K.m.mammen v. The Director General Of Income Tax (Investigation)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASReserved on : 09.08.2019 Pronounced on : 28.08.2019CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.S.RAMESH W.P.No.3929 of 2014andM.P.No.1 of 2014 K.M.MammenVs.1.The Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), No.46, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. ... PetitionerVs. 2.The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle IV (1), Income Tax New Building, Room No.112, 1[st] Floor, No.46, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. Central Circle IV (1), Income Tax New Building, Room No.112, 1[st] Floor, No.46, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. 3.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle IV (1), Income Tax New Building, Room No.112, 1[st] Floor, No.46, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. Central Circle IV (1), Income Tax New Building, Room No.112, 1[st] Floor, No.46, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. 4.The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, (CCA) No.121, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. No.121, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. 5.The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax/ Director General of Income Tax, No.121, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. Director General of Income Tax, No.121, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. ... Respondents https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ PRAYER : Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of theConstitution of India, praying for a Writ of CertorarifiedMandamus, calling for the records of the respondents pertainingto the petitioner's income tax assessment for the AY 2002-2003in PAN:AAEPMO314R and to quash the impugned order of the firstrespondent dated 15.01.2014 and consequently direct therespondents 1, 4 and 5 herein to compound the offence inaccordance with law. For Petitioner : Mr.Abudukumar Rajaratnam for Mr.S.Ashok Kumar For Respondents : Mr.ANR. Jayaprathab Junior Standing Counsel O R D E R The petitioner, while filing his returns for the assessmentyear 2002-2003, is alleged to have concealed an amount ofRs.2,26,38,372/- deposited in a Foreign Bank Account and isthereby prosecuted for offences under Section 270 C of theIncome Tax Act, 1961. The petitioner had filed a compoundingpetition under Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and thesame was dismissed on 15.01.2014. The present Writ Petition hasbeen filed against this dismissal order. 2. Heard Mr.Abudukumar Rajaratnam, learned counsel for thepetitioner and Mr.A.N.R. Jayaprathap, learned Junior Standingcounsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:- a) The case of the respondent is that the petitioner hadcreated a Trust in the name of Webster Foundation and the saidTrust had opened an account with LGT bank, Liechtenstein, aForeign State in Europe. The petitioner, his father and hisbrother were named as direct beneficiaries of the Trust. It isfurther alleged that the petitioner, had made a declaration ofendowment in favour of M/s. Webster Foundation, by endowing theFoundation with a sum of € 1,23,000 on 24.03.2000. The statementof accounts showing the balance in the foreign account ofWebster Foundation as on 31.12.2001, including the accruedinterest, was a sum of Swiss Franc 778, 437.80 (equivalent toIndian Rs.2,26,38,372/-). b) On 25.03.2009, a notice under Section 148 of the IncomeTax Act was issued, stating that the income of the petitionerchargeable to tax for the assessment year 2002-03, has escapedassessment within the meaning of Section 147 of the Income TaxAct, 1961. The petitioner gave a reply to the said notice on https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ b) On 25.03.2009, a notice under Section 148 of the IncomeTax Act was issued, stating that the income of the petitionerchargeable to tax for the assessment year 2002-03, has escapedassessment within the meaning of Section 147 of the Income TaxAct, 1961. The petitioner gave a reply to the said notice on https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 13.04.2009, based on which a sworn statement was recorded underSection 131 of the Act on 16.11.2009. The assessment order cameto be passed thereafter on 29.12.2009. The petitioner had paidthe tax for a sum of Indian Rs.1,28,15,546/-. After about ayear, a show cause notice was issued by the Commissioner on28.01.2011 for alleged commission of offences under Section 276Cand 277 of the Act to which, the petitioner had given a reply on17.02.2011. After obtaining the sanction for prosecution on24.03.2011, a complaint was filed in E.O.C.C.No.121 of 2011 foroffences under Section 276C and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. c) In this background, the petitioner had filed a petitionon 28.03.2011 under Section 279 (2) of the Act, for compoundingthe offences in the criminal complaint. The first respondentherein, had dismissed the same by an order dated 15.01.2014,which is under challenge in the present Writ Petition. d) Pursuant to the impugned order of the DGIT, theCommissioner of Income Tax, Appeals had reduced the penaltylevied on the petitioner through orders in ITA No.12/2012-13 andthe reduction was confirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunalin ITA.No.1882/MDS/2014 dated 27.09.2017. Subsequently, when thepetitioner had filed a petition before this Court seeking toquash the criminal complaint filed in E.O.C.C.No.121 of 2011,the same was dismissed on 28.02.2019. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner put forth hissubmissions under the following points: A) As per the CBDT Guidelines, the authority to compound anon-technical offence under Section 276 C (1) is by a Committee,which Guidelines are binding on the Income Tax authorities underSection 119 of the Income Tax Act and as such, the impugnedorder passed by the DGIT (investigation) Chennai is withoutjurisdiction. B) When the Commissioner of Income Tax had reduced thepenalty under Section 279 (1A) of the Act, the DGIT was notjustified in refusing to compound the offences. In support ofsuch a contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decisionof the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Dass V. Income Tax Officerreported in 1999 (5) SCC 241. C) The documents relied upon by the respondents are notlegally valid in the eye of law and therefore has no legalexistence. D) The notice issued under Section 148 of the Act iswithout jurisdiction since, the Deputy Commissioner of IncomeTax has failed to record his satisfaction that the escapement ofchargeable income was due to the omission or failure on the partof the assessee. E) The notice under Section 148 is beyond the limitationperiod of six years as provided under Section 149 of the Act andhence is without jurisdiction. 5. To such submissions, the learned Standing counsel forthe respondents would place his objections in the followingmanner: A) The application for compounding the offences wererejected in the preliminary stage and as such, the Committeecontemplated under the CBDT Guidelines need not be approached.Even otherwise, the offence under Section 277 is a technicaloffence and as such, the DGIT was well within his jurisdictionto pass the order. Insofar as the offence under Section 276C (1)is concerned, the conditions prescribed in paragraph 4 of theGuidelines were not satisfied and in view of paragraph 5.1 ofthe Guidelines, such non-satisfaction would entitle the DGIT topass the impugned order. 5. To such submissions, the learned Standing counsel forthe respondents would place his objections in the followingmanner: A) The application for compounding the offences wererejected in the preliminary stage and as such, the Committeecontemplated under the CBDT Guidelines need not be approached.Even otherwise, the offence under Section 277 is a technicaloffence and as such, the DGIT was well within his jurisdictionto pass the order. Insofar as the offence under Section 276C (1)is concerned, the conditions prescribed in paragraph 4 of theGuidelines were not satisfied and in view of paragraph 5.1 ofthe Guidelines, such non-satisfaction would entitle the DGIT topass the impugned order. B) Reduction of penalty will not be a ground to quash theimpugned order and the decision in Prem Dass's case (supra) isnot applicable to the present case since the order passed underSection 273A of the Act, reducing the penalty has not becomefinal since the Department has filed a Tax Case Appeal againstthe ITAT order in a Tax Case Appeal and therefore the benefitunder Section 279 cannot be claimed by the petitioner. C) The Madras High Court has directed the trial court todecide the authenticity of the documents relied upon by thepetitioner in its order in Crl.O.P.No.9065 of 2011 and hencethere is no infirmity. D & E) The legality of the notice issued under Section 148of the Act has been seized by the Hon’ble Division Bench of thisCourt in TCA.No.252 of 2013. Since the Tax Case Appeal and thecriminal case are independent to each other, it cannot be saidthat the notice is without jurisdiction. As per the EconomicOffences (Inapplicability of limitation) Act, there is nolimitation for launching such types of cases and therefore thesesubmissions deserves no consideration. 6. I have given careful thought and consideration to thesubmissions advanced by both the counsels and would answer them as follows: 7. Point A: 7.1. The Central Board Of Direct Taxes had issued revisedGuidelines for compounding of offences under the provisions ofthe Direct Tax Laws on 16.05.2008. Guideline No. 7.1 (c) of thesaid Guidelines reads as follows: “The authority competent to compound allapplications for compounding of non-technicaloffences other than the non-technical offencesas covered in para 7.1(b) above will be theCommittee comprising: i) CCIT (CCA)ii) DGIT (Inv.) andiii) CCIT/DGIT having jurisdiction overthe case.Where CCIT (CCA)/DGIT (Inv.) is theCCIT/DGIT having jurisdiction over the case,then another officer of the rank of CCIT maybe co-opted as the member of the Committee.The CCIT/DGIT having jurisdiction over thecase will act as Member-Secretary who willalso co-opt such other member as the case maybe, and convene the meeting, as well asmaintain its minutes.” 7.2. As per the aforesaid Guidelines, the authority tocompound a non-technical offence under Section 276C (1), whichis an offence for a wilful attempt to evade tax, etc., would beby a Committee comprising of CCIT (CCA), DGIT (Investigation)and CCIT/DGIT (referred to as Committee) having jurisdictionover the case. Section 276C has been classified as a non-technical offence as per the aforesaid revised Guidelines and assuch, the competent authority to compound such a non-technicaloffence would be the Committee. 7.3. When the petitioner was alleged to have concealed thedeclaration of endowment in a foreign country in his return ofincome filed for the assessment year 2002-2003 and therebywilfully attempted to evade tax penalty and interest,prosecution was launched against him for offences under Section276C (1) and 277 of the Income Tax Act. The learned Standingcounsel for the respondents would attempt to say that since, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 7.3. When the petitioner was alleged to have concealed thedeclaration of endowment in a foreign country in his return ofincome filed for the assessment year 2002-2003 and therebywilfully attempted to evade tax penalty and interest,prosecution was launched against him for offences under Section276C (1) and 277 of the Income Tax Act. The learned Standingcounsel for the respondents would attempt to say that since, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ offence under Section 277 is a technical offence as per theaforesaid Guidelines and therefore the DGIT was well within hisjurisdiction in passing the impugned order. Insofar as the non-technical offence under Section 276C (1) of the Act isconcerned, it is his submission that the conditions prescribedin paragraph 4 of the Guidelines were not fulfilled and sinceGuideline No. 5.1 prescribes that all conditions prescribed inparagraph 4 should be satisfied before a non-technical offenceis considered for compounding, the DGIT was well within itspowers in passing the impugned orders. Above all, the impugnedorder was rejected in the preliminary stage itself andtherefore, there was no necessity for the Committee to considerthe compounding application. 7.4. I am not in agreement with such submission for morethan one reason. When the revised Guidelines confersjurisdiction on the Committee for compounding non-technicaloffences, the reasoning of the Department that the applicationcame to be rejected in the preliminary stage itself and hencethe Committee need not be approached, is not founded on anylegal principle. In order to exercise its jurisdiction, the DGITmust be vested with powers to handle the compounding applicationfrom the inception itself. This goes without saying that even ifthe DGIT is of the view that the application requires to berejected in the preliminary stage itself, there is the duty caston him to forward such a compounding application to theCommittee, who is vested with the jurisdiction to handle thesame and not assume such powers on himself. 7.5. Likewise, when one among the two offences, namely,Section 276C (1) of the Act has been classified as a non-technical offence, the compounding of which powers was vestedwith the committee, the DGIT will have no powers to go into themerits of the compounding application, on the ground that theother offence, namely, Section 277 has been classified as atechnical offence under the Guidelines and therefore, deal withthe application which involves the non-technical offence also.Viewed from this angle also, it can be said that the DGIT hadexceeded in his jurisdiction to take up the petitioner'scompounding application. 7.6 There is yet another aspect to this ground. The revisedGuidelines does not define or explain as to what are technicaloffences and non-technical offences. While that being so, I amunable to comprehend as to how Section 277, which finds place inboth the technical, as well as the non-technical offences hasbeen adopted as a technical offence, in the absence of anydefinition to these terms. Hence, the reliance on theclassification of technical and non-technical can only be saidto be an attempt to get over the mandate in the revised Guidelines. As such, it is quite evident that the DGIT hasexceeded his powers in dealing with the petitioner’s compoundingapplication, when he had absolutely no powers to deal with itfrom the inception, in view of the revised Guidelines of CBDT. 7.7. Under Section 119 (1) of the Income Tax Act, allinstructions issued by the Board shall be observed and followedby all the Income Tax authorities. The said provision reads asfollows: Guidelines. As such, it is quite evident that the DGIT hasexceeded his powers in dealing with the petitioner’s compoundingapplication, when he had absolutely no powers to deal with itfrom the inception, in view of the revised Guidelines of CBDT. 7.7. Under Section 119 (1) of the Income Tax Act, allinstructions issued by the Board shall be observed and followedby all the Income Tax authorities. The said provision reads asfollows: “Section 119 (1): The Board may, fromtime to time, issue such orders, instructionsand directions to other income- taxauthorities as it may deem fit for the properadministration of this Act, and suchauthorities and all other persons employed inthe execution of this Act shall observe andfollowsuchorders,instructionsanddirections of the Board: Provided that no such orders, instructions ordirections shall be issued- a) so as to require any income-taxauthority to make a particular assessment orto dispose of a particular case in aparticular manner; or b) so as to interfere with the discretionof the [***][Commissioner (Appeals)] in theexercise of his appellate functions.” 7.8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Catholic Syrianbank Ltd V. Commissioner of Income Tax, Thrissur reported in2012 (3) SCC 784 had held that the circulars can be issued bythe Board to explain or tone down the rigours of law and thatthe circulars cannot be ignored. The relevant portion of thesaid order reads as follows: “23. Now, we shall proceed to examine theeffect of the circulars which are in force andare issued by the Central Board of DirectTaxes (for short, `the Board') in exercise ofthe power vested in it under Section 119 ofthe Act. Circulars can be issued by the Boardto explain or tone down the rigours of law andto ensure fair enforcement of its provisions.These circulars have the force of law and arebinding on the income tax authorities, though they cannot be enforced adversely against theassessee. Normally, these circulars cannot beignored. 24. A circular may not override ordetract from the provisions of the Act but itcan seek to mitigate the rigour of aparticular provision for the benefit of theassessee in certain specified circumstances.So long as the circular is in force, it aidsthe uniform and proper administration andapplication of the provisions of the Act.{Refer to UCO Bank, Calcutta v. Commissionerof Income Tax, W.B. (1999) 4 SCC 599]}.” 7.9. Section 120 of the Income Tax Act provides that theIncome Tax authorities shall exercise all or any of the powersassigned to them in accordance with such directions as the Boardmay issue for the exercise of the powers and performance oftheir functions. When the circular prescribes and confers powerson the committee to deal with an application seeking forcompounding the offences, the DGIT cannot usurp the powers ofthe Committee to deal with non-technical offences and deviatefrom the Guidelines which is binding on him in view of Section119 of the Income Tax Act. In view of these statutory provisionsand in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court citedabove, I am of the view that the impugned order passed by theDGIT is without jurisdiction. 8.1. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies onSection 279 (1A) of the Income Tax Act and the decision in PremDass's case (supra) and contends that since the Commissioner(Appeals) has reduced the penalty from 300% to 100%, noprosecution can be launched or continued against the assessee.Per contra, the learned Standing counsel contends that the orderin appeal has been subjected to further appeal before this Courtand hence has not attained finality. Before addressing thisissue, it would be relevant to have a glimpse of Section 279(1A) and the law laid down in Prem Dass's case (supra), touchingupon this aspect. 8.2. Section 279 (1A) of the Income Tax Act reads asfollows: 8.1. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies onSection 279 (1A) of the Income Tax Act and the decision in PremDass's case (supra) and contends that since the Commissioner(Appeals) has reduced the penalty from 300% to 100%, noprosecution can be launched or continued against the assessee.Per contra, the learned Standing counsel contends that the orderin appeal has been subjected to further appeal before this Courtand hence has not attained finality. Before addressing thisissue, it would be relevant to have a glimpse of Section 279(1A) and the law laid down in Prem Dass's case (supra), touchingupon this aspect. 8.2. Section 279 (1A) of the Income Tax Act reads asfollows: “A person shall not be proceeded againstfor an offence under section 276C or section277 in relation to the assessment for an assessment year in respect of which thepenalty imposed or imposable on him underclause (iii) of sub- section (1) of section271 has been reduced or waived by an orderunder section 273A.” 8.3. In the case of Prem Dass (supra), the Hon'ble SupremeCourt was of the view that the assessee cannot be proceededagainst for the offences, when the Commissioner (Appeals) hasreduced the penalty. The relevant portion of the order reads asfollows: “10. We also find sufficient force in thecontention of Mr. Salve that the legislativemandate in Section 279(1A) of the Income TaxAct has not been borne in mind by the HighCourt while interfering with an order ofacquittal. Mr. Shukla, no doubt has indicatedthat the said provision will have noapplication as the penalty imposed has notbeen reduced or waived by an order underSection 273A. We do not agree with theaforesaid literal interpretation of theprovisions of Section 279(1A) of the Act, whenwe find that the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeal) has reduced the penalty. Further thetribunal has totally set aside the order,imposing penalty could not have been lostsight of by the High Court while consideringthe question whether the order of acquittalpassed by the Sessions Judge has to beinterfered with or not, particularly, when thegravamen of indictment relates to filing ofincorrect return and making wrong verificationof the statements filed in support of thereturn, resulting in initiation of penaltyproceedings. Bearing in mind the legislativeintent engrafted under Section 279(1A) of theIncome Tax Act and the conclusion of thelearned Sessions Judge, on appreciation ofevidence not having been reversed by the HighCourt and the grounds of acquittal passed bythe Sessions Judge not having been examined bythe High Court, we have no hesitation to cometo the conclusion that the High Court was notjustified in interfering with an order ofacquittal.” 8.4. Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, in explicit terms,is self-explanatory to the effect that when the penalty imposedon the assessee is reduced under Section 273A, such an assesseecannot be proceeded against for offences under Sections 276C or277. The term used in the Section is 'shall' and hence isrequired to be considered as mandatory in nature and wouldtherefore imply that when the penalty imposed has been reducedor waived, the Assessee cannot be proceeded against for thealleged offences. 8.5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Prem Dass’s case (supra)has reiterated this proposition as seen from the above extract.The Commissioner of Appeals, in his order dated 25.03.2014 inITA, had taken note of the fact that in the penalty order, theAssessing Officer has not accorded any justification or reasonsfor levying the maximum penalty of 300% of the tax sought to beevaded and thereby was of the opinion that a minimum amount ofpenalty at 100% can be imposed. 8.5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Prem Dass’s case (supra)has reiterated this proposition as seen from the above extract.The Commissioner of Appeals, in his order dated 25.03.2014 inITA, had taken note of the fact that in the penalty order, theAssessing Officer has not accorded any justification or reasonsfor levying the maximum penalty of 300% of the tax sought to beevaded and thereby was of the opinion that a minimum amount ofpenalty at 100% can be imposed. 8.6. The only objection to such a proposition from theDepartment is that the order passed by the Tribunal, reducingthe penalty, has been challenged in Tax Case Appeal before thisCourt. It is not the case of the Department that this Court hadstayed the order of the Commissioner of Appeals, as well as theTribunal in the Tax Case Appeals. Just because the orderreducing the penalty has been put under challenge in the TaxCase Appeals, it cannot be said that the order reducing thepenalty itself has been kept under abeyance. In this background,it can only be said that the petitioner would be entitled to thebenefit of Section 279 (1A) of the Act and the mere challenge tothe order reducing the penalty may not suffice to deny such abenefit. In view of these subsequent developments, there cannotnow be any impediment on the part of the Department to compoundthe offences under Sections 276C and 277 of the Act. 8.7. The learned Standing counsel for the respondents madea faint attempt by placing reliance on paragraph 19 of thedismissal order dated 28.02.2019 passed in Crl.O.P.No.9065 of2011 and submitted that Prem Dass's case (supra) has beendistinguished and held to be not applicable to the present case.Hence the learned Standing counsel would submit that, since theorder of reduction of penalty was not passed under Section 273Bof the Act, Section 279 (1A) of the Act is not applicable to thepetitioner. 8.8. As observed earlier, Section 279 (1A) is self-explanatory and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Dass’s case(supra) has further clarified that the assessee cannot beproceeded against for an offence when the penalty imposed on himhas been reduced. Under Article 141 of the Constitution ofIndia, the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court shall bebinding on all Courts, which includes the High Courts. As such,the decision in Prem Dass’s case (supra) would be binding onthis Court and as such, with due respects to the observationsmade in this regard in paragraph 19 of the order passed by thelearned Judge in Crl.O.P.No.9065 of 2011 dated 28.02.2019, isper incuriam and the observation made therein is not the properappraisal and cannot be relied upon. 8.9. At this juncture, it is brought to my notice that theorder in Crl.O.P.No.9065 of 2011 has been challenged by thepetitioner before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in S.L.A(Criminal) No. 6179 of 2019 and the order has been stayed on28.02.2019. 9. Point C, D and E:Now that, this Court has held that the appropriateauthority to consider a compounding petition filed under Section279 of the Act would be by a Committee comprising of the CCIT(CCA); DGIT (Investigation); and CCIT/DGIT having jurisdictionover the case, as per the revised Guidelines of CBDT and that inview of the subsequent developments, whereby the penalty imposedon the petitioner has been reduced by the Commissioner of IncomeTax, Appeals on 25.03.2014 and the same being confirmed by theIncome Tax Appellate Tribunal on 27.09.2017, the contentionsraised in point Nos.C, D and E are not specifically dealt withby this Court since, this Court is of the view that the matterbe remanded back to the Committee prescribed under the revisedGuideline No.7.1 (c) for passing appropriate orders. 10. In the light of the above observations, the impugnedorder passed by the first respondent herein under Section 279(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 15.01.2014 is set asideand the matter is remanded back to the Committee prescribedunder the CBDT Guideline No.7.1 (c) dated 16.05.2008. Thepetitioner is granted liberty to place a copy of this orderalong with afresh compounding petition under Section 279 of theIncome Tax Act, before the Committee, within a period of 30 daysfrom the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On receipt of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the aforesaid application along with a copy of this order, theCommittee shall consider the same, in the light of theobservations made in this order and pass appropriate orders inaccordance with law, within a period of 60 days there from. TheWrit Petition stands allowed accordingly. Consequently,connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs. Sd/-Assistant Registrar(CS-V)//True copy//Sub Assistant RegistrarDPTo1.The Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), No.46, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034.2.The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle IV (1), Income Tax New Building, Room No.112, 1[st] Floor, No.46, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034.3.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle IV (1), Income Tax New Building, Room No.112, 1[st] Floor, No.46, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. 4.The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, (CCA) No.121, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. 5.The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax/ Director General of Income Tax, No.121, (Old No.108), M.G. Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai-600 034. +1cc to Mr.AP.Srinivas, Advocate SR.No.73828 +1cc to Mr.S.Ashokkumar, Advocate SR.No.73833 RGN(CO)GMY(09/09/2019) W.P.No.3929 of 2014and M.P.No.1 of 2014