Salcete, Goa v. The Chief Commissioner Of
High Court
04 Nov 2003 In favour of: Unclear
Forum / Bench
High Court · hcbgoa
Parties
Salcete, Goa v. The Chief Commissioner Of
Date of order
04 Nov 2003
Assessment year(s)
—
Outcome
Dismissed
The order — as passed by the High Court
Case summary
In Salcete, Goa v. The Chief Commissioner Of, the High Court (2003) dismissed the appeal.
Issue: Indeed Section 119 of the Act enables the Board to issue general or special orders in respect of class of incomes or class of cases for the purpose of proper and efficient management of the work of assessment and collection of revenue, whether by way of relaxation of any of the provisions referred t...
Summary auto-generated from the order below — read the full judgment for the complete reasoning.
Sections referenced in this judgment
WRITPETITION NOS. 402 OF 2003 AND 403 OF 2003
WRITPETITION NO. 402 OF 2003
Mrs. Jeanette K. Alemao,
of Goa, Indian Inhabitant,
r/o Novangully, Varca,
Salcete, Goa.
... Petitioner.
Versus
1. The Chief Commissioner of
Income-tax, Aayakar Bhavan,
Plot No.5, EDC Complex,
Patto Plaza, Panaji, Goa,
2. The Asstt. Commissioner
of Income-tax, Circle-2,
Gomantak, Vidya Niketan,
3rd Floor, Margao, Goa, and
3. Union of India, Panaji,
Goa, through the Senior
Standing Counsel.
... Respondents.
Shri S. V. Pikale & Shri Anand M. Redkar, advocates for
the petitioner.
Shri S. R. Rivonkar and Ms.Amina Fadte, advocates for the
respondents.
WRITPETITION NO.403 OF 2003
Kennedy Alemao,
of Goa, Indian Inhabitant,
r/o Novangully, Varca,
Salcete, Goa.
... Petitioner.
Versus
1. The Chief Commissioner of
Income-tax, Aayakar Bhavan,
Plot No.5, EDC Complex,
Patto Plaza, Panaji, Goa,
2. The Asstt. Commissioner
of Income-tax, Circle-2,
Gomantak, Vidya Niketan,
3rd Floor, Margao, Goa, and
3. Union of India, through
Senior Standing Counsel.
... Respondents.
- 2 -
Shri S. V. Pikale and Shri Anand M. Redkar, advocates for
the petitioner.
Shri S. R. Rivonkar and Ms. Amina Fadte, advocates for the
respondents.
CORAM : A. M. KHANWILKAR &P. V. HARDAS, JJ.DATE : 5th November, 2003.
ORAL ORDER(Per Khanwilkar, J.)
The principal question involved in both these
petitions is: Whether Clause (e) of paragraph 2 of Notification F.No.400/234/95-II(B) dated 23rd May, 1996,
issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in exercise of
the powers conferred under Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of
Section 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, would envelope a
case of default in paying advance tax and/or self-assessment
tax for which interest has been charged in terms of Sections 234B and 234C against the assessee? The said Clause (e)
reads thus:-
"(e) Where a return of income could not befiled by the assessee due to unavoidablecircumstances and such return of income isfiled voluntarily by the assessee or hislegal heirs without detection by AssessingOfficer."
2. Briefly stated, the petitioners in both these
cases had filed return for the relevant assessment years and
the Assessing Officer assessed their income and charged
interest under Sections 234B, 234C and 220(2) of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), on
account of failure of the petitioners to pay advance tax and
self-assessment tax on the returned income. The petitioners thereafter moved separate applications before the Chief
Commissioner of Income Tax for waiving of interest so charged
by the Assessing Officer under Sections 234B and 234C of the
Act only. The Chief Commissioner by the impugned Judgment
and Order has rejected the applications as filed by the
petitioners, holding that the case was not covered by Clause
(e) of paragraph 2 of the subject Notification, which
empowers the Chief Commissioner to waive interest charged
under Sections 234B and 234C, as the case may be. According
to the Chief Commissioner, the said clause was inapplicable
to the present case and that he could have exercised powers
bestowed on him in terms of the said Notification only if the
conditions of the said Notification were fully complied with. He relied on the Circular No.783 dated 18th November, 1999, issued by the Board to support this view. Reliance has also
been placed on the decision of the Kerala High Court in the
case of Universal Trades Corporation vs. Chief CIT, as reported in 249 ITR 291, which has held that waiver is not
possible if the conditions laid down in the Board’s
Notification No.400 dated 23rd May, 1996, are not satisfied.
The Chief Commissioner also relied on the decision of the
Apex Court in CIT vs. Anjum M. H . Ghaswala & Ors.
CIT vs. Anjum M. H . Ghaswala & Ors. ,
bestowed on him in terms of the said Notification only if the
conditions of the said Notification were fully complied with. He relied on the Circular No.783 dated 18th November, 1999, issued by the Board to support this view. Reliance has also
been placed on the decision of the Kerala High Court in the
case of Universal Trades Corporation vs. Chief CIT, as reported in 249 ITR 291, which has held that waiver is not
possible if the conditions laid down in the Board’s
Notification No.400 dated 23rd May, 1996, are not satisfied.
The Chief Commissioner also relied on the decision of the
Apex Court in CIT vs. Anjum M. H . Ghaswala & Ors.
CIT vs. Anjum M. H . Ghaswala & Ors. ,
(2001) 252 ITR 1 (SC), wherein it is observed that
waiver/reduction of interest levied under Sections 234A, 234B
or 234C, as the case may be, is permissible only under the
Circulars of CBDT in cases and conditions
mentioned/prescribed in the said Circular. The Chief Commissioner incidentally also considered the plea taken on behalf of the petitioners about their financial hardship
which prevented them from complying with the statutory
requirement of payment of advance tax and self-assessment tax
and found that there was no substance in the said plea
because both the assessees in the returns as filed by them, have shown sufficient funds available for payment of taxes during the relevant assessment years. The Chief Commissioner also rejected the argument canvassed on behalf of the petitioners that they were under mistaken belief that the tax was to be directly deducted at source by the Government. The Chief Commissioner has found that in fact the petitioners
were collecting tolls and the money was directly received in their hands. In fact, the petitioners were required to make payment to the Government and it was not a converse case of the petitioners receiving payment from the Government. The Chief Commissioner thus found that in any case there was no convincing reason forthcoming to show any indulgence to the petitioners. This decision of the Chief Commissioner dated
their hands. In fact, the petitioners were required to make payment to the Government and it was not a converse case of the petitioners receiving payment from the Government. The Chief Commissioner thus found that in any case there was no convincing reason forthcoming to show any indulgence to the petitioners. This decision of the Chief Commissioner dated 14th March, 2002, is the subject-matter of challenge in the
respective petitions.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
reiterated the grounds set up on behalf of the petitioners in the application as filed for waiver of interest charged under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act. According to him, the
Clauses in the subject Notification dated May 23, 1996,
should be liberally construed - inasmuch as there is ample
power in the Chief Commissioner to waive interest in the fact
situation of the present case. Learned counsel placed
reliance on four decisions to contend that the view taken by
the Chief Commissioner that Clause (e) of paragraph 2 of the
subject Notification is inapplicable to the fact situation of
the present case, is inappropriate. Reliance was placed on
Parshottam Nagindas & Ors. vs. B. R.Adwalpalkar, reported in (1995) 218 ITR 392 (Guj.), Jaswant
the case of Parshottam Nagindas & Ors. vs. B. R.
Adwalpalkar
Clauses in the subject Notification dated May 23, 1996,
should be liberally construed - inasmuch as there is ample
power in the Chief Commissioner to waive interest in the fact
situation of the present case. Learned counsel placed
reliance on four decisions to contend that the view taken by
the Chief Commissioner that Clause (e) of paragraph 2 of the
subject Notification is inapplicable to the fact situation of
the present case, is inappropriate. Reliance was placed on
Parshottam Nagindas & Ors. vs. B. R.Adwalpalkar, reported in (1995) 218 ITR 392 (Guj.), Jaswant
the case of Parshottam Nagindas & Ors. vs. B. R.
Adwalpalkar
Rai & Anr. vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes & Revenue &Ors., (1998) 231 ITR 745 (SC), Sangam Pastic Centre vs. P.K. Tiwary, Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1997) 226 ITR 260Ors., (1998) 231 ITR 745 (SC), Sangam Pastic Centre vs. P.K. Tiwary, Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1997) 226 ITR 260
Rai & Anr. vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes & Revenue &
Ors.,
K. Tiwary, Commissioner of Income-Tax,
(Guj.) and lastly, Sant Lal vs. Union of India & Ors.
Sant Lal vs. Union of India & Ors.,
(1996) 222 ITR 375 (P. & H.). According to the learned
counsel for the petitioners, the application as filed before
the Chief Commissioner for the relief prayed therein was
appropriate and was covered by the expansive provisions of
Section 119 of the Act read with the said Notification dated
23rd May, 1996. He further submits that the petitioners have
made out sufficient grounds for that relief as they did not
pay the advance tax as well as self-assessment tax due to the
mistaken belief, as they were under the impression that tax
was deductible at source, as the "Toll Nakas were of
Government of Goa".
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
Revenue contends that no fault can be found with the view
taken by the Chief Commissioner that the case on hand was not
covered by any of the Clauses of the subject Notification,
much less Clause (e) of paragraph 2 thereof, which was
pressed into service. He submits that Clause (e) applies
only in respect of failure to file return of income due to
unavoidable circumstances and such return of income was to be
filed voluntarily by the assessee or his legal heirs, without detection of the Assessing Officer. He submits that in the present case, the petitioners had failed to comply with the
statutory requirement of payment of advance tax and self-assessment tax on the returned income; and that no authority has been delegated to the Chief Commissioner to
self-assessment tax on the returned income; and that no authority has been delegated to the Chief Commissioner to waive the statutory interest provided for under Sections 234B
and 234C of the Act in that behalf, under the said Notification. He submits that in such a case, the Chief Commissioner cannot interfere so as to waive interest determined by the Assessing Officer, for it is outside the scope of the subject Notification. He has also supported the
finding recorded by the Chief Commissioner on the merits of
the contention of the petitioners regarding financial hardship and mistaken belief in assuming that the amount was deductible at source. He placed reliance on the observations
made by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court inCommissioner of Income-tax vs. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala, (supra). He has also placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sita Holiday Resorts Ltd. vs. Chief
Commissioner of Income-tax & Ors., (2002) 2458 ITR 751.
5. Having considered the rival submission, the principal question that needs to be addressed by us is:
finding recorded by the Chief Commissioner on the merits of
the contention of the petitioners regarding financial hardship and mistaken belief in assuming that the amount was deductible at source. He placed reliance on the observations
made by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court inCommissioner of Income-tax vs. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala, (supra). He has also placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sita Holiday Resorts Ltd. vs. Chief
Commissioner of Income-tax & Ors., (2002) 2458 ITR 751.
5. Having considered the rival submission, the principal question that needs to be addressed by us is:
whether the case of waiver of statutory interest charged on
account of non-payment of advance tax and/or self-assessment
tax on the returned income is covered by Clause (e) of
paragraph 2 of the subject Notification dated May 23, 1996?
We have already adverted to the relevant clause. On a plain
language of the said Clause it is obvious that it applies
only in cases where return of income could not be filed by
the assessee due to unavoidable circumstances and such return
of income were to be filed voluntarily by the assessee or his
legal heirs, without detection by the Assessing Officer. No more and no less. Indeed Section 119 of the Act enables the Board to issue general or special orders in respect of class of incomes or class of cases for the purpose of proper and efficient management of the work of assessment and collection
of revenue, whether by way of relaxation of any of the
provisions referred to in Sub-section (2)(a), which includes Sections 234B and 234C. And as per Clause (b) of Sub-Section (2), the Board by general or special order authorise any income tax authority, not being a Commissioner (Appeals), to consider the claim for exemption, deduction, refund or any other relief, which would include waiver of interest charged by the Assessing Officer under Sections 234B and 234C of the
income tax authority, not being a Commissioner (Appeals), to consider the claim for exemption, deduction, refund or any other relief, which would include waiver of interest charged by the Assessing Officer under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act, as in the present case. However, the Chief Commissioner
as authorised under the subject Notification issued in exercise of Section 119 would have been competent to waive the interest charged under Section 234B and Section 234C in
relation to default in payment of advance tax and self-assessment tax on the returned income only if he was so authorised by the Board. The purport of Section 119 of the Act has been incidentally considered by the Apex Court in the
case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Anjum M. H.Ghaswala (supra). The Apex Court has observed that the power of relaxation contemplated under Section 119(2)(a) of the Act
can be exercised only in regard to class of cases or class of incomes. It has also observed that the Act requires the Board to exercise the power under Section 119 in a particular manner, i.e. by way of issuance of orders, instructions and directions. These orders, instructions and directions are meant to be issued to the income tax authorities for proper administration of the Act. In the same decision, the Apex Court while considering the provisions of Sections 234A, 234B and 234C, then went on to observe thus:-
case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Anjum M. H.Ghaswala (supra). The Apex Court has observed that the power of relaxation contemplated under Section 119(2)(a) of the Act
can be exercised only in regard to class of cases or class of incomes. It has also observed that the Act requires the Board to exercise the power under Section 119 in a particular manner, i.e. by way of issuance of orders, instructions and directions. These orders, instructions and directions are meant to be issued to the income tax authorities for proper administration of the Act. In the same decision, the Apex Court while considering the provisions of Sections 234A, 234B and 234C, then went on to observe thus:-
"...........................................We do not find any such problem in theprovisions of the Act to which we havealready referred. Sections 234A, 234B and234C in clear terms impose a mandate tocollect interest at the rates stipulatedtherein. The expression "shall" used in thesaid section cannot by any stretch ofimagination be construed as ‘may’. Thereare sufficient indications in the scheme ofthe Act to show that the expression ‘shall’used in Sections 234A, 234B and 234C is usedby the Legislature deliberately and it hasnot left any scope for interpreting the saidexpression as ‘may’." (Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court then went on to observe that:
"The change brought about by the AmendingAct (Finance Act, 1987) is a clearindication of the fact that the intention ofthe Legislature was to make the collectionof statutory interest mandatory."
From the above observations of the Apex Court, it is amply
clear that charging of interest under Sections 234B and 234C
as in this case, is on account of the statutory obligations.
The Apex Court in the same Judgment has observed that an
assessee cannot expect any reduction in amounts statutorily
payable under the Act. The Apex Court then made reference to
the subject Notification and has observed thus:-
"The learned Solicitor General has pointedout that by virtue of the power vested inthe Board under Section 119(2)(a) of theAct, the Board has issued circulars byNotification No. F.No.400/234/95-IT(B),dated May 23, 1996. As per this circular,ithas empowered that the Chief Commissionerof Income-tax and Director-General ofIncome-tax may waive or reduce interestcharged under Sections 234A, 234B and 234Cofthe Act in the class of cases or class ofincomesspecified in paragraph 2 of the saidorderfor the period and on conditions whichare enumerated therein. He submitted thatin view of the said circular, the sameauthority can be exercised by the Commissionsince the said circular would amount torelaxation of the rigour of Sections 234A,234B and 234C of the Act. We are in unisonwith this submission of the learnedSolicitor General." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the provision such as Section 119 of the Act and the Notification so issued by the Board in exercise of powers under that provision is beneficial for the assessee, but the
principal question in the present case is whether the Chief
Commissioner was authorized to waive interest charged in
respect of default in payment of advance tax and
self-assessment tax on the returned income. At least the
subject Notification makes no provision for that situation.
Whereas Clause (e) would apply only where return of income
could not be filed by the assessee due to unavoidable
circumstances, and not in a case such as the present one.
Since the exercise of power by the Chief Commissioner, who is
obviously a delegated authority having been authorized by the
Board to consider the claim which would include the issue of
waiver of interest charged on account of statutory provision
referred to in Section 119 of the Act, but that power can be
principal question in the present case is whether the Chief
Commissioner was authorized to waive interest charged in
respect of default in payment of advance tax and
self-assessment tax on the returned income. At least the
subject Notification makes no provision for that situation.
Whereas Clause (e) would apply only where return of income
could not be filed by the assessee due to unavoidable
circumstances, and not in a case such as the present one.
Since the exercise of power by the Chief Commissioner, who is
obviously a delegated authority having been authorized by the
Board to consider the claim which would include the issue of
waiver of interest charged on account of statutory provision
referred to in Section 119 of the Act, but that power can be
exercised only in situations referred to in the subject
Notification. Strong reliance was placed by the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the case of
Parshottam Nagindas & Ors. vs. B. R. Adwalpalkar
Parshottam Nagindas & Ors. vs. B. R. Adwalpalkar, (supra)
to contend that a liberal construction should be given to the
subject Circular and Clause (e) can be read as permitting
waiver of interest also in situation of failure to pay
advance tax, or self-assessment tax on the returned income.
It is not possible to countenance this submission. That
would amount to re-writing of the Notification issued by the
Board, which is express and unambiguous. Besides, the ratio
in the case of Parshottam Nagindas
Parshottam Nagindas (supra) is in the context
of provisions under Section 273A of the Income Tax Act. That
ratio will be of no avail to canvass before this Court that
Clause (e) be liberally construed so as to include a
situation obtaining in the present case. It is not possible
for us to accept that contention. Reliance was also placed
by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the decision of the Apex Court in Jaswant Rai vs. C.B.D.T. & Revenue, (supra). Even that decision is an authority in relation to
the purport of Section 271(4A) of the Act and for which
reason that would be of no avail to the present case. The
Sangam
third authority relied on behalf of the petitioners (Sangam
Plastic Centre vs. P. K. Tiwary, Commissioner of
Plastic Centre vs. P. K. Tiwary, Commissioner of
Plastic Centre vs. P. K. Tiwary, Commissioner of
Income-tax (supra)) is again pertaining to the purport of
Income-tax (supra)
Section 273A of the Act and will be of no assistance to
examine the question that arises for our consideration. The
last authority relied upon on behalf of the petitioners in
the case of Sant Lal vs. Union of India,
Sant Lal vs. Union of India, (supra) has
considered the challenge to the validity of the provisions of
Sections 234A, 234B and 234C. In fact this decision can be
pressed into service to negative the arguments canvassed on
behalf of the petitioners. The Division Bench of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court has adverted to the decision of the
Karnataka High Court reported in (1995)215 ITR 758 in the
case of Union Home Products Ltd. vs. Union of India
Union Home Products Ltd. vs. Union of India,
Union Home Products Ltd. vs. Union of India
wherein at page 766 the Court has observed that:
"Thevery purpose behind the introduction ofSections234A, 234B and234C is to take awayfrom the authorities concerned, thediscretion of reducing or waiving the levyofinterest which was earlier exercisable bythem". (Emphasis supplied)Sections234A, 234B and234C is to take awayfrom the authorities concerned, thediscretion of reducing or waiving the levyofinterest which was earlier exercisable bythem". (Emphasis supplied)
and Haryana High Court has adverted to the decision of the
Karnataka High Court reported in (1995)215 ITR 758 in the
case of Union Home Products Ltd. vs. Union of India
Union Home Products Ltd. vs. Union of India,
Union Home Products Ltd. vs. Union of India
wherein at page 766 the Court has observed that:
"Thevery purpose behind the introduction ofSections234A, 234B and234C is to take awayfrom the authorities concerned, thediscretion of reducing or waiving the levyofinterest which was earlier exercisable bythem". (Emphasis supplied)Sections234A, 234B and234C is to take awayfrom the authorities concerned, thediscretion of reducing or waiving the levyofinterest which was earlier exercisable bythem". (Emphasis supplied)
It has been further observed in that decision that the levy is automatic the moment it is proved that the assessee has committed a default within the comprehension of any one of the provisions in question. Be that as it may, the decision in Santa Lal’s case, as can be observed from the discussion at pages 388 and 389, the Court went on to examine
the matter in the context of the power bestowed on the
"Board" to relax various provisions by virtue of Section 119
of the Act. The observations made in this decision will have
to be therefore understood in the context of powers available
to the "Board" to relax or waive interest charged under
Sections 234B and 234C, as in this case; but that does not
mean that the Chief Commissioner can exercise that power on
his own, in the absence of specific delegation to him in that
behalf. It will be useful to advert to the dictum of the
Delhi High Court in the case of Sita Holiday Resorts Ltd.
Sita Holiday Resorts Ltd.vs. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax & Ors., (supra),
vs. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax & Ors.,
wherein it is observed that the interest contemplated under
Section 234B of the Act, for deficiency or default in payment
of advance tax is mandatory in nature; that there is no
provision in the Act authorising any authority to reduce or
waive it. In that case Clause (d) of paragraph (2) of the
self-same Notification was considered. Be that as it may,
the view expressed by the High Court is that the delegated
authority (Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and Director
General of Income Tax) can waive or reduce the interest
chargeable under Section 234B and two other sections in the
class of cases or class of incomes, specified in paragraph 2
thereof for the period and to the extent it may deem fit, subject to fulfilment of the conditions enumerated therein. To put it differently, the Chief Commissioner could relax or waive interest charged by virtue of Section 234B and 234C only if the Board was to authorise the Chief Commissioner to
do so, even in a case of default in payment of advance tax and self-assessment tax on the returned income. As that authorization is conspicuously absent in the subject Notification, the argument as canvassed before this Court on behalf of the petitioners cannot be countenanced.
6. In our view, therefore, no fault can be found with the view taken by the Chief Commissioner in the impugned decisions that the case on hand was not covered by any of the Clauses, much less Clause (e) of paragraph 2 of the subject Notification. If that view is to be maintained, it is unnecessary to go into any other contention raised before us.
7. In the circumstances, we see no reason to
interfere with the view taken by the Chief Commissioner. The Writ Petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.
. mc
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