Jagpal v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Panchkula And Others

ITA-133-2019 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH ITA-133-2019 (O&M) Date of Decision: 25.3.2019 Jagpal Versus ....Appellant. Commissioner of Income Tax, Panchkula and others ...Respondents. CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR MITTAL.HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANJARI NEHRU KAUL. PRESENT: Mr. Abhilaksh Grover, Advocate for the appellant. AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, J. 1.This order shall dispose of bunch of three appeals bearing ITANos. 133 to 135 of 2019 as according to the learned counsel for theappellant similar issues are involved therein. For brevity, the facts are beingextracted from ITA-133-2019.2.ITA-133-2019 has been filed by the assessee under Section260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the Act”) against the orderdated 27.10.2016 (Annexure A-1) passed by the Income Tax AppellateTribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as “theTribunal”) in ITA No. 330/Chd/2016, for the assessment year 2011-12,claiming the following substantial questions of law:- i)Whether in the facts and the circumstances of thecase, the ITAT was justified in not allowing theappeal filed by the Appellant, especially when inidentical cases, the same relief has been granted?case, the ITAT was justified in not allowing theappeal filed by the Appellant, especially when inidentical cases, the same relief has been granted? ITA-133-2019 ii)Whether the learned Tribunal erred in notconsidering the settled law as laid down by theHon'ble Supreme Court in Ghanshyam Dass(supra)?considering the settled law as laid down by theHon'ble Supreme Court in Ghanshyam Dass(supra)? iii)Whether interest received received on enhancedcompensation under Section 28 of the LandAcquisition Act is in the nature interest or whetherit is a part of the compensation itself?compensation under Section 28 of the LandAcquisition Act is in the nature interest or whetherit is a part of the compensation itself? iv)Whether the interest received on enhancedcompensation is liable to be taxed under the head“Income from Other Sources”?compensation is liable to be taxed under the head“Income from Other Sources”? v)Whether the Tribunal has acted arbitrarily in not granting relief to the Appellants, but havingallowed identical cases of similarly situatedpersons?allowed identical cases of similarly situatedpersons? 3.A few facts necessary for adjudication of the instant appeal asnarrated therein may be noticed. The assessee received enhancedcompensation along with interest amounting to ` 9,64,57,703/- includingthe interest of ` 4,77,53,426/- from the Haryana Urban DevelopmentAuthority (HUDA) for compulsory acquisition of agricultural land. He filedhis return of income for the year under consideration on 18.11.2011declaring total income at ` 8,17,872/- besides agricultural income of` 4,00,000/-. The case of the assessee was selected for scrutiny and a noticeunder Section 143(2) of the Act was issued. The Assessing Officer added50% of the interest, i.e. ` 2,38,76,713/- to the total income of the assessee.Feeling aggrieved, by the assessment order, the assessee filed an appeal ITA-133-2019 -3- before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [for brevity “the CIT(A)”]. The CIT(A) vide order dated 10.2.2016 (Annexure A-2), dismissedthe said appeal. Still dissatisfied, the assessee filed an appeal before theTribunal. The Tribunal vide order dated 27.10.2016 (Annexure A-1),affirmed the findings of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal. Hence, thepresent appeals. Since, the appeals were barred by limitation, theapplications have been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (inshort “the 1963 Act”) for condonation of delay in filing the appeals. ITA-133-2019 -3- before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [for brevity “the CIT(A)”]. The CIT(A) vide order dated 10.2.2016 (Annexure A-2), dismissedthe said appeal. Still dissatisfied, the assessee filed an appeal before theTribunal. The Tribunal vide order dated 27.10.2016 (Annexure A-1),affirmed the findings of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal. Hence, thepresent appeals. Since, the appeals were barred by limitation, theapplications have been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (inshort “the 1963 Act”) for condonation of delay in filing the appeals. 4.We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant.5. The primary question that arises for consideration in theseappeals is whether there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay of733 in ITA Nos. 133 and 134 of 2019 and 739 days in ITA-135. 6.Examining the legal position relating to condonation of delayunder Section 5 of the 1963 Act, it may be observed that the Supreme Courtin Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat IndustrialDevelopment Corporation and another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 laying downthe broad principles for adjudicating the issue of condonation of delay, inparas 14 and 15 observed as under:- “14. We have considered the respective submissions.The law of limitation is founded on public policy. Thelegislature does not prescribe limitation with the objectof destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure thatthey do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedywithout delay. The idea is that every legal remedy mustbe kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To putit differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress ofthe legal injury. At the same time, the courts arebestowed with the power to condone the delay, ifsufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedywithin the stipulated time. 15. The expression “sufficient cause” employed inSection 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similarother statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts toapply the law in a meaningful manner which sub servesthe ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can belaid down in dealing with the applications forcondonation of delay, this Court has justifiablyadvocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoningthe delay of short duration and a stricter approach wherethe delay is inordinate-Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v.Shantaram Baburao Patil.” Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similarother statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts toapply the law in a meaningful manner which sub servesthe ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can belaid down in dealing with the applications forcondonation of delay, this Court has justifiablyadvocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoningthe delay of short duration and a stricter approach wherethe delay is inordinate-Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v.Shantaram Baburao Patil.” 7. It was further noticed by the Apex Court in R.B. Ramlingam v.R.B. Bhavaneshwari 2009(1) RCR (Civil) 892 as under:- “.....It is not necessary at this stage to discuss each andevery judgment cited before us for the simple reason thatSection 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay downany standard or objective test. The test of “sufficientcause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not anobjective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treatedalike. The statute of limitation has left the concept ofevery judgment cited before us for the simple reason thatSection 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay downany standard or objective test. The test of “sufficientcause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not anobjective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treatedalike. The statute of limitation has left the concept of “.....It is not necessary at this stage to discuss each andevery judgment cited before us for the simple reason thatSection 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay downany standard or objective test. The test of “sufficientcause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not anobjective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treatedalike. The statute of limitation has left the concept ofevery judgment cited before us for the simple reason thatSection 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay downany standard or objective test. The test of “sufficientcause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not anobjective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treatedalike. The statute of limitation has left the concept of “sufficient cause” delightfully undefined, thereby leavingto the Court a well-intentioned discretion to decide theindividual cases whether circumstances exist establishingsufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficientcause. The categories of sufficient cause are neverexhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to bedealt with by the Court as such.” It was also recordedthat:- “For the aforestated reasons, we hold that in eachand every case the Court has to examine whetherdelay in filing the special leave petition standsproperly explained. This is the basic test whichneeds to be applied. The true guide is whether thepetitioner has acted with reasonable diligence inthe prosecution of his appeal/petition....” and every case the Court has to examine whetherdelay in filing the special leave petition standsproperly explained. This is the basic test whichneeds to be applied. The true guide is whether thepetitioner has acted with reasonable diligence inthe prosecution of his appeal/petition....” 8. From the above, it emerges that the law of limitation has beenenacted which is based on public policy so as to prescribe time limit foravailing legal remedy for redressal of the injury caused. The purpose behindenacting law of limitation is not to destroy the rights of the parties but to seethat the uncertainty should not prevail for unlimited period. Under Section 5of the 1963 Act, the courts are empowered to condone the delay where aparty approaching the court belatedly shows sufficient cause for not availingthe remedy within the prescribed period. The meaning to be assigned to theexpression “sufficient cause” occurring in Section 5 of the 1963 Act shouldbe such so as to do substantial justice between the parties. The existence ofsufficient cause depends upon facts of each case and no hard and fast rule ITA-133-2019 9. The Apex Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. and R.B. Ramlingam's cases (supra) noticed that the courts should adoptliberal approach where delay is of short period whereas the proof requiredshould be strict where the delay is inordinate. Further, it was also observedthat judgments dealing with the condonation of delay may not lay down anystandard or objective test but is purely an individualistic test. The court isrequired to examine while adjudicating the matter relating to condonation ofdelay on exercising judicial discretion on individual facts involved therein.There does not exist any exhaustive list constituting sufficient cause. Theapplicant/appellant is required to establish that inspite of acting with duecare and caution, the delay had occurred due to circumstances beyond hiscontrol and was inevitable. and R.B. Ramlingam's cases (supra) noticed that the courts should adoptliberal approach where delay is of short period whereas the proof requiredshould be strict where the delay is inordinate. Further, it was also observedthat judgments dealing with the condonation of delay may not lay down anystandard or objective test but is purely an individualistic test. The court isrequired to examine while adjudicating the matter relating to condonation ofdelay on exercising judicial discretion on individual facts involved therein.There does not exist any exhaustive list constituting sufficient cause. Theapplicant/appellant is required to establish that inspite of acting with duecare and caution, the delay had occurred due to circumstances beyond hiscontrol and was inevitable. 10.According to the learned counsel for the appellant, theappellant is engaged in agriculture in the village of Haryana and being noteducated, was not fully aware of the rights and remedies available to him forthe redressal of his grievances. The appellant was unable to file the appealon time as he had come to know about the same only from the order dated4.10.2018 passed by the Tribunal in identical cases. It was urged that thedelay, if any, has occurred in the aforesaid circumstances in filing the appealbefore this Court. Learned counsel further argued that the delay wasunintentional and due to the circumstances beyond the control of theappellant. 11. We do not find any ground to condone the colossal delay of733 and 739 days in filing the appeals. The question regarding whetherthere is sufficient cause or not depends upon each case and primarily is a ITA-133-2019 -7- question of fact to be considered taking into totality of events which hadtaken place in a particular case. In the present case after appreciating thematter it cannot be said that there was sufficient cause for condonation ofdelay. However, the appeal was required to be filed within the stipulatedperiod of limitation of 120 days. But the appellant filed the appeal beforethis Court on 27.2.2019, after a delay of 733 days. The plea of the appellantas mentioned above would not satisfy the test of sufficient cause. Theexplanation of the appellant is bereft of justification for the delay caused infiling the appeal keeping in view the totality of facts and circumstances ofthe present case. 12.In view of the above, finding no merit in the applications forcondonation of delay in filing the appeal, the same are hereby dismissed andconsequently, the appeals are also dismissed as time barred. (AJAY KUMAR MITTAL) JUDGE March 25, 2019gbs (MANJARI NEHRU KAUL)JUDGE Whether Speaking/ReasonedYesWhether ReportableYes