Reliance Is Placed On Full Bench Judgment Of The High Court Of Bombay Atgoa In The Matter Of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Reliance Is Placed On The Judgment Of The Hon'ble Supreme Court Dated 27March, 2009 Delivered In The Matter Of Commissioner Of Customs Andcentral Excise Versu

HIGH COURT OFCHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Tax Case (Income Tax Appeal) No.21 of 2007 Shri S. Rajeshwar Rao, counsel for theappellants in all the appeals andcounsel for therespondentin I.T.A. No.49^003. Shri Ashish Surana, counselfor the appellant in I.T.A. No.49/2003. Shri Rajendra Tripathi, counsel for the respondent in Tax Case (IncomeTaxAppeal)No.21/2007. Shri Neelabh Dubey.counsel for the respondent jn Tax Case (IncomeTaxAppeal) No.7/2006 and 8/2006. Divlsion Bench: Hon'bleShri Dhirendra Mishra &Hon'ble Shri R.N. Chandrakar, JJ. ORDER(Passed on|^"June,2009) The following order of the Court was passed by Dhirendra Mishra, J.1. The appellants herein have preferred these appeals under Section 260-A ofthe'income TaxAct, 1961 (in short 'the Act')along withseparate applications underSection 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay, as theseappeals have been preferred after the prescribed period of limitation of 120days from the date on which theorder appealed against was received by theappellants as provided under Section 260-A sub-section 2 ofthe Act. 2. ShriRajeshwara Rao, leamed counsel for the Revenue submitted that theIncome Tax Act, 1961 and the provisions of Sectipn 260-A are not complete'Cc-ae in itself.By virtue of sub-section (7) of section 260-A, provisions oftheCode of Civil Procedure relating to appeal are applicable to appeal underSection 260-A.Under Order 41Rule 3-A of the CPC.application forcondonation of delay, for condoning the delay inappeal is maintainable andthat procedure is applicable to appealunder section 260-A and, therefore, itcannot be said that Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act does notapply to appealsunder Section 260-A.Specific provisions have been made forcondonation ofdelay under Section 249 and 253 and application under Section 256(1 )oftheIT Act for cpndoning the delay authorizing such Authorities/Tribunals tocondone the delay only because these Authorities/Tribunals are not courts,however, no such provision has been made under section 256 (2) and 260 forcondoning the delay in filing applications/appeals to the High Court, as Section29(2) of the Limitation Act is attracted and, therefore, the Legislature did not feel it necessary to expressly provide for condonation of delay by the HighCourt.' ':::!'':.':• •^,, 4"...'•';,: ',' 3.Reliance is placed on Full Bench Judgment of the High Court of Bombay atGoa in the matter of Commissioner of Income Tax Versus VelingkarBrothers and inthe case ofCITVersusAnandilal Poddar &Sons Ltd., .4.On the other hand, Shri Neelabh Dubey Advocate appearing on behalfoftherespondents submitted that the Income Tax Act, 1961 is acomplete Code initself.It provides for all aspects relating to levy and recovery of Income Tax-,procedure therefor, remedies including appeals and revisions and penaltiesand prosecution.Section 260-A provides for an appeal to the hligh Court onsubstantial question of law.Sub-section 2(a) of Section260-Aprovides inmandatory form that the appeal shall be filed before the Tribunalwithin 120days and a longer period of limitation, already provided by the Legislature,impliedly excluded the applicability of Section 5of the Limitation Act.Learnedcounsel would submit that collection of revenue cannot brook delay and,therefore, the Legislature by providing the different period of limitation, which islonger than the period of limitation provided in Article 116of the LirR^on Actclearly indicates its intention in excluding application of Section 5 of theLimitationActbynecessaryimplication,He furthersubmittedthat thelegislature consciously omitted the provision relating to condonation of delay inappeal in the High Court as appeals are preferred in the High Court after thequestion in issue has already been considered by three forums. 5.Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 27March, 2009 delivered in the matter of Commissioner of Customs andCentral Excise Versus Nl/s Hongolndia (P) Ltd., and another in SLP(C)No.14467/2007.March, 2009 delivered in the matter of Commissioner of Customs andCentral Excise Versus Nl/s Hongolndia (P) Ltd., and another in SLP(C)No.14467/2007. 1 (2007) 209 CTR (Bom) (FB) 8: (2007) 289 ITR 382^ (Bom) (FB): (2007) 161 TAXMAN• 264 (Bom)(FB).....-(2005) 139 CTR(Cal) 539: (2005) 279 ITR 104 (Cal)(FB).....-(2005) 139 CTR(Cal) 539: (2005) 279 ITR 104 (Cal) 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7.Chapter-XX of theAct deals with appeals and revisions.Section 249(1)provides for form of appeal.Sub-section (2) of Section 249 provides forlimitation of 30 days in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).Sub-section (3) empowers the Commissioner (Appeals) to admit the appealaftc;-expiration of the said period if he issatisfied that the appellant hadsufficient cause for not presenting it within the period.Section 253 deals withappeals to the Appellate Tribunal.Sub-section (3) of Section 253 provides forlimitation of 60 days from the date on which the order sought to be appealedagainstis communicated to the assessee or to the Commissioner, as the casemay be.forfilingappealbeforetheAppellateTribunal.Undersub-section (5),theAppellateTribunalmayadmittheappealorpermitthe filingofmemorandum of cross objection after expiry of the relevant period if he issatisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within the period.Section 255 (1) lays down the procedure to be followed by the AppellateTribunal whereas, Section260-A deals with appeals to the High Court, whichreads as under-provides for form of appeal.Sub-section (2) of Section 249 provides forlimitation of 30 days in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).Sub-section (3) empowers the Commissioner (Appeals) to admit the appealaftc;-expiration of the said period if he issatisfied that the appellant hadsufficient cause for not presenting it within the period.Section 253 deals withappeals to the Appellate Tribunal.Sub-section (3) of Section 253 provides forlimitation of 60 days from the date on which the order sought to be appealedagainstis communicated to the assessee or to the Commissioner, as the casemay be.forfilingappealbeforetheAppellateTribunal.Undersub-section (5),theAppellateTribunalmayadmittheappealorpermitthe filingofmemorandum of cross objection after expiry of the relevant period if he issatisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within the period.Section 255 (1) lays down the procedure to be followed by the AppellateTribunal whereas, Section260-A deals with appeals to the High Court, whichreads as under- "260A.(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court fromevery order passed in appeal by theAppellate Tribunal,[before[the][ dateof][ establishment][ of][ theNational][ Tax]Tribunal] if the High Court is satisfied that the caseinvolyes a substantial question of law.(2) The Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner or anassesseeaggrievedbyanyorderpassedbytheAppellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Courtandsuch appeal underthis sub-section shall be-(a) filed within one hundred and twenty days from thedate on which the order appealed against is received bytheassesseeortheChiefCommissionerorCommissioner;(b) Omitted by the Finance Act, 1999, w.e.f. 1-6-1999. 't^',.. (c) in the formofa memorandum of appeal preciselystating thereiri thesubstantial question of lawlmolved.(3)Whether the High Court issatisfied that a substantialquestionof law is involved in any case, it shall formulatethat question. 't^',.. (c) in the formofa memorandum of appeal preciselystating thereiri thesubstantial question of lawlmolved.(3)Whether the High Court issatisfied that a substantialquestionof law is involved in any case, it shall formulatethat question. (4)The appealshall beheard only on the question soformulated, and the respondents shall.at the hearing ofthe appeal, be allowed toargue that thecase does notinvolvesuch question:Provided that nothinginthissub-sectionshallbx.-?deemed to take away or abridge the power of the courtto hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeat on anyother substantialquestionoflaw not formulated by it, ifitis satisfied that the case involves such question.(5) The High Court shall decide the question of lawformulatedanddeliveredsuchjudgmentthereoncontainingthegroundsonwhichsuchdecisionisfounded and mayaward such costas itdeemsfit.(6) The High Court may determine any issue which -(a) hasnot been determined by theAppellate Tribunal;'!or •;.'.:,•(b)hasbeen wrongly determinedby the AppellateTribunal by reasonof a decision on such question of laifras is referred to in sub-section (1).(7)[Save][ aSiOtherwise]provided[in][ this][ Act,the]provisionsofthe Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908 (5 of1908), relatingto appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be,applying the caseofappeals underthis section. ^ 8. Sub-section (1) provides for appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunalto the High Court provided that the High Court is satisfied that the caseinvolves substantial question of law.Sub-section (2) provides that the appealis to be fjled within 120 days from the date on which the orderappealed againstis received by the assessee or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, asthe case may be. Sub-section (3) stipulates that the High Court, if satisfied,may formulate substantial question of law involved in any case and the appeal is to be heard and decided only on question so formulated.Sub-section (7) (7)makes the provisions of CPC, 1908, relating to appeals to the High Court,applicable jncaseof appeal under this section only whereit is not otherwiseprovided in the Act.makes the provisions of CPC, 1908, relating to appeals to the High Court,applicable jncaseof appeal under this section only whereit is not otherwiseprovided in the Act. Sub-section (7) (7) 9,-ln view of the specific provisions ofthe Act, as detailed hereinabove, questionfo^sur consideration is -whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable inrespect of appeal filed under Section 260-A of the Act? ls^ShriRajeshwaraRao,learnedcounselfortheappellants,c6ntendedthatintheabsence of any specific prohibition in the Act for condoning the delay,particularly, in Section 260-A of the Act, Section29(2) of. the Limitation Act isapplicable.He further argued that sub-section (7)ofSection 260-A specificallymakes the provisions of CPC in relation to appeal before the High Courtapplicableand, therefore, as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 3-A of theCPC the High Court is empowered to entertain and decide any application forcc'ridonation of delay in filing the appeal. 11. In the matter of Velingkar Brothers (Supra),the question['whether]Section 5of the Limitation Act, 1963shall apply in case of an appeal filed under Section260-A of the ITAct, 1961' was referred by the Division Bench to a LargerBench for adjudication.Answering the reference in affirmative, the full Benchof the Bombay High Court held thus:- "Sec.260A itself provides that the provisions of the CPCrelating to appeals, as far as possible, are applicable tothe appeals under S.260A.It would mean that S.260A isnot exhaustiveof all the facets, a'spects'and matterswithregard to the appeals under S.260A.It seems that thelegislature did not intend to make the provision of S.260Awatertight. Theexdusipn ofthe provisions of ss.4 to 24of the Limitation Act as provided ins.29(2) cannot belightly inferred. Impliedexclusion is not readily inferred.That the legislature has used thewords'shall be filed' in "Sec.260A itself provides that the provisions of the CPCrelating to appeals, as far as possible, are applicable tothe appeals under S.260A.It would mean that S.260A isnot exhaustiveof all the facets, a'spects'and matterswithregard to the appeals under S.260A.It seems that thelegislature did not intend to make the provision of S.260Awatertight. Theexdusipn ofthe provisions of ss.4 to 24of the Limitation Act as provided ins.29(2) cannot belightly inferred. Impliedexclusion is not readily inferred.That the legislature has used thewords'shall be filed' in sub-s.(2) means that the limitation for filing tl^e appeal isas provided therein but that does not make s.29(2) of theLimitation Act, 1963 inapplicable. The High Court beingthe superior Court, the power tocondone the delay infilingthe appeal must be read to be existent, more so byvirtue of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act, unless there isclear indication of its exclusion byimplication.The useoftheword 'shall' andthe longer period oflimitation (120days) are not indicators of Such exclusion.Nor from thepositionthatS.260Aissilent aboutapplicability of-^s.29(2),any justifiableinferencecanbedrawn forinapplicabilityofthat provision.Whatis obvious neednot be statedand, therefore,legislaturemay havethoughtfitthatitwasnotnecessarytoexpressspecificallyabout thepower of theHighCourt tocondone the delay in viewofexistence ofs.29(2). Whenthe statuteis silent, the presumptionisnot drawnautomatically about the exclusion ofs.29(2) or for thatmatter s.5 of the Limitation Act.There is nothing toindicate that the application of s.29(2) is excluded exceptprovidingaspeciallimitation.Sec.260Adoesnotnecessarily imply the exclusion of ss.4 to 24 of theLimitation Act.Therefore, s.5 of the Limitation Act is~applicable incase ofthe appeals filed under S.260A." ^ 12.1nthe matter ofAnandiIal Poddar & Sons Ltd. (Supra) also, the Calcutta HighrCourt, while considering applicability of LimitationAct in appeal before the HighCourt under Section 260A of the IT Act, held that though Section 260A of the ITAct expressly provides for a period of limitation for preferring an appeal to theHigh Court, the same does not implythat the applicationofss.4to[24ofthe]Limitation Act is excluded.In order to exclude the application of ss.4 to 24within the meaningofs.29of the Limitation Act, the necessary exclusion mustbe express andsuch express exclusionis to be inferred bynecessaryimplication from the statute itself.The Court is not supposed to presumeexdusion on account of thestatute being silent in that aspect.It cannot be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in respect of appealpreferred under Section 260A. l3.The Supreme Court in the matter of M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., and another(Supra),while dealing with question 'whether the High Court in the referenceapplication underSection 35H(1) of the unamended Act, has power underScsdion 5of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay beyond the periodprescribed under the main statute i.e. Central Excise Act', held that the High, Court has no power to condone the delayin filing the 'reference application"filed by the Commissioner under unamended Section 351-1(1) of the CentralExcise Act, 1944 beyond the period of 180days. 14. Shri Neelabh Dubey, learned counsel appearing forthe respondents submittedthatthough the judgment inthe matter of M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., andanother(Supra) is in relation to reference under Section 35M(1) ofthe CentralExcise Act, but the relevant provisions under Chapter XX of the Act is parirrateria to the provisions of appealunder Chapter VI-A of the Central ExciseAct, 1944, therefore, ratioof law laid downin ftfl/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., andanothershall applyto anyappeal under Section 260A of theAct also. 14. Shri Neelabh Dubey, learned counsel appearing forthe respondents submittedthatthough the judgment inthe matter of M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., andanother(Supra) is in relation to reference under Section 35M(1) ofthe CentralExcise Act, but the relevant provisions under Chapter XX of the Act is parirrateria to the provisions of appealunder Chapter VI-A of the Central ExciseAct, 1944, therefore, ratioof law laid downin ftfl/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., andanothershall applyto anyappeal under Section 260A of theAct also. 15.8efore appreciating'theaboveargumentoflearnedcounselfortherespondents, we propose to examine the provisions relatingto appeals underGhapter VI-Aof the Central Excise Act. As per Section 35, against any orderpassed by the Central Excise Officer, appeal liesto the Commissioner ofCentral Excise (Appeals).Theappeal is to be preferred within 60 days fromthe date of communication ofsuch decision to theaggrieved party. Proviso tosub-section(l) enables the Commissioner (Appeals) toallowit toberepresented within a further period of 30 days if he is satisfied that theappellantwas prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal withinthe aforesaid period of 60 days. Any person aggrieved by the decisions/orders of the Commissioner of Central Excise or the Commjssipner (Appeals) mayprefer anappeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 3 months Trom the date onwhich theorder appealed is communicated to the aggrieved party, Sub-section(5) enables the Tribunal to condone the delay even beyond the prescribedperiod provided there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within thatperiod.Under Section 35EE, revision lies to the Central Government.Undersub-section (2), application under sub-section (1) is to be made withinS-'l'months from the date of communication.Proviso to sub-section (2) enablesthe revisional authority to condone the delay for a further period of 90 days.Unamended Section 35-G provides for appeal to the High Court.Sub-section2(a) enables the aggrieved person to filean appeal to the High Court within180 days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by theaggrieved party. There is no provision to condone the delay in filing the appealbeyond prescribed period of 180 days.Unamended Section 35H provides forreferenceapplicationtotheHighCourt.Undersub-section(1),theCommissioner of Central Excise or other party within a period of 180 days ofthe date on which he is served with notice of an order under Section 3C 'v<lirectthe Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising from suchorder ofthe Tribunal. Application for referenceis to be madeto the High Courtwithin 180 days and there is no provision to extend the period of limitation forfiling application to the High Court beyond the said period and condone thedelay. l6.Afterclosescrutiny ofthe provisions contained in ChapterVI-A ofthe CentralExcise Act, 1944, we find substance insubmission of learned counsel for theappellants that the provisionscontained in ChapterVI-A ofthe Centrat ExciseAct, 1944, which deals with appeal, \s panmateriato the provisions containedin Chapter XX of the Act,which also dealswith appeals and revisions undertheITAct.Excise Act, 1944, we find substance insubmission of learned counsel for theappellants that the provisionscontained in ChapterVI-A ofthe Centrat ExciseAct, 1944, which deals with appeal, \s panmateriato the provisions containedin Chapter XX of the Act,which also dealswith appeals and revisions undertheITAct. 17. Inthematter of AhmedabadPvt.Primary Teachers'Assn. VersusAdministrative Officer and others , the question before the Hon'ble SupremeCourt was interpretation of definition of "Employee" as contained in Section2(e) of the Paymentof Gratuity Act, 1972.Interpreting the definition of'Employee' with the external aid of statutes in pari materia, the Hon'bleSupreme Court observed thus:- 17. Inthematter of AhmedabadPvt.Primary Teachers'Assn. VersusAdministrative Officer and others , the question before the Hon'ble SupremeCourt was interpretation of definition of "Employee" as contained in Section2(e) of the Paymentof Gratuity Act, 1972.Interpreting the definition of'Employee' with the external aid of statutes in pari materia, the Hon'bleSupreme Court observed thus:- "12. We have critically examined the definition clause inthe light of the arguments advanced on either side andhave eompared it with the definitions given in otherlabour enactments.On the doctrineof "pari materia",reference to other statutes dealing with the same subjector forming part of the samesystem is a permissible aid tothe construction of provisions in a statute.See thefollowingobservationscontainedinPrinciplesofStatutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh (8th Edn.), Syn.4,atpp.235 to 239:"Statutes in pari materia It hasalready been seen thata statute must beread as a whole as words are to be understood in theircontext.Extension of this rule of context permitsreference to other statutes in pari materia i.e. statutesdealing with the same subject-matter or forming part ofthe same system.Viscount Simonds in a passagealready noticed conceived it to be a right and duty toconstrueevery word of a statute in its context and heused the word context in its widest sense including 'otherstatutes in pari materia',As stated by Lord Mansfield'where there are differentstatutes inpari materia thoughmade at different times,or even expired,andnotreferringtoeachother,theyshallbetakenandconstrued together, as one system and asexplanatory ofeach other". The application of this rule of construi.ction has themerit of avoiding any apparent contradiction between aseriesofstatutesdealing withthe same subject;it allowsthe use of an earlier statute to throwlight on the meaningofaphrase used in a laterstatute inthe samecontext; itpermits the raisingofa presumption, in the absenceofanycontextindicating a contrary intention, thatthe samemeaning attachesto the same wordsin a laterstatute asin an earlier statute if the words are used in similarconnection inthe twostatutes; and it enables the use 6falaterstatute asparliamentaryexpositionof themeaningofambiguousexpressionsinanearlier,statute."". 18.1n the matter of Sirsilk Ltd. Versus Textiles Committee and others , the1-lon'bleSupreme Court while considering asto what statutes are considered tobe in pari maten'a,referred to "Statutes and Statutory Construction" bySutherland thus:- "Statutes are considered to be in pari materia to pertainto the same subject-matter when they relate to the sameperson[or][ things,][ or][ to][ the][ same][ class][ of]persons[or]thing,orhave the same purpose or object. {StatutesandStatutory Consfrocf/on, Vol.2, p.535, 3rd edn.)" 19.1n the matter of J.K. Steel Ltd., Versus tlnion of India and others, thcHon'ble Supreme Court, while considering pari materia provisions of CentralExcises and Salt Act (1944), Sch.l.ltem 26AA-TariffAct(1934), Sch.l entry63 (36), held in paragraph-29 of the judgment that Acts being in pari materiamust be taken together as forming one code and as interpreting and enforcingeach other.In para-26 ofthe above judgment, referringto its earlier judgmentinthe matterof C.A. Abraham V. I.T.O., Kottayam{AIR1961 SC609},itwasobserved that['ln]interpreting a fiscal statute the Courtcannot proceed to make good deficiencies if there may beany; ttie Court must interpret the statute asitstands and in case of doubt in a manner favourable to the tax payer."20. The Hon'bleSupreme Court after elaborately dealing with the above provisionsofthe Central Excise Act in detail has negated the argument based on Section29(2) of the Limitation Act that in absence of any express exclusion of thepr6'visions of Limitation Act in any special law ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Actwould be applicable, Ithas been observed thus: good deficiencies if there may beany; ttie Court must interpret the statute asitstands and in case of doubt in a manner favourable to the tax payer."20. The Hon'bleSupreme Court after elaborately dealing with the above provisionsofthe Central Excise Act in detail has negated the argument based on Section29(2) of the Limitation Act that in absence of any express exclusion of thepr6'visions of Limitation Act in any special law ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Actwould be applicable, Ithas been observed thus: "In this regard, we have tosee the schemeof the speciallaw here in this case is Central Excise Act. The nature ofthe remedy provided thereinare such that the legislatureintended it to be a complete Code by itself which aloneshould govern the severalmatters provided by it.If, onan examination of therelevant provisions, it is clear thatthe provisions ofthe Limitation Act are necessarilyexcluded, then the benefitsconferred therein cannot becalled in aid to supplement the provisionsof the Act.Inour considered view, that even in a case where thespecial law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4to 24 of the Limitation Act by an expressreference, itwould nonetheless be open to the court to examinewhether andto whatextent,thenatureof thoseprovisions or thenature of thesubject-matter andscheme of the special law exclude their operation.Inother words, the applicability of the provisions of theLimitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the termsof the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the CentralExcise Act relating to filing of reference application totheHigh Court. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1 944support the conclusion that the time limit prescribedunderSection 351-1(1) to make a reference to High Courtjs absolute and unextendable by courtunderSection 5ofthe Limitation Act.It is well settledlaw that it is the dutyof the court to respect the legislative intent and by givingliberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended byinvoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act." 2l.Wehavealready reproduced the relevant provisionsip^-the Income Tax Actcontained in Chapter XX,which relates toappeals and reyisions. We have alsopointed out the salient features of the provisions under Chapter VI-A, whichdeals with appeals under the Central Excise Act.Both the acts have beenenacted by the Central Legislature.The Central Excise Act wasenacted toconsolidate andamend thelaw relating to central dutieson excisewhereas,the Income Tax Act, 1961 was enacted to consolidate and amend the lawrelating to income tax and super tax.Both the acts are periodically amendedthrough Finance Act to give effect to the finandal proposals of the C?ntralGovernment for the relevant financlal yearsand thus have the same purposeand object.Therefore, on the doctrine of "pari matena", reference to CentralExcise Act is a permissible aid to theconstruction of provisions of the Act. 22. As far as the arguments advanced by Shri Rajeshwara Rao, learned counselfor the appellants herein basedon judgmentofFull Bench ofthe BombayHigh Court that sub-section (7) of Section 260A of the Act makes the provisionsof CPC applicable in relation to appeal to the High Court and, therefore, theIncome TaxAct is not a complete Code isconcerned, fromperusal of sub-section (9) of Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, we find that the same isexactly identical assub-section (7) of Section 260A ofthe Act. 23. In the matter of Ravulu Subba Rao and others Versus Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Madras , in paragraph-IOit has been held thatthe Courts musttherefore construe the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act asforming acode complete in itself and exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein, andascertain what their true scope is.In paragraph-16, it has been further heldthus: "To sum up, the Indian.lncome Tax Act is a selfcontained code exhaustive of the matters dealt withAIR1956SC604 Barve 23. In the matter of Ravulu Subba Rao and others Versus Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Madras , in paragraph-IOit has been held thatthe Courts musttherefore construe the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act asforming acode complete in itself and exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein, andascertain what their true scope is.In paragraph-16, it has been further heldthus: "To sum up, the Indian.lncome Tax Act is a selfcontained code exhaustive of the matters dealt withAIR1956SC604 Barve therein and its provisions show an intention to departfrom the common rule, quifacit peralium facitperse. Itsintentionagainis that a firmshould be given benefit ofS.23(5)(a),onlyif itisregistered underS.26-Ainaccordance with the conditions laid down in that sectionand the rules framed thereunder.And as those rulesrequire the application to be signed by thepartner inperson, the signature by an agent onhis behalf isinvalid." -24. Thus, relying upon principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inthe matter of IVI/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., and another (Supra), we hold that theIncome TaxAct, 1961 is a special law.The nature of the remedy providedtherein are such thatthe legislature intended it to be a complete code by itselfwhich alone should govern the several matters provided by it. The scheme ofthe Income Tax Act, 1961,supportthe conclusion that time limit prescribedunder Section 260A to file an appeal before the High Court is absolute andunextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the limitationcannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the LimitationAct. 25. Since all the appeals herein have been preferredbeyond the prescribed periodof 120 days under Section260A of the Act, the same are dismissed on theground of limitation.Noordersas to costs.Sd/-Sd/-DhirendraR.N. Chandrakar MishraJudgeJudge