal. However, the matter is remanded back to theAssessing Officer, to decide the other part of the matterafresh, in accordance with the observations, made above. Obviously, the Assessing Officer will also take intoaccount, all such pleas & stands, that may be taken beforethe Assessing Officer, on facts, as well as on law, by theassessee so also the revenue. ( DEO NARAYAN THANVI ),J. ( N P GUPTA ),J. RankawatJK, PS