M/S.jyothy Laboratories Ltd.,Vyasarpadi, Chennai 39(As Transferee Company Into Whichm/S.henkel India Limited Has Merged),Rep. By Its Manager Mr.bakthavatchalam v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax,Large Tax Payer Unit-Ii

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS CORAM: The Honourable Mr. Justice S.VAIDYANATHAN Writ Petition No.3145 of 2013 M/s.Jyothy Laboratories Ltd.,Vyasarpadi, Chennai 39(As transferee company into whichM/s.Henkel India Limited has merged),Rep. by its Manager Mr.Bakthavatchalam K. .. Petitioner Vs. 1.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,Large Tax Payer Unit-II,1775, Jawaharlal Nehru Inner Ring Road,Anna Nagar, Western Extension,Chennai-600 101.Large Tax Payer Unit-II,1775, Jawaharlal Nehru Inner Ring Road,Anna Nagar, Western Extension,Chennai-600 101. 2. The Joint Commissioner of Income Tax,Large Tax Payer Unit-II,1775, Jawaharlal Nehru Inner Ring Road,Anna Nagar, Western Extension,Chennai-600 101.Large Tax Payer Unit-II,1775, Jawaharlal Nehru Inner Ring Road,Anna Nagar, Western Extension,Chennai-600 101. 3. The Commissioner of Income Tax,Large Tax Payer Unit-II,1775, Jawaharlal Nehru Inner Ring Road,Anna Nagar, Western Extension,Large Tax Payer Unit-II,1775, Jawaharlal Nehru Inner Ring Road,Anna Nagar, Western Extension, Chennai-600 101. .. Respondents Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia, for the issuance of a writ of Mandamus, to direct therespondents to stay the entire disputed outstanding demand ofRs.10,00,00,000/- purusant to order dated 28.1.2015 for assessmentyear 2010-11 pending disposal of the appeal by the (IT(A). https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ For Petitioner : Mr.Venkataraman, SC for Mr.K.Harishankar Sr.Standing counsel for ORDER This Writ Petition has been filed, praying for the issuanceof a writ of Mandamus, to direct the respondents to stay the entiredisputed outstanding demand of Rs.10,00,00,000/- and also grantinterim injunction restraining the respondents from taking coerciveaction in recovering the demand pursuant to order, dated 28.01.2015for assessment year 2010-11, pending disposal of the appeal by theCIT (A). The petitioner company is an assessee on the file of thefirst respondent. It has filed its Return of Income for theassessment year 2010-11 on 30.09.2010, declaring a total income ofRs.NIL, inter alia, in the computation of income, the assessee hadshown at a loss of Rs.26,12,03,142/-. In the assessment proceedingsunder Section 143 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short, the Act), anotice under Section 143(2) of the Act was issued on 6.9.2011 andalso notice under Section 142(1), dated 15.7.2014 along withquestionnaire was issued by the Assessing Officer. Pursuant to thesame, the petitioner’s representatives appeared and submitted thedetails. During the course of scrutiny proceedings, it is reflectedthat the assess had entered into international transaction with itsassociated enterprises abroad and the value of the same exceeds Rs.15Crores, hence, after obtaining approval from the Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Large Taxpayer Unit, Chennai, the case was referred toTransfer Pricing Officer-I, Chennai for determining arms length priceof the international transactions of the assess company for theassessment year 2010-2011. Thereafter, the Transfer Pricing Officer-V, Chennai has given a finding that an adjustment ofRs.11,32,55,061/- has been proposed in the case of petitionercompany and accordingly, held that an upward adjustment ofRs.5,90,27,,202/- was considered as necessary towards brand promotionfees and disallowance of management fees to the tune ofRs.5,42,27,859/-. Subsequently, it appears that a draft assessmentdated 31.3.2014 was forwarded to the petitioner company, wherein,apart from the adjustment of Rs.11,32,55,061/-, certain other additions/disallowances were made. Thereafter, since no objectionswere filed in respect of draft assessment, the assessment proceedingswere completed as per Section 143(3) read with Section 144C(3) of theAct, assessing total income of Rs.19,51,92,486/- after adjusting thebrought forward losses the assessed income was NIL. In the saidassessment order, addition was made towards Arms Length Price asdetermined by the Transfer Pricing Officer, amount toRs.11,32,55,061/-, disallowance on loss of sale of assets amount toRs.6,82,90,387/-, disallowance of wrong claim of VRS compensationunder Section 35 DD at Rs.5,24,39,887/- and addition on capital gainof Rs.1,13,984/-. Consequently, by invoking explanation (7) toSection 271(1) (c) of the Act, penalty proceedings were initiated inrespect of adjustments made by the Transfer Pricing Officer underSection 92CA(4) of the Act. By proceedings, dated 28.11.2014, thefirst respondent, imposed penalty in terms of Section 271(1)(C) ofthe Act, for furnishing inaccurate particulars and concealing theincome in respect of all the disallowances as stated above. It hasbeen held by the first respondent that the petitioner company hadintentionally and willfully made an incorrect claim, which warrantslevy of penalty leviable 300% of the tax, which comes toRs.23,85,94,851/-, however, considering the facts of the case, thefirst respondent imposed penalty at Rs.10,00,00,000/-. 3. Being aggrieved by the said imposition of penalty, thepetitioner company preferred an appeal under Section 246A of the Actbefore the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Chennai. Pendingdisposal of the appeal, the petitioner moved a stay petition underSection 220(6) of the Act before the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, the first respondent herein. By proceedings, dated 28.1.2015,the first respondent has disposed of the stay application, inter aliagranted partial stay of outstanding demand of Rs.5,00,00,000/- till30.9.2015 or disposal of appeal whichever is earlier, but refused togrant in respect of entire outstanding demand of Rs.10,00,00,000/-.Aggrieved over the same, the petitioner has come forward with thepresent writ petition. 4. On 09.02.2015, after hearing both sides, this Court passedthe following: “The 1strespondent is directed to proceed withthe matter till the final orders are passed in this writpetition and the amount need not be insisted upon. The1strespondent is also directed to proceed with thematter on day-to-day basis and the pendency of this writpetition is not a bar for it to decide the matter onmerits. Call after two weeks for orders.” 5. Heard the learned counsel and perused the entire materialsavailable on record. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 6. At the out set, it is curious enough to note that thepetitioner has not challenged the order of the first respondent,dated 28.1.2015, who granted partial stay in respect of totaloutstanding demand, but only sought for mandamus, to direct therespondents to stay the entire disputed outstanding demand ofRs.10,00,00,000/- pending disposal of the appeal. As the said orderhas not been challenged, it could be presumed that the petitioner hasaccepted the said order, of-course, partially. However, while thesaid order was in force, the petitioner cannot seek stay for entireoutstanding by way of a direction to the respondents from this Courtand even assuming that the relief as sought for by this Court isentertained, the authority cannot be expected to comply with thedirection unless and until the earlier order is set aside. Admittedly, the petitioner has not filed the present writ petitionfor grant of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus. Therefore, on thisground, this Court is of the view that the relief sought for by thepetitioner cannot be granted. 7. However, Mr.R.Venkataraman, learned senior counsel appearingfor the petitioner would contend that the first respondent hascommitted error in levying the penalty in respect of issues, viz.,adjustment on Arm’s length price, disallowances of loss on sale ofassets, disallowance of excess claim of VRS compensation and incomeunder Section 50C, etc., without properly appreciating the claim madeby the petitioner towards the above said aspects. He pointed outthat the petitioner has not concealed the particulars of the incomeor deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income,which warrants levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. The learned senior counsel contended that already the petitioner haspreferred the appeal challenging the order of the first respondentpassed under Section 271(1)(c) and the petitioner is having a goodcase and there would be fair chances in succeeding the appeal andtherefore, when the issue regarding the liability of payment ofpenalty imposed by the first respondent is the subject matter pendingin the form of appeal before the 1st respondent, wherein, thefinality would reach on disposing of the said appeal, there is nojustification for the 1st respondent in granting the partial interimstay of outstanding demand of Rs.5,00,00,000/- instead of entireoutstanding demand of Rs.10,00,00,000/-. Therefore, the learnedsenior counsel would contend that though the said order was notchallenged, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, thisCourt, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article226, can act ex debito justitiae and render real and substantialjustice. Therefore, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner-assessee, urged that the entire disputed demand should be kept inabeyance till the appeal filed by the assessee is decided on merits,which he submitted that was likely to succeed in toto as the penaltylevied by the Authority was not justified at all. He, however,further submitted that till such appeal is decided on merits and ifno stay is granted against such recovery, the very purpose of filing of the appeal would be frustrated and the petitioner company alreadyin financial crises, would not be in a position to comply with theconditions imposed by the authority granting partial stay. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for theRevenue would contend that the authority, while exercising hisdiscretionary power, has rightly imposed the penalty and though asper the statute the maximum penalty leviable is 300% which comes toRs.23,85,94,851/-, however considering the facts of the case, imposedminimum penalty at Rs.10,00,00,000/- and considering this fact aswell as the other issues, the authority has rightly rejected to grantstay of outstanding amount, which requires no interference. 9. Though the learned counsel raised very many contentionsregarding the imposition of penalty which according to him, does notwarrant in the circumstances under which, the assessee has notconcealed the particulars of income deliberately, but committed onlyan inadvertent and bona fide error which can be corrected by theauthority, etc., this Court is refrained from dealing with all thesecontentions inasmuch as admittedly, the writ petitioner has notchallenged the issue of levying penalty by the first respondentinvoking Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. 10. On a perusal of the order, dated 28.1.2015, it transpiresthat the first respondent passed the order in interim stay petition,exercising his discretion by invoking Section 220(6) of the Act,while entertaining the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section246 of the Act, treating the petitioner as not being in default inrespect of the amount in dispute in the appeal. 10. On a perusal of the order, dated 28.1.2015, it transpiresthat the first respondent passed the order in interim stay petition,exercising his discretion by invoking Section 220(6) of the Act,while entertaining the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section246 of the Act, treating the petitioner as not being in default inrespect of the amount in dispute in the appeal. 11. The Income Tax Act, 1961 is a self-contained andcomprehensive code in itself. Chapter XVII deals with “Collection andRecovery of tax”, which is divided in six parts, viz. A to G, ofwhich, Part D refers 'collection and recovery’. It is relevant toextract the Section 220(6) of the Act, which reads as under: “(6) Where an assessee has presented an appeal underSection 246 1 [or Section 246A,] the 2 [Assessing] Officermay, in his discretion, and subject to such conditions ashe may think fit to impose in the circumstances of thecase, treat the assessee as not being in default inrespect of the amount in dispute in the appeal, even https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ though the time for payment has expired, as long as suchappeal remains undisposed of.” 12. A perusal of the above, it is explicit that theauthority has been conferred with the power to treat theassessee as not being in default in respect of the amountin dispute in the appeal, however subject to conditions ashe may think fit to impose. The word ‘as he may think fitto impose’ if read harmoniously, it would definitely meanthat the power vested in the authority is amplitude andwide enough and can be exercised according to hisdiscretion. In fact, the above said provision enables theauthority only to treat the assessee as not being indefault in respect of amount in dispute in the appeal,however, it is to be noted that there is no power isvested in the authority to grant stay under the Act norempowers the authority to permit the assessee to pay thetax in instalments. It is implied that once theauthority, having satisfied with the facts andcircumstances of the case in appeal, treated the assesseeas not a defaulter for a particular amount, it isautomatic that stay in respect of such amount has beengranted. Therefore, the legislature has left it to thediscretion of the authority in the matter of imposing theconditions on the assessee while treating him as not adefaulter. The discretionary power conferred upon theauthority is in effect and substance one to give or not togive stay and it works both ways depending upon the mannerin which it is exercised. If the authority treats theassessee as not being in default, the assessee will not beproceeded against till the appeal is disposed of and theState will be restrained to collect the amount till theoutcome of the appeal. If he refuses to exercise hisdiscretion, the assessee will be subjected to coerciveprocess and the State will be in a position to recover thetax immediately. 13. In the land mark decision delivered on 11.03.1968, the threeJudges bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “ITO versusM.K.Mohammed” reported in AIR 1969 SC 430, in unanimous opinionauthored by Grover, J, dealing with words “as he may think fit”,which were available to the Income Tax Officer and ITAT also whiledeciding appeals before it and in the face of absence of clearprovisions for grant of stay against the disputed demand of tax, theApex Court held that such power is inherent. The conclusions of theHon'ble Supreme Court in para 13 and 14 of the judgment are quotedbelow for ready reference:- 13. In the land mark decision delivered on 11.03.1968, the threeJudges bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “ITO versusM.K.Mohammed” reported in AIR 1969 SC 430, in unanimous opinionauthored by Grover, J, dealing with words “as he may think fit”,which were available to the Income Tax Officer and ITAT also whiledeciding appeals before it and in the face of absence of clearprovisions for grant of stay against the disputed demand of tax, theApex Court held that such power is inherent. The conclusions of theHon'ble Supreme Court in para 13 and 14 of the judgment are quotedbelow for ready reference:- “13. Section 255 (5) of the Act does empower theAppellate Tribunal to regulate its own procedure, but itis very doubtful if the power of stay can be spelt outfrom that provision. In our opinion the Appellate Tribunalmust be held to have the power to grant stay as incidentalorS.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1264/2011 M/s MaheshwariAgro Industries Vs. Union of India & Ors. Judgment dt:15/12/2011 44/69 ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction.This is particularly so when section 220 (6) dealsexpressly with a situation when an appeal is pendingbefore the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but the Actis silent in that behalf when an appeal is pending beforethe Appellate Tribunal. It could well be said that whensection 254 confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedlygrants the power of doing all such acts, or employing suchmeans, as are essentially necessary to its executions andthat the statutory power carries with it the duty inproper cases to make such orders for staying proceeding aswill prevent the appeal if successful from being renderednugatory. 14. A certain apprehension may legitimatelyarise in the minds of the authorities administering theAct that, if the Appellate Tribunal proceed to stayrecovery of taxes or penalties payable by or imposed onthe assessee as a matter of course, the revenue will beput to grant loss because of the inordinate delay in thedisposal of appeals by the Appellate Tribunal. It isneedless to point out that the power of stay by theTribunal is not likely to be exercised in a routine way oras a matter of course in view of the special nature oftaxation and revenue laws. It will only be when a strongprima facie case is made out that the Tribunal willconsider whether to stay the recovery proceedings and onwhat conditions, and the stay will be granted in mostdeserving and appropriate cases where the Tribunal issatisfied that the entire purpose of the appeal will befrustrated or rendered nugatory by allowing the recoveryproceedings to continue during the pendency of theappeal.” 14. Therefore, the power under Clause (6) of Section 220 isindeed a discretionary one. However, it is one coupled with a duty tobe exercised judiciously and reasonably, based on relevant grounds.It should not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or based onmatters extraneous or irrelevant. The Income-tax Officer should applyhis mind to the facts and circumstances of the case relevant to theexercise of the discretion, in all its aspects. He has also toremember that he is not the final arbiter of the disputes involvedbut only the first amongst the statutory authorities. Questions offact and of law are open for decision before the two appellate authorities, both of whom possess plenary powers. In exercising hispower, the Income-tax Officer should not act as a mere tax-gathererbut as a quasi-judicial authority vested with the power of mitigatinghardship to the assessee. The Income-tax Officer should divorcehimself from his position as the authority who made the assessmentand consider the matter in all its facets, from the point of view ofthe assessee without at the same time sacrificing the interests ofthe Revenue. authorities, both of whom possess plenary powers. In exercising hispower, the Income-tax Officer should not act as a mere tax-gathererbut as a quasi-judicial authority vested with the power of mitigatinghardship to the assessee. The Income-tax Officer should divorcehimself from his position as the authority who made the assessmentand consider the matter in all its facets, from the point of view ofthe assessee without at the same time sacrificing the interests ofthe Revenue. 15. Coming to the case on hand, the first respondent, havingconsidered the facts and circumstances under which, the petitionerhas intentionally concealed the particulars of the income anddeliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, bygiving sufficient reasons in respect of the issues in dispute, viz.,adjustment on Arm’s length price, disallowance of loss on sale ofassets, etc., has granted partial stay of outstanding demand ofRs.5,00,00,000/- till 30.9.2015 or disposal of appeal whichever isearlier, but refused to grant in respect of entire outstanding demandof Rs.10,00,00,000/-. He has also specifically stated that any refundthat may arise to the assessee subsequently for any other assessmentyear would be adjusted against the said demand. On going through thesame, I am of the considered view that the first respondent hasrightly imposed the conditions while exercising his discretion in ajustifiable and reasonable manner, which does not warrantinterference. It is settled law that if the Tribunals or thefunctionaries appointed under the special Acts do not perform theirduties, they may be compelled by an appropriate writ to do so. Where,however, they are acting within the limits of the powers assigned tothem by the Legislature and have exercised their discretion in ajustifiable and reasonable manner, this Court will not sit injudgment over them and will not ordinarily interfere unless thediscretion has been exercised so capriciously or in such anoutrageous manner so as to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction ofthis Court. 16. Discretion has been defined as the freedom or authority tomake judgments and to act as one sees fit, i.e. to say free exerciseof power as regards the ability to choose from different ways toachieve a particular goal or result. Administrative discretion wouldmean choosing from various available alternatives but with referenceto rules of reasons and justice and not according to personal whims.Invariably, in all systems of jurisprudence, it is an accepted normthat the Court will not interfere with the action pursued by suchauthorities in exercise of their administrative discretion. Itcannot be expected of the Courts to have the time and competence tojudge each and every matter, let alone substitute its wisdom for thatof the authority concerned. The Courts, certainly will not allowdiscretionary power to assume the garb of arbitrary power. The Courts have to ensure that discretion is exercised strictly withinthe conditionalities laid down by the law while exercising suchdiscretion. 17. It is worthwhile to refer the observation regarding thesubject matter ‘discretion’ made in the decision reported in “”VatchaSreeramamurthy versus ITO reported in 1956 (30) ITR 252”, reads thus, “The scope of a discretionary power conferred on apublic authority is the subject matter of treatises anddecisions. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes,both edition, the following passage appears at page 239 : Courts have to ensure that discretion is exercised strictly withinthe conditionalities laid down by the law while exercising suchdiscretion. 17. It is worthwhile to refer the observation regarding thesubject matter ‘discretion’ made in the decision reported in “”VatchaSreeramamurthy versus ITO reported in 1956 (30) ITR 252”, reads thus, “The scope of a discretionary power conferred on apublic authority is the subject matter of treatises anddecisions. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes,both edition, the following passage appears at page 239 : "Statutes which authorise persons to do act for thebenefit of other, or as it is sometimes said for thepublic good or the advancement of justice, have oftengiven rise to controversy when conferring the authority interms simply enabling and not mandatory. In inaction thatthey may or shall if they think fit or shall have power.or that it shall be lawful for them to do such acts astatute appears to use the language of mere permission butit has been so often decided as to have become an axiomthat in such cases such cases such expression may have, tosay the least a composer force and so would seem to bemodified by judicial exposition." At page 248, the author deals with cases where thepower is qualified by express references to thedesecration of the authorised person. The author givesillustration of powers qualified by words "if they shouldso think fit", "if deemed advisable" and similar words andcomes to the conclusion that the power is limited by theduty. A summary of the mode of exercise of desecration isgiven at page 123 : "According to his discretion means, it has been said,according to the rules of reason and justice, not privateopinion, according to law and not humour; it is to be notarbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular; tobe exercised, not capriciously. But on judicial groundsand for substantial reasons. And it must be exercisedwithin the limits to which an honest man competent to thedischarge of his office ought to confine himself, that is,within the limits and for the objects intended by thelegislature. These dicta may be summed up in the statementof Lord Esher that the discretion must be exercisedwithout taking into account any reason which is not alegal one. If people who have to exercise a public duty byexercising their discretion take into account matterswhich the courts consider not to be proper for the guidance of their discretion, then in the eye of the lawthey have not exercised their discretion." The result of the aforesaid passages may be statedthus : The discretionary statutory power conferred upon anauthority for the public good is coupled with a duty toperform it under relevant circumstances. The fact that theexercise of the power is left to the discretion of theauthorised person does not exonerate him from discharginghis duty. If the discretionary power so conferred isexercised arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonable or bytaking into consideration extraneous and irrelevantconsideration, in the eye of law, the authority concernedmust be deemed not to have exercised the discretion atall, that is, he has not discharged his duty. If the Courton the facts placed before it comes to a definiteconclusion that a particular authority has not exercisedhis duty for one or other of the aforesaid reasons, itwill compel the authority to discharge his duty, or, toput it differently, to exercise his discretion honestlyand objectively. There is also an essential distinction between refusalto exercise the discretion and the manner of its exercise.If the authority fails to discharge his duty by refusingto exercise his discretion when facts calling for itsexercise exist, or, if he exercises discretion under thecircumstances mentioned above, which is not an exercise ofdesecration in law, the Court will compel him to do so. Ifthe authority concerned exercises his discretion honestlyand in the spirit of the statute, no mandamus will beissued directing him to exercise his discretion in aparticular way. See Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. v.Income-tax Officer, Ambala, Julius v. Bishop of Oxford,Allcroft v. Lord Bishop of London.” 18. In the above said decision, the assessee therein, had to filea writ petition because the realisation of the tax assessed had notbeen stayed during the pendency of an appeal before the Tribunal. Thecontroversy centred in that case mainly on the scope of thediscretionary power conferred by Section 45 of the Indian Income TaxAct, 1922, on the Income Tax Officer. It was held that a writpetition to compel the Income Tax Officer to exercise his discretionunder Section 45 or to exercise it honestly and objectively was notbarred. But on the merits the court declined issue a writ. ViswanathaSastri, J., in his separate judgment made the following observationsat p. 271: “Lastly it has to be observed that Section 45 of theIncome Tax Act is somewhat cryptic in its terms and merelygives the Income Tax Officer power to declare a person tobe not in default pending the appeal. There is noprovision for stay similar to Order 41, Rules 5 & 6 of theCivil Procedure Code. There is no conferment of an expresspower of granting a stay of realisation of the tax, thoughthe effect of an order in favour of the assessee underSection 45 of the Act is a stay. Nor is there a provisionfor allowing the tax to be paid in instalments or fortaking security for deferred payment. Neither theAppellate Assistant Commissioner nor the AppellateTribunal is given the power to stay the collection of tax.Whether the law should not be made more liberal so as toenable an assessee who has preferred an appeal, to obtainfrom the appellate forum, a stay of collection of the tax,either in whole or in part, on furnishing suitablesecurity, is a matter for the legislature to consider.” The above decision was also extracted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court inits decision reported in “ITO versus M.K.Mohammed Kunhi” reported inAIR 1969 SC 430. 19. Further, it is a settled principle of law that the writCourt is not certainly sitting in appeal over each and every orderpassed by the statutory authority. The task of the writ Court toexamine the decision-making process was found in the decisionreported in “State of UP versus Maharaja Dharmedar Prasad Singh”reported in AIR 1989 SC 997. The writ Court is averse to interferewith the acts and actions of the statutory authorities unless thoseare beyond jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. The Writ Courtwill certainly interfere if the impugned orders are contrary to theprinciples of natural justice causing effect manifest injustice.Unless those ingredients are present, the Writ Court will be slow tointerfere in the matter. 19. Further, it is a settled principle of law that the writCourt is not certainly sitting in appeal over each and every orderpassed by the statutory authority. The task of the writ Court toexamine the decision-making process was found in the decisionreported in “State of UP versus Maharaja Dharmedar Prasad Singh”reported in AIR 1989 SC 997. The writ Court is averse to interferewith the acts and actions of the statutory authorities unless thoseare beyond jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. The Writ Courtwill certainly interfere if the impugned orders are contrary to theprinciples of natural justice causing effect manifest injustice.Unless those ingredients are present, the Writ Court will be slow tointerfere in the matter. 20. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of theconsidered view that the first respondent has not exercisedarbitrarily or capriciously in order to upset the order passed by himby imposing conditions to pay Rs.5 crores while granting partial stayand that no reasonable grounds are made out to direct the respondentsto grant stay in respect of entire disputed outstanding demand or togrant injunction from taking coercive action in recovering the demandand hence, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that theentire purpose of the appeal will be frustrated or rendered nugatoryby allowing the recovery proceedings to continue during the pendencyof the appeal, cannot be accepted. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. Assistant Registrar(CO) True Copy Sub-Assistant Registrar To 1.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,Large Tax Payer Unit-II,1775, Jawaharlal Nehru Inner Ring Road,Anna Nagar, Western Extension,Chennai-600 101. 2. The Joint Commissioner of Income Tax,Large Tax Payer Unit-II,1775, Jawaharlal Nehru Inner Ring Road,Anna Nagar, Western Extension,Chennai-600 101. 3. The Commissioner of Income Tax,Large Tax Payer Unit-II,1775, Jawaharlal Nehru Inner Ring Road,Anna Nagar, Western Extension,Chennai-600 101. + 2 ccs to Mr.K.Harishankar, Advocate SR 9786 + 1 cc to Mr.T.PramodKumar Chopda, Sr.Standing Counsel for Income Tax, High Court, Madras SR 9679 gr(co)prk3/3