M/S Bps Infrastructure Village- Raseda, Tehsil- Baloda Bazar, Districtbaloda Bazar- Bhatapara v. The Income-Tax Officer Ward-1 (3), Raipur, Cgthe Income-Tax Officer Ward-1 (3), Raipur, Cg

NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR TAXC No. 87 of 2024 M/s BPS Infrastructure Village- Raseda, Tehsil- Baloda Bazar, DistrictBaloda Bazar- Bhatapara 493332, Pan- Aaofb5038r Baloda Bazar- Bhatapara 493332, Pan- Aaofb5038r ---- Appellant Versus The Income-Tax Officer Ward-1 (3), Raipur, CGThe Income-Tax Officer Ward-1 (3), Raipur, CG ---- Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant For Respondent : Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. S. Rajeshwar Rao, Advocate. :Ms. Naushina Afrin Ali, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Smt. Rajani Dubey, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice12/04/2024 1. Heard Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant as wellas Ms. Naushina Afrin Ali, learned counsel for the respondent.as Ms. Naushina Afrin Ali, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. By the present appeal under Section 260 A of the Income Tax Act, 1961(for short, the Act), the appellant/assessee seeks to challenge the orderdated 05.12.2023 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, RaipurBench, Raipur (for short, the ITAT), in ITA No. 315/RPR/2023 for theAssessment Year (for short, the AY) 2019-2020 arising out of orderpassed by the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) {for short, theCIT(A)}, National Faceless Appeal Center (NFAC), Delhi dated(for short, the Act), the appellant/assessee seeks to challenge the orderdated 05.12.2023 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, RaipurBench, Raipur (for short, the ITAT), in ITA No. 315/RPR/2023 for theAssessment Year (for short, the AY) 2019-2020 arising out of orderpassed by the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) {for short, theCIT(A)}, National Faceless Appeal Center (NFAC), Delhi dated 29.09.2021, which in turn arises from the intimation issued by theCentralized Processing Center (CPC)/A.O under Sec. 143(1) of theIncome-tax Act,1961 dated 06.03.2020 for the assessment year 2019-20. 3. The facts, in brief, are that the appellant filed its return for the AY 2019-2020 on 31.10.2019 declaring his total income at Rs. 14,66,150/-. Thereturn was processed by the Assessing Officer (for short, the AO) underclause (a) sub-section (1) of Section 143 and a total income was computedat Rs. 34,50,570/- after disallowing Rs. 19,84,415/- relating to employeescontribution to provident fund and ESIC to the extent not credited to theemployees account on or before the due date under Section 36(1)(va) ofthe Act. The said order of the AO was challenged before the Commissionerof Income Tax (Appeals) under Section 246A of the Act which stooddismissed on 29.09.2021. The said order passed by the CIT(A) was furtherchallenged before the learned ITAT which also stood dismissed on theground of delay.2020 on 31.10.2019 declaring his total income at Rs. 14,66,150/-. Thereturn was processed by the Assessing Officer (for short, the AO) underclause (a) sub-section (1) of Section 143 and a total income was computedat Rs. 34,50,570/- after disallowing Rs. 19,84,415/- relating to employeescontribution to provident fund and ESIC to the extent not credited to theemployees account on or before the due date under Section 36(1)(va) ofthe Act. The said order of the AO was challenged before the Commissionerof Income Tax (Appeals) under Section 246A of the Act which stooddismissed on 29.09.2021. The said order passed by the CIT(A) was furtherchallenged before the learned ITAT which also stood dismissed on theground of delay. 4. Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant submits that thethe appellant filed return of Income on 31.10.2019 declaring total income atRs.14,66,150/- after claiming PF and ESIC deduction of Rs.19,84,415/-under Section 36(1) (va) of the Act. While processing the return underSection143(1)(a) of the Act the claim was disallowed. The first appeal filedunder section 246A was dismissed on the grounds of non-compliance andit appears that the notices under Section 250 of the Act and the order oflearned CIT(A) were uploaded on appellant's ITBA e-filing portal and hecame to know about this only on 08.10.2023 while randomly checking theportal. The second appeal before learned ITAT was filed on 17.10.2023along with application for condonation of delay of 690 days along withaffidavit. The learned ITAT has dismissed the appeal on grounds of delaywithout considering the fact that the notices and order under Section 250of the Act were not served upon the appellant as required under Rule 46 ofthe appellant filed return of Income on 31.10.2019 declaring total income atRs.14,66,150/- after claiming PF and ESIC deduction of Rs.19,84,415/-under Section 36(1) (va) of the Act. While processing the return underSection143(1)(a) of the Act the claim was disallowed. The first appeal filedunder section 246A was dismissed on the grounds of non-compliance andit appears that the notices under Section 250 of the Act and the order oflearned CIT(A) were uploaded on appellant's ITBA e-filing portal and hecame to know about this only on 08.10.2023 while randomly checking theportal. The second appeal before learned ITAT was filed on 17.10.2023along with application for condonation of delay of 690 days along withaffidavit. The learned ITAT has dismissed the appeal on grounds of delaywithout considering the fact that the notices and order under Section 250of the Act were not served upon the appellant as required under Rule 46 of Income Tax Rules, 1962 but were merely uploaded on his e-filing portal /e-mailed without any real time alert. The scheme of filing and disposal ofappeals under IAct has been converted from physical mode to facelessmode and various notifications were issued by CBDT in this regard. Income Tax Rules, 1962 but were merely uploaded on his e-filing portal /e-mailed without any real time alert. The scheme of filing and disposal ofappeals under IAct has been converted from physical mode to facelessmode and various notifications were issued by CBDT in this regard. 5. As per Mr. Sinha, the faceless appeal scheme was initially launched w.e.f.01.04.2020 and most of the period was covered under Covid-19 periodand several notifications were issued subsequently stating the procedure.As per faceless mechanism, all communications need to be sentelectronically with real time alert and it appears that order of learnedCIT(A) was dropped on the e-filing portal of the appellant without anyfurther real time alert which is contrary to legal provisions. Such delayshave also occurred in several cases and appellant could get list of 26cases mentioned at para-No.21 and 22 of appeal memorandum. Thissubstantiates genuineness of ill-effects of migration from physical mode tofaceless mode, which is faced by income-tax assessees at large. Out of 26appeals, 17 appeals were dismissed mainly on the grounds of delay on thepresumption that appellants were not alert and delay is attributable to thelackadaisical conduct; while they were allowed in 9 cases. In all thesecases mandate of Rule 46 of Income Tax Rules, 1962 was overlooked.01.04.2020 and most of the period was covered under Covid-19 periodand several notifications were issued subsequently stating the procedure.As per faceless mechanism, all communications need to be sentelectronically with real time alert and it appears that order of learnedCIT(A) was dropped on the e-filing portal of the appellant without anyfurther real time alert which is contrary to legal provisions. Such delayshave also occurred in several cases and appellant could get list of 26cases mentioned at para-No.21 and 22 of appeal memorandum. Thissubstantiates genuineness of ill-effects of migration from physical mode tofaceless mode, which is faced by income-tax assessees at large. Out of 26appeals, 17 appeals were dismissed mainly on the grounds of delay on thepresumption that appellants were not alert and delay is attributable to thelackadaisical conduct; while they were allowed in 9 cases. In all thesecases mandate of Rule 46 of Income Tax Rules, 1962 was overlooked. 6. It is further submitted that as per Rule 46 of IT Rules and provisions ofSection 282 of the Act read with Rule 127 of IT Rules and section 13 of theInformation Technology Act, 2000, in case of dropping the notices andorder on e-filing portal, the date of receipt is deemed to be the date whenthe addressee has downloaded the communication. Accordingly, the delayin this case is neither deliberate nor attributable to lackadaisical attitude ofthe appellant as presumed by learned ITAT.Section 282 of the Act read with Rule 127 of IT Rules and section 13 of theInformation Technology Act, 2000, in case of dropping the notices andorder on e-filing portal, the date of receipt is deemed to be the date whenthe addressee has downloaded the communication. Accordingly, the delayin this case is neither deliberate nor attributable to lackadaisical attitude ofthe appellant as presumed by learned ITAT. 7. In support of his contentions, he relies on a decision of the Punjab &Haryana High Court in in Munjal BCU Centre of Innovation andEntrepreneurship vs. CIT(E)- 2024(3)TM1479 (P&H HC), wherein it hasHaryana High Court in in Munjal BCU Centre of Innovation andEntrepreneurship vs. CIT(E)- 2024(3)TM1479 (P&H HC), wherein it has been held that it is essential that before any action is taken, acommunication of the notice must be in terms of the provisions and apragmatic view has to be adopted always in these circumstances. Anindividual or company is not expected keep the e-portal open all the timeso as to have knowledge of departments actions. Further, in Shakti Steel 7. In support of his contentions, he relies on a decision of the Punjab &Haryana High Court in in Munjal BCU Centre of Innovation andEntrepreneurship vs. CIT(E)- 2024(3)TM1479 (P&H HC), wherein it hasHaryana High Court in in Munjal BCU Centre of Innovation andEntrepreneurship vs. CIT(E)- 2024(3)TM1479 (P&H HC), wherein it has been held that it is essential that before any action is taken, acommunication of the notice must be in terms of the provisions and apragmatic view has to be adopted always in these circumstances. Anindividual or company is not expected keep the e-portal open all the timeso as to have knowledge of departments actions. Further, in Shakti Steel Trading vs. The Asstt. Commissioner (ST) WP No. 4122 & 4255 &4256 in GST matters, which are analogous to IT matters, the Hon'bleMadras High Court has held that it is advisable for the Department to servenotice on such assessee through other mode of communicationsprescribed when they failed to respond to the summons, orders, noticesand other communications through e-mail. There has to be some amountof flexibility. Rigidity in administration of tax in such matters may not servethe purpose and can be counter productive. Mr. Sinha further relies on thedecision of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst.Katiji & Others, {(1987) 167 ITR 471}, Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. SudhaRani Debi {1978 AIR 537}, Senior Bhosale Estate (HUF) v. TheAssistant Commissioner of Income Tax {(2019) 419 ITR 732 SC},decision of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Forest DevelopmentCorpn. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS) Circle11(3), Bangalore {2010 (8) TMI – 1134} and the decision rendered by theITAT in The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle -4(1) Raipurv. M/s. Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (Through ChhattisgarhState Power Holding Company Ltd.). 8. On the other hand, Ms. Naushina Afrin Ali, learned counsel for therespondent/Revenue submits that the order passed by the learned ITAT isjust and proper warranting no interference. respondent/Revenue submits that the order passed by the learned ITAT isjust and proper warranting no interference. 9.We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings anddocuments annexed with the appeal.documents annexed with the appeal. 10.From perusal of the orders of the learned ITAT and other authorities of the Department, it transpires that the assessee firm had e-filed its return ofincome for A.Y 2019-20 on 30.09.2010, declaring an income of Rs.14,66,150/-. The A.O/CPC, Bengaluru vide intimation issued underSection 143(1) of the Act, dated 06.03.2020 disallowed the assessee'sclaim for deduction of delayed deposit of employees share of contributiontowards ESI/PF of Rs.19,84,415/- under Section 36(1) (va) of the Act anddetermined its income at Rs. 34,50,570/-. The assessee carried the matterin appeal before the CIT(A) but without success. Observing, that thedisallowance of the assessee's claim for deduction of delayed deposit ofemployees share of contribution towards ESI/PF was rightly made by theA.O under Section 36(1) (va) of the Act, the CIT(A) approved theadjustment made by the DCIT, CPC, Bengaluru under Section 143(1) ofthe Act. Being aggrieved with the order of the CIT (A), the assessee tookup the matter in an appeal before the learned ITAT wherein the submissionof the assessee has been mentioned in para 5 of the order the ITAT whichis as under: “5. Shri Ravi Agrawal Ld. Authorized Representative (forshort 'AR') for the assessee at the threshold of hearing ofthe appeal submitted that a delay of 690 days wasinvolved in filing of the present appeal. Elaborating on thereasons leading to the aforesaid delay, It was submittedby the Ld. AR that the same had occasioned for thereason that the accountant of the assessee firm. viz. ShriAmitabh Paul had failed to bring to the notice of thepartners of the assessee firm the order of the CIT(Appeals), dated 20.09.2021. The Ld. AR submitted thatShri Bhuvneshwar Prasad Sahu, partner of the assesseefirm received the aforesaid order from his accountant onlyas on 08.10.2023. The Ld. AR submitted that ShriAmitabh Paul, accountant had admitted that though theorder of the CIT(Appeals) was received by him way backbut it had skipped from his mind to bring the same to thenotice of the partners of the assessee firm. Carrying thiscontention further, the Ld. AR submitted that it was onlyshort 'AR') for the assessee at the threshold of hearing ofthe appeal submitted that a delay of 690 days wasinvolved in filing of the present appeal. Elaborating on thereasons leading to the aforesaid delay, It was submittedby the Ld. AR that the same had occasioned for thereason that the accountant of the assessee firm. viz. ShriAmitabh Paul had failed to bring to the notice of thepartners of the assessee firm the order of the CIT(Appeals), dated 20.09.2021. The Ld. AR submitted thatShri Bhuvneshwar Prasad Sahu, partner of the assesseefirm received the aforesaid order from his accountant onlyas on 08.10.2023. The Ld. AR submitted that ShriAmitabh Paul, accountant had admitted that though theorder of the CIT(Appeals) was received by him way backbut it had skipped from his mind to bring the same to thenotice of the partners of the assessee firm. Carrying thiscontention further, the Ld. AR submitted that it was only when Shri Bhuwaneshwar Prasad Sahu (supra) hadfurther brought the aforesaid order of the CIT (Appeals)on 29.09.2021, to the notice of his chartered account, viz.Shri Ajay Agrawal that he was informed that the appeal ofthe assessee firm had been dismissed by theCIT(Appeals) Raipur. The Ld. AR further submitted thatas the order of the CIT(Appeals) was dropped in the e-mail account, viz., " " i.e. e-mail account that was generated by his accountant ShriAmitabh Paul and the partners of the assessee firm hadno access to the same, thus, it was for the said bonafidereason that they had remained unaware about the orderpassed by the CIT/Appeals) dated 29.09.2021…..”further brought the aforesaid order of the CIT (Appeals)on 29.09.2021, to the notice of his chartered account, viz.Shri Ajay Agrawal that he was informed that the appeal ofthe assessee firm had been dismissed by theCIT(Appeals) Raipur. The Ld. AR further submitted thatas the order of the CIT(Appeals) was dropped in the e-mail account, viz., " " i.e. e-mail account that was generated by his accountant ShriAmitabh Paul and the partners of the assessee firm hadno access to the same, thus, it was for the said bonafidereason that they had remained unaware about the orderpassed by the CIT/Appeals) dated 29.09.2021…..” 11. The reason that the delay in filing of the present appeal can by no meansbe held to be justified for the reason that partners of the assessee firm hadremained unaware about the order passed by the CIT (A) dated29.09.2021 which was dropped in the e-mail account of his accountant,viz. Shri Amitabh Paul. As the reason given by the assessee firm regardingthe inordinate delay involved in filing of the present appeal does not inspireany confidence, and in fact reveals a lackadaisical conduct of the partnersof the assessee firm, therefore, the same cannot be summarily acceptedon the very face of it. Considering the callous and lackadaisical conduct ofthe partners of the assessee firm who ought to have remained vigilantabout their income tax matter was held by the ITAT. be held to be justified for the reason that partners of the assessee firm hadremained unaware about the order passed by the CIT (A) dated29.09.2021 which was dropped in the e-mail account of his accountant,viz. Shri Amitabh Paul. As the reason given by the assessee firm regardingthe inordinate delay involved in filing of the present appeal does not inspireany confidence, and in fact reveals a lackadaisical conduct of the partnersof the assessee firm, therefore, the same cannot be summarily acceptedon the very face of it. Considering the callous and lackadaisical conduct ofthe partners of the assessee firm who ought to have remained vigilantabout their income tax matter was held by the ITAT. 12.As has been rightly relied on by the learned ITAT that in the case of Stateof West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah reported in 1972 AIR SC749, the Hon'ble Apex Court had held that the expression "sufficient causeshould receive a liberal construction so as toadvance substantial justice,particularly when there is no motive behind the delay The expression"sufficient cause will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The actionwhich can be condoned by the court should fall within the realm of normalhuman conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. However, as the appellant/assessee in the present case is acting in defiance of law, therefore thereof West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah reported in 1972 AIR SC749, the Hon'ble Apex Court had held that the expression "sufficient causeshould receive a liberal construction so as toadvance substantial justice,particularly when there is no motive behind the delay The expression"sufficient cause will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The actionwhich can be condoned by the court should fall within the realm of normalhuman conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. However, as the appellant/assessee in the present case is acting in defiance of law, therefore there can be no reason to allow its application and condone the substantial delayof 690 days involved in preferring of the captioned appeal. Further, theHon'ble Supreme Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chotelal v. RewaCoalfields Ltd. reported in AIR (1962) 361 (SC) that seeker of justicemust come with clean hands, therefore, now when in the presentappealthe assessee appellant had failed to come forth with any good andsufficient reason that would justify condonation of the delay involved inpreferring of the captioned appeal, the ITAT declined to condone the delayof 690 days, without adverting to the merits of the case and hencedismissed the captioned appeal of the assessee as barred by limitation. 13. As far as the issue involved pertaining to claiming of deduction undersection 36 (1) (va) of the IT Act 1961 on delayed payment of employeesshare of contribution towards ESI/PF of Rs. 19,84,415, in the instant caseis concerned is no more res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court hasdecided the legal issue on merits in the matter of Checkmate Services P.Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax-1, {Civil Appeal No. 2833 of 2016,decided on 12.10.2022}, wherein at paragraphs 51 to 54, it was observedas under:- 13. As far as the issue involved pertaining to claiming of deduction undersection 36 (1) (va) of the IT Act 1961 on delayed payment of employeesshare of contribution towards ESI/PF of Rs. 19,84,415, in the instant caseis concerned is no more res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court hasdecided the legal issue on merits in the matter of Checkmate Services P.Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax-1, {Civil Appeal No. 2833 of 2016,decided on 12.10.2022}, wherein at paragraphs 51 to 54, it was observedas under:- “51. The analysis of the various judgments cited onbehalf of the assessee i.e., Commissioner of Income-Taxv. Aimil Ltd. [2010] 321 ITR 508 (Delhi High Court);Commissioner of Income-Tax and another v. SabariEnterprises [2008] 298 ITR 141 (Karnataka High Court).;Commissioner of Income Tax v. Pamwi Tissues Ltd.[2009] 313 ITR 137 (Bombay High Court).;Commissioner of Income-Tax, Udaipur v. Udaipur DugdhUtpadak Sahakari Sandh Ltd. [2013] 35 taxmann.com616 (Rajasthan High Court) and Nipso Polyfabriks(supra) would reveal that in all these cases, the HighCourts principally relied upon omission of second provisoto Section 43B (b). No doubt, many of these decisionsalso dealt with Section 36(va) with its explanation.However, the primary consideration in all the judgments,cited by the assessee, was that they adopted theapproach indicated in the ruling in Alom Extrusions. Asnoticed previously, Alom Extrutions did not consider thefact of the introduction of Section 2(24)(x) or in fact the other provisions of the Act. other provisions of the Act. 52. When Parliament introduced Section 43B, what wason the statute book, was only employer’s contribution(Section 34(1)(iv)). At that point in time, there was noquestion of employee’s contribution being considered aspart of the employer’s earning. On the application of theoriginal principles of law it could have been treated onlyas receipts not amounting to income. When Parliamentintroduced the amendments in 1988-89, inserting Section36(1)(va) and simultaneously inserting the secondproviso of Section 43B, its intention was not to treat thedisparate nature of the amounts, similarly. As discussedpreviously, the memorandum introducing the Finance Billclearly stated that the provisions – especially secondproviso to Section 43B - was introduced to ensure timelypayments were made by the employer to the concernedfund (EPF, ESI, etc.) and avoid the mischief of employersretaining amounts for long periods. That Parliamentintended to retain the separate character of these twoamounts, is evident from the use of different language.Section 2(24)(x) too, deems amount received from theemployees (whether the amount is received from theemployee or by way of deduction authorized by thestatute) as income - it is the character of the amount thatis important, i.e., not income earned. Thus, amountsretained by the employer from out of the employee’sincome by way of deduction etc. were treated as incomein the hands of the employer. The significance of thisprovision is that on the one hand it brought into the fold of“income” amounts that were receipts or deductions fromemployees income; at the time, payment within theprescribed time – by way of contribution of theemployees’ share to their credit with the relevant fund isto be treated as deduction (Section 36(1)(va)). The otherimportant feature is that this distinction between theemployers’ contribution (Section 36(1)(iv)) andemployees’ contribution required to be deposited by theemployer (Section 36(1)(va)) was maintained – andcontinues to be maintained. On the other hand, Section43B covers all deductions that are permissible asexpenditures, or out-goings forming part of theassessees’ liability. These include liabilities such as taxliability, cess duties etc. or interest liability having regardto the terms of the contract. Thus, timely payment ofthese alone entitle an assessee to the benefit ofdeduction from the total income. The essential objectiveof Section 43B is to ensure that if assessees are followingthe mercantile method of accounting, nevertheless, thededuction of such liabilities, based only on book entries,would not be given. To pass muster, actual paymentswere a necessary pre-condition for allowing the expenditure. 53. The distinction between an employer’s contributionwhich is its primary liability under law – in terms ofSection 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amountsreceived by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is,thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers’income, and the later retains its character as an income(albeit deemed), by virtue of Section 2(24)(x) - unless theconditions spelt by Explanation to Section 36(1)(va) aresatisfied i.e., depositing such amount received ordeducted from the employee on or before the due date. Inother words, there is a marked distinction between thenature and character of the two amounts – the employer’sliability is to be paid out of its income whereas the secondis deemed an income, by definition, since it is thededuction from the employees’ income and held in trustby the employer. This marked distinction has to be bornewhile interpreting the obligation of every assessee underSection 43B. 54. In the opinion of this Court, the reasoning in theimpugned judgment that the non-obstante clause wouldnot in any manner dilute or override the employer’sobligation to deposit the amounts retained by it ordeducted by it from the employee’s income, unless thecondition that it is deposited on or before the due date, iscorrect and justified. The non-obstante clause has to beunderstood in the context of the entire provision ofSection 43B which is to ensure timely payment before thereturns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borneby the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment andother statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities,what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute.Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway inthat as long as deposits are made beyond the due date,but before the date of filing the return, the deduction isallowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case ofamounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case ofemployees’ contributions- which are deducted from theirincome. They are not part of the assessee employer’sincome, nor are they heads of deduction per se in theform of statutory pay out. They are others’ income,monies, only deemed to be income, with the object ofensuring that they are paid within the due date specifiedin the particular law. They have to be deposited in termsof such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms ofthose enactments and on or before the due datesmandated by such concerned law, that the amount whichis otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treatedas a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for thededuction that such amounts are deposited on or beforethe due date. If such interpretation were to be adopted, the non-obstante clause under Section 43B or anythingcontained in that provision would not absolve theassessee from its liability to deposit the employee’scontribution on or before the due date as a condition fordeduction.” 14. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Checkmates Services (supra), the presentappeal filed by the appellant is not only devoid of merits but also barred bylimitation as provided under Section 253 of the Act. The learned ITAT hasrightly dismissed the appeal of the assessee. We, therefore, are notpersuaded to differ with the view taken by the ITAT and the reasonassigned thereof. 15. Resultantly, the present appeal is dismissed as devoid of any merit andno substantial question of law arises in this appeal for consideration by thisno substantial question of law arises in this appeal for consideration by this Court. \ Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice