Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax 4 v. Hemalatha Rajan

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 20.07.2017 CORAM : The Hon'ble Ms.INDIRA BANERJEE, CHIEF JUSTICE AND The Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR Tax Case Appeal No.303 of 2017 Principal Commissioner of Income Tax 4,No.121, Nungambakkam High Road,Chennai-600 034. .. Appellant/Appellant Vs. Hemalatha Rajan.. Respondent/Respondent Tax Case Appeal is preferred under Section 260A of the IncomeTax Act, 1961 against the order of the Income Tax AppellateTribunal, Madras 'A' Bench, dated 30[th]November 2016 inITA No.02/Mds/2016 preferred against the Order dated 19.10.2015made in I.T.A.No.60/2013-14 on the file of the Commissioner ofIncome Tax (Appeals) Chennai filed against the Order dated30.07.2013 on the file of the Deputy Commissioner of Income TaxCompany vide-IV(1) Chennai for the Assessment year 2009-2010. For Appellant: Mr.Karthik Ranganathan The Hon'ble Chief Justice and M.Sundar, J. This is a Tax Case Appeal under Section 260A of the IncomeTax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'IT Act' for brevity). 2A thumbnail sketch of facts necessary for appreciatingthis order are set out infra under the caption 'Factual Matrix'. 3FACTUAL MATRIX : 3(a) The Income Tax Department, i.e., Principal Commissionerof Income Tax 4, No.121, Nungambakkam High Road, Chennai-600 034 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ For Appellant: Mr.Karthik Ranganathan The Hon'ble Chief Justice and M.Sundar, J. This is a Tax Case Appeal under Section 260A of the IncomeTax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'IT Act' for brevity). 2A thumbnail sketch of facts necessary for appreciatingthis order are set out infra under the caption 'Factual Matrix'. 3FACTUAL MATRIX : 3(a) The Income Tax Department, i.e., Principal Commissionerof Income Tax 4, No.121, Nungambakkam High Road, Chennai-600 034 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is the appellant before us. The appellant is hereinafterreferred to as 'Revenue' for the sake of clarity and convenience.3(b) Assessee, who is an individual, is the sole respondentbefore us. The respondent is referred to as 'Assessee' for thesake of clarity and convenience. The assessment year, which issubject matter of this appeal is 2009-10 and the same shallhereinafter be referred to as the 'said assessment year' forconvenience and clarity. 3(c) Assessee filed return of income for the said assessmentyear on 31.3.2010, declaring a total income of Rs.1,93,15,945/-.The return was processed under Section 143(1) of the IT Act on23.03.2011 and subsequently, the case was selected for scrutinyby issue of notice under Section 143(2) of the IT Act on20.8.2010. A detailed questionnaire was issued to the Assesseeon 28.6.2011. In response to the questionnaire and subsequentnotices issued from time to time, the authorised representativeof the Assessee appeared before the Assessing Officer(hereinafter referred to as 'AO' for brevity) from time to timeand submitted the details called for. On the basis of thedetails furnished, the assessment was completed. In theassessment order, a sum of Rs.3.82 crores was added by the AOunder Section 28(va) of the IT Act. This sum of Rs.3.82 Croreswas received by the Assessee from a Dutch company forrelinquishing her right to sue for damages. Assessee'scontention that this is a capital receipt was turned down andthe AO treated the same as revenue receipt.3(d) Thereafter, owing to the above said addition, separatepenalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the IT Act wereinitiated against the Assessee. In and by order dated 30.7.2013,the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Company Circle-IV(1),Chennai imposed a penalty of Rs.89,84,690/- being an amountequivalent to tax, which according to the said authority was thetax sought to be evaded by the Assessee by reason of the allegedconcealment of particulars of income. The order of penalty cameto be passed on the basis that the Assessee has concealed incomein the nature of 'success sharing bonus' to the tune ofRs.2,67,60,000/- being the money received by her from the Dutchcompany as aforesaid for giving up her right to sue for damages. 3(e) Aggrieved, Assessee preferred a statutory appealbefore the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-8, Chennai-600034 (hereinafter referred to as 'CIT(A)' for brevity). After adetailed hearing in the statutory appeal, the CIT(A), exercisinghis appellate powers under Section 250(6) of the IT Act allowedthe appeal and cancelled the penalty. CIT(A) came to theconclusion that there is no concealment and that the issue as towhether success sharing bonus is capital receipt or revenuereceipt is debatable. 3(f) Not satisfied with the decision of the CIT(A), Revenuefiled a statutory appeal before the Income Tax AppellateTribunal, “A” Bench, Chennai (hereinafter referred to as 'ITAT' 3(f) Not satisfied with the decision of the CIT(A), Revenuefiled a statutory appeal before the Income Tax AppellateTribunal, “A” Bench, Chennai (hereinafter referred to as 'ITAT' forbrevity).ThisappealbytheRevenueisI.T.A.No.02/Mds/2016. ITAT also came to the conclusion that theaforesaid issue is debatable, that there is no concealment ofincome and confirmed the above said order of CIT(A), wherein theCIT(A) has allowed the appeal and cancelled the penalty. 3(g) Not satisfied with the order of ITAT, Revenue haspreferred the instant appeal before us under Section 260A of theIT Act on two questions, which according to the Revenue aresubstantial questions of law. We shall deal with the said twoquestions in the later part of this judgment. 3(h) Before proceeding with the discussion of the case, thisbeing a thumbnail sketch of facts, we deem it appropriate toalso set out a detailed factual matrix with regard to how andthe circumstances under which the payment received from a Dutchcompany by the Assessee (which is the crux of the matter) arose. 4DETAILED FACTUAL MATRIX : 4(a) The Assessee is a Promoter Director and her spouse isthe Managing Director of a public limited company incorporatedin India in the name and style Ma Foi Management ConsultantsLtd. (hereinafter referred to as 'Ma Foi' for brevity). The saidcompany is providing Human Resource Services. It is the case ofAssessee that as part of its expansion strategy, the companyentered into a strategic alliance with a company based inNetherlands, which goes by name Vedior NV. Through an agreemententered with Vedior NV, Assessee sold 82.48% of the total equityshareholding of her company, i.e., Ma Foi to the said Vedior NV.In the agreement, it is not in dispute that there was a clause,which granted preemptive rights to the assessee to re-acquirethe shares of Ma Foi if and when Vedior NV wishes to sell outthe shares of Ma Foi to a third party. According to this clause,the Assessee was to be offered such shares at the prices atwhich any third party has expressed its readiness to purchase.Only if the Assessee is unable to purchase the share at thevalue stated therein within a period of thirty days from thedate of offer, the Netherlands based company, i.e., Vedior NV,will have the right to transfer such shares to a third party. 4(b) However, Vedior NV entered into a deal with anothercompany, being Randstad, wherein and whereby Vedior NV was takenover by Randstad. The acquisition by Randstad was acquisition ofVedior NV as a whole. Aggrieved by the action of Vedior NV, theAssessee issued a legal notice to Vedior NV, alleging that byvirtue of being taken over by Randstad, her shares (which weresold to Vedior NV) also stood transferred to Randstad. This,according to the Assessee, has violated and breached her rightof preemptive purchase of shares of Ma Foi. 4(c) In the said assessment year (i.e., 2009-10), there wasa settlement between Assessee and Randstad. In the settlement, Randstad offered to monetarily compensate the Assessee in a sumof Rupees one million Euro, if she withdraws the notice toVedior NV. The settlement fructified and Randstad paid off theAssessee for not proceeding further with the legal notice anddropping the intended proceedings. This payment made by Randstadto Assessee in Indian currency is Rs.2,67,60,000/-. Though theAssessee had received the said sum, she had not offered it forassessment as her income (revenue receipt) in her returns forthe said assessment year. Whether this is a capital receipt or arevenue receipt is the crux and gravamen of this case. We nowproceed to discuss the case under the caption 'Discussion' infra. 5DISCUSSION : Randstad offered to monetarily compensate the Assessee in a sumof Rupees one million Euro, if she withdraws the notice toVedior NV. The settlement fructified and Randstad paid off theAssessee for not proceeding further with the legal notice anddropping the intended proceedings. This payment made by Randstadto Assessee in Indian currency is Rs.2,67,60,000/-. Though theAssessee had received the said sum, she had not offered it forassessment as her income (revenue receipt) in her returns forthe said assessment year. Whether this is a capital receipt or arevenue receipt is the crux and gravamen of this case. We nowproceed to discuss the case under the caption 'Discussion' infra. 5DISCUSSION : 5(a) In proceedings under Sections 143(2) and 142(1) of theIT Act, the Assessee, in response to the notices, took the standthat the above said sum so received from Randstad is of capitalnature and therefore, not taxable under the IT Act as it is nota revenue receipt. Assessee contended that the said sum wasreceived by her on an agreement to refrain from endorsing hercontractual rights, namely, her right of first refusal quapurchase of Ma Foi shares. According to Assessee, this arisesout of a share purchase agreement, which was under breach andtherefore, the receipt is a capital receipt and not a revenuereceipt. The AO did not accept this argument and added theaforesaid sum to the returned income. Effectively, the AO addedRs.3.82 crores under Section 28(va) of the IT Act. 5(b) To be noted, with regard to tax on such addedcomponent, Assessee carried the same in appeal. During firstappellate proceedings, CIT(A) held that taxing the same underSection 28(va) of the IT Act is incorrect and changed the headof income. CIT(A) held it to be taxable under the head 'incomefrom other sources' and invoked the provisions of Section 56 ofthe IT Act. The matter was carried to ITAT. ITAT held againstthe appellant and treated the same as revenue receipt. Therelevant order of ITAT is dated 20.12.2012 made inI.T.A.No.1776/Mds/2012 and 1777/Mds/2012. Aggrieved by the orderof ITAT, the appellant / assessee preferred an appeal beforethis Court. This Court has admitted the appeal of the assesseevide Tax Case Appeal No.93 of 2013 (spouse K.Pandiarajan's caseon the same issue is T.C.A.No.92 of 2013). This court also hasgranted an interim stay with regard to recovery of tax arrears.That Tax Case Appeals are pending in this court. It is not indispute before us. 5(c) However, owing to the above said addition alleging thatthe same is willful concealment and non disclosure of income,separate penalty proceedings were initiated and penaltyequivalent to a sum of tax allegedly sought to be evaded waslevied. Such penalty was levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the IT Act as mentioned supra. This penalty component alone wasassailed by the Assessee before the CIT(A) successfully as setout supra. CIT(A), relying on the ratio in various reportedjudgments that a debatable issue cannot be the foundation forlevy of penalty, came to the conclusion that this is not a fitcase for imposition of penalty. 5(d) CIT(A) noticed that the issue whether it is a revenuereceipt or a capital receipt is res integra as the matter ispending in this Court. Besides this, CIT(A) also relied on adecision of ITAT in the case of Assessee's spouse where the samehas been put in issue. ITAT, in the case of Assessee's spousevide I.T.A.No.54/Mds/2015 dated 12.6.2015, had cancelled thepenalty levied on the same issue, observing that it is not adispute regarding disclosure of information relating to incomeas all relevant particulars pertaining the contentious receipthad been produced and that it was only a question whether totreat this as revenue receipt or capital receipt. 5(d) CIT(A) noticed that the issue whether it is a revenuereceipt or a capital receipt is res integra as the matter ispending in this Court. Besides this, CIT(A) also relied on adecision of ITAT in the case of Assessee's spouse where the samehas been put in issue. ITAT, in the case of Assessee's spousevide I.T.A.No.54/Mds/2015 dated 12.6.2015, had cancelled thepenalty levied on the same issue, observing that it is not adispute regarding disclosure of information relating to incomeas all relevant particulars pertaining the contentious receipthad been produced and that it was only a question whether totreat this as revenue receipt or capital receipt. 5(e) As stated supra, this was carried in appeal to the ITATby the Revenue. ITAT concurred with the finding returned by theCIT(A) and held that the issue is not clear and debatable asthis Court (Madras high Court) is in seizin of the matter inT.C.A.Nos.92 and 93 of 2013, which have been admittedly pendingand interim order granted therein is operating. 5(f) We, therefore, examined two perspectives of the matter.One perspective is, when a particular issue is debatable or whena particular matter is res integra and when Assessee takes aposition that is favourable to the Assessee, can that be treatedas concealment or non disclosure for the purpose of penaltyproceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the IT Act. To be noted,in the instant case, the issue is res integra in the Assessee'scase itself. The second perspective is considering the facts andcircumstances of the case, as also the trajectory it has takenin reaching this court from the AO via CIT(A) and ITAT, does anysubstantial question of law arise under Section 260A of the ITAct. 5(g) With regard to the first perspective, learned counselfor Revenue Mr.Karthik Ranganathan fairly submitted that thereis no dispute that the issue as to whether relevant paymentreceived by Assessee from the Dutch company towards giving upher right for right to sue for damages on account of breach isin the nature of 'success sharing bonus' and whether such'success sharing bonus' is to be treated as revenue receipt orcapital receipt is clearly res integra in T.C.A.Nos.92 and 93 of2013 in this Court. In other words, this court in in seizin ofthe matter. As a consequence, learned counsel for the Revenue isnot in a position to debate or dispute that the issue on the date of filing of the returns by the Assessee in the instantcase was clearly debatable. As the issue was debatable, Assesseehas taken the position that is favourable to her and treated thesame as capital receipt. Otherwise, there is no deliberateconcealment or non disclosure. 5(h) By a long catena of authorities, Courts have repeatedlyheld that for imposition of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) ofthe IT Act, 'mens rea' is most important. In other words, in aplethora of authorities, Courts have repeatedly held that in theabsense of mens rea on the part of Assessee to conceal theincome or deliberate non disclosure, penalty proceedings cannotbe initiated. To be noted, as far as tax component is concerned,the same has been levied and it is now the subject matter ofT.C.A.Nos.92 and 93 of 2013, which will be decided independentlyon the merits of the matter. 5(i) We further put it to the learned Standing Counsel forRevenue as to how he attempts to sustain penalty proceedingswhen it cannot be disputed that the lone issue which is the cruxof the matter is debatable. To this, learned Standing Counselfor Revenue replied by taking us through Section 275 of the ITAct. Learned Standing counsel for Revenue would submit thatthere is a cap qua time frame for imposing penalty, if theyawait the outcome of T.C.A.Nos.92 and 93 of 2013, it will becometoo late for them to impose the penalty and therefore, they havecommenced penalty proceedings and imposed penalty on theAssessee, though the issue is, indisputably, debatable. 5(i) We further put it to the learned Standing Counsel forRevenue as to how he attempts to sustain penalty proceedingswhen it cannot be disputed that the lone issue which is the cruxof the matter is debatable. To this, learned Standing Counselfor Revenue replied by taking us through Section 275 of the ITAct. Learned Standing counsel for Revenue would submit thatthere is a cap qua time frame for imposing penalty, if theyawait the outcome of T.C.A.Nos.92 and 93 of 2013, it will becometoo late for them to impose the penalty and therefore, they havecommenced penalty proceedings and imposed penalty on theAssessee, though the issue is, indisputably, debatable. 5(j) This submission, though attractive at first blush, on acloser scrutiny does not find favour with us. The reason is, thequestion before us is whether the conduct of the Assessee infiling returns in the instant case, is one that warrantsimposition of penalty owing to non disclosure / concealment.Assuming for a moment, if this court later returns a finding inthe above said Tax Case Appeal that the receipt in question fromthe Dutch company should be treated as revenue receipt and notas capital receipt, that would not in any manner lead to theconclusion that the Assessee is guilty of deliberate nondisclosure / deliberate concealment. That decision will onlyanswer the question as to whether the Assessee is liable to paytax or not. What is to be noted is, as on the date of filing ofthe return by the Assessee for the said assessment year in theinstant case, which is 31.3.2010, the issue is as to whether therelevant payment is revenue receipt or capital receipt wasclearly debatable and therefore, Assessee chose to take aposition which is favourable for her. This in our opinion doesnot in any manner qualify as deliberate non disclosure orconcealment. 5(k) We do not find any mens rea on the part of the Assesseequa concealment and non disclosure. Therefore, we have nohesitation in coming to the conclusion that this may not be acase which warrants penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c)of the IT Act. However, this being an appeal under Section 260Aof the IT Act, it can be entertained only on substantialquestions of law and not even on questions of law. What is'substantial question of law' for the purpose of Section 260A ofthe IT Act has been well elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Courtof India. 5(l) In M.Janardhana Rao Vs. Joint Commissioner of IncomeTax [2005 273 ITR 50 (SC) = (2005) 2 SCC 324], the Supreme Courtremanded to the High Court an appeal under Section 260A of ITAct since substantial questions of law were not framed at thetime of admission and were framed after the conclusion ofarguments. In doing so, it referred to the Apex Court judgmentin Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. vs Century Spg. & Mfg. Co.Ltd. to enumerate the principles regardingsubstantial question of law. Though Chunilal Mehta's case dealtwith Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India which providesfor certificate of appeal to be granted by the High Court, ifthe case involves a substantial question of law of generalimportance, it was cited by the Apex Court to enumerate theprinciples regarding the concept of ‘substantial question oflaw’. The same case was referred to by the Supreme Court in HeroVinoth Vs. Seshammal [(2006) 5 SCC 545] to lay down theprinciples regarding substantial question of law in an appealunder Section 100 of CPC. 5(m) With regard to 'substantial question of law', the testslaid down by the Supreme Court of India for finding out whethera given set of questions of law are mere questions of law orsubstantial questions of law is found in Hero Vinoth's casejudgment. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is found inparagraphs 21 to 23 of the said judgment, which read as follows :“21. The phrase “substantial question of law”,as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC isnot defined in the Code. The word substantial,as qualifying “question of law”, means—of havingsubstance, essential, real, of sound worth,important or considerable. It is to beunderstood as something in contradistinctionwith—technical, of no substance or consequence,or academic merely. However, it is clear thatthe legislature has chosen not to qualify thescope of “substantial question of law” bysuffixing the words “of general importance” ashas been done in many other provisions such asSection 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question oflaw on which a second appeal shall be heard neednot necessarily be a substantial question of lawof general importance. In Guran Ditta v. RamDitta [(1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172]the phrase “substantial question of law” as itwas employed in the last clause of the thenexisting Section 100 CPC (since omitted by theAmendment Act, 1973) came up for considerationand their Lordships held that it did not mean asubstantial question of general importance but asubstantial question of law which was involvedin the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3)SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314] the ConstitutionBench expressed agreement with the followingview taken by a Full Bench of the Madras HighCourt in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju[AIR 1951 Mad 969 : (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)] :(Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR1962 SC 1314] , SCR p. 557) “When a question of law is fairlyarguable, where there is room fordifference of opinion on it or where theCourt thought it necessary to deal withthat question at some length and discussalternative views, then the question wouldbe a substantial question of law. On theother hand if the question was practicallycovered by the decision of the highestcourt or if the general principles to beapplied in determining the question arewell settled and the only question was ofapplyingthoseprinciplestotheparticular fact of the case it would notbe a substantial question of law.” This Court laid down the following test asproper test, for determining whether a questionof law raised in the case is substantial: (SirChunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962SC 1314] , SCR pp. 557-58)“The proper test for determining whether aquestion of law raised in the case issubstantial would, in our opinion, bewhether it is of general public importanceor whether it directly and substantiallyaffects the rights of the parties and if sowhether it is either an open question inthe sense that it is not finally settled bythis Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free fromdifficulty or calls for discussion ofalternative views. If the question issettled by the highest court or the generalprinciples to be applied in determining thequestion are well settled and there is amere question of applying those principlesor that the plea raised is palpably absurdthe question would not be a substantialquestion of law.” 22. In Dy. Commr. v. Rama Krishna Narain [1954SCR 506 : AIR 1953 SC 521] also it was held thata question of law of importance to the partieswas a substantial question of law entitling theappellant to a certificate under (the then)Section 100 CPC. the Federal Court or is not free fromdifficulty or calls for discussion ofalternative views. If the question issettled by the highest court or the generalprinciples to be applied in determining thequestion are well settled and there is amere question of applying those principlesor that the plea raised is palpably absurdthe question would not be a substantialquestion of law.” 22. In Dy. Commr. v. Rama Krishna Narain [1954SCR 506 : AIR 1953 SC 521] also it was held thata question of law of importance to the partieswas a substantial question of law entitling theappellant to a certificate under (the then)Section 100 CPC. 23. To be “substantial” a question of law mustbe debatable, not previously settled by law ofthe land or a binding precedent, and must have amaterial bearing on the decision of the case, ifanswered either way, insofar as the rights ofthe parties before it are concerned. To be aquestion of law “involving in the case” theremust be first a foundation for it laid in thepleadings and the question should emerge fromthe sustainable findings of fact arrived at bycourt of facts and it must be necessary todecide that question of law for a just andproper decision of the case. An entirely newpoint raised for the first time before the HighCourt is not a question involved in the caseunless it goes to the root of the matter. Itwill, therefore, depend on the facts andcircumstance of each case whether a question oflaw is a substantial one and involved in thecase or not, the paramount overall considerationbeing the need for striking a judicious balancebetween the indispensable obligation to dojustice at all stages and impelling necessity ofavoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.(See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [(2001) 3 SCC 179] .) “ 5(n) Now, in the light of the above, we examine twoquestions on which the Revenue wants us to entertain thisappeal, which read as follows : “1.Whether on facts and circumstances of thecase the Appellate Tribunal was correct indeleting the penalty levied u/s.271(1)(c) of theAct?2.Whether on facts and circumstances of thecase the Appellate Tribunal was correct indeleting penalty on the ground that assessee'sTax Case Appeal is admitted by the Hon'ble HighCourt would give rise to the presumption that theissue is debatable?” 5(o) We applied the above tests and examined whether theyare mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. Asthere is nothing of substance, of purport or nothing that woulddecide the right of parties qua questions of law, we have nohesitation in holding that the two questions of law aspropounded by Revenue are not substantial questions of law atall. We are also of the view that they may not even qualify asquestions of law as the very language in which the questions arecouched would demonstrate that there is a huge factual elementbuilt into them. 5(p) Independent of the aforesaid two questions suggested bythe Revenue in the Memorandum of Appeal, we also applied ourmind to see if any substantial question of law arises in theinstant case. To our mind, there is none. Therefore, we have nohesitation in coming to the conclusion that no substantialquestion of law arises in the instant case. 6CONCLUSION : 6(a) Owing to all that have been stated supra, the instantcase is not fit enough to be entertained under Section 260A ofthe IT Act. More so, as no substantial question of law arises,the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7DECISION : 7(a) In the light of all that have been stated supra,particularly under the captions detailed factual matrix anddiscussion, the instant Tax Case Appeal No.303 of 2017 isdismissed. As we have not issued notice to the respondent, weare not examining the aspect of costs. Sd/- Asst.Registrar (CCC) vvk To 1. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 'A' Bench, Chennai. 'A' Bench, Chennai. 6CONCLUSION : 6(a) Owing to all that have been stated supra, the instantcase is not fit enough to be entertained under Section 260A ofthe IT Act. More so, as no substantial question of law arises,the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7DECISION : 7(a) In the light of all that have been stated supra,particularly under the captions detailed factual matrix anddiscussion, the instant Tax Case Appeal No.303 of 2017 isdismissed. As we have not issued notice to the respondent, weare not examining the aspect of costs. Sd/- Asst.Registrar (CCC) vvk To 1. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 'A' Bench, Chennai. 'A' Bench, Chennai. 2.The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals-8)Chennai. 3.The Deputy Commissioner & Income Tax,Company Circle IV (1)Chennai.Company Circle IV (1)Chennai. 4.The Income Tax Appellant TribunalC Bench, Chennai. +1cc to M/S.Karthik Rangarajan, Advocate Sr. 51140 T.C.A.No.303 of 2017 RSI(CO)VR(02/08/2017)