Sangam Food Products v. Income Tax Officer And Ors

$~123 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + W.P.(C) 11197/2024 SANGAM FOOD PRODUCTS .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Aditya Kumar Garg, Advocate. versus INCOME TAX OFFICER AND ORS .....Respondents Through: Mr. Aseem Chawla, Advocate CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YASHWANT VARMAHON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA O R D E R% 13.08.2024CM APPL. 46306/2024 (exemption) Allowed, subject to all just exceptions. This application stands disposed of. W.P.(C) 11197/2024 & CM APPL. 46305/2024 (interim relief) 1.The writ petitioner is aggrieved by the communication dated 22 June 2023 issued by the Income Tax Officer[1] in purported exercise of powers conferred under Section 220(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961[2]made during the course of disposing of a stay petition which had been moved by the writ petitioner. 2.As is manifest from a reading of the aforesaid e-mail communication, all that has been observed by the ITO is as follows:- “Please deposit 20% of the tax due to enable this office to allow you stay of demand as per CBDT instructions ... 1 ITO 2 Act W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 1 of 11 With regards Rajendra Jha Income Tax Officer Ward 43(1), New Delhi” 3.We note that the aspect of the power conferred on the Assessing Officer[3] to deal with applications seeking stay of demand pending appeal was one which directly arose for our consideration in National Association of Software and Services Company (NASSCOM) v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) and Others[4]. While culling out the principles which would apply and must be borne in mind, we had in NASSCOM observed as follows:- “12.It must at the outset be noted that the two OMs’ noticed above neither prescribe nor mandate 15% or 20% of the outstandingdemand as the case may be, being deposited as a pre-condition forgrant of stay. The OM dated 29 February 2016 specifically spokeof a discretion vesting in the AO to grant stay subject to a deposit ata rate higher or lower than 15% dependent upon the facts of aparticular case. The subsequent OM merely amended the rate to be20%. In fact, while the subsequent OM chose to describe the 20% deposit to be the “standard rate”, the same would clearly not sustain in light of the discussion which ensues. 13. We note that while dealing with an identical question, we had in Avantha Realty Ltd. v Pr. CIT. observed as under: “2. We note that the impugned orders are principally based on the instructions of the Central Board of Direct Tax(‘CBDT’) as encapsulated in the Office Memorandumdated 31 July 2017 and which had while dealing with themanner in which the power under Section 220(6) of the Act is liable to be exercised had held that assessees’ maybe accorded interim protection subject to deposit of 20%of the total outstanding demand failing which they wouldbe treated as an “assessee in default”. 3. Insofar as the aforesaid Office Memorandum is concerned, suffice it to note that while considering its ambit the Supreme Court in Pr. CIT v. LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. had held as follows:- “1. Delay condoned. Leave Granted. 2. Having heard Shri Vikramjit Banerjee, learned ASGappearing on behalf of the appellant, and giving 3 AO 4 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1863 W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 2 of 11 credence to the fact that he has argued before us thatthe administrative circular will not operate as a fetter on-the Commissioner since it is a quasijudicial authority,we only need to clarify that in all cases like the present,it will be open to the authorities, on the facts ofindividual cases, to grant deposit orders of a lesseramount than 20%, pending appeal. 3. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.” 2. Having heard Shri Vikramjit Banerjee, learned ASGappearing on behalf of the appellant, and giving 3 AO 4 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1863 W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 2 of 11 credence to the fact that he has argued before us thatthe administrative circular will not operate as a fetter on-the Commissioner since it is a quasijudicial authority,we only need to clarify that in all cases like the present,it will be open to the authorities, on the facts ofindividual cases, to grant deposit orders of a lesseramount than 20%, pending appeal. 3. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.” 14.As is manifest from the order passed by the Supreme Court inPr. CIT v. LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd., it had been emphasizedthat the administrative circular would not operate as a fetter upon -the power otherwise conferred on a quasijudicial authority and thatit would be wholly incorrect to view the OM as mandating the deposit of 20%, irrespective of the facts of an individual case. Thiswould also flow from the clear and express language employed insub-section (6) of Section 220 which speaks of the AssessingOfficer being empowered “in his discretion and subject to suchconditions as he may think fit to impose in the circumstances of thecase”. The discretion thus vested in the hands of the AO is onewhich cannot possibly be viewed as being cabined by the terms ofthe OM. 15. The issue of a grant of stay pending appellate remedies being pursued arose for the consideration of a Division Bench of the Court in Dabur India Ltd v. CIT (TDS), where it was pertinently observed as under: “6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties andhaving perused the two Office Memorandums, in question,this Court is of the view that the requirement of payment-of twenty percent of disputed tax demand is not a prerequisite for putting in abeyance recovery of demandpending first appeal in all cases. The said pre-condition ofdeposit of twenty percent of the demand can be relaxed inappropriate cases. Even the Office Memorandum dated 29February, 2016 gives instances like where addition on thesame issue has been deleted by the appellate authorities inearlier years or where the decision of the Supreme Courtor jurisdictional High Court is in favour of the assessee. 8. In the present case, the impugned order is non-reasoned.The three basic principles i.e. the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury have not beenconsidered while deciding the stay application.” 16. More recently in Indian National Congress v. Dy. CIT we had an occasion to examine the scope of the power conferred by Section 220(6) of the Act and which was explained in the following terms: W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 3 of 11 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. 8. In the present case, the impugned order is non-reasoned.The three basic principles i.e. the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury have not beenconsidered while deciding the stay application.” 16. More recently in Indian National Congress v. Dy. CIT we had an occasion to examine the scope of the power conferred by Section 220(6) of the Act and which was explained in the following terms: W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 3 of 11 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. “22. However, as we read the order impugned, the matter does not appear to have proceeded along those lines before the ITAT. The tone and tenor of submissions clearly appear to have been concentrated upon the merits of the assessment order. Although the issue of payment of 20%of the outstanding demand appears to have been raised, thesame came to be summarily rejected by the ITAT incryptic terms. Notwithstanding the above, it becomespertinent to observe that the 20% deposit which is spokenof in the OM dated 31 July 2017 is not liable to be viewedas a condition etched in stone or one which is inviolable.The OM merely seeks to provide guidance to theauthorities to bear in mind certain aspects whileconsidering applications for stay of demand pending anappeals remedy being pursued. The OM is not liable to beread as conferring an indefeasible right upon the assesseeto claim a stay of a tax liability by merely offering orconsenting to deposit 20% of the outstanding liability.Ultimately, it is for the authorities to examine and considerwhat amount would be sufficient to securitise the interestof the Revenue and thus a just balance being struck. Thequantum of the deposit that would be required to be madewould ultimately depend upon the facts and circumstancesof each case. ……… xxxx xxxx xxxx 23. The position which thus emerges is that while 20% isnot liable to be viewed as an entrenched or inflexible rule,there could be circumstances where the respondents maybe justified in seeking a deposit in excess of the abovedependent upon the facts and circumstances that mayobtain. This would have to necessarily be left to the soundexercise of discretion by the respondents based upon aconsideration of issues such as prima facie, financialhardship and the likelihood of success. This observationwe render being conscious of the indisputable position thatthe OM applies only upto the stage of the appeal pendingbefore the CIT(A) and being of little significance when it comes to the ITAT.” 17.As explained in Indian National Congress, the 20% which is spoken of in the OM cannot possibly be viewed as being aninviolate or inflexible condition. The extent of the deposit which anassessee may be called upon to make would have to be examinedand answered bearing in mind factors such as prima facie case,undue hardship and likelihood of success. We note that whiledealing with the question of the claim of stay as made by anassessee and the competing obligation to protect the interest of the W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 4 of 11 This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. Revenue, the Supreme Court in Benara Valves Ltd. v.Commissioner of Central Excise had elucidated the legal positionin the following words: “The principles relating to grant of stay pending disposal of the matters before the forums concerned have been considered in several cases. It is to be noted that in such matters though discretion is available, the same has to be exercised judicially. The applicable principles have been set out succinctly in Siliguiri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, Samarias Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Samuel and Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. Revenue, the Supreme Court in Benara Valves Ltd. v.Commissioner of Central Excise had elucidated the legal positionin the following words: “The principles relating to grant of stay pending disposal of the matters before the forums concerned have been considered in several cases. It is to be noted that in such matters though discretion is available, the same has to be exercised judicially. The applicable principles have been set out succinctly in Siliguiri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, Samarias Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Samuel and Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. It is true that on merely establishing a prima facie case,interim order of protection should not be passed. But if ona cursory glance it appears that the demand raised has noleg to stand on, it would be undesirable to require theassessee to pay full or substantive part of the demand.Petitions for stay should not be disposed of in a routinematter unmindful of the consequences flowing from theorder requiring the assessee to deposit full or part of thedemand. There can be no rule of universal application insuch matters and the order has to be passed keeping inview the factual scenario involved. Merely because thisCourt has indicated the principles that does not give alicense to the forum/authority to pass an order whichcannot be sustained on the touchstone of fairness, legalityand public interest. Where denial of interim relief maylead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injuryorshake a citizen’s faith in the impartiality of publicadministration, interim relief can be given. It has become an unfortunate trend to casually dispose of stay applications by referring to decisions in Siliguri Municipality and Dunlop India cases without analysing factual scenario involved in a particular case……. Two significant expressions used in the provisions are ‘undue hardship to such person’ and ‘safeguard the interests of Revenue’. Therefore, while dealing with the application twin requirements of considerations i.e. consideration of undue hardship aspect and imposition of conditions to safeguard the interest of Revenue have to be kept in view. W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 5 of 11 As noted above there are two important expressions in Section 35-F. One is undue hardship. This is a matter within the special knowledge of the applicant for waiver and has to be established by him. A mere assertion about undue hardship would not be sufficient. It was noted by this Court in S. Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka that under Indian conditions expression "undue hardship" is normally related to economic hardship. ‘Undue’ means something which is not merited by the conduct of the claimant, or is very much disproportionate to it. Undue hardship is caused when the hardship is not warranted by the circumstances. For a hardship to be 'undue' it must be shown that the particular burden to observe or perform the requirement is out of proportion to the nature of the requirement itself, and the benefit which the applicant would derive from compliance with it. The word ‘undue’ adds something more than just hardship. It means an excessive hardship or a hardship greater than the circumstances warrant. The other aspect relates to imposition of condition to safeguard the interest of Revenue. This is an aspect which the Tribunal has to bring into focus. It is for the Tribunal to impose such conditions as are deemed proper to safeguard the interests of the Revenue. Therefore, the Tribunal while dealing with the application has to consider materials to be placed by the assessee relating to undue hardship and also to stipulate condition as required to safeguard the interest of the Revenue.” 17.1 The aforesaid principles were reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Monotosh Saha v Special Director, Enforcement Directorate. The word ‘undue’ adds something more than just hardship. It means an excessive hardship or a hardship greater than the circumstances warrant. The other aspect relates to imposition of condition to safeguard the interest of Revenue. This is an aspect which the Tribunal has to bring into focus. It is for the Tribunal to impose such conditions as are deemed proper to safeguard the interests of the Revenue. Therefore, the Tribunal while dealing with the application has to consider materials to be placed by the assessee relating to undue hardship and also to stipulate condition as required to safeguard the interest of the Revenue.” 17.1 The aforesaid principles were reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Monotosh Saha v Special Director, Enforcement Directorate. 18. We find a lucid explanation of the legal position with respect to pre-deposit and the grant of stay in a decision rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in ITC Ltd v. Commissioner (Appeals), Customs and Central Excise where the Court had held as follows: “18. In ITO v. M.K. Mohammad Kunhi, the apex court held that stay should be granted if a strong prima faciecase has been made out and in the most deserving andappropriate cases where entire purpose of the appeal willbe frustrated or rendered nugatory by allowing therecovery proceedings to continue, during the pendency of W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 6 of 11 the appeal. 19. In B.P.L. Sanyo Utilities and Appliances Ltd. v. Union of India, the Karnataka High Court held that in the matter of grant of waiver of pre-deposit, each case has to be examined on its own merit and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. 21. In Mehsana District Cooperative Milk ProducersUnion Ltd. v. Union of India, the hon'ble Supreme Courtconsidered the case of dispensation of predepositcondition and held that the appellate authority mustaddress to itself to the prima facie merits of the appellant'scase and upon being satisfied of the same, determine thequantum of deposit taking into consideration the financialhardship and other such related factors…… 23. In J.N. Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. CEGAT, the Calcutta-High Court while considering the provisions of predeposit of duty and penalty, observed that where theauthority concerned comes to the conclusion that theappellant has a good prima facie case so as to justify the-dispensation of requirement of predeposit of the disputedamount on duty and penalty, the authority must exerciseits discretion to dispense with such requirementparticularly in a case where the appellant satisfies theauthority concerned that its case is squarely covered by thedecision of a competent Court binding on it. In such aneventuality, asking the appellant to deposit the dutydemanded and penalty levied would undoubtedly causeundue hardship to the appellant. While deciding the saidcase, Calcutta High Court placed reliance upon thejudgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in L. HirdayNarain v. ITO, wherein the Court observed as under: ‘If a statute invests a public officer with authority to do an act in a specified set of circumstances, it is imperative upon him to exercise his authority in a manner appropriate to the case when a party interested and having a right to apply moved in that behalf and circumstances for exercise of authority are shown to exist. Even if the words used in the statute prima facie enabling, the courts will readily infer a duty to exercise power which is invested in aid of enforcement of a right-public or private-of a citizen.’ 24. Thus, even where enabling or discretionary power is conferred on a public authority, the words which are W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 7 of 11 This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 27/08/2024 at 11:51:40 24. Thus, even where enabling or discretionary power is conferred on a public authority, the words which are W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 7 of 11 This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 27/08/2024 at 11:51:40 permissive in character, require to be constituted,involving a duty to exercise that power, if some legal rightor entitlement is conferred or enjoyed, and for theeffectuating the such right or entitlement, the exercise ofsuch power is essential. The aforesaid view standsfortified in view of that fact that every power is coupledwith a duty to act reasonably and theCourt/Tribunal/Authority has to proceed having strictadherence to the provisions of law. (Vide Julius v. LordBishop of Oxford; Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji; K.S. Srinivasan v. Union of India; YogeshwarJaiswal v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal; AmbicaQuarry Works etc. v. State of Gujarat……... 26. In Bongaigaon Refinery & Petrochem Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise (A), the Calcutta High Court, while examining a similar issue and placed reliance upon a large number of judgments and held that the phrase “undue hardship” would cover a case where the appellant has a strong prima facie case. The phrase also covers a situation where there is an arguable case in the appeal. If the Appellate Authority forms the opinion that appellant has a strong prima facie case, it should dispense with the pre-deposit condition altogether. However, where it is of the opinion that the appellant has no arguable case, the Appellate Authority must safeguard the interest of the Revenue, as the same also cannot be jeopardised. 27. In Sri Krishna v. Union of India, the Delhi High Court-considered the issue of dispensation of predepositcondition and the concept of undue hardship whileconsidering the provisions of section 129E of the CustomsAct, 1962 and section 35 of the Act and held that theCourt while considering the case of the appellant shouldexamine as to whether the Appellate Authority or Tribunalhave dealt with the plea raised by the appellant before itand have considered as to whether the appellant hasa prima facie case on merit. In case the appellant has astrong prima facie case, as is most likely to exonerate himfrom liability and the Appellate Authority/Tribunal insistson the deposit of the amount, it would amount to unduehardship. 28. In Hoogly Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Calcutta High Court again reiterated the view that if the appellant has a strong prima facie case, he is entitled of waiving the pre-deposit condition and in case the Appellate Authority insists to deposit the amount so W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 8 of 11 This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 27/08/2024 at 11:51:40 assessed or penalty so levied, it will cause undue hardship to the assessee. While considering the said case, the Court placed reliance upon the large number of judgments including Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner (Appeals), Central Excise; Hari Fertilizer v. Union of India; Re. American Refrigeration Co. Ltd., In re and VIT Sea Foods v. Collector of Customs, wherein the Courts had expressed the similar view. 29. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs (Appeals), while examining the issue of pre-deposit under Section 35 of the Act, after considering a large number of judgments of the Apex Court and various High Courts, it was held as under: assessed or penalty so levied, it will cause undue hardship to the assessee. While considering the said case, the Court placed reliance upon the large number of judgments including Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner (Appeals), Central Excise; Hari Fertilizer v. Union of India; Re. American Refrigeration Co. Ltd., In re and VIT Sea Foods v. Collector of Customs, wherein the Courts had expressed the similar view. 29. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs (Appeals), while examining the issue of pre-deposit under Section 35 of the Act, after considering a large number of judgments of the Apex Court and various High Courts, it was held as under: ‘While considering the case of ‘undue hardship’, theauthority is required to examine the prima facie onmerits of the dispute as well. Pleading of financialdisability would not be the only consideration.Where the case is fully covered in favour of theassessee by a biding precedent like that of thejudgment of the Supreme Court, jurisdictional HighCourt or a Special Bench of the Tribunal, then tostill insist upon the deposit of duty and penaltylevied would certainly cause undue hardship to theassessee. Absence of the financial hardship in such acase would be no ground to decline the dispensation-of predeposit under the proviso to Section 35F. Thepower to dispense with such deposit is conferredunder the authorities has to be exercised precisely incases like this type and if it is not exercised undersuch circumstances then this Court will require it tobe exercised. Such like cases where two views are-not possible then the condition of predeposit beforethe appeal is heard on merits, can be dispensed with.In case two views are possible on interpretation,based on conflicting judgments of the Tribunal ordifferent High Courts in the absence of the judgmentof the jurisdictional High Court then the authoritiesmay pass the order under proviso to Section 35F ofthe Act keeping in view the facts of the case inhand.’……… xxxx xxxx xxxx 35. In view of the above, the aforesaid authorities make itclear that the Court should not grant interim relief/stay ofthe recovery merely by asking of a party. It has tomaintain a balance between the rights of an individual and W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 9 of 11 This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 27/08/2024 at 11:51:40 35. In view of the above, the aforesaid authorities make itclear that the Court should not grant interim relief/stay ofthe recovery merely by asking of a party. It has tomaintain a balance between the rights of an individual and W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 9 of 11 This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 27/08/2024 at 11:51:40 the State so far as the recovery of sovereign dues isconcerned. While considering the application for-stay/waiver of a predeposit, as required under the law, theCourt must apply its mind as to whether the appellant hasa strong prima facie case on merit. In case it is covered bythe judgment of a Court/Tribunal binding upon theAppellate Authority, it should apply its mind as to whetherin view of the said judgment, the appellant is likely tosucceed on merit. If an appellant having strong prima faciecase, is asked to deposit the amount of assessment somade or penalty so levied, it would cause undue hardshipto him, though there may be no financial restrain on theappellant running in a good financial condition. The arguments that appellant is in a position to deposit or if he succeeds in appeal, he will be entitled to get the refund, are not the considerations for deciding the application. The order of the Appellate Authority itself must show that it had applied its mind to the issue raised by the appellant and it has been considered in accordance with the law. Theexpression “undue hardship” has a wider connotation as ittakes within its ambit the case where the assessee is askedto deposit the amount even if he is likely to exoneratefrom the total liability on disposal of his appeal.Dispensation of deposit should also be allowed where twoviews are possible. While considering the application forinterim relief, the Court must examine all pros and consinvolved in the case and further examine that in caserecovery is not stayed, the right of appeal conferred by thelegislature and refusal to exercise the discretionary powerby the authority to stay/waive the predeposit condition,would be reduced to nugatory/illusory. Undoubtedly, theinterest of the Revenue cannot be jeopardized but thatdoes not mean that in order to protect the interest of theRevenue, the Court or authority should exercise its dutyunder the law to take into consideration the rights andinterest of an in dividual. It is also clear that before anygoods could be subjected to duty, it has to be establishedthat it has been manufactured and it is marketable and toprove that it is marketable, the burden is on the Revenueand not on the manufacturer.’ 19.Though some of the decisions noticed by us hereinabove -pertained to predeposit prescriptions placed by a statute, theprinciples enunciated therein would clearly be of relevance whileexamining the extent of the power that stands placed in the handsof the AO in terms of Section 220(6) of the Act. In our consideredopinion, the respondents have clearly erred in proceeding on theassumption that the application for consideration of outstanding W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 10 of 11 This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 27/08/2024 at 11:51:40 demands being placed in abeyance could not have even been-entertained without a 20% predeposit. The aforesaid stand as takenis thoroughly misconceived and wholly untenable in law.” 4.We note that although the petitioner aggrieved by the aforesaid order had also moved the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax[5], no orders have been passed on those applications. W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 10 of 11 This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 27/08/2024 at 11:51:40 demands being placed in abeyance could not have even been-entertained without a 20% predeposit. The aforesaid stand as takenis thoroughly misconceived and wholly untenable in law.” 4.We note that although the petitioner aggrieved by the aforesaid order had also moved the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax[5], no orders have been passed on those applications. 5.In view of the aforesaid and since the order rendered by the ITO is clearly rendered unsustainable, we allow the instant writ petition and quash the order dated 22 June 2023. 6.We accordingly direct the ITO, Ward 43(1), New Delhi to examine the application for stay afresh and bearing in mind the legal position as enunciated in NASSCOM. YASHWANT VARMA, J. AUGUST 13, 2024/vp RAVINDER DUDEJA, J. 5 PCIT W.P.(C) 11197/2024 Page 11 of 11