Ita/186/2013 Of Dr.a.v.sreekumar v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK MENON WEDNESDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF JANUARY 2018 / 4TH MAGHA, 1939 I.T.A.No.186 of 2013 ---------------------- AGAINST THE ORDER IN I.T.A.NO.690/COCH/2007 DATED 08-02-2013 OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH, COCHIN. ------------------ APPELLANT(S)/RESPONDENT/ASSESSEE:- ---------------------------------- DR.A.V.SREEKUMAR,` "FRAGRANCE", VELLUR, PAYANNUR, KANNUR. BY ADVS.SRI.V.V.ASOKAN SRI.K.I.MAYANKUTTY MATHER SRI.MAHESH V RAMAKRISHNAN SRI.P.RAHUL RESPONDENT(S)/APPELLANT/REVENUE:- --------------------------------- 1. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL, KOCHI-682015. 2. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL CIRCLE, CALICUT-673001. BY SENIOR COUNSEL FOR GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (TAXES) SRI.P.K.R.MENON. BY STANDING COUNSEL FOR GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (TAXES) SRI.JOSE JOSEPH. THIS INCOME TAX APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24-01-2018, ALONG WITHI.T.A.NO.217 OF 2013, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:- I.T.A.NO.186 OF 2013 APPENDIX APPELLANT'S ANNEXURES:- ------------------------ ANNEUXRE-ATRUE COPY OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING AUTHORITY FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1999-2000 DATED 26.12.2006.FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1999-2000 DATED 26.12.2006. ANNEUXRE-BTRUE COPY OF THE APPELLATE ORDER WITH REFERENCE TO THE ASSESSMENTYEAR 1999-2000 DATED 16.04.2007.YEAR 1999-2000 DATED 16.04.2007. ANNEXURE-CTRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL,KOCHI BENCH IN ITA.690, 691 AND 692/COCH/2007 DATED 08.02.2013.KOCHI BENCH IN ITA.690, 691 AND 692/COCH/2007 DATED 08.02.2013. RESPONDENT'S ANNEXURES:- ------------------------- NIL. vku/- [ true copy ] “C.R.” K. Vinod Chandran & Ashok Menon, JJ. ------------------------------------------------------- I.T.A.Nos.186 of 2013 & 217 of 2013 ------------------------------------------------------- Dated, this the 24[th] day of January, 2018 JUDGMENT Vinod Chandran, J: The appellant, the authorised legal heir of the assessee,has filed the above two appeals relating to two assessment years1999-2000 and 2000-2001. The assessments relate to the deceasedmother of the appellant, who had a total of five children, four of whomauthorized the appellant herein to contest the matter since the motherdied on 24.02.2006, after the search effected in her premises as alsothe notice issued under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [forbrevity “the Act”]. 2. We first notice the facts, which from the perspective of the assessee, are as hereinafter. The Department conductedsearches of the residential premises of the assessee under Section132 on 02.03.2005 and 20.04.2005. A notice was issued under Section153A of the Act on 06.01.2006, alleging inter alia that the assesseeentered into transactions of a property having total extent of 16cents; 8 cents of which was sold in the assessment year 1999-2000and the balance 8 cents in the assessment year 2000-2001. The - 2 - 2. We first notice the facts, which from the perspective of the assessee, are as hereinafter. The Department conductedsearches of the residential premises of the assessee under Section132 on 02.03.2005 and 20.04.2005. A notice was issued under Section153A of the Act on 06.01.2006, alleging inter alia that the assesseeentered into transactions of a property having total extent of 16cents; 8 cents of which was sold in the assessment year 1999-2000and the balance 8 cents in the assessment year 2000-2001. The - 2 - assessee had returned a total amount of Rs.32,00,000/- asconsideration; 16 lakhs in each of the assessment years. Twodocuments received, before the search, by the Department through aTax Evasion Petition, allegedly filed by one of the brokers involved inthe transaction, revaled the total consideration as Rs.1,01,00,000/-.The assessee died on 24.02.2006 and the appellant, filed a return on09.10.2006, accepting the total consideration to be Rs.60,00,000/-,more than that returned originally. Returns were filed for therespective years showing a receipt of Rs.44,00,000/- in the financialyear 1998-99 and Rs.16,00,000/- in the financial year 1999-2000. Anotice under Section 143 was issued on 29.10.2006, pursuant towhich the assessment orders were passed for the respective yearsmaking an addition of Rs.34,50,000/- in both the years. Computationof capital gains was also done and an assessment was made for theassessment year 1999-2000 determining the total income atRs.30,20,525 and for the assessment year 2000-2001 atRs.31,35,980/-. 3. The assessee filed an appeal raising three grounds.One that the assessment year 1999-2000 cannot be taken up forconsideration of block assessment, since it is beyond the six yearperiod provided under Section 153A of the Act. The contention was advanced on the premise that the last of the search on 20.04.2005was in 2006-2007 and the block years have to be computed from thedate of the panchnama as prepared by the officer conducting the lastof the searches. Yet another contention was with respect to thedocuments relied on to make additions, being not one seized in thesearch conducted and hence the proceedings under Section 153Aread with Section 143 being non est. There was also an objectionraised with respect to the computation of capital gains. 4. The first appellate authority rejected the contention with respect to the assessment year 1999-2000 not being liable forconsideration in the 6 year block period. The argument as to noproceedings being possible under Section 153A, for reason of thesame being not based on material recovered at search was alsorejected. With respect to the documents relied on, the AssessingOfficer found that there could have been no reliance placed on theconsent letters received by the Department and termed them to be“dumb documents”. The first appellate authority found that they werephoto copies in which the purchaser has not signed and there is nofurther material unearthed to come to a conclusion that the assesseehad received consideration in excess of that returned pursuant to thenotice under Section 153A. The first appellate authority directed the assessment to be completed as per the returns filed pursuant to thenotice under Section 153A and the computation of capital gains to beas returned by the assessee and not that adopted by the AssessingOfficer. assessment to be completed as per the returns filed pursuant to thenotice under Section 153A and the computation of capital gains to beas returned by the assessee and not that adopted by the AssessingOfficer. 5. The Revenue was in appeal before the Tribunal; inwhich appeals cross objections were filed by the assessee. Theground with respect to assessment year 1999-2000 not beingincludable within the block period of 6 years, based on theassessment year in which the last of the search was conducted, wasrejected confirming the findings of the first appellate authority. TheTribunal also found that there was no mandate in Section 153A, as tothe proceedings being confined to the material seized in the search.On the documents relied on by the Department, the consent letters;the Tribunal found that the statement of the witnesses showed thatthe consent letters were signed in the presence of the buyer. Therewere also amounts paid to the assessee through other persons whodid not have sufficient means and who deposed before the AssessingOfficer that they had encashed the cheques and passed over theamounts to the husband of the assessee. It was also found that theAssessing Officer had verified the Bank account of the purchaser andnoticed that he has withdrawn Rs.50,50,000/- after the registration of the first deed which was on 01.07.1998. The said withdrawal wasalso equivalent to the sale price of the remaining 8 cents of land,which was registered on 10.05.1999. The Tribunal, hence, upheld theorder of the Assessing Officer, reversing to that extent the order ofthe first appellate authority. The computation of capital gains wasremanded back to the Assessing Officer after setting aside the orderof the CIT (A) directing adoption of capital gains as returned by theassessee. 6. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant as also the learned Senior Counsel for Government of India(Taxes). At the time of admission this Court had framed the questionsof law, which are as follows: “(i) Can the Assessing Officer rely on materials alreadyavailable with him (much prior to the search) in aproceeding under Section 153A? Is not such exercise acolourable one and consequently irregular and vitiated?available with him (much prior to the search) in aproceeding under Section 153A? Is not such exercise acolourable one and consequently irregular and vitiated? (ii)Is not the impugned assessment proceedings barred bylimitation?”limitation?” 7. Though common questions are raised in the appeals the one on limitation framed as (ii) is confined to assessment year1999-2000. The question raised essentially is whether the Tribunalwas correct in finding that the assessment year 1999-2000 would be liable to be included under the block period of 6 years as providedunder Section 153A of the Act when the last of the searchesconducted under Section 132 and the panchnama prepared was on20.04.2005 in the assessment year 2006-07. The question at (i),common to both years raise the issue whether the reliance placed onthe consent letters obtained by the Department by way of a TaxEvasion Petition could be sustained as valid to initiate proceedingsunder Section 143 read with Section 153A when the said documentwas not one recovered in the search conducted in the premises ofthe assessee. the one on limitation framed as (ii) is confined to assessment year1999-2000. The question raised essentially is whether the Tribunalwas correct in finding that the assessment year 1999-2000 would be liable to be included under the block period of 6 years as providedunder Section 153A of the Act when the last of the searchesconducted under Section 132 and the panchnama prepared was on20.04.2005 in the assessment year 2006-07. The question at (i),common to both years raise the issue whether the reliance placed onthe consent letters obtained by the Department by way of a TaxEvasion Petition could be sustained as valid to initiate proceedingsunder Section 143 read with Section 153A when the said documentwas not one recovered in the search conducted in the premises ofthe assessee. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has, in seekingan affirmative answer on the question framed as (ii), taken usthrough the provisions of Sections 153A & 153B. Section 153A dealswith assessment in case of search or requisition. It is a non-obstanteclause, where a search is initiated under Section 132 or books ofaccount, other documents or any assets are requisitioned underSection 132A enabling notice to such person requiring him to furnishthe return of income in respect of each assessment year falling withinsix assessment years referred to in clause (b). Clause (b) speaks ofassessment or reassessment of the total income of six assessmentyears immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the - 7 - previous year in which such search is conducted or requisition ismade. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 153B(1) speaks of finalisationof the assessment or reassessment within the period specifiedtherein. The limitation specified in clause (a) and (b) of Section153B(1) commences from the end of the financial year in which thelast of the authorisation for search or for requisition was executed.Reference is also made to sub-section (2) of Section 153(B), whichdeems such authorisation to be that recorded in the last panchnamadrawn in relation to any person pursuant to a search conducted in hispremises. Hence going by the limitation for finalisation commencingfrom the last panchnama drawn, the 6 year block period should alsobe determined from the assessment year in which the lastpanchnama was drawn, is the argument. 9. We are unable to accept the argument so raised by theappellant. Sections 153A and 153B deal with two different aspects ofthe very same proceedings. Section 153A is a provision forassessment in case of search and seizure. This enables theassessment or re-assessment of the total income of six assessmentyears immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to theprevious year in which search is conducted. In the present case, thesearch was conducted on the close of the assessment year 1999-2000 on 02.03.2005 and then on the opening of the nextassessment year 2005-2006, on 20.04.2005. The computation of theblock period in which such assessment or reassessment are takenup under Section 153A; sub-clauses (a) & (b) of Section 153A(1)specifies it to be the six preceeding assessment years relevant to theprevious year in which the search is conducted or requisition made.The authorisation under Section 132 or Section 132A or the last ofsuch authorisation issued, is relevant only for considering thelimitation for finalisation of assessments and not for computing theblock period of six years. The limitation period with respect tofinalisation of assessment cannot be applied for computaion of theassessment years which are enabled to be assessed or reassessedunder Section 153A. 10. On the facts of the present case, the first search wasconducted on 02.03.2005 in the assessment year 2005-06. Hence, itenabled assessment or reassessment for 6 prior assessment yearsfrom the assessment year on which the search was conducted. Thefirst search being in the assessment year 2005-2006, the 6[th]assessment year prior to the search, is 1999-2000; on the previousyear of which the first transaction occured. There is hence nolimitation as to the assessment year reopened, ie: 1999-2000 and we answer question No.(ii) against the assessee and in favour of theRevenue. 11. The other question raised by the appellant, for both the assessment years, is that the proceedings under Section 153A isnot sustinable insofar as there being no incriminating materialrecovered in search and there was no basis on which the blockassessment was proceeded with. The appellant relies on thedecision in CIT v. Kabul Chawla [(2016) 380 ITR 573 (Delhi)]. It isthe contention of the appellant, as revealed from the manner in whichthe questions are framed in the memorandum of appeal, that theDepartment had purposefully initiated a proceeding under Section153A, since, otherwise, the consent letters which were received byway of a Tax Evasion Petition could not have been proceeded withfor reason of limitation. 12. We agree with the decision of the Delhi High Court in Kabul Chawla and as relevant to the instant case, we extract thefollowing legal position as laid down by their Lordships sitting indivision: “(iv) Although section 153A does not say that additionsshould be strictly made on the basis of evidence found inthe course of the search, or other post-search material orinformation available with the Assessing Officer which can be related to the evidence found, it does not mean thatthe assessment “can be arbitrary or made without anyrelevance or nexus with the seized material. Obviously,an assessment has to be made under this section only on”the basis of the seized material”. Therein no incriminating material was unearthed during the searchand, hence, no additions could have been made to the assessment,was the finding. Therein the additions, which were deleted, were onaccount of additions made on deemed dividend, corresponding toadditions made on protective basis in the hands of Companies inwhich the assessee was a shareholder. We are, however, convincedthat the said proposition of law, to which we respectfully agree,cannot lead to a deletion of additions at the hands of the deceasedassessee herein, represented by the appellant-legal heir. 13. We started the narration of facts with the rider of thatbeing 'from the perspective of the assessee' since the facts hereinare not so simple as to merely apply the principle of no incriminatingevidence having been recovered in search. Viewed from thedepartmental perspective, we notice that the Department received aTax Evasion Petition in which copies of two consent letters wereenclosed. The Department initiated a search in the premises of the 13. We started the narration of facts with the rider of thatbeing 'from the perspective of the assessee' since the facts hereinare not so simple as to merely apply the principle of no incriminatingevidence having been recovered in search. Viewed from thedepartmental perspective, we notice that the Department received aTax Evasion Petition in which copies of two consent letters wereenclosed. The Department initiated a search in the premises of the assessee on the basis of the said materials which were inciminatingby themselves. The search could have revealed further defalcationsor could have revealed further incriminating material with respect tothe same transaction. True, there were no further incriminatingmaterials received on the land deal. But it was revealed that theassessee had rental income from a flat purchased by the assesseeat Bangalore. The purchase was in the year 1998-99 and it was soldin the assessment year 2004-05 upon which certain additions weremade for that year. The additions made for that year was modified bythe Tribunal, on which there is no appeal. But it is of significance thatthe return filed pursuant to the notice under Section 153A,conceeded the rental income in the block period and theconsideration recieved from the land deal was also shown as morethan that originally returned. There was incriminating material seized,with respect to the rental income, which was conceeded to by theassessee in the returrn filed pursuant to the search and seizure.There can hence be no ground taken that the other material whichwere already available with the Department cannot be relied on in theproceedings. Further, the proceedings pursuant to the search alsodisclose incriminating evidence having been unearthed with respectto the land deal also. 14. Pertinent is the fact that it is pursuant to the search and the enquiry conducted thereafter that the suppressed accountmaintained by the assessee in which the unaccounted considerationfrom the purchaser was unearthed. There was also unearthed,evidence with respect to two individuals, connected to the asseseee,but with no sufficient means, in whose accounts considerableamounts had been credited on encashment of the cash cheques,issued by the purchaser. The said individuals on oath admitted thatthe encashment was made on the request of the husband of theassessee and the amounts handed over to him. 15. The notice issued under Section 153A, after thesearch, hence was not solely on the basis of the copies of theconsent letters received along with the Tax Evasion Petition. Wehave already found that the ground of limitation with respect toassessment year 1999-2000 relating to the first transaction, whichwas occasioned in the financial year 1998-1999, is not sustainable.Even then, the assessee's contention is that the proceedings underSection 153A was illegal and not validly instituted for reason of therebeing no incriminzting material recovered on search. Even if therewas no incriminating material seized on search, the Department wasperfectly within its authority to proceed on the basis of the consent letters received. However, then the proceedings ought to have beentaken under Section 147 read with Section 149 of the IT Act. letters received. However, then the proceedings ought to have beentaken under Section 147 read with Section 149 of the IT Act. 16. In this context, we have to examine the assessee'scontention as to the Department having deliberately proceeded underSection 153A, to get over the difficulties in proceeding otherwise aspermitted by the IT Act; and giving a “fresh life” to the proceedingsinitiated on the materials already available with them, by way of theTax Evasion Petition. Section 147 provides for reopening ofassessment for reason of escapement of income. The materialsreceived along with the Tax Evasion Petition definitely speaks ofescapement of income, which gives a valid ground for theDepartment to proceed under Section 147. Then what has to beexamined is whether the Department could have proceeded underSection 147 in tune with the limitation as provided under Section 149.As per Section 147, if the Assessing Officer has reason to believethat any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, for anyassessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of Sections 148to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other incomechargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comesto his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings. Theproviso restricts any such proceeding after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year if an assessment undersub-section (3) of Section 143 or Section 147 has been made for therelevant assessment year unless there is a failure on the part of theassessee to make a return under Section 139 or in response tonotice issued under sub-section (1) of Section 142 or Section 148 orto disclose fully and truly all material facts necesary for theassessment. Issuance of notice, where income has escapedassessment, as provided for in Section 148, is subject to thelimitation provided under Section 149. No notice under Section 148shall be issued for the relevant assessment year if four years haveelapsed from the end of the said year under clause (a) of sub-section(1) of Section 149. However, the limitation, as per clause (b) ofSection 149(1), extends for a further period of two years if the incomechargeable to tax, which has escaped assessment, amounts to onelakh rupees or more for that year. 17. In the present case, the legal heir of the assesseefiled a return of income on a notice issued under Section 153Aproviding an additional income of Rs.34,50,000/- in the first financialyear, being 1998-99 and stuck to the return already filed ofRs.16,00,000/- for the financial year 1999-00. The returns were filedadmitting the receipt of an amount of Rs.60,00,000/- as against the original returned amount of Rs.32,00,000/- for the two transactionscarried out in the financial years 1998-1999 and 1999-2000. Theassessee, as per the return, admitted a receipt of Rs.44,00,000/- inthe assessment year 1999-2000 and 16 lakhs in the assessmentyear 2000-2001. Hence there was a failure on the part of theassessee to disclose fully and truly all materials necessary forassessment. The limitation of four years as provided in the proviso toSection 147 does not apply. The tax effect for the year is more thanone lakh and by virtue of the sub-cluse (b) of Section 149 (1)proceedings can be taken for six years. 18. As far as the assessment year 1999-2000 is original returned amount of Rs.32,00,000/- for the two transactionscarried out in the financial years 1998-1999 and 1999-2000. Theassessee, as per the return, admitted a receipt of Rs.44,00,000/- inthe assessment year 1999-2000 and 16 lakhs in the assessmentyear 2000-2001. Hence there was a failure on the part of theassessee to disclose fully and truly all materials necessary forassessment. The limitation of four years as provided in the proviso toSection 147 does not apply. The tax effect for the year is more thanone lakh and by virtue of the sub-cluse (b) of Section 149 (1)proceedings can be taken for six years. 18. As far as the assessment year 1999-2000 is concerned, the limitation commences from 31.03.2000, as perSection 149. The notice under Section 153A was dated 06.01.2006,i.e: in the financial year 2005-2006. Hence, if it was a notice underSection 149, the same would have been sustainable since for therelevant assessment year, i.e., 1999-2000 the income chargeable totax which has escaped assessment, is far more than one lakh. Theproceedings have been taken in the 6[th] year the last of the years inwhich the Department was entitled to initiate such proceedings undersection 149, i.e, on 06-01-2006, in assessment year 2005-2006. Thelimitation comences from 31.03.2000. If that be so, there is no ITA.Nos.186 of 2013 & - 16 - limitation with respect to the next assessment year also, being2000-2001, which extends upto the year 2006-2007. We do not findany benefit having been derived by the Department insofar asinitiating proceedings under Section 153A. Even if the search did notresult in seizure of any incriminating material, the Department couldhave proceeded under Section 149 based on the materials receivedalong with the Tax Evasion Petition. 19. The mere fact that without proceeding under Section147 read with Sections 148 and 149, the Department proceededunder Section 153A would not by that alone absolve the assesseefrom making good the tax relating to the income which has escapedassessment. The mere fact that the provision under which theDepartment proceeded was not proper, would not vitiate the entireproceedings especially since there is no procedural requirementdistinguishing a notice under Section 148 or one under Section 153A. 20. Now we have to look at whether the escapement ofincome is proved and established. The appellant has a contentionthat the assessee did not accept the signture in the copy of theconsent letters. Nor could a verification of the signature with admittedsignatures be attempted, for reason of the material received by theDepartment being mere photo copies. There was no evidence unearthed, according to the appellant, as to the assessee havingreceived any amounts other than that returned, i.e., Rs.60,00,000/-;Rs.44,00,000/- in the financial year 1998-99 and Rs.16,00,000/- in1999-2000. That is a question of fact and we would not havenormally looked into the same; and there is also no question on thataspect raised in the appeal. But, if there is no material available,definitely the findings of the Tribunal could be held to be perverse. unearthed, according to the appellant, as to the assessee havingreceived any amounts other than that returned, i.e., Rs.60,00,000/-;Rs.44,00,000/- in the financial year 1998-99 and Rs.16,00,000/- in1999-2000. That is a question of fact and we would not havenormally looked into the same; and there is also no question on thataspect raised in the appeal. But, if there is no material available,definitely the findings of the Tribunal could be held to be perverse. 21. This question is also inextricably linked with thecontention of the appellant that there was no incriminating materialunearthed on search. Hence, we looked into the assessment orders.We find from the assessment orders that the purchaser had issuedcheques to two persons unconnected with the transaction, but veryclose to the assessee, one Lakshmanan and another Kamala. Theywere nominees of the assessee and did not have any financialtransaction with the purchaser. These persons admitted on oath thatthe cash cheques issued by the purchaser in their names wereencashed on the instructions of Sri.Karunakaran, the husband of theassessee who handed over the said cheques to the two persons.The proceeds, after encashment, were also stated to be handed overto Sri.Karunakaran. One of the witnesses to the agreement (consentletter), one E.C.Manoharan was examined on oath and he admitted ITA.Nos.186 of 2013 &- 18 - 217 of 2013 that he had witnessed the same. The proceeds of cheques issued bythe purchaser, which were not disclosed by the assessee, werecredited to the undisclosed bank account of the assessee. That andthose encashed through close allies came to Rs.28,00,000/-. 22. The details of such evidence were communicated tothe legal heir of the assessee, who did not seek cross-examination ofany of the said witnesses; but merely filed a reply denying theexistence of the consent letters and the statement of the witnesses.In the cash flow statement filed on behalf of the assessee, theassessee had shown a total receipt of Rs.60,00,000/- from oneK.N.Abdul Hameed, the purchaser, out of which Rs.44,00,000/- issaid to have been received in the assessment year 1999-2000. Thefirst transaction, transferring half of the right in the property, wasmade by execution of a sale deed on 01.07.1998 after which thepurchaser Abdul Hameed was found to have withdrawnRs.50,50,000/-. Hence, there was clear evidence as to the totalconsideration received, being Rs.1,01,00,000/- in the twotransactions; establishing the information as disclosed from the copyof the consent letters received along with the Tax Evasion Petition.The first transaction took place in the financial year 1998-1999, inwhich the assessee admitted receipt of only Rs.44,00,000/- and after - 19 - the execution of the first sale deed, there was a withdrawal ofRs.50,50,000/- from the purchaser's account. This obviously was forthe second transaction, the sale deed of which was executed on10.05.1999, at the commencement of the next financial year1999-2000. The exact amount of income escaped from assessmentis supported by ample evidence. We do not see any reason tointerfere with the orders of the Tribunal. The questions of law are answered in favour of theRevenue and against the assessee. The appeal is rejected affirmingthe order of the Tribunal. The computation of capital gains shall beproceeded with by the Assessing Officer and finalised expeditiously;if not already done. The parties are left to suffer their respectivecosts. Sd/-K.Vinod ChandranJudge vku/- Sd/- Ashok MenonJudge [ true copy ]