Madhu Dadha v. The Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax Officer Central Circle Iv(2) Chennai 600 034

Dated : 23.06.2009 Coram The Honourable Mr.Justice F.M.IBRAHIM KALIFULLAandThe Honourable Mr.Justice B.RAJENDRAN TC(A). No. 421 of 2009and TCMP.No. 1 of 2009 Madhu Dadha ....Appellant -vs- The Assistant Commissionerof Income Tax OfficerCentral Circle IV(2)Chennai 600 034 ...Respondent Tax Case Appeal against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chennai 'B' Bench dated25.04.2008 in ITA No.120/Mds/2007 for the Block Assessment year 1.4.1988 to 15.12.1988. For Appellant : Mr. G. Ashokapathyfor M/s. Pass Associates. JUDGMENT The Judgment of the court was delivered by B.RAJENDRAN,J)The assessee has preferred the above appeal as against the order passed by the Income TaxAppellate Tribunal, Chennai 'B' Bench dated 25.04.2008 in ITA No.120/Mds/2007 for the BlockAssessment year 1.4.1988 to 15.12.1988. 2. The assessee is a partner in a firm and also a shareholder of M/s. Tamil Nadu DadhaPharmaceuticals Limited. Pursuant to a search and seizure action conducted in the case of SunPharma Group of Industries at Mumbai and Baroda on 17.12.1988 consequential search was carriedout in the business and residential premises of the Dadhas at Chennai as well as at Bangalore.Pursuant to the scheme of amalgamation approved by Gujarat and Madras High Court M/s TamilNadu Dadha Pharmaceuticals Limited was converted into M/s. Sun Pharma India Limited shares inthe ratio of $:1 viz., for every 4 shares of M/s. Tamil Nadu Dhadha Pharmaceuticals Limited oneshare of M/s. Sun Pharma India Limited was allotted. The Assessing Officer on the basis of certainloose sheets of paper found at the time of search and on the basis of suspicion came to a conclusionthat the scheme of amalgamation was only on paper whereas in practice the shares were sold to M/s.Sun Pharma @ Rs.290 per share. The Assessing Officer consequentially determined the shares heldby the appellant as undisclosed income of the appellant. While doing so, the Assessing Officer clubbed the value of shares held by the minor sons in the hands of the appellant and determined thetotal undisclosed income of the appellant at Rs.3,91,93,881/- and determined the tax thereon atRs.2,35,04,328/- and passed the order of assessment on 3.7.2008. 3. Against the order of assessment, the assessee preferred an appeal before the learnedCommissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)following the order in the case of Mahendra Dadha dismissed the assessee's case by his order dated16.9.2005. 4. Though the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax was served on the assessee as early as9.11.2005 and the last date for filing of the appeal was 8.1.2006, the assessee had not preferred theappeal in time. The assessee preferred the appeal after a delay of 558 days along with an affidavitexplaining the delay for filing the appeal. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal considered the matterin respect of the appeal filed by the assessee, after giving opportunity, the Appellate Tribunal afterelaborately discussing the affidavit filed by the assessee and taking into consideration all aspects,ultimately rejected the appeal as the appellant has not been given any sufficient reasons or cause forthe delay in filing the appeal within the stipulated time. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's appeal.Aggrieved against the same, the above appeal has been filed. 5. The questions of law raised in the appeal are as follows:- (1) Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is right in law in not condoning the delay of theappellant in filing the appeal before the Tribunal by not appreciating the bonafide reason (death ofthe appellants authorised representative) of the appellant for not filing the appeal in time?(2) Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is right in law in disposing the appellant appeal onthe grounds of limitation alone and not considering and adjudicating the various other grounds filedby the appellant before the Tribunal? 5. The questions of law raised in the appeal are as follows:- (1) Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is right in law in not condoning the delay of theappellant in filing the appeal before the Tribunal by not appreciating the bonafide reason (death ofthe appellants authorised representative) of the appellant for not filing the appeal in time?(2) Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is right in law in disposing the appellant appeal onthe grounds of limitation alone and not considering and adjudicating the various other grounds filedby the appellant before the Tribunal? 6. At the time of admission, the learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that thereasons for rejecting the appellant's appeal in not condoning the delay is legally unsustainable andthat a lenient view ought to have been taken by the Tribunal and that the delay was duly explainedby the appellant before the authorities. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant. At the outset, a reading of the order of the Tribunalwill clearly indicate that the conduct of the appellant either before the Assessing Authority or beforethe Tribunal was not conducive for even consideration of a remote chance for condoning the delay.In this context, it is necessary to extract the factual finding given by the Tribunal in respect of thereasons for the delay as stated by the appellant and the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal,:" In view of the above discussion, it is clear that though the courts have to take a liberal approachwhile deciding the condonation of delay, at the same time there is always a requirement of sufficientcause to explain the delay. In the absence of sufficient cause delay cannot be condoned merely onequitable ground as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K. RAMACHANDRAN v. STATE OFKERALA cited supra. It is clear that the assessee has to establish sufficient cause for not filing itsappeal in time. In the present case, the appeal has been filed after a delay of 558 days. From thecontents of the affidavit and submissions of the learned counsel for the assessee, it is clear that theassessee has not explained the delay for such a long period and just took the ground of death of hercounsel in January 2007, that too after the expiry of about one year from the last date of filing theappeal. Even the assessee failed to explain the sufficient cause or reason by giving necessary detailsas to how the delay from January 2007 to the date of filing the appeal has occurred. From the facts itseems that the asseessee was negligent by not taking the necessary step for filing the appeal withinthe time prescribed by the statute and thereby from the conduct of the assessee, it seems that theassessee takes the condonation of delay provision as granted. It is well settled law that the court helps the vigilant and not indolent. We are therefore of the view that the asseesee has not made outsufficient cause for condoning the delay in the present appeal. The cause shown by the assessee ismuch less than the sufficient cause as to why the appeal was not filed after the expiry of limitationperiod and even after the expiry of limitation period. Since the assessee has not given any details asto what step she took for filing the appeal within the limitation period or as early as possibletherefore, the explanation for delay of 558 days appears to be too insufficient, unsatisfactory andunreasonable for condoning the inordinate delay. From the affidavit it reflects that averments arequite vague as no dates have been specified as to when the papers were handed for drafting anappeal and on what occasion the enquiries were made for preparation and filing of appeal.Moreover, when the assessee never went for signing the appeal, how it could have been filed aspresumed by the assessee. Even the conduct of the assessee before this Tribunal is also notappreciable as various notice were sent to the assessee and first time the assessee appeared on3.3.2008 when the appeal was heard. We therefore decline to condone the delay of 558 days in filingthe present appeal. Accordingly, the prayer for condonation of delay is rejected." 8. From a reading of the above, it is clear that the appellant has not explained the cause of delay infiling the appeal, especially when authorised representative viz., representative who was givencharge to file the appeal had died exactly one year after the last date of filing of the appeal. Whenthat be so, it is pertinent to point out that actually the filing of the appeal was not done and evenafter the death of Ashok Kumbat, the assessee had taken more than six months in filing the presentappeal. The assessee had neither given any particular or details in the affidavit as on which date thepapers were handed over to the counsel for preparing the appeal and on what occasion the assesseeenquired about the progress in preparing the appeal and filing the same. 9. As rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, the averments in the affidavit are quite vague. Theassessee has also accepted that the assessee never went for signing the appeal then how it couldhave been filed as presumed by the assessee. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that itwas the block assessment and more than ten appeals were sought to be filed and there was abonafide impression since other appeals having been filed, this appeal ought to have been filed bythe authorised representative is presumed cannot in any way, support the case of the appellant. Thefinding of the Tribunal is very clear and does not warrant any interference by us. 10. In this context, the appellant wanted to rely on a decision reported in (2008) 219 CTR (Mad) 197in the case of PAY AND ACCOUNTS OFFICER, CHEPAUK v. INCOME TAX OFFICER. In this case,the appellant is a Government Agency. The Tribunal has specifically noted that the administrativedelay i.e. time taken in obtaining necessary sanction from the Government for pursuing the appellateremedy constituted sufficient case for the delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal andtherefore, such delay ought to have been condoned. In that particular case, in the facts andcircumstances of the case, the delay was accepted by the Tribunal and it was also accepted by theHonourable Supreme Court since the delay was duly explained. But here the case is different. Theappellant has not chosen to give any reason, much less sufficient reason for accepting the delaycaused by the appellant. In fact, no details have been given for the delay. Hence, this ruling will nothelp the contention of the appellant. 11. Next ruling relied upon by the appellant is the decision reported in (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC) inthe case of COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION v. MST. KATIJI AND ORS., wherein the HonourableSupreme Court had explained the fact for sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In this case,considering the fact that the Government is the appellant and also the delay in filing the appeal isonly four days, condoned the delay. It is specifically mentioned that the sufficient cause isadequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves theends of justice and they may liberal approach only for the reason that every day's delay must be explained, which does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must beapplied in a rational common sense and pragmatic manner. Finally the Supreme Court had rightlyheld that turning to the facts of that particular case giving rise to that appeal, the HonourableSupreme Court was satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. Therefore, the delay wascondoned only after the Court came to the conclusion that the sufficient cause was shown andproved and which has been accepted by the said Court. 12. As far as the present case is concerned, the assessee has never made proper plea for sufficientcause giving evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt for the delay, that too, for the inordinatedelay of 558 days in filing the appeal. 13. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that though other block appeals havebeen filed in time, only, this particular appeal is filed with a delay and that too after six months fromthe date of death of authorised representative cannot be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay.Hence, the ruling cited by the learned counsel for the appellant will not applicable to the facts of thepresent case. 14. At this juncture, we have to be guided by the judgment reported in [1990] 1 LLN 457 in the caseof T.N.M. BANK LTD. v. APP. AUTY., SHOPS ACT. In that particular case, the Division Bench of thiscourt has held that, ".................. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technicalconsideration. Rules of limitation are based on principles of sound policy and principles of equity. Isa litigant liable to have a Damocles' sword hanging over his head indefinitely for a period to bedetermined at the whims and fancies of the opponent?" In that decision, this Court has held that the delay of 285 days in preferring the appeal could not becondoned. It was held that the condonation of delay was not justified on facts and evidence of thecase. As rightly pointed out that the Rules of limitation are based on principles of sound public policyand principles of equity. Though there is no presumption that the delay is occasioned deliberately oron account of culpable negligence, if the admitted facts in that case are taken note of, there is nodoubt that the delay on the part of the appellant is deliberate and the appellant is clearly guilty ofculpable negligence. Such negligent attitude of the appellant was not taken care to preserve theright of appeal and having been slept over for more than 558 days and not explained the delaywithout any reasonable doubt, the appellant cannot avail sympathy or discretion of this Court. 15. In any way of the matter, the discretion having been rightly refused by the Tribunal, there is nosufficient reason or cause to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. Hence, the appeal isdismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected TAMP is also dismissed. bg To 1. The Assistant Commissionerof Income Tax OfficerCentral Circle IV(2) Chennai 600 034 2. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal,Chennai 'B' BenchChennai