M/S Bgr Boilers Pvt Ltd Rep.by Authorised Signatory R N S Tomar 443 Guna Building Anna Salai Teynampet Chennai 600 018 Tamil Nadu v. Joint Commissioner Of Income Tax, Addl/Jcit, Transfer Pricing Officer-2, Room

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 07.09.2020 CORAM THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE ANITA SUMANTH WRIT PETITION NOS.32699, 33751, 34174, 34389, 34568, 34743,34817, 35272, 35300, 35420, 35485, 35520 AND 32703 OF 2019 AND WMP.NOS.389, 2789, 1928, 3552, 1898, 2048, 3553, 1929 & 2599 OF2020 AND 33116, 34233, 34234, 34803, 34805, 35053, 35054, 35281,35282, 35493, 35494, 35580, 35581, 36070, 36072, 36100, 36101,36102, 36250, 36251, 36308, 36309, 36362, 36363 AND 33117 OF 2019 1.M/S.PFIZER HEALTHCARE INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED,(FORMERLY KNOWN AS HOSPIRA HEALTHCARE INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED)REPRESENTED BY THE AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY,BODHISATWA RAY, SRI NIVAS, NEW NO.86,OLD NO.89, GN CHETTY ROAD, T.NAGAR,CHENNAI 600 017.(FORMERLY KNOWN AS HOSPIRA HEALTHCARE INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED)REPRESENTED BY THE AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY,BODHISATWA RAY, SRI NIVAS, NEW NO.86,OLD NO.89, GN CHETTY ROAD, T.NAGAR,CHENNAI 600 017. ... PETITIONER IN WP.NO.32699 OF 2019 1 SAINT GOBAIN INDIA PVT LTD., LEVEL 7 SUGAPI ACHI BUILDING RUKMINI LAKSHMIPATHI ROAD, EGMORE, CHENNAI 600 008 REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR.L.VENKATESWARAN. 1 M/S.SIEMENS GAMESA RENEWABLE POWER PVT LTD.,(FORMERLY KNOWN AS M/S GAMESA RENEWABLE POWER PVT.LTD.) REPRESENTED BY THE FISCAL HEAD-S.RAMACHANDRAN,(FORMERLY KNOWN AS M/S GAMESA RENEWABLE POWER PVT.LTD.) REPRESENTED BY THE FISCAL HEAD-S.RAMACHANDRAN, 334, THE FUTURA BLOCK -B, 8TH FLOOR,RAJIV GANDHI SALAI, SHOLINGANALLUR,CHENNAI-119.RAJIV GANDHI SALAI, SHOLINGANALLUR,CHENNAI-119. 1 1 M/S.BNY MELLON TECHNOLOGY PRIVATE LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS INAUTIX TECHNOLOGIES INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED) REP.BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR NITIN CHANDEL, NO.4, 10TH FLOOR, TIDEL PARK,TARAMANI, CHENNAI-113. ... PETITIONER in WP No.34389 of 2019 1 KUBOTA AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED BLOCK NO.94, TOWER 1, 8TH FLOOR,TVH BELICIAA TOWERS, MRC NAGAR, CHENNAI - 600028 REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR AKIRA KATO ... PETITIONER in WP No.34568 of 2019 1 M/S.FLEXTRONICS TECHNOLOGIES (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED PLOT NO.3, PHASE II, SIPCOT INDUSTRIAL PARK SANDAVELLURE VILLAGE, SRIPERUMBUDUR TALUK, KANCHIPURAM DISTRICT, TAMIL NADU 602 106.REP.BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY ASHOK SRIDHARAN 1 M/S.MANDO AUTOMOTIVE INDIAN PVT LTD. S 1A AND S5 PILLAIPAKKAM POST VENGADU VILLAGE KANCHEEPURAM DISTRICT 602 105 TAMILNADU, REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR FINANCE SUDARARAJAN-J ... PETITIONER in WP No.34817 of 2019 1 TVS MOTOR COMPANY LTD. 29/8 JAYALAKSHMI ESTATES HADDOWS ROAD CHENNAI 600 006 REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR.K.S.SRINIVASAN 1 PERKINS INIDA PRIVATE LIMITED 7TH FLOOR INTERNATIONAL TECH PARK CHENNAI TARAMANI ROAD TARAMANI CHENNAI - 600113 PAN. REP. BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY K.KRISH KUMAR 2 1 M/S.VERIZON DATA SERVICES INDIA PVT.LTD. NO.1 CITIUS-B BLOCK 8TH FLOOR OLYMPIA INDUSTRIAL ESTATE GUINDY CHENNAI -600 032 REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY MR.RAMNATH SUBRAMANIAN ... PETITIONER in WP No.35420 of 2019 1 M/S BGR BOILERS PVT LTD REP.BY AUTHORISED SIGNATORY R N S TOMAR 443 GUNA BUILDING ANNA SALAI TEYNAMPET CHENNAI 600 018 TAMIL NADU. ... PETITIONER in WP No.35485 of 20191 ALLISON TRANSMISSION INDIA PVT LTD. (ATIPL) A-21 SIPCOT INDUSTRIAL PARK ORAGADAM SRIPERUMBUDUR TALUK KANCHIPURAM - 602 105 TAMIL NADU REP.BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR MR.RAJSINGH MOSES ... PETITIONER in WP No.35520 of 20191 M/S.PFIZER HEALTHCARE INDIA PVT LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS HOSPIRA HEALTHCARE INDIA PRIVATE LTD.) REP.BY THE AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY MR.BODHISATWA RAY SRI NIVAS NEW NO.86 OLD NO.89,GN CHETTY ROAD, T NAGAR, CHENNAI-600 017. ... PETITIONER in WP No.32703 of 2019 Vs. 1.JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, ADDL/JCIT, TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER-2, ROOM NO.505, 5 FLOOR, TOWER-1, BSNL BUILDING, 16, GREAMS ROAD, CHENNAI – 600 006. ... PETITIONER in WP No.35485 of 20191 ALLISON TRANSMISSION INDIA PVT LTD. (ATIPL) A-21 SIPCOT INDUSTRIAL PARK ORAGADAM SRIPERUMBUDUR TALUK KANCHIPURAM - 602 105 TAMIL NADU REP.BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR MR.RAJSINGH MOSES ... PETITIONER in WP No.35520 of 20191 M/S.PFIZER HEALTHCARE INDIA PVT LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS HOSPIRA HEALTHCARE INDIA PRIVATE LTD.) REP.BY THE AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY MR.BODHISATWA RAY SRI NIVAS NEW NO.86 OLD NO.89,GN CHETTY ROAD, T NAGAR, CHENNAI-600 017. ... PETITIONER in WP No.32703 of 2019 Vs. 1.JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, ADDL/JCIT, TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER-2, ROOM NO.505, 5 FLOOR, TOWER-1, BSNL BUILDING, 16, GREAMS ROAD, CHENNAI – 600 006. 2.DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CORPORATE CIRCLE – 5(2), 4 FLOOR, WANAPARTHY BLOCK, 121, MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD, NUNGAMBAKKAM, CHENNAI – 600 034. ... RESPONDENTS in WP.No.32699 of 2019 1 THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER CIRCLE 3(1) TOWER 1 BSNL BUILDING 16 GREAMS ROAD TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER CIRCLE 3(1) TOWER 1 BSNL BUILDING 16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI 600 006 2 THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX LARGE TAX PAYER UNIT 2 121 LARGE TAX PAYER UNIT 2 121 NUNGAMBAKKAM HIGH ROAD CHENNAI 600 034CHENNAI 600 034 ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.33751 of 2019 1 THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ADDL/JCIT TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER ADDL/JCIT TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER 3 INCOME TAX OFFICE - BSNL TOWER NO.16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI - 600 006 2 THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE -2(1) 121 MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD NUNGAMBAKKAM CHENNAI - 600 034 ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.34174 of 2019 1 JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER - 2 (I/C) ROOM NO.511, 5TH FLOOR TOWER - I BSNL BUILDING NO.16 GREAMS ROAD, CHENNAI - 600006 2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE 1(2) 6TH FLOOR WANAPARTHY BLOCK AAYAKAR BHAWAN NUNGAMBAKKAM CHENNAI – 600034 ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.34389 of 2019 1 THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER 3 TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER 3 TOWER 1 BSNL BUILDING 16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI - 600006 CHENNAI - 600006 2 THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE-4(2) 121 CORPORATE CIRCLE-4(2) 121 NUNGAMBAKKAM HIGH ROAD, CHENNAI – 600034 ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.34568 of 2019 1 THE ADDITIONAL JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER -1 (TPO -1) ROOM NO.502 TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER -1 (TPO -1) ROOM NO.502 5TH FLOOR TOWER -I INCOME -TAX OFFICE BSNL TOWER NO.16 GREAMS ROAD,CHENNAI-600 006. BSNL TOWER NO.16 GREAMS ROAD,CHENNAI-600 006. 2 THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE 2(1) ROOM NO.511 WANAPARTHY BLOCK - V FLOOR NO.121 CORPORATE CIRCLE 2(1) ROOM NO.511 WANAPARTHY BLOCK - V FLOOR NO.121 MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD NUNGAMBAKKAM CHENNAI - 600 034.CHENNAI - 600 034. ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.34743 of 20191 THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ADDL/JCIT TPO3 ROOM NO.502, 5TH FLOOR,TOWER I INCOME TAX OFFICE BSNL TOWER NO.16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI 600 0062 THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE 4(1) ROOM NO.430 MAIN BUILDING IV FLOOR CHENNAI MAIN BUILDING NO. 121 MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD NUNGAMBAKKAM CHENNAI – 600 084.... RESPONDENTS in WP No.34817 of 20191 THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER CIRCLE -3(1) TOWER -1 BSNL BUILDING 16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI - 600 006 2 THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE -3(1) 121 NUNGAMBAKKAM HIGH ROAD CHENNAI 600 034 ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.35272 of 20191 JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER NO.2 ROOM TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER NO.2 ROOM NO.511 5TH FLOOR BSNL BUILDING TOWER 1 NO.16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI - 600006 NO.16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI - 600006 2 THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE -3(1) 121 NUNGAMBAKKAM HIGH ROAD CHENNAI 600 034 ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.35272 of 20191 JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER NO.2 ROOM TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER NO.2 ROOM NO.511 5TH FLOOR BSNL BUILDING TOWER 1 NO.16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI - 600006 NO.16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI - 600006 2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE 5(2) ROOM NO.415 MAIN BUILDING - 4TH FLOOR CHENNAI MAIN BUILDING NO. 121 MAHATAMA GANDHI ROAD NUNGAMBAKKAM CHENNAI-34 ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.35300 of 2019 1 THE ADDITIONAL/JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAXTRANSFER PRICING OFFICER-3 (TPO-3) ROOM NO.502 5TH FLOOR TOWER 1 INCOME TAX OFFICE BSNL TOWER NO.16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI-600 006.TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER-3 (TPO-3) ROOM NO.502 5TH FLOOR TOWER 1 INCOME TAX OFFICE BSNL TOWER NO.16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI-600 006. 2 THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE 3(2) ROOM NO.511 WANAPARTHY BLOCK - V FLOOR NO.121 MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD NUNGAMBAKKAM CHENNAI - 600 034 ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.35420 of 2019 1 JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER-2 ROOM NO 511 5TH FLOOR TOWER -I BSNL BUILDING NO. 16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI 600 006 2 ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE 1(2) 6TH FLOOR WANAPARTHY BLOCK AAYAKAR BHAWAN NUNGAMBAKKAM CHENNAI 600 034 ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.35485 of 2019 1 THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER 1 (1) TOWER -1 BSNL BUILDING 16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI - 600 006 2 THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE 1(1) NO. 121 CORPORATE CIRCLE 1(1) NO. 121 MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD NUNGAMBAKKAM CHENNAI - 600 034.CHENNAI - 600 034. ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.35520 of 2019 1 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX TRANSFER PRICING OFFICER -2 (2) ROOM NO.505 5TH FLOOR TOWER -1 BSNL BUILDING 16 GREAMS ROAD CHENNAI 600 006.2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE -5 (2) 4TH FLOOR WANAPARTHY BLOCK 121 MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD NUNGAMBAKKAM CHENNAI 600 034. ... RESPONDENTS in WP No.32703 of 2019 Prayer: WP.No.32699 of 2019:- PETITION filed under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia praying for the issuance of Writ of Certiorari, callingfor the records on the file of First Respondent in passing theimpugned Order No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019692338(1) for theAssessment Year 2016-17 under Section 92CA(3) of the Income-taxAct, 1961 dated 01.11.2019, quash the same as illegal, arbitraryand devoid of merit. WP No.33751 of 2019:- Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia, praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari Call for therecords of the 1st Respondent and quash the impugned orderpassed under section 92CA of the Act dated 01.11.2019 in PANAABCS4338M for the Assessment year 2016-17 in order No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019692179 (1) or pass such further or otherorders as may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of thiscase. WP No.34174 of 2019:- Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari calling for therecords on the file of First Respondent in passing the impugnedOrderNo.ITBA/TransferPricingOfficer/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019692325 (1) for the Assessment year 2016-17 under Section92CA(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 01.11.2019, quash thesame as illegal, arbitrary and devoid of merit. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ WP No.34389 of 2019:- Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari Calling for therecords on the file of 1st Respondent in the impugned orderdated 01.11.2019 in PAN bearing Order No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019692257(1) for the Assessment Year 2016-17under section 92CA(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, quash thesame as illegal, arbitrary and devoid of merit Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari calling for therecords on the file of First Respondent in passing the impugnedOrderNo.ITBA/TransferPricingOfficer/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019692325 (1) for the Assessment year 2016-17 under Section92CA(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 01.11.2019, quash thesame as illegal, arbitrary and devoid of merit. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ WP No.34389 of 2019:- Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari Calling for therecords on the file of 1st Respondent in the impugned orderdated 01.11.2019 in PAN bearing Order No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019692257(1) for the Assessment Year 2016-17under section 92CA(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, quash thesame as illegal, arbitrary and devoid of merit Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari To call for therecords of the 1st Respondent and quash the impugned orderpassed under Section 92CA of the Act dated 01.11.2019 inPAN.AADCK5472E for the Assessment Year 2016-17 in orderNo.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019691995(1) Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari Call for the recordsof the 1st respondent and quash the impugned order under section92 CA of the Act bearing No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019692288(1) dated 01/11/2019 for the Assessment year 2016-17 issued bythe 1st respondent. WP No.34817 of 2019:- Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari Call for the recordsof the 1st Respondent and quash the impugned order under section92CA of the Act bearing No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019691497(1) dated 01.11.2019 for the Assessment year 2016-17 Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari to call for therecords of the 1st respondent and quash the impugned orderpassed under section 92CA(3) of the Act Dated 01.11.2019 in PANAAACS7032B for the Assessment year 2016-17 in order No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019668533 (1). Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari Direction or ordersetting aside/quashing, the Impugned Order dated 01.11.2019 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ passed by Respondent No.1 bearing No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019688886(1) of the 1st respondent and all implicationsconsequent thereto Petition praying to issue a Writ of certiorari to call forthe records of the 1st respondent and quash the impugned orderunder section 92CA of the Act bearing No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019659024(I), dated 01.11.2019 for the Assessment Year 2016-17 Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari calling for therecords on the file of Second Respondent in the impugned orderdated 16.12.2019 in PAN bearing Order No.ITBA/ AST/F/144C/2019-201/1022407628 (1) for the Assessment Year 2016-17under section 144C of the Income tax Act, 1961, quash the sameas illegal, arbitrary and devoid of merit insofar as it relatesto assessing the adjustment made by the First Respondent in hisorder numberITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019665476(1)dated01.11.2019. Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari to call for therecords of the 1st Respondent and quash the impugned orderpassed under Section 92CA of the Act dated 01.11.2019 in PANAAGCA4054P for the Assessment year 2016-17 in order No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019678061(1) and draft assessment orderNo.ITBA/AST/F/144C/2019-20/1022174670(1) dated 12.12.2019 passedunder Section 143(3) r.w.s 144C. Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari Calling for therecords on the file of 1st respondent in passing the impugnedorderNo.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019692173(1)fortheAssessment Year 2011 -12 under section 92CA(3) of the Income TaxAct, 1961 dated 01/11/2019, quash the same as illegal, arbitraryand devoid of merit. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari to call for therecords of the 1st Respondent and quash the impugned orderpassed under Section 92CA of the Act dated 01.11.2019 in PANAAGCA4054P for the Assessment year 2016-17 in order No.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019678061(1) and draft assessment orderNo.ITBA/AST/F/144C/2019-20/1022174670(1) dated 12.12.2019 passedunder Section 143(3) r.w.s 144C. Petition to issue a Writ of certiorari Calling for therecords on the file of 1st respondent in passing the impugnedorderNo.ITBA/TPO/F/92CA3/2019-20/1019692173(1)fortheAssessment Year 2011 -12 under section 92CA(3) of the Income TaxAct, 1961 dated 01/11/2019, quash the same as illegal, arbitraryand devoid of merit. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ W.P. NumbersPetitionerRespondents32699 of 2019Mr.Ajay Vohra,Mrs.HemaSenior Counsel forMuralikrishnan,Mr.R.SivaramanSenior Standing Counsel33751 & 35272 of 2019Mr.Vikram Vijayraghavanfor Subbaraya AiyarMrs.HemaPadmanabhan andMuralikrishnan,RamamaniSenior Standing Counsel34174 of 2019Mr.R.SivaramanMrs.HemaMuralikrishnan,Senior Standing Counsel34389 & 35485 of 2019Mr.N.V.BalajiMrs.HemaMuralikrishnan,Senior Standing Counsel34568 & 35520 of 2019Mr.S.P.ChidambaramMrs.HemaMuralikrishnan,Senior Standing Counsel34743 & 34817 of 2019Mr.Sandeep Bagmar R.Mrs.HemaMuralikrishnan,Senior Standing Counsel35300 of 2019Mr.P.S.Raman, Mr.A.P.Srinivas,Senior Counsel forSenior Standing CounselMr.Prahalad Bhat35420 of 2019Ms.P.JayalakshmiMrs.HemaMuralikrishnan,Senior Standing Counsel32703 of 2019Mr.R.SivaramanMrs.HemaMuralikrishnan,Senior Standing CounselC O M M O N O R D E R All Petitioners in this batch barring one (Petitioner inW.P.No.34568 of 2019) challenge orders passed under Section 92CA(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short ‘Act’) primarily onthe ground that the impugned orders are barred by limitation byone day. The alternate ground canvassed by some of thepetitioners is that the impugned orders have been passed inviolation of the principles of natural justice. There is nodispute in regard to the facts and only legal grounds are raisedand canvassed. 2. The petitioners filed returns of income including incomefrom transactions with associated entities abroad, thusnecessitating a reference of issues arising under Chapter X tothe Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO). The TPO has, after issuanceof notices, passed orders dated 01.11.2019 that, according tothe petitioners, is barred by limitation by one day. Hence thesewrit petitions. 3. The submissions of the petitioners represented byMr.Vohra and Mr.P.S.Raman, learned senior counsels andMr.SandeepBagmar,Mr.S.P.Chidambaram,Mr.Vijayaraghavan,Mr.N.V.Balaji, Ms.P.Jayalakshmi and Mr.R.Sivaraman, learnedcounsels are as follows: 4. The provisions of Section 92CA(3A) require that an orderbe passed by the TPO before 60 days prior to the last day onwhich the period of limitation referred to in Section 153 formaking assessment, expires. Assessments are to be completedwithin the limitation set out in Section 153, that is, within 21months from the end of the assessment year in which the incomewas first assessable, ie., within 21 months from 31.03.2017 orrather, no order of assessment for the aforesaid period shall bepassed after 31.12.2018. The assessments are to encompass incomefrom international transactions as well, and for this purpose, areference is to be made to the TPO who will, after hearing theassessee pass a transfer pricing order, in terms of Section 92CA(3A) extracted below: Reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer:- Reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer:- . . . . (3A) Where a reference was made under sub-section (1)before the 1st day of June, 2007 but the order undersub-section (3) has not been made by the TransferPricing Officer before the said date, or a referenceunder sub-section (1) is made on or after the 1st day ofJune, 2007, an order under sub-section (3) may be madeat any time before sixty days prior to the date on whichthe period of limitation referred to in section 153, oras the case may be, in section 153B for making the orderof assessment or reassessment or recomputation or freshassessment, as the case may be, expires: Provided that in the circumstances referred to in clause(ii) or clause (x) of Explanation 1 to section 153, ifthe period of limitation available to the TransferPricing Officer for making an order is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall be extended to sixtydays and the aforesaid period of limitation shall bedeemed to have been extended accordingly. 5. Thus, on a combined reading of Sections 92CA(3A) and 153(1), impugned orders dated 01.11.2019 fall beyond limitation, aslimitation under Section 153 expired on 31.12.2019, the periodof 60 days prior thereto would run till the 1[st] of November, 2019and ‘any date prior thereto’ would mean the 31[st] of October orbefore. 6. They also argue that the word ‘may’ used in Section 92CA(3A) is to be read as ‘shall’. For this purpose, I am taken indetail through the scheme of assessment and the limits imposedtherefor. Section 153 prescribes an outer time limit for thecompletion of assessment and uses the word ‘shall’. Section92CA(3A), that prescribes a limitation within a limitation, isalso mandatory and imposes a strict rule of time upon the TPO.The two provisions are couched in opposing semantics – Section153 imposes a prohibition and states that no order of assessmentshall be made after the expiry of 21 months from the end of theyear when the income is assessable and 92CA is a command to theTPO to pass an order of transfer pricing at any time before 60days prior to the date on which the period of limitationreferred to in Section 153 expires. 7. There is a sanctity attached to the period of 60 days ascan be seen from the proviso to sub-section (3A) of Section 92CAwhich states that, if, for any reason the limitation availableto a TPO for passing a transfer pricing order is less than 60days, then the remaining period shall be extended to 60 days andthe period of limitation would be reckoned accordingly. 8. Moreover, the second proviso after Section 153,specifically provides that where the period available to a TPOis extended to 60 days in line with the proviso to sub-section(3A) of Section 92CA and the period of limitation available tothe Assessing Authority for passing an order of assessment/re-assessment/re-computation is less than 60 days, then suchremaining period shall also stand extended to 60 days. 9. In addition, the provisions of the General Clauses Actare pressed into service, to indicate situations where differentwords have been used in the prescription for limitation, such as‘before’ and ‘upto’. Reference is made to Maxwell’sInterpretation of Laws as well as Halsbury’s Laws of England, insupport of the submission that even though the word used in Section 92CA(3) is ‘may’ it should be read as ‘shall’ bearing inmind the context in which it has been used. 10. My attention is also drawn to the Central Action Planissued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes for the guidance ofofficers in the Income tax department wherein, in Chapter VIIthereof, dealing with International Taxation and TransferPricing, the Board has directed that, to quote from the documentat page 35 thereof, ‘Completion of transfer pricing auditsgetting time barred on 31.10.2019’ be completed by that date. 11. Reliance is placed by the petitioner on the followingjudgments of the Supreme Court/decisions of the High Courts. Section 92CA(3) is ‘may’ it should be read as ‘shall’ bearing inmind the context in which it has been used. 10. My attention is also drawn to the Central Action Planissued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes for the guidance ofofficers in the Income tax department wherein, in Chapter VIIthereof, dealing with International Taxation and TransferPricing, the Board has directed that, to quote from the documentat page 35 thereof, ‘Completion of transfer pricing auditsgetting time barred on 31.10.2019’ be completed by that date. 11. Reliance is placed by the petitioner on the followingjudgments of the Supreme Court/decisions of the High Courts. i)State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Jogendra Singh (AIR 1963 SC1618)1618) ii)Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs toGovernment of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity (1979 4 SCC 85)Government of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity (1979 4 SCC 85)iii)Mohan Singh & Ors. vs. International Airport Authority ofIndia & Ors. (1997 9 SCC 132)India & Ors. (1997 9 SCC 132) iv)R.Rudraiah & Anr. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1998 3SCC 23)SCC 23) v)D.K.Basu vs. State of West Bengal and others (2015 8 SCC744)744)vi)Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks,Mumbai and others (1998 8 SCC)Mumbai and others (1998 8 SCC) vii)Sahara Hospitality Ltd. and Another vs. Commissioner ofIncome-Tax and Others (352 ITR 38)Income-Tax and Others (352 ITR 38) viii) Chamber of Tax Consultants v. Central Board of DirectTaxes, New Delhi ((2019) 104 taxmann.com 397)Taxes, New Delhi ((2019) 104 taxmann.com 397) ix)Sharbati Devi Jhalani vs. CWT (159 ITR 549 (Del) x)Surendra Kumar Jain vs. Pr. CIT (408 ITR 328 (Del))xi)Moser Baer India Ltd. and others vs. AdditionalCommissioner of Income-Tax and Another (2009 316 ITR 1(Delhi)x)Surendra Kumar Jain vs. Pr. CIT (408 ITR 328 (Del))xi)Moser Baer India Ltd. and others vs. AdditionalCommissioner of Income-Tax and Another (2009 316 ITR 1(Delhi)xii)M.K.Srikanta Setty vs. CIT (160 ITR 517 (Karn.)) 12. By way of reply, batting solo for the Department,Ms.Hema Muralikrishnan, learned Senior Standing Counsel arguesthat the interpretation given by the petitioners to the timescheme under Section 92CA(3A) is incorrect. The proper readingof the timeline is, to quote the revenue: The words used in the above section are 60 days priorto the date on which the period of limitationexpires. The date on which the period of limitationexpires is 00.00.00 am of 01.01.2020 and 60 days prior to 01.01.2020 is 02.11.2019 (31 days of Dec and+29 days of Nov). Therefore, the date “before 60days” would be a date before 02.11.2019. 01.11.2019being a date before 02.11.2019, the impugned orderpassed on 01.11.2019 is within time and not barred bylimitation. (emphasis supplied in the counter) 13. According to her, limitation to pass an order ofassessment runs till 12 a m of 01.01.2020. The period of 60 dayswould have to be computed including the 31[st] of December andending on the 2[nd] of November, 2019. The passing of the impugnedorders on the 1[st] of November is thus, perfectly in order. prior to 01.01.2020 is 02.11.2019 (31 days of Dec and+29 days of Nov). Therefore, the date “before 60days” would be a date before 02.11.2019. 01.11.2019being a date before 02.11.2019, the impugned orderpassed on 01.11.2019 is within time and not barred bylimitation. (emphasis supplied in the counter) 13. According to her, limitation to pass an order ofassessment runs till 12 a m of 01.01.2020. The period of 60 dayswould have to be computed including the 31[st] of December andending on the 2[nd] of November, 2019. The passing of the impugnedorders on the 1[st] of November is thus, perfectly in order. 14. Alternatively, the time frame under Section 92CA(3A) isonly directory, as the assessment at that point of time is onlya work-in-progress. She points out that a transfer pricing auditwould only be made in relation to those transactions where ArmsLength Price (ALP) is to be determined and other issues arisingfrom the return of income, both domestic and international,would be processed parallelly/simultaneously. Thus, it is not asthough the Assessing Officer has to await completion of transferpricing audit to complete the proceedings for assessment andpass an order of assessment. The period of sixty days, is,according to her, merely a guide to ensure that the transferpricing audit is completed, roughly, within the period of sixtydays and forwarded to the Assessing Officer for integrationwith, and completion of assessment within the overall time limitprescribed in Section 153. 15. She points out that the General Clauses Act relied uponby the petitioners states that the proper interpretation of theword ‘to’ means that the date has to stand included. Thus, thereference to 60 days prior to the date on which the period oflimitation referred to in section 153, expires, is a referenceto the 1[st] of January 2020 and not 31[st] of December 2019. Shepoints out that the interim orders passed by this Courtpermitted the Assessing Authority to continue with proceedingsand pass orders of assessment, retaining the same in sealedcovers. This has been done in all cases barring one,W.P.No.34568 of 2019, where the order of stay passed by thisCourt was not complied with and a final order of assessment cometo be passed 14.01.2020. The prayer in this Writ Petition hasbeen amended to challenge the final order of assessment in thelight of the consent expressed by the learned Senior StandingCounsel for the Revenue. 16. Furthermore, the Writ Petitions are not maintainable asobjections may well be filed as against draft orders ofassessment before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) and theprovisions of Section 144C(8) are wide, entitling the DRP toconfirm, reduce or enhance the variations made. 17. In reply, Mr.Vohra points out that the determination ofALP has ramifications on other aspects of taxability, such asthe existence of a permanent establishment and the grant of taxcredit. While, admittedly, proceedings for regular assessmentand for transfer pricing do go on simultaneously, sixty days isnecessary to complete adjudication of those issues where thedetermination of ALP assumes importance and the ALP determinedhas a hearing upon other issues in assessment. The observationsof the TPO in the context of the transfer pricing audit willalso have to be taken into account by the officer inadjudicating upon issues in some situations. It is for thisreason that Legislature has, in its wisdom, specifically setapart a period of 60 days to ensure that sufficient time isavailable with the Assessing Officer to complete the process ofassessment, holistically. 18. Some of the petitioners (in W.P.Nos.32699, 35300 and34174 of 2019) have also raised the issue of violation of theprinciples of natural justice contending that notices wereissued by the TPOs towards the close of limitation (whether31.10.2019 or 01.11.2019) and time was therefore insufficientfor the petitioners to make their submissions before the TPO. 19. The revenue relies on the amendment to Section 92CA(4)which requires the Assessing Officer to compute total income ofan assessee after receipt of the transfer pricing order. Priorto 01.06.2007, it was mandatory for the Assessing Authority toaccept the ALP determined by the TPO and the phrase used in theprovision was ‘having regard to’. Post amendment, the provisionmade it compulsory for the Assessing Authority to adopt the ALPas determined by the TPO and the phrase ‘having regard to’ wasreplaced by the phrase ‘in conformity with’. Thus, according tothe revenue, the AO hardly need apply his mind with respect tothe ALP determined and the prescription of 60 days is merely forinternal convenience of the different officers to facilitatestep by step completion of assessment. 20. Much has been stated about the use of the words in thecomputation itself, such as ‘may’, ‘shall’, the absence ofreference to ‘month’ as it may have led to an ambiguity of whether the period should be reckoned as 30 or 31 days and theabsence of the phrase ‘no order shall be made’ as used inSection 153. This, according to the revenue, leads to theconclusion that there is nothing sacrosanct about the period of60 days which must be construed as flexible. 21. On the question of alternate remedy, I see no reason torelegate the petitioners to the Assessing Authority forcompletion of draft assessment that may be challenged before theDRP. Limitation, which is the issue raised in these writpetitions, is a mixed question of law and facts, but there areno disputes on factual aspects in the present case. The writpetitions are thus, held to be maintainable. 22. Limitation has been prescribed for each stage/processin an assessment, commencing with the filing of a return,transfer pricing proceedings under Section 92, filing ofobjections to draft assessment order in terms of Section 144C(2), passing of final order of assessment after expiry of theperiod for filing of objections in terms of Section 144C(4),issuance of directions by the DRP in terms of Section 144C(12)and passing of final assessment order after receipt ofdirections from the DRP in terms of Section 144C(13). Anassessment involving issues of transfer pricing is thus measuredby limitation at every step. 23. On the question of interpretation of the languageemployed in the provisions, the following judgements of theSupreme Court settle the position that one should not proceedblindly on the basis of the words/phrases employed in Statute,whether ‘may’, ‘shall’, ‘no order shall be passed’ or ‘within’and the scheme of assessment in entirety as well as theintention of Legislature qua that scheme of assessment must betaken into account. 24. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs toGovernment of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity (1979 4 SCC 85), theBench states thus: . . . . 17.But a statute is not to be interpreted merely fromthe lexicographer's angle. The court must give effectto the will and inbuilt policy of the Legislature asdiscernible from the object and scheme of theenactment and the language employed therein. 24. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs toGovernment of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity (1979 4 SCC 85), theBench states thus: . . . . 17.But a statute is not to be interpreted merely fromthe lexicographer's angle. The court must give effectto the will and inbuilt policy of the Legislature asdiscernible from the object and scheme of theenactment and the language employed therein. 18.Exposition ex visceribus actus is a longrecognised rule of construction. Words in a statuteoften take their meaning from the context of thestatute as a whole. They are therefore, not to beconstrued in isolation. For instance, the use of theword "may" would normally indicate that the provisionwas not mandatory. But in the context of a particularstatute, this word may connote a legislativeimperative, particularly when its construction in apermissive sense would relegate it to the unenviableposition, as it were, "of an ineffectual angelbeating its wings in a luminous void in vain". If thechoice is between two interpretations", said ViscountSimon L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster AmalgamatedCollieries, Ltd, the narrower of which would fail to achieve themanifest purpose of the legislation we shouldavoid a construction which would reduce thelegislation to futility and should rather acceptthe bolder construction based on the view thatParliament would legislate only for the purposeof bringing about an effective result. 19.The provisions of Sections 63 and 64 of the Actare to be interpreted in the light of this principle.The language and scheme of the Excise Act, taken as awhole, show that the purpose of this legislation isnot only to raise revenue but also to control andrestrict the import, export, transport, manufactureand sale of intoxicants. Free and unrestricted use ofintoxicants and illicit trade in contrabandintoxicants not only means a loss of revenue to thepublic exchequer but also has a harmful effect onpublic health and morals. Moreover, illicit trade andsmuggling of intoxicants is often committed in anorganised and clandestine manner, and is difficult todetect. 20.We have, therefore, to adopt that construction ofthe expressions "shall be liable to confiscation"used in Section 3(2) and "may" in sub-section (1) ofSection 64, which will preserve the efficacy of theprovisions as an instrument for combating these anti-social activities, and reject the other which willrender them ineffective. 21.Thus considered, it seems clear that theexpressions "shall be liable to confiscation" and"may" in the aforesaid provisions were intended tohave a compulsive force. 25. In Mohan Singh & Ors. vs. International AirportAuthority of India & Ors. (1997 9 SCC 132), the Bench,considering the identical question as before me now, states: 20.We have, therefore, to adopt that construction ofthe expressions "shall be liable to confiscation"used in Section 3(2) and "may" in sub-section (1) ofSection 64, which will preserve the efficacy of theprovisions as an instrument for combating these anti-social activities, and reject the other which willrender them ineffective. 21.Thus considered, it seems clear that theexpressions "shall be liable to confiscation" and"may" in the aforesaid provisions were intended tohave a compulsive force. 25. In Mohan Singh & Ors. vs. International AirportAuthority of India & Ors. (1997 9 SCC 132), the Bench,considering the identical question as before me now, states: 17.The distinction of mandatory compliance ordirectory effect of the language depends upon thelanguage couched in the statute under considerationand its object, purpose and effect. The distinctionreflected in the use of the word "shall" or "may"depends on conferment of power. In the presentcontext, "may" does not always mean may. May is a mustfor enabling compliance of provision but there arecases in which, for various reasons, as soon as aperson who is within the statute is entrusted withpower, it becomes duty to exercise. Where the languageof statute creates a duty, the special remedy isprescribed for non-performance of the duty. In "Craieson Statute Law" (7th Edn.), it is stated that theCourt will, as a general rule, presume that theappropriate remedy by common law or mandamus foraction was intended to apply. General rule of law isthat where a general obligation is created by statuteand statutory remedy is provided for violation,statutory remedy is provided for violation, statutoryremedy is mandatory. The scope and language of thestatute and consideration of policy at times may,however, create exception showing that legislature didnot intend a remedy (generality) to be exclusive.Words are the skin of the language. The language isthe medium of expressing the intention and the objectthat particular provision or the Act seeks to achieve.Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the intention.The word "shall" is not always decisive. Regard mustbe had to the context, subject matter and object ofthe statutory provision in question in determiningwhether the same is mandatory or directory. Nouniversal principle of law could be laid in thatbehalf as to whether a particular provision orenactment shall be considered mandatory or directory.It is the duty of the Court to try to get at the realintention of the legislature by carefully analysingthe whole scope of the statute or section or a phraseunder Consideration. As stated earlier, the question as to whether the statute is mandatory or directorydepends upon the language in which the intent iscouched. The meaning and purpose the Act seeks toachieve. In "Suhtherland Statutory Construction" (3rdEdn.) Volume 1 at page 81 in paragraph 316, it isstated that although the problem of mandatory anddirectory legislation is a hazard to all governmentalactivity, it is peculiarly hazardous to administrativeagencies because the validity of their action dependsupon exercise of authority in accordance with theircharter of existence the statute. If the directions ofthe statute are mandatory, then strict compliance withthe statutory terms is essential to the validity ofadministrative action. But if the language of thestatute is directory only, then variation from itsdirection does not invalidate the administrativeaction. Conversely, if the statutory direction isdiscretionary only, it may not provide an adequatestandard for legislative action and the delegation. In"Crawford on the Construction of Statutes" at page516, it is stated that: "The question as to whether a statute is mandatory ordirectory depends upon the intent of the legislatureand not upon the language in which the intent isclothed. The meaning and intention of the legislaturemust govern, and these are to be ascertained, not onlyfrom the phraseology of the provision, but also byconsidering its nature, its design, and theconsequences which would follow from construing it theone way or the other ...." 26. In R.Rudraiah & Anr. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1998 3 SCC 23), a Division Bench of the Supreme Court states: 13. The point is whether the language in Section 48-Aof the Land Reforms Act. 1961 fixing a period oflimitation is clear and unambiguous. If the period is6 months from the date of commencement of section 1 ofthe KLR Amendment Act of 1978 (Act 1/1979), and if thedate of commencement of that section is not in disputeand the six month period for filing application is tocount from 1.1.79 and it expired on 30.6.1979, can itbe said that the language of section 48-A is ambiguousand is to be liberally construed? Can it be said thatif 30.6.79 is the last day for filing of applicationsby tenant then section 48-A must be treated as harshand unjust to tenants and should be interpreteddifferently? 17.It is true there is a principle of interpretationof statutes that the plain or grammatical constructionwhich leads to injustice or absurdity is to be avoided(See Venkatarama Iyer, J in Tirath Singh vs. BachiterSingh (AIR 1955 SC 830 at 855). But that principle canbe applied only if "the language admits of aninterpretation which would avoid it". Shamrao V.Parulekar v. District Magistrate (AIR at 327). In ourview Section 48-A, as amended, has fixed a specificdate for the making of an application by a simple ruleof arithmetic, and there is therefore no scope forimplying any `ambiguity' at all. Further "the fixation of periods of limitation must always beto some extent arbitrary and may frequently result inhardship. But in construing such provisions, equitableconsiderations are out of place, and the strictgrammatical meaning of the words is the only safeguide". (Sir Dinshaw Mulla in Nagendranath Dev vs.Sureshchandra Dev [ILR 60 Cal 1 (PC)]. 27. In M.K.Srikanta Setty vs. CIT (160 ITR 517 (Karn.)),the Bench was considering the provisions of Section 3 of theVoluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Act, 1976 (Central Act 8 of 1976) and states in that context, as follows: 7. Section 3 of the Act provides for making adeclaration in accordance with the provisions ofsection 4 of the Act before January 1, 1976, or on orbefore December 31, 1975. The time specified in section3 of the Act for making a declaration is an absoluteperiod which cannot be extended or condoned by any oneunder any circumstance. 8. In the context, the words "make" and "made"occurring in sections 3 and 4 of the Act mean that adeclaration under the Act should be filed or presentedon or before December 31, 1975, and not beyond thatdate. 10. In Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR1932 PC 165, the Judicial Committee of the PrivyCouncil stated the rule of construction to be followedin interpreting articles of the Act in these words (atp. 167) : "... The fixation of periods of limitation must alwaysbe to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently resultin hardship. But, in construing such provisions,equitable considerations are out of place and thestrict grammatical meaning of the words is, theirLordships think, the only safe guide." 11. In more than one case, our Supreme Court hasrestated these principles. On these principles thatgovern, this court is bound to place a strictconstruction on the period of limitation stipulated bysection 3 of the Act. Any hardship to be caused istotally irrelevant and must be ignored by the court. "... The fixation of periods of limitation must alwaysbe to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently resultin hardship. But, in construing such provisions,equitable considerations are out of place and thestrict grammatical meaning of the words is, theirLordships think, the only safe guide." 11. In more than one case, our Supreme Court hasrestated these principles. On these principles thatgovern, this court is bound to place a strictconstruction on the period of limitation stipulated bysection 3 of the Act. Any hardship to be caused istotally irrelevant and must be ignored by the court. 28. The Supreme Court in D.K.Basu vs. State of West Bengaland others (2015 8 SCC 744) was interpreting the provisions ofSection 21 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and inthat context states thus: A plain reading of the above would show thatParliament has used the word “may” in sub-section (1)of Section 21 while providing for the setting up of aState Human Rights Commission. In contrast Parliamenthas used the word “shall” i