Managing Director v. The Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, Vapi Circle

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19823 of 2019 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE BELA M. TRIVEDI Sd/- and HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHISd/-================================================================1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed toNosee the judgment ?2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?Yes3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of theNojudgment ?4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of lawNoas to the interpretation of the Constitution of India orany order made thereunder ? ================================================================ BAYER VAPI PRIVATE LIMITED KAVASSERI RAJAGOPALAN SEKHAR (MANAGING DIRECTOR) Versus THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, VAPI CIRCLE ================================================================Appearance:DARSHAN R PATEL(8486) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1MR NIKUNT RAVAL for MRS KALPANA K RAVAL(1046) for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE BELA M. TRIVEDIand HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI Date : 04/08/2021 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE BELA M. TRIVEDI) 1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner –Bayer Vapi Private Limited invoking the extraordinaryjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiaseeking the following prayer :-Bayer Vapi Private Limited invoking the extraordinaryjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiaseeking the following prayer :- “(A) Issue a writ of certiorari and/or a writ ofmandamus and/or any other writ direction or order toquash and set aside the impugned notice dated28/03/2019 under section 148 of the income-tax Act,1961 annexed hereto at Annexure-‘F’ alongwithobjections rejection order dated 04/10/2019 annexedhereto at Annexure ‘J’ and Reassessment order dated14/10/2019 annexed at Annexure ‘L’”mandamus and/or any other writ direction or order toquash and set aside the impugned notice dated28/03/2019 under section 148 of the income-tax Act,1961 annexed hereto at Annexure-‘F’ alongwithobjections rejection order dated 04/10/2019 annexedhereto at Annexure ‘J’ and Reassessment order dated14/10/2019 annexed at Annexure ‘L’” 2. The short facts as germane for deciding the presentpetition are that the petitioner is a Company incorporatedunder the Companies Act. The petitioner had filed astatement of Income and Return for the Assessment Year2014-2015 on 28.11.2014, in respect of which a scrutinyAssessment Order under Section 143(3) of the Income TaxAct, 1969 (hereinafter referred to the said Act) wasframed on 30.12.2016. The petitioner thereafterreceived a Notice on 28.03.2019 under Section 148 of thesaid Act whereby the petitioner was called upon to showcause as to why the assessment for the Assessment Year2014-2015 should not be re-opened. The petitioner videthe letter dated 26.04.2019 responded to the said noticepetition are that the petitioner is a Company incorporatedunder the Companies Act. The petitioner had filed astatement of Income and Return for the Assessment Year2014-2015 on 28.11.2014, in respect of which a scrutinyAssessment Order under Section 143(3) of the Income TaxAct, 1969 (hereinafter referred to the said Act) wasframed on 30.12.2016. The petitioner thereafterreceived a Notice on 28.03.2019 under Section 148 of thesaid Act whereby the petitioner was called upon to showcause as to why the assessment for the Assessment Year2014-2015 should not be re-opened. The petitioner videthe letter dated 26.04.2019 responded to the said notice and requested for furnishing the reasons. Therespondent supplied the reasons for reopening vide theletter dated 30.05.2019. Being aggrieved by the saidreasons, the petitioner had filed its objections vide theletter dated 31.07.2019. The respondent by a SpeakingOrder rejected the said objections and also simultaneouslyissued a Final Showcause Notice dated 04.10.2019(Annexure ‘J’). As per the case of the petitioner, it hadrequested for adjournment vide the letter dated11.10.2019, however the respondent reframed theassessment vide the impugned order 19.10.2019(Annexure ‘L’). The aggrieved petitioner has thereforefiled the present petition. 3. The respondent, raising a preliminary objection againstthe maintainability of the petition on the ground ofexistence of an alternative remedy, has filed a replydenying the allegations and averments made in thepetition, to which the petitioner has filed an affidavit-in-rejoinder. the maintainability of the petition on the ground ofexistence of an alternative remedy, has filed a replydenying the allegations and averments made in thepetition, to which the petitioner has filed an affidavit-in-rejoinder. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. Darshan R. Patel appearing for thepetitioner placing reliance on the decision of the SupremeCourt in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax v.Kelvinator India Limited and Others reported in [2010]320 ITR 561 (SC) vehemently submitted that the scrutinyassessment having already been framed by the respondentpetitioner placing reliance on the decision of the SupremeCourt in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax v.Kelvinator India Limited and Others reported in [2010]320 ITR 561 (SC) vehemently submitted that the scrutinyassessment having already been framed by the respondent under Section 143(3) vide the order dated 30.12.2016, thereopening of the assessment vide the impugned notice, onthe basis of change of opinion of the assessing officerwas not permissible. He further submitted that thepetitioner-assessee had disclosed truly and fully all thematerial necessary for the Assessment Year underconsideration, however the reopening was sought to bedone by the respondent without any new tangiblematerial on record. He also submitted that the showcausenotice was illegal in absence of a previous sanction ascontemplated under Section 151 of the said Act. Asregards the framing of the impugned order ofreassessment, Mr. Patel submitted that the same waspassed without considering the request of the petitionerseeking adjournment and therefore, was in violation ofthe principles of natural justice, and under thecircumstances, the petitioner was not required to availthe alternative remedy under the Act in view of thedecision of this Court in the case of Gujarat Gas Limitedv. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 245 ITR 84and in the case of Vishvanath Engineers v. ACIT reportedin . 352 ITR 549 (Guj) 5. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel Mr. NikuntRaval for the respondent has raised a preliminaryobjection against the maintainability of the petitionrelying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in theRaval for the respondent has raised a preliminaryobjection against the maintainability of the petitionrelying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the 5. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel Mr. NikuntRaval for the respondent has raised a preliminaryobjection against the maintainability of the petitionrelying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in theRaval for the respondent has raised a preliminaryobjection against the maintainability of the petitionrelying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax and Others v.Chhabil Dass Agarwal reported in [2013] 357 ITR 357(SC) to contend that the assessment order having beenframed, the petitioner was required to exhaust thealternative remedy by filing an Appeal. He furthersubmitted that the adjournment letter dated 11.10.2019sent by the petitioner was received in the office of therespondent on 14.10.2019, on which date the impugnedorder of assessment was already passed, and even if thesaid order was treated as an ex-parte order, thepetitioner is required to avail the statutory remedyavailable under the Act. Mr. Raval also submitted thatthe assessment of the concerned year was sought to bere-opened, as the petitioner had not truly and fullydisclosed the material facts and even otherwise as per theexplanation to the Section 147, mere production ofdocuments would not necessarily amount to true and fulldisclosure of material facts. He also submitted that theAssessing Officer while passing the order under Section143(3) on 30.12.2016, had not taken into considerationthe material, i.e. Appendix 6 and Appendix 8 (AnnexureI and II) of the Tax Audit Report form 3CD, from whichit appeared that the TDS was not deducted, and whenthe petitioner had failed to deduct the TDS, he was liablefor payment of interest as contemplated under theprovisions contained in the Act. He also submitted that the requisite sanction under Section 151 was alsoobtained by the Assessing Officer before reopening theassessment. 6. At the outset it is required to be noted that as per thesettled legal position, when a statutory alternative remedyis available to the petitioner, the Courts should be loathein entertaining the petition under Article 226 of theConstitution of India. It is needless to say that theIncome Tax Act provides for a complete machinery tochallenge an order of assessment, and therefore theimpugned order of reassessment should have beenchallenged by the petitioner only by way of filing anappeal as prescribed under the Act. The Supreme Courtin a very recent decision in the case of AssistantCommissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and Others v. GlaxoSmith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited reported inAIR 2020 SC 2819, while considering the question as towhether the High Court under Article 226 of theConstitution of India ought to entertain a challenge to anassessment order on the ground that the statutory remedyof appeal against that order had stood foreclosed by lawof limitation, observed as under :- “11. In the backdrop of these facts, the central questionis: whether the High Court ought to have entertained thewrit petition filed by the respondent? As regards the “11. In the backdrop of these facts, the central questionis: whether the High Court ought to have entertained thewrit petition filed by the respondent? As regards the power of the High Court to issue directions, orders orwrits in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of theConstitution of India, the same is no more res integra.Even though the High Court can entertain a writ petitionagainst any order or direction passed/action taken by theState under Article 226 of the Constitution, it ought not todo so as a matter of course when the aggrieved personcould have availed of an effective alternative remedy inthe manner prescribed by law (see Baburam PrakashChandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zila Parishad now ZilaParishad, Muzaffarnagar8 and also Nivedita Sharma vs.Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors.9). InThansingh Nathmal & Ors. vs. Superintendent of Taxes,Dhubri & Ors.10, the Constitution Bench of this Courtmade it amply clear that although the power of the HighCourt under Article 226 of the Constitution is very wide,the Court must exercise selfimposed restraint and notentertain the writ petition, if an alternative effectiveremedy is available to the aggrieved person. In paragraph7, the Court observed thus: “7. Against the order of the Commissioner an order forreference could have been claimed if the appellantssatisfied the Commissioner or the High Court that aquestion of law arose out of the order. But theprocedure provided by the Act to invoke the jurisdictionof the High Court was bypassed, the appellants movedthe High Court challenging the competence of theProvincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Courtunder Article 226 and sought to reopen the decision ofthe Taxing Authorities on question of fact. Thejurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of theConstitution is couched in wide terms and the exercisethereof is not subject to any restrictions except theterritorial restrictions which are expressly provided inthe Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it isnot exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. Thevery amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it willordinarily be exercised subject to certain self imposedlimitations. Resort that jurisdiction is not intended as analternative remedy for relief which may be obtained ina suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarilythe Court will not entertain a petition for a writunderArticle 226, where the petitioner has analternative remedy, which without being undulyonerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy.Againthe High Court does not generally enter upon adetermination of questions which demand an elaborateexamination of evidence to establish the right to enforcewhich the writ is claimed. The High Court does nottherefore act as a court of appeal against the decision ofa court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and doesnot by assuming jurisdiction underArticle 226trenchupon an alternative remedy provided by statute forobtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself inanother jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the mannerprovided by a statute, the High Court normally will notpermit by entertaining a petition underArticle 226ofthe Constitution the machinery created under the statuteto be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to itto seek resort to the machinery so set up.” (emphasis supplied) We may usefully refer to the exposition of this Court inTitaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Orissa& Ors., wherein it is observed that where a right orliability is created by a statute, which gives a specialremedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by thatstatute must only be availed of. In paragraph 11, theCourt observed thus: petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself inanother jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the mannerprovided by a statute, the High Court normally will notpermit by entertaining a petition underArticle 226ofthe Constitution the machinery created under the statuteto be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to itto seek resort to the machinery so set up.” (emphasis supplied) We may usefully refer to the exposition of this Court inTitaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Orissa& Ors., wherein it is observed that where a right orliability is created by a statute, which gives a specialremedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by thatstatute must only be availed of. In paragraph 11, theCourt observed thus: “11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchyof authorities before which the petitioners can getadequate redress against the wrongful acts complainedof. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appealbefore the Prescribed Authority under subsection (1)of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners aredissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they canprefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under subsection(3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case tobe stated upon a question of law for the opinion of theHigh Court under Section 24 of the Act.TheActprovides for a complete machinery to challenge anorder of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the modeprescribed by the Act and not by a petitionunderArticle 226of the Constitution. It is now wellrecognised that where a right or liability is created by astatute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it,the remedy provided by that statute only must beavailed of.This rule was stated with great clarity byWilles, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v.Hawkesford [(1859) 6 CBNS 336, 356] in the followingpassage: There are three classes of cases in which a liability maybe established founded upon statute. . . . But there is athird class, viz. where a liability not existing at commonlaw is created by a statute which at the same timegives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it….The remedy provided by the statute must be followed,and it is not competent to the party to pursue thecourse applicable to cases of the second class. The formgiven by the statute must be adopted and adhered to. The rule laid down in this passage was approved by theHouse of Lords in Neville v. London Express NewspapersLtd. (1919 AC 368) and has been reaffirmed by thePrivy Council in AttorneyGeneral of Trinidad andTobago v. Gordon Grant & Co. Ltd. (1935 AC 532)and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (AIR 1940 PC105). It has also been held to be equally applicable toenforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was thereforejustified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.” (emphasis supplied) In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. &Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.12, this Court went on toobserve that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedyunder Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. The Court,however, added a word of caution and expounded thatthe constitutional Court would certainly take note of thelegislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Actand would exercise its jurisdiction consistent with theprovisions of the enactment. To put it differently, thefact that the High Court has wide jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution, does not meanthat it can disregard the substantive provisions of astatute and pass orders which can be settled onlythrough a mechanism prescribed by the statute.” (emphasis supplied) In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. &Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.12, this Court went on toobserve that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedyunder Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. The Court,however, added a word of caution and expounded thatthe constitutional Court would certainly take note of thelegislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Actand would exercise its jurisdiction consistent with theprovisions of the enactment. To put it differently, thefact that the High Court has wide jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution, does not meanthat it can disregard the substantive provisions of astatute and pass orders which can be settled onlythrough a mechanism prescribed by the statute.” 7. The Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner ofIncome-Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (supra)has also made very pertinent observations with regard toexercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 when analternative efficacious remedy is available to thepetitioner. The said observations read as under :- “15. Before discussing the fact proposition, we wouldnotice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. Itis settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficaciousalternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposedlimitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenienceand discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it iswithin the discretion of the High Court to grant reliefunder Article 226 despite the existence of an alternativeremedy. However, the High Court must not interfere ifthere is an adequate efficacious alternative remedyavailable to the petitioner and he has approached the HighCourt without availing the same unless he has made outan exceptional case warranting such interference or thereexist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinaryjurisdiction under Article 226. (See: State of U.P. vs.Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86; Titaghur Paper MillsCo. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433; HarbanslalSahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107; Stateof H.P. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC499). 16. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashidand Sons vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR1954 SC 207; Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah,AIR 1955 SC 425; Union of India vs. T.R. Varma, AIR1957 SC 882; State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State ofMadras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 have held that though Article226 confers a very wide powers in the matter of issuingwrits on the High Court, the remedy of writ absolutelydiscretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitablerelief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction.The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercisethe power if it comes to the conclusion that there has beena breach of principles of natural justice or procedurerequired for decision has not been adopted. (See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar,(1965) 2 SCR 653; Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das,(1984) 2 SCC 436; S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, (1988)1 SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC75; Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293; A.Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC695; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj)Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State ofMaharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh vs. State ofHaryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India)Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72).” (See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar,(1965) 2 SCR 653; Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das,(1984) 2 SCC 436; S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, (1988)1 SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC75; Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293; A.Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC695; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj)Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State ofMaharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh vs. State ofHaryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India)Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72).” 8. In the instant case, the Assessing Officer after followingthe principles of natural justice and following the dueprocedure had passed a Speaking Order on 04.10.2019 inresponse to the objections raised by the petitioner againstreopening of the assessment for the Assessment Year2014-2015. The Assessing Officer thereafter passed theimpugned Assessment Order on 14.10.2019 after affordingthe principles of natural justice and following the dueprocedure had passed a Speaking Order on 04.10.2019 inresponse to the objections raised by the petitioner againstreopening of the assessment for the Assessment Year2014-2015. The Assessing Officer thereafter passed theimpugned Assessment Order on 14.10.2019 after affording the opportunity of hearing by calling upon the petitionerto show cause as to why the deductions under Section43B and under Section 40(a)(ia) as mentioned in theorder dated 04.10.2019, should not be made. Under thecircumstances, and in view of the legal position statedhereinabove, a complete machinery having been providedunder the Act for reassessment and for obtaining relief inrespect of impugned order passed by the respondent, thepetitioner Assessee could not be permitted to abandon thesaid remedy and to invoke the jurisdiction of this Courtunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Though itis sought to be pointed out by Mr. Patel that theadjournment application submitted by him was notconsidered by the respondent before passing theimpugned order of reassessment, the same cannot beaccepted at this juncture, in view of the contention raisedby the respondent in the affidavit-in-reply that the saidrequest for adjournment was received by the office of therespondent on 14.10.2019 when the impugned order wasalready passed. Be that as it may, even if the saidrequest was not considered by the respondent, the samecould be treated at the most as an irregularity whichwould not warrant interference of this Court for settingaside the assessment order, more particularly, when anefficacious and alternative statutory remedy is providedunder the Act. 9. Since we are not inclined to entertain the petition on theground of existence of alternative remedy, as such weneed not go into the merits of the petition, however Mr.Darshan R. Patel relying upon the decision in the case ofCommissioner of Income-Tax v. Kelvinator India Limitedand Others (supra) has vehemently submitted that theAssessing Officer can not reopen an assessment on merechange of opinion, we may deal with the said issue also.In the said case the Supreme Court while dealilng withthe changes made to Section 147 of the said Act w.e.f. 1[st]April, 1989 observed as under :-ground of existence of alternative remedy, as such weneed not go into the merits of the petition, however Mr.Darshan R. Patel relying upon the decision in the case ofCommissioner of Income-Tax v. Kelvinator India Limitedand Others (supra) has vehemently submitted that theAssessing Officer can not reopen an assessment on merechange of opinion, we may deal with the said issue also.In the said case the Supreme Court while dealilng withthe changes made to Section 147 of the said Act w.e.f. 1[st]April, 1989 observed as under :- “6. On going through the changes, quoted above, madeto Section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to DirectTax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, re-opening could bedone under above two conditions and fulfillment of thesaid conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on theAssessing Officer to make a back assessment, butin section 147 of the Act [with effect from 1st April,1989], they are given a go-by and only one conditionhas remained, viz., that where the Assessing Officer hasreason to believe that income has escaped assessment,confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore,post-1st April, 1989, power to reopen is much wider.However, one needs to give a schematic interpretationto the words "reason to believe" failing which, we are afraid, Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to theAssessing Officer to reopen assessments on the basis of"mere change of opinion", which cannot be per sereason to reopen. We must also keep in mind theconceptual difference between power to review andpower to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no powerto review; he has the power to re-assess. But re-assessment has to be based on fulfillment of certainpre-condition and if the concept of "change of opinion"is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department,then, in the garb of re-opening the assessment, reviewwould take place. One must treat the concept of"change of opinion" as an in-built test to check abuseof power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1stApril, 1989, Assessing Officer has power to re-open,provided there is "tangible material" to come to theconclusion that there is escapement of income fromassessment. Reasons must have a live link with theformation of the belief.” 10.In view of the above, it is quite clear that theAssessing Officer has power to reopen if there is tangiblematerial to believe that there was an escapement ofincome from assessment and that when such material hasa live link with the formation of the belief. In theinstant case, as stated by the respondent in the affidavit-in-reply, the petitioner had not deducted the TDS asdetailed in Annexure 6 to form 3CD and therefore, the same was not taken into consideration by the AssessingOfficer while passing the order under Section 143(3) ofthe Act. When the said material was not considered atthe time of original assessment on 30.12.2016, theconsideration of the same by the respondent could not besaid to be a change of opinion or review of earlier order. 11.In that view of the matter, the petition beingdevoid of merits is dismissed. Sd/- (BELA M. TRIVEDI, J) Caroline Sd/-(A. C. JOSHI, J)