Reliance Is Placed On Full Bench Judgment Of The High Courtof Bombay Atgoa In The Matter Of Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Velingkarbrothers And In Thecase Of Cit Versus Anandilalpoddar & Sons Ltd.,2

^ HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH ATBILASPURTax Case (Income Tax Appeal) No.21 of 2007 Shri S. Rajeshwar Rao, counsel for the appellants in all the appeals andcounsel forthe respondent in I.T.A. No.49/2003. Shri Ashish Surana, counselfor the appellantin I.T.A. No.49/2003. Shri Rajendra Tripathi, eounsel for the respondent in Tax Case (IncdmeTaxAppeal)No.21/2007. Shri Neelabh Dubey, counsel for the respondent in Tax Case (IncomeTax Appeal) No. 7/2006 and 8/2006. Diylsion BencA: Hon'ble Shri Dhirendra MishraSHon'ble Shri R.N. Chandrakar, JJ. OR D E R(Passed[on]|^T''June,2009) The followingorderof the Court was passed by Dhirendra Mishra, J.1.The appellants herein have preferred these appeals under Section 260-A oftheIncome Tax Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act') along with separate applications underSection 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay, as theseappeals have been preferred after the prescribed periodof limitation of 120days from the date on which the orderappealed againstwas received by theappellants asprovided under Section 260-A sub-section 2 oftheAct. 2. Shri Rajeshwara Rao, learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that theIncome Tax Act, 1961 and the provisions of Section 260-A are not completeCode in itself.By virtue of sub-section (7) of section 260-A, provisions of theCode of Civil Procedure relating to appeal are applicable to appeal underSection260-A.Under Order41Rule3-Aof theCPC,application forcondonationof delay, for condoning the delay in appeal is maintainable andthat procedure is applicable to appeal under section 260-A and, therefore, itcannot besaid that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to appealsunder Section 260-A.Specific provisions have been made for condonation ofdelay under Section 249 and 253 and application underSection 256(1)0ftheIT Act for condoning the delay authorizing such Authorities/Tribunals tocondone the delay only because these Authorities/Tribunals are not courts,however, nosuch provision has been made under section 256 (2) and 260 forcondoning the delay in filingapplications/appeals to the High Court, as Section29(2) ofthe Limitation Act is attracted and, therefore, the Legislature did not feel it necessaryto expressly provide for condonation ofdelay by the High'Court.;'••:;'.;' '! 3.Reliance is placed on Full Bench Judgment of the High Courtof Bombay atGoa in the matter of Commissioner of Income Tax Versus VelingkarBrothers and in thecase of CIT Versus AnandilalPoddar & Sons Ltd.,2. 4.On the other hand, Shri Neelabh Dubey Advocate appearing on behalf of therespondents submitted that the Income Tax Act, 1961 is a complete Code initself.It providesfor all aspects relating to levy and recovery of Income Tax,procedure therefor, remedies including appeals and revisions and penalti&sand prosecution.Section 260-A provides for an appeal to the High Court onsubstantial question of law.Sub-section 2(a) of Section 260-Aprovidesinmandatory form that the appeal shall be filed before the Tribunal within 120days and a longer period of limitation, already provided by the Legislature,impliedly excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.Learnedcounsel would submit that collection of revenue cannot brook delay and,therefore, the Legislature by providing the different period of limitation, which islongerthan the period oflimitation providedin Article 116ofthe Limitation Actclearly indicates its intention in excluding application of Section 5of theLimitationActbynecessaryimplication.He furthersubmittedthat thelegislature consciously omitted the provision relating to condonation of delay inappeal in the High Court as appeals are preferred in the High Court afterthequestion in issue has already been considered by three forums. 5.Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'bleSupreme Court dated27March, 2009 delivered in the matter of Commissioner of Customs andCentral Excise Versus M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., and another in SLP(C)No. 14467/2007.March, 2009 delivered in the matter of Commissioner of Customs andCentral Excise Versus M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., and another in SLP(C)No. 14467/2007. 1 (2007) 209 CTR (Bom) (FB) 8: (2007) 289 ITR 382 (Bom) (FB): (2007) 161 TAXMAN 26.4 (Bom)^FBL..(2005) .„„ 199 CTR„„ (Cal).„_,.„„,„„„,„„, 539: (2005) 279 ITR 104„. (Cal) ^... (2007) 209 CTR (Bom) (FB) 8: (2007) 289 ITR 382 (Bom) (FB): (2007) 161 TAXMAN 26.4 (Bom)^FBL..(2005) .„„ 199 CTR„„ (Cal).„_,.„„,„„„,„„, 539: (2005) 279 ITR 104„. (Cal) ^... 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7.Chapter-XX of the Act deals withappeals and revisions.Section 249(1)provides for form of appeal.Sub-section (2) of Section 249 provides forlimitation of 30 days in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).Sub-section (3) empowers the Commissioner(Appeals) to admit the appealafter expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant hadprovides for form of appeal.Sub-section (2) of Section 249 provides forlimitation of 30 days in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).Sub-section (3) empowers the Commissioner(Appeals) to admit the appealafter expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant hadsufficient cause for not presenting it within the period.Section 253 deals withappeals to the Appellate Tribunal.Sub-section (3) of Section253 provides forlimitation of 60 days from the date on which the order soughtto be appealedagainst is communicated to theassessee or to theCommissioner, as the caseappeals to the Appellate Tribunal.Sub-section (3) of Section253 provides forlimitation of 60 days from the date on which the order soughtto be appealedagainst is communicated to theassessee or to theCommissioner, as the casemay be, for filing appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.Under sub-section (5),theAppellateTribunalmayadmittheappealorpermitthefilingofmemorandum of cross objection after expiry of the relevant period if he issatisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting itwithin the period.Section 255 (1) lays down the procedure to be followed by the AppellateTribunal whereas.Section 260-A deals with appeals to the High Court.whichreads asunder:-theAppellateTribunalmayadmittheappealorpermitthefilingofmemorandum of cross objection after expiry of the relevant period if he issatisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting itwithin the period.Section 255 (1) lays down the procedure to be followed by the AppellateTribunal whereas.Section 260-A deals with appeals to the High Court.whichreads asunder:- "260A.(1)An appeal shall lie to the High Court fromevery order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal,[before the date of establishment of the National TaxTribunal] if the High Court is satisfied that thecaseinvolves a substantial question of law.(2) The Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner or anassesseeaggrievedbyanyorderpassedbytheAppellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Courtand such appeal underthis sub-section shall be-(a)[filed][ within][ one][ hundred][ and][ twenty][ days][ from][ the]date on which the order appealed against is received bytheassesseeorttieChiefCommissionerorCommissioner;(b) Omitted bythe FinanceAct, 1999, w.e.f. 1-6-1999. (c) in the form of a memorandum of appeal predselystating therein the substantial question of law invplved.(3) Whetherthe High Court issatisfied that a substantialquestion of taw is involved in any case, it shall formulatethat question. (4) The appeal shatl be heard onlyon the question soformulated, andthe respondents shall, at the hearing ofthe appeal, be allowed to argue that thecase does notinvolve such question: (c) in the form of a memorandum of appeal predselystating therein the substantial question of law invplved.(3) Whetherthe High Court issatisfied that a substantialquestion of taw is involved in any case, it shall formulatethat question. (4) The appeal shatl be heard onlyon the question soformulated, andthe respondents shall, at the hearing ofthe appeal, be allowed to argue that thecase does notinvolve such question: Provided that nothinginthis sub-sectionshallbedeemed to take away or abridge ttie power of the courtto hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on anyother substantial question oflaw not formulated by it, if itis satisfied thatthe case involves such question.(5) The High Courtshall decide the question of lawformulatedanddeliveredsuchjudgmentthereoncontainingthegroundsonwhichsuchdecisionisfounded and may award such costas it deems fit.(6) The High Court may determine any issuewhich -(a)has not been determined by the Appellate Tribunal;or '•':.;,,,..(b)hasbeen wrongly determinedby the AppellateTribunal by reasonof a decisionon such question oflawas is referredto in sub-section (1)., (7)[Save][ as][ otherwise]provided[inthis][ Act.the]provisions[ i]of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relatingto appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be,applying the caseofappeals underthis section. 8. Sub-section (1) provides for appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunalto the High Court provided that the High Court issatisfied fhat the caseinvolvessubstantial question of law.Sub-section (2) provides that the appealis to be filed within 120 days from the date on which the order appealed againstis received by the assessee or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, asthe case may be. Sub-section (3) stipulatesthatthe High Court,if satisfied,may formutate substantial question of law involvedin any case and the appeal t-1 is to be heard and decided only on question so formulated.Sub-seetion (7)makes the provisions of CPC, 1908, relating to appeals to the High Court,applicable in case of appeal under thissection only where it is not otherwiseprovided in the Act.makes the provisions of CPC, 1908, relating to appeals to the High Court,applicable in case of appeal under thissection only where it is not otherwiseprovided in the Act. 9.In view of thespecific provisions oftheAct, as detailed hereinabove, questionfor our consideration is -whether Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act is applicable inrespect of appeal filed under Section 260-A of the Act?10. Shri Rajeshwara Rao, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that in theabsence of any specific prohibition in the Act for condoning the delay,particularly.in Section 260-A of the Act, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act isapplicable.He further argued that sub-section (7) of Section 260-A specificallymakes the provisions ofCPC in relation to appeal before the High Courtapplicable and, therefore, as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 3-A of theCPC the High Court isempowered to entertain and decide anyapplication forcondonation of delay in filing the appeal. 9. 11. In the matter of Velingkar Brothers (Supra), the question 'whether Section 5ofthe Limitation Act, 1963shall apply in case of an appeal filed under Section260-A of the IT Act, 1961' was referred by the Division Bench to a LargerBench for adjudication.Answering the reference in affirmative, the full Benchofthe Bombay High Court held thus:- "Sec.260A itself providesthatthe provisjons ofthe CPCrelating to appeals, as far as possible, are applicable tothe appeals under S.260A.It would mean that S.260A isnot exhaustive of all the facets, aspects and matters withregard to the appeals unders.260A.Itseems that thelegislature did notintend to make the provision ofs.260Awatertight. The exclusion ofthe provisions ofss.4 to 24of the Limitation Act as provided ins.29(2) cannot belightly inferred.Implied exclusion is not readily inferred.Thatthe legislature has used thewords 'shall be filed' in "Sec.260A itself providesthatthe provisjons ofthe CPCrelating to appeals, as far as possible, are applicable tothe appeals under S.260A.It would mean that S.260A isnot exhaustive of all the facets, aspects and matters withregard to the appeals unders.260A.Itseems that thelegislature did notintend to make the provision ofs.260Awatertight. The exclusion ofthe provisions ofss.4 to 24of the Limitation Act as provided ins.29(2) cannot belightly inferred.Implied exclusion is not readily inferred.Thatthe legislature has used thewords 'shall be filed' in sub-s.(2) means that the limitation for filing the appeal isas provided therein but that does not makes.29(2) of theLimitatibn Act, 1963 inapplicable. The High Court beingthe superior Court, the power to condone the delay infiling the appeat must be read to be existent, more so byvirtue of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act, unless there isclearindication of its exclusion by implication.The useof the word 'shall' and the longer period of limitation (120days) are not indicators of such exclusion. Nor from thepositionthatS.260Aissilent aboutapplicabilityofs.29(2),any justifiableinference canbedrawn forinapplicability of thatWhat is obvious need provision.not bestatedand,therefore,legislaturemayhavethoughtfitthatitwasnot necessarytoexpressspecificallyabout thepower of theHighCourt tocondone the delay in view ofexistence ofs.29(2). Whenthe statuteissilent, the presumptionisnot drawnautomatically about the exclusion of s.29(2) or for thatmatter s.5 of the Limitation Act.There is nothing toindicate thatthe application ofs.29(2) is excluded exceptprovidingaspeciallimitation.Sec.260Adoesnotnecessarily imply the exclusion of ss.4 to 24 of theLimitation Act.Therefore,s.5 of the Limitation Act isapplicable incase of the appeals filed under S.260A."12. In the matter of Anandilal Poddar & Sons Ltd. (Supra) also, the Calcutta HighCourt.while considering applicability of Limitation Act in appeal before the HighCourt under Section 260Aof the IT Act, held thatthough Section 260A of the ITAct expressly provides for a periodof limitation for preferring an appeal to theHigh Court, the same does not imply that the application of ss.4 to 24oftheLimitation Act is excluded.In order fo exclude the application of ss.4 to 24within the meaning of s.29 of the Limitation Act, the necessary exclusion mustbe express andsuch express exclusionis to be inferred by necessaryimplication from the statute itself.The Court isnot supposed to presumeexclusion on account of thestatute being silent in that aspect.It cannot be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in respect of appealpreferred under Section260A. l3.The Supreme Court in the matter of M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., and another(Supra),[while][ dealing][ with]question['whether][ the][ High][ Court][ in][ the][ reference]application under Section 35hl(1) of the unamended Act, has power underSection 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 fo condone the delay beyond the periodprescribed underthe main statute i.e. Central Excise Act', held that the HighCourt has no power to condone the delay in filing the "reference application"filed by the Commissioner underunamended Section 35M(1) of the CentralExcise Act, 1944 beyond the period of 180 days. 14. ShriNeelabh Dubey, learned counsel appearing forthe respondents submittedthat though the judgment in the matter of M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., andanother (Supra) is in relation to reference underSection 35H(1)ofthe CentralExcise Act, but the relevant provisions under Chapter XX of the Act is parimateria to the provisions of appeal under Chapter VI-A of the Central ExciseAct, 1944, therefore, ratio of law laid down in M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., andanother shall apply to any appeal under Section 260A of the Act also. 14. ShriNeelabh Dubey, learned counsel appearing forthe respondents submittedthat though the judgment in the matter of M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., andanother (Supra) is in relation to reference underSection 35H(1)ofthe CentralExcise Act, but the relevant provisions under Chapter XX of the Act is parimateria to the provisions of appeal under Chapter VI-A of the Central ExciseAct, 1944, therefore, ratio of law laid down in M/s Hongo India (P) Ltd., andanother shall apply to any appeal under Section 260A of the Act also. 15.8eforeappreciatingtheaboveargumentoflearnedcounselfortherespondents, we propose to examine the provisions relating to appeals underChapter VI-A of the Central Excise Act. As per Section 35, against any orderpassed by the Central Excise Officer, appeal lies to the Commissioner ofCentral Excise (Appeals).The appeal is to be preferred within 60 days fromthe date of communication of such decision to the aggrieved party. Proviso tosub-section (1)enables theCommissioner (Appeals) toallowit toberepresentedwithin a further period of 30 days if he is satisfiedthat theappellant was prevented by sufficient causefrom presenting the appeal withinthe aforesaid period of 60 days. Any person aggrieved by the decisions/orders of the Commissioner of Central Excise or the Commissioner (Appeals) mayprefer[an][ appeal][ to][ the][ Appellate][ Tribunal][ within][ 3][ months][ from][ the][ date][ on]which the order appealed is communicated tothe aggrieved party. Sub-section(5)[enables][ the][ Tribunal][ to][ condone][ the][ delay][ even][ beyond][ the]prescribedperiod provided[there][ was][ sufficient][ cause][ for][ not]presenting[it][ within][ that]period.Under Section 35EE, revisionlies to the Central Govemment.Llndersub-section (2), application undersub-section (1) isto be made within 3months from the date of communication.Proviso to sub-section (2) enablesthe revisional authority to condone the delay for a further period of 90 days.Unamended Section 35-G provides for appeal to the High Court.Sub-section2(a) enables the aggrieved person to file an appeal to the High Court within180 days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by theaggrieved party. There is no provision to condone the delay in filing the appealbeyond prescribed period of 180 days.Unamended Section 35H provides forreferenceapplicationtotheHighCourt.Under sub-section(l),theCommissioner of Central Excise or other party within a period of 180 days ofthedateon which he isserved with notice ofan order under Section 35C directthe Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of lawarising from suchorder ofthe Tribunal. Application for reference is to be made to the High Courtwithin 180 days and there is no provision to extend the period of limitation forfiling application to the High Court beyond the said period and condone thedelay. l6.After dose scrutiny of the provisions contained in Chapter VI-Aof the CentralExcise Act, 1944, we find substance in submission of learned counsel for theappellants that the provisions contained in Chapter VI-Aof the Central ExciseAct, 1944, which deals with appeal, is pari materia to the provisions containedin ChapterXXoftheAct.which alsodealswith appeals and revisions under theITAct.Excise Act, 1944, we find substance in submission of learned counsel for theappellants that the provisions contained in Chapter VI-Aof the Central ExciseAct, 1944, which deals with appeal, is pari materia to the provisions containedin ChapterXXoftheAct.which alsodealswith appeals and revisions under theITAct. l6.After dose scrutiny of the provisions contained in Chapter VI-Aof the CentralExcise Act, 1944, we find substance in submission of learned counsel for theappellants that the provisions contained in Chapter VI-Aof the Central ExciseAct, 1944, which deals with appeal, is pari materia to the provisions containedin ChapterXXoftheAct.which alsodealswith appeals and revisions under theITAct.Excise Act, 1944, we find substance in submission of learned counsel for theappellants that the provisions contained in Chapter VI-Aof the Central ExciseAct, 1944, which deals with appeal, is pari materia to the provisions containedin ChapterXXoftheAct.which alsodealswith appeals and revisions under theITAct. 17.1nthematterof AhmedabadPvt.Primary Teachers'Assn.VersusAdministrative Officer and others, the question before the Hon'ble SupremeCourt was interpretation of definition of "Employee" as contained in Section2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act,1972.Interpreting the definition of'Employee' with the external aid of statutes in pari materia, the Hon'bleSupreme Court observed thus:-"12. We have critically examined the definition clause inthelight of the arguments advanced on either side andhave compared it with the definitions given in otherlabour enactments.On the doctrine of "pari materia",reference to Qther statutes dealing with the same subjectorforming part ofthe samesystem is a permissible aid tothe construction of provisions in a statute.See thefollowingobservationscontainedinPrinciplesofStatutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh (8th Edn.), Syn.4,atpp.235 to239:"Statutes in parimateriaIt hasalready been seen that a statute must beread as a whole as words areto be understood in theircontext.Extension of thisruleof contextpermitsreference to other statutes in pari materia i.e. statutesdealingwith the same subject-matter or forming part ofthe same system.Viscount Simonds in a passagealready noticed conceived it to be a right and duty toconstrue every word of a statute inits contextand heused the word context in its widestsense including 'otherstatutes in pari materia'.As stated by Lord Mansfield'where there are different statutes in pari materia thoughmadeat different times,or evenexpired,andnotreferringtoeachother,theyshallbetakenandconstrued together, as onesystem and as explanatory ofeach other'. The apptication of this rule of construction has themerit ofavoiding any apparent contradiction between aseries of statutes dealing with the same subject; itallowsthe use of an earlier statute to throw light on the meaningof a phrase usedin a later statute in the same context;itpermits the raisingof a presumption, in the absence ofany context indicating a contrary intention, that thesamemeaning attaches to the same words in a later statute asin an earlierstatute if the wordsare used in similarconnection in the two statutes; and it enables the use ofalaterstatuteasparliamentaryexpositionof themeaningofambiguousexpressionsinanearlierstatute."". 18.1n the matter of Sirsilk Ltd. Versus Textiles Committeeand others , theHon'ble Supreme Court while considering as to what statutes are considered tobein par/ maten'a,referred to "Statutes and Statutory Construetion" bySutherland thus:- "Statutes are considered to be in pari materia to pertainto the same subject-matter when they relate to thesameperson or things, or to the same class of persons orthing, or have the same purposeor object. (Statutes andStatutory Consfrucffon, Vol.2, p.535, 3rd edn.)" 18.1n the matter of Sirsilk Ltd. Versus Textiles Committeeand others , theHon'ble Supreme Court while considering as to what statutes are considered tobein par/ maten'a,referred to "Statutes and Statutory Construetion" bySutherland thus:- "Statutes are considered to be in pari materia to pertainto the same subject-matter when they relate to thesameperson or things, or to the same class of persons orthing, or have the same purposeor object. (Statutes andStatutory Consfrucffon, Vol.2, p.535, 3rd edn.)" 19 In the matter of J.K. Steel Ltd., VersusUnion of India andothers, theHon'ble Supreme Court, whileconsidering pari materia provisions of CentralExcises and Salt Act (1944), Sch.l, Item 26AA - TariffAct (1934), Sch.l entry63 (36), held in paragraph-29 of the judgment that Acts being in pari materiamust be takentogether as forming one code and as interpreting and enforcingeach other.In para-26 of the above judgment, referring to its earlier judgmentin the matter of C.A. Abraham V. I.T.O., Kottayam {AIR 1961 SC 609}, it wasobserved that 'ln interpreting a fiscal statute the Court cannot proceed to make 1989 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 168AIR 1970 SUPREME COURT 1173AIR 1970 SUPREME COURT 1173 good deflciencies ifthere may be any; the Court must interpretthe statute as itstands and in case of doubt in a manner favourable to the tax payer."20,The Hon'ble Supreme Court after elaborately dealing with the above provisionsofthe Central ExciseAct in detail has negated the argument based onSection29(2) of the Limitation Act that in absence of any express exclusion of theprovisions of Limitation Act in any special law ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Actwould be applicable. It has been observed thus: "In this regard.we have to see the schemeof the speciallawhere in this case is Central ExciseAct. The nature ofthe remedy provided therein are such that the legislatureintended itto be a complete Code by itself which aloneshould govern the several matters provided by it.If, onan examination of the relevant provisions, it is clearthatthe provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarilyexduded, thenthe benefitsconferred therein cannot becalled in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act.Inour considered view, that even ina case where thespecial lawdoes not excludethe provisions ofSections4to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, itwould nonetheless be open to the court to examinewhetherandto whatextent,thenature of thoseprovisionsor the natureof thesubject-matter andscheme of the special law excludetheiroperation.Inother words, the applicability of theprovisions of the.Limitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the termsofthe Limitation Act but by the provisionsof the CentralExcise Act relating to filing of reference application to theHigh Court. The scheme ofthe Central Excise Act, 1944support the conclusion that the time limit prescribedunderSection 35M(1) to make a reference to High Courtis absolute andunextendable bycourtunder Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act.It is wellsettled law that it is the dutyof thecourt to respect the legislative intent and by givingliberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended byinvoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act." zi.We have already reproduced the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Actcontained in ChapterXX, which relates to appeals and revisions. We have alsopointed out the salient featuresof the provisions under Chapter VI-A, whichdeals with appeals under the Central Excise Act.Both the acts have beenenactedby the Central Legislature.The Central ExciseAct was enacted toconsolidate and amend the law relating to central duties on excise whereas,the Income Tax Act, 1961 was enacted to consolidate and amend the lawrelating to income tax andsupertax.Both the acts are periodically amendedthrough Finance Act to give effect to the financial proposals of the Centra!Government forthe relevant financial yearsand thus have the same purposeand object.Therefore, on the doctrine of "pari materia", reference to CentralExciseAct is a permissible aidto the construction of provisions ofthe Act. 22.As far as the argumentsadVanced by Shri Rajeshwara Rao, learned counselfor the appellants herein basedon judgmentofFull Bench ofthe BombayHigh Court that sub-sectipn (7)of Section 260A ofthe Act makes the provisionsof CPC applicable in relation to appeal to the High Court and, therefore, theIncome Tax Act is not a complete Code is concerned, fromperusal of sub-section (9) of Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, we find that thesame is-exactly identical assub-section (7) of Section 260A ofthe Act. 23. In the matter of Ravulu Subba Rao and others Versus Commissioner ofIncome Tax,IVIadras , in paragraph-IOit has been heldthatthe Courts musttherefore construethe provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act as forming acode complete in itself and exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein, andascertain what their true scope is.In paragraph-16, it has been further heldthus: "To sumup,theIndian .Income Tax Actis a selfcontained code exhaustive of the matters dealt with AIR1956SC604 Barve therein and its provisions show an intention to departfrom the common rule, qui facit peralium facitperse. Itsintention again is that a firm should be given benefit ofS.23(5)(a),onlyifitisregisteredunderS.26-Ainaccordance with the conditionslaid down in that sectionand the rules framed thereunder.And as those rulesrequire the application to be signed by the partner inperson, the signature by an agent on his behalf isinvalid." 24.Thus, relying upon principlesof law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inthe matter of M/sHongo India (P) Ltd., and another (Supra), we hold that theIncome Tax Act, 1961 isa special law.The nature of the remedy providedtherein are such thatthe legislature intendedit to be a complete code by itselfwhich alone should govern the several matters provided by it. The scheme ofthe Income Tax Act, 1961, support the conclusion that time limit prescribedunder Section 260A to file anappeal before the High Court is absolute andunextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the limitationcannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the LimitationAct.:••. 25. Since all the appeals herein have been preferred beyondthe prescribed periodof 120 days under Section 260A of the Act, the same are dismissed ontheground of limitation.