Shri A. N. Dyaneswaran v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Circle, Ii(4), Ayyakar Bhavan

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.SARAVANAN W.P.No.34571 of 2013 Shri A. N. Dyaneswaran, ... PetitionerVs. 1.The Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle, II(4), Ayyakar Bhavan, No.46, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai 600 034. 2.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle, II(4), Ist Floor, New Building, No.46, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai 600 034. ... Respondents Prayer : Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of theConstitution of India praying for to issue a Writ or order inthe nature of Writ more particularly Writ of Certioraricalling for records of the 2[nd] respondent in assessmentproceedings in C.No.DCIT/C.C-II(4)/2013-14 dated 11.12.2013and No.DCIT/C.C-II(4)/2013-14 dated 09.12.2013 pertaining toPan No.AAFPD4407M, communication dated 19.11.2013, quash thesame as it is being initiated after a lapse of six years fromthe order of this Hon'ble Court in TCA No.150 of 2004 dated03.09.2007. For Petitioner : Senior Counsel Mr.B.Kumar (For Mr. B. Satish Sundar) *** The present writ petition has been filed by thepetitioner for a writ of certiorari, to call for the recordsof the 2[nd]respondent in assessment proceedings inhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/C.No.DCIT/C.C-II(4)/2013-14 dated 11.12.2013 and No.DCIT-II (4)/2013-14 dated 09.12.2013, pertaining to PAN No.AAFPD4407Mvide communication dated 19.11.2013 and quash the same ashaving been initiated after a lapse of 6 years from the orderof this Court in Tax Case (Appeal) No.150 of 2004 dated03.09.2007. 2.The petitioner, a former Managing Director of TamilnaduMinerals Limited (TAMIN) was subject to a block assessment forthe period 01.04.1985 to 20.01.1996, pursuant to a searchconducted at various places of the petitioner and hisassociates on 19/20.01.1996. Several incriminating documentswere recovered and therefore based on the above suchproceedings under Chapter XIVB of the Income Tax Act, 1961were initiated. As per Section 158-BC of the Income Tax Act,1961 as it stood there the time limit for completion of blockassessment was one year from the end of the month in which thelast of the authorization of search under Section 132 or forrequisition under authorization was made. 3.Under these circumstances, an Assessment order came tobe passed on 31.01.1997 under Section 143(3) read with Section158BC of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 4. A very detailed order was passed by the AssistantCommissioner of Income Tax, Chennai on 30.01.1997 for theblock period 1986-1987 to 1996- 1997 upto 20.01.1996 being the date of the search. The orderplaced reliance on the following:- List of Annexures1.Granite Sample PapersAnnexure A(11papers)2.Details of money received for grantAnnexure B(80of quarry leasepapers)3.Dr.Dharmambal Signature & AffidavitAnnexure C(10papers) 4.List of costly gadgetsAnnexure D(1 papers)5.Copy of the seized material relatingAnnexure E(5 papers)to secret commission received by theassessee6.Details of donation to D.N.TrustAnnexure F(6 papers)received as Demand Drafts 5.Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner hereinfiled an appeal under Section 253 (1)(b) of the Income TaxAct, 1961 before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in IT(S&S)A.No.54/Mds/1997 for the assessment years 1986-1987 to 1996-1997. An order came to be passed by the Tribunal on 29.10.2013by partly allowing the appeal. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 6.It is not relevant to delve into the aforesaid orderauthored by the Judicial Member. However what is curious fromthe preamble to the said order is that the Income TaxDepartment was not represented by any of the authorizedrepresentatives before the Tribunal and the order came to bepassed based on written submissions filed. The cause titlereads as under: (Block Assessment years: 1986-1987 to 1996-1997)Shri A.N.Dyaneswaran,Chennai.:Appellant https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 6.It is not relevant to delve into the aforesaid orderauthored by the Judicial Member. However what is curious fromthe preamble to the said order is that the Income TaxDepartment was not represented by any of the authorizedrepresentatives before the Tribunal and the order came to bepassed based on written submissions filed. The cause titlereads as under: (Block Assessment years: 1986-1987 to 1996-1997)Shri A.N.Dyaneswaran,Chennai.:Appellant Asstt.Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Circle II(4), Chennai.:RespondentAppellant by: Shri K.RaviRespondent by: None (Written submissions filed). 7.It appears that the case was taken up for hearing on20.02.2013 and since the hearing could not be completed onthat date. It was adjourned to 24.02.2003 and heard again on24.02.2003 and 25.02.2003 on which date the departmentalrepresentative submitted that he would require the presence ofthe Assessing Officer while making submissions and thereforerequested for adjournment of the case to the 3[rd] week of April,2003. It was submitted that the Assessing Officer would bebusy, for completing the assessments as the time forcompleting the assessment in his circle would expire. TheTribunal therefore directed the counsel for the petitionerbefore the Tribunal to file a written submission and supply acopy of the same to Departmental representative in advance andthe Departmental representative was directed to file a replybefore the next date of hearing and the matter was adjournedto 22.04.2003. 8.The case was thereafter taken up for hearing on19.05.2003 and again when the matter was taken up for hearing,there was a request for adjournment on behalf of the IncomeTax Department. It appears that a letter dated 19.05.2003 wasfiled before the Tribunal for adjournment with the followingrequest:- ''Since no one else is conversant withthe case, please forward the enclosed writtensubmissionoftheDepartmentalRepresentatives before the Hon.Members,Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 'A' Bench forfavour of their orders.'' Rejecting the request of the Income Tax Department, thefollowing observations:-''The case is treated as closed. Thehttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/Department may file the reply if desire so on or before 18[th] June 2003 and after gettingthe copies the assessee if so desire a re-joinder within a week of getting hisreply.'' 9.The Tribunal thereafter proceeded to pass an orderdated 29.10.2003 and thereby granted substantial relief to thepetitioner. 10.Aggrieved by the same, the respondent Income TaxDepartment filed the TCA.No.150 of 2004 before the DivisionBench of this Court under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act,1961. The Division bench of this Court by its order dated03.09.2007 framed the following substantial questions of law:- 1.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal had enough materialto hold, as was right in deleting theadditions made on account of money received bythe assessee from persons seeking granitemining licenses from TAMIN? 2.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal was right in holdingthat the case found in the assessee's officeand residential premises was amounts given tothe Tamil Nadu Basket Ball Association? 3.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal was right intreating the huge investments made in thenames of the assessee's mother and son as notthat of the assessee on the ground that sincethe mother had filed a declaration under KVSSand since the son is a bank officer who has anindependent source of income? 4.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal was right in holdingthat the amounts in deposits in the name ofDr.Dharmambal Namasivayam Trust cannot beincluded in the hands of the assessee underChapter XIV-B in the absence of clear evidencefound as a result of search? 3.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal was right intreating the huge investments made in thenames of the assessee's mother and son as notthat of the assessee on the ground that sincethe mother had filed a declaration under KVSSand since the son is a bank officer who has anindependent source of income? 4.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal was right in holdingthat the amounts in deposits in the name ofDr.Dharmambal Namasivayam Trust cannot beincluded in the hands of the assessee underChapter XIV-B in the absence of clear evidencefound as a result of search? 5.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal had enough materialto hold, and was right in accepting theassessee's explanation that the costly sareesworth Rs.10.20 lakhs found during the searchwere received as gifts at the time ofmarriage? 6.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal was right indeleting the addition on account of estimatedmarriage expenses of the assessee's son? 7.Whether in the facts and circumstanceshttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/of the case, the Tribunal had enough material to hold and was right in holding that theadvance given to the Tamil nadu Basket BallAssociation by the assessee came out ofcollections made for the association? 8.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal was right indeleting the addition on account of secretcommission received by the assessee fromforeign companies for sale of granite, on theground that the revenue had not placed onrecord how the amount was received by theassessee? 9.Whether the facts and circumstances ofthe case, the Tribunal was right in holdingthat the foreign currency found in theassessee's house belonged to Seethalakshmi onthe basis of a mere statement? 10.Whether the facts and circumstances ofthe case, the Tribunal was right in holdingthat the addition in respect of fixed depositsin the name of Narayanan should be deletedfrom the hands of the assessee as the saidNarayanan had filed KVSS declarations? 11.Whether in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the Tribunal was hyper technicalin insisting only on direct evidence to proveeach addition, and in not acceptingcircumstantial evidence?. 11.The Division bench of this Court after hearing thesubstantial questions raised by the respondent Income TaxDepartment ultimately partly set aside the order of theTribunal vide its order dated 03.09.2007 and remitted the caseback with a direction to re-consider the matter afresh,keeping in view of the discussions made therein, and to passorders after giving opportunity to the petitioner inaccordance with law. The operative portion of the order dated03.09.2007 of the Division Bench of this Court in TCA No.150of 2004 is reproduced below:- 6.To summarise:- 12.Aggrieved by the above order dated 03.09.2007 of theDivision Bench of this Court in TCA No.150 of 2004, thehttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/respondent Income Tax Department filed an appeal with a delay before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Though, the number of delayhas not be explained in the counter filed by the respondentIncome Tax Department, what is evident is that the SLP filedby the respondent Income Tax Department against the orderdated 03.09.2007 of the Division Bench of this Court inTCA.No.150 of 2004 was dismissed only on the ground of delayin filing the appeal by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide itsorder dated 05.07.2013. 6.To summarise:- 12.Aggrieved by the above order dated 03.09.2007 of theDivision Bench of this Court in TCA No.150 of 2004, thehttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/respondent Income Tax Department filed an appeal with a delay before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Though, the number of delayhas not be explained in the counter filed by the respondentIncome Tax Department, what is evident is that the SLP filedby the respondent Income Tax Department against the orderdated 03.09.2007 of the Division Bench of this Court inTCA.No.150 of 2004 was dismissed only on the ground of delayin filing the appeal by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide itsorder dated 05.07.2013. 13.Pursuant to the dismissal of the SLP filed by therespondent Income Tax Department, notice dated 19.11.2013 wasissued to the petitioner which has been impugned in this writpetition wherein the respondent Income Tax Department hasstated that the an opportunity was being given to thepetitioner to work out the modality for cross examination ofabout 29 persons who had given statement against thepetitioner and the petitioner was to make his own arrangementfor cross examining these persons at his convenience indifferent places in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.The respondent also includes 3 seized materials and thatentries relating to same which reads as follows: 7.In this connection, it is seen thatin 3 seized material viz. NGN/B&D/LS-15,NGN/B&D/LS-17 and NGN/B&D/LS-18, there are149, 53 and 420 entries respectively, totalling to 622 entries. The full listof these entries are enclosed herewith.Out of the 29 persons referred to above,entries relating to some of them are foundin this list also which is indicatedseparately in the list as (***). Exceptvery few cases as above, these entries donot have complete addresses. Thus in theabsence of complete address, as directedby the Hon'ble High court the enquiriescannot be extended to other persons inthis list even on a sampling basis if notfor all persons. 8.It is seen that these 3 seizedmaterials fall under the category of beingin your own letterhead or that of TAMINand also in your handwriting apparently.Therefore, you are requested to furnishthe complete address of these persons inthe list and also explain the nature ofits contents, so that the order of theHigh Court could be implemented. In thisconnection, your attention is also drawnto the provisions of section 132(4A) ofthe Income Tax Act. 14.The petitioner partly participated in the saidproceedings and thereafter raised an objection under Sectionhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/131(1) A of the Income Tax Department and stated that the proceedings were been conducted in violation of principles ofnatural justice. By communication dated 11.12.2013 DeputyCommissioner of Income Tax informed the petitioner that thequestioning the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Central Circle II (4), Chennai was rejected asdevoid of merits as a cross objection of proceedings wereconducted in his capacity of the Assessing Officer as per thedirections of the High Court and there were 3 persons who werepresent and are made available for the petitioner to commencehis cross examination. The petitioner was therefore calledupon to commence cross examination of these witnesses. 15.On receipt of the above communication dated 11.12.2013the petitioner filed the present writ petition for the aboverelief. The case of the petitioner in the present writpetition is that though the respondent have re-commencedthe remand proceedings after a lapse of six years from03.09.2007 from the date of disposal of the petitioner'sAppeal in TCA.No.150 of 2004 by this Court. 15.On receipt of the above communication dated 11.12.2013the petitioner filed the present writ petition for the aboverelief. The case of the petitioner in the present writpetition is that though the respondent have re-commencedthe remand proceedings after a lapse of six years from03.09.2007 from the date of disposal of the petitioner'sAppeal in TCA.No.150 of 2004 by this Court. 16.It is submitted that there was no reasonable excuse onthe part of the respondent in delaying to comply with thedirections of this Court. It is submitted that even thoughthere is no time limit prescribed in the order of the HighCourt remanding the case back to the 2[nd] respondent to completethe assessment, it should have commenced within a reasonableperiod of time. 17.The said proceedings should have been commenced andcompleted within a reasonable period and therefore thecommencing under the proceedings long after the event bymerely producing few witnesses for cross examination was inviolation of principles of natural justice. 18.It is further submitted that the entire investigationwas based on certain records allegedly evidencing receipt ofCommission for giving mineral license to about 971 persons outof which only 23 were examined by the Department and thereforethe assessment proposed was based on sampling and cannot beaccepted. 19.The department had itself admitted the inabilitylocate the scores of the persons from whom the petitioner hadallegedly received commission during the information allegedlygathered during the search conducted on 19/20.01.1997. 20.It is submitted that the Division Bench of this Courthas categorically held that the respondent cannot proceedwithout corroborative evidence of persons whose statementshave been recorded. It is submitted that the seized materialsrelate to 345 applicants, however no dates have beenmentioned. In respect of the same, the Assessing Officerhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/totalled the amount and made the addition of Rs.20,31,99,350/- in the year of search, i.e, for the assessment year 1996-1997.It is submitted that huge addition was made withoutverification from the 345 persons. The fact whether reallyamounts were paid or not is not mentioned. Even if is assumedthat the said amounts were paid, the details regarding thedates of payment are not mentioned. Without considering theabove aspects, the Assessing Officer has made addition withoutany factual basis and justification. 21.It is submitted that under these circumstances, thecase was remitted back to the Assessing Officer with aspecific direction to consider the matter afresh, keeping inview of the discussions made in the order, and to pass ordersafter giving opportunity to the assessee in accordance withlaw. 22.The learned Senior Counsel appearing for thepetitioner further submits that under Section 158BH of theIncome Tax Act, 1961 it has been provided that save asotherwise provided in a search conduct, all the otherprovision of the Acts were applied assessment made in chapter14 of the Income Tax Act, i.e, (XIV) and therefore submitsthere should be a harmonious interpretation to the provisionsof the Income Tax Act, 1961 in the context of remand order.The respondents should have completed the assessmentproceedings within a period of 1 year. However the Departmenthas taken about 6 years to implement the order of the HighCourt and that the delay is not excusable. 23.In this connection, learned senior counsel placed thereliance on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in thecase of in the case of Manik Chand Burman Vs. Income-TaxOfficer (1998) 229 ITR 90 which reads as under: 23.In this connection, learned senior counsel placed thereliance on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in thecase of in the case of Manik Chand Burman Vs. Income-TaxOfficer (1998) 229 ITR 90 which reads as under: 2.This is a classic example of thecallousness and the lethargic attitude of therespondent. The facts are that the assessmentcame to be completed for the year 1949-50 onthe petitioner on March 23, 1954. Thepetitioner, aggrieved by the said assessmentorder, went up in appeal. The AppellateAssistant commissioner of Income Tax by hisorder dated December 30, 1957, set aside theassessment order directing the AssessingOfficer to redo the assessment in the light ofdirections as contained in the appellate order.The petitioner thereafter was called upon toappear before the Assessing Officer on severaldates. Several notices had been issued duringthe period, ranging from 1970 to 1976. After alapse of about 7 years, the respondent issuedtwo notices dated January 18, 1983, and January28, 1983, and then the petitioner filed theinstant writ petition before this Courthttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/challenging the impugned notices mainly on the ground that after a considerable lapse of time,the respondent was not justified in havingissued the said notices. In paragraph No.19 ofthe writ petition, it is stated that at therelevant time, there was no limitation formaking such assessment. However, learnedcounsel for the petitioner submits before usthat when no limitation is prescribed, then therespondent should have made the assessmentwithin a reasonable time. It is a well-settledprinciple of law that when no limitation isprescribed to complete an assessment, the sameshould be done within a reasonable time. Inthe absence of the law of limitation, therespondent is not free to take up theproceedings at any time. 4.It is therefore, clear from Sub-section(2A) of Section 153 of the Income-Tax Act thatafter setting aside or cancellation, an orderof assessment may be made at any time beforethe expiry of two years from the end of thefinancial year in which the order under Section146 cancelling the assessment is passed by theAssessing Officer. Prior to the insertion ofSub Section (2A) in Section 153 in the year1970, there was a Circular No.10-P(V-68) of1968, dated 15[th] October, 1968, to the effectthat if any assessment has been set aside inappeal that should normally be completed withintwo years. The period of limitation assuggested in the said circular was lateraccepted by the Central legislation and this ishow sub-section (2A) came to be inserted inSection 153 of the Income-Tax Act. From, thisit is manifest that the Department neverintended to keep the proceedings open foryears. Though limitation was not there beforesub-section (2A) was inserted in Section 153yet the circular clearly indicates theDepartment's intention in this regard.Therefore, even if limitation was not thereunder the old Act, still it is not open tolearned Standing Counsel to argue that theassessment could have been completed at anytime in case an order in appeal for redoing theassessment was passed. 24.The learned senior counsel for the petitionerthereafter placed the reliance on the decision of the KeralaHigh Court in K.Iswara Bhat Vs. Commissioner of AgriculturalIncome-tax (2000) ITR 238 wherein Division Bench of this Courtheld that proceedings initiated were set aside with ahttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/direction to the assessing authority to assess the assessee in as HUF. Delay in initiating the proceedings was heldunreasonable and irrational as order was passed after aninordinate delay. 24.The learned senior counsel for the petitionerthereafter placed the reliance on the decision of the KeralaHigh Court in K.Iswara Bhat Vs. Commissioner of AgriculturalIncome-tax (2000) ITR 238 wherein Division Bench of this Courtheld that proceedings initiated were set aside with ahttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/direction to the assessing authority to assess the assessee in as HUF. Delay in initiating the proceedings was heldunreasonable and irrational as order was passed after aninordinate delay. 25.The another decision of this Court in the case ofM.Srinivasa Rao Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax(2007) 295 ITR 136 was invited which followed the decisions ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamd Amin Vs.Fatmabal Ibrahim (1997) 6 SCC 71 wherein held as follows:It was held that time limit is notprescribed under Section 153(3) of theAct, the impugned proceedings initiated bythe respondent after a lapse of six yearscannot be allowed to continue, hence, theimpugned order is quashed and the writpetition is allowed. The fact that theTribunal had remitted the case back to theAssessing Officer for fresh considerationby its order dated 09.07.2001, afterholding an enquiry regarding the entry inthe trial balance of S.M.S.Gardensreceiving Rs.3,96,000 from one Periyaswamytowards sale of old furniture and fixturesat Rs.3,96,000 and whether this amount wasreally given by the petitioner orPeriyasamy. 26.It is submitted that there the impugned proceedingsinitiated by the respondent after a lapse of six years of theorder could not be allowed to be continued and therefore theimpugned order was quashed and the writ petition was allowed.Therefore, the Tribunal had remitted the case back to theAssessing Officer for fresh consideration, by its order dated09.07.2001, after holding an enquiry regarding the entry inthe trial balance of S.M.S.Gardens receiving Rs.3,96,000 fromone Periyaswamy towards sale of old furniture and fixtures atRs.3,96,000 and whether this amount was really given by thepetitioner or Periyasamy. It is the further case of thepetitioner that after the order of the Tribunal, therespondent has not taken any action for holding an enquiry forpassing fresh assessment order with regard to addition ofRs.3,96,000. 27.The learned Senior Counsel also referred to thedecision of this Court in GE T & D India Limited Vs DeputyCommissioner of Income-Tax, Company Circle I(1), Chennai[2019] 414 ITR 727 (Mad) was followed by the followingobservations:22.The alternate ground raised by thepetitioneristhattheassessmentproceedings requires to be made within areasonable time and as such, the delay of 8years and 7 months is inordinate andhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/unreasonable and therfore, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. One of the settledproposition of law, as decided in variousdecisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court as wellas many High Courts is that where nolimitation is prescribed for completion ofreassessment, such prcess must be completedwithin a reasonable time and thisproposition would depend on the facts andcircumstances of each and every case. 28.The learned senior counsel also submits that thedecisions rendered in Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjaband Others Vs. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk ProducersUnion Limited (2007) 11 SCC 363 wherein held as follows:“In Section 21 of the Act although noperiod of limitation has been prescribedtheefor, the same would not mean that thesuo motu power can be exercised at anytime. It is trite that if no period oflimitation has been prescribed, statutoryauthority must exercise its jurisdictionwithin a reasonable period. What,however, shall be the reasonable periodwould depend upon the nature of thestatute, rights and liabilities thereunderand other relevant factors.” 28.The learned senior counsel also submits that thedecisions rendered in Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjaband Others Vs. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk ProducersUnion Limited (2007) 11 SCC 363 wherein held as follows:“In Section 21 of the Act although noperiod of limitation has been prescribedtheefor, the same would not mean that thesuo motu power can be exercised at anytime. It is trite that if no period oflimitation has been prescribed, statutoryauthority must exercise its jurisdictionwithin a reasonable period. What,however, shall be the reasonable periodwould depend upon the nature of thestatute, rights and liabilities thereunderand other relevant factors.” 29.The learned senior counsel for the petitioner furtherdrew attention to the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Courtin Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs. NHK Japan BroadcastingCorporation (2008) 305 ITR 137 wherein it was held as follows:Whether the Income-tax AppellateTribunal was correct in law in holding thatthe orders passed under Section 201(1) and201(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, areinvalid and barred by time having beenpassed beyond a reasonable period? Filingof paper books is dispensed with. Since,the question arising in this appeal hasarisen in a large number of other appeals,we have heard the matter in full andproceed to deliver the judgment rather thanmerely admitting the matter for taking itup in due course. 30.The learned counsel for the petitioner also placed adecision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Nokia IndiaPrivate Limited Vs Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax in W.P.(C).No.1773 of 2016 order dated 21.09.2017 whrein the Hon'bleDelhi High Court held as under:23. The Court is also unable to agree withhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/the contention that unless the entire assessment order is wholly set aside, thetime limit for passing the fresh orderunder Section 153 (2A) would not btattracted. There is no warrant for suchan interpretation. The object behindintroduction of sub-section (2A) was toprescribe a time limit for completing theassessment proceedings upon the originalassessment being set aside or beingcancelled in appeal. Clearly, theintention was not to restrict theapplicability of sub-section (2A) only tosuch cases where the 'entire' originalassessment order is set aside. 25. In the present case, of the sevenissues, the assessment in respect of fivewas set aside and the issues remanded fora fresh determination. Whether the remandwas to the TPO or the DRP would not make adifference as long as what results fromthe remand is a fresh assessment of theissue. Clearly, therefore, the time limitfor completing that exercise was governedby Section 153(2A) of the Act. 31.The learned counsel also states that prior to 1968,there was no limitation prescribed and that there was acircular and thereafter the Act has been amended and it hasbeen specifically amended with a view to put an effort tocomplete the assessment proceedings in time. 32.Finally, the learned senior counsel for thepetitioner also drew my attention an unreported decision ofthe Delhi High Court at New Delhi in ITA 23/2021 & CM Appl.5385/2021 (Condonation of Delay) in PCIT (Central) – 3 Vs.Anand Kumar Jain (HUF) and ITA 26/2021 & CM Appl.5516/2021(Condonation of Delay) in PCIT (Central) – 3 Vs. Anand KumarJain and ITA 27/2021 & CM Appl.5522/2021 (Condonation ofDelay) in PCIT (Central) – 3 Vs. Satish Dev Jain and ITA28/2021 & CM Appl.5524/2021 (Condonation of Delay) in PCIT(Central) – 3 Vs.Sajan Kumar Jain and ITA 29/2021 & CMAppl.5525/2021 (Condonation of Delay) in PCIT (Central) – 3Vs. Anand Kumar Jain and ITA 30/2021 & CM Appl. 5526/2021(Condonation of Delay) in PCIT (Central) – 3 Vs. Anand KumarJain and ITA 31/2021 & CM Appl.5540/2021 (Condonation ofDelay) in PCIT (Central) – 3 Vs. Satish Dev Jain. 33.It is submitted that statement howsoever incriminatingduring the search made under Section 132(4) of the Income TaxAct, though has evidentiary value and is relevant, suchstatement cannot, on a standalone basis, without reference tohttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/any other material discovered during search and seizure operations, empower an AO to frame the block assessment. 34. A reference was made to a decision of the DivisionBench of the Andhra High Court in CIT Vs Sri Ramdas MotorTransport Ltd (1999) 238 ITR 177 (AP), wherein it was heldthat a reading of the provision of Section 132(4) of the Actin the context of discovery of undisclosed income, where nodocuments or incriminating material is found, the powers underSection 132(4) of the Act cannot be invoked. 35.Defending the impugned order, the learned counsel forthe respondent submits that the petitioner had participated inthe proceedings initiated pursuant to remand order of the HighCourt. He submits that there was a reasonable excuse for notimplementing the order of the High Court in as much as therespondent had preferred an appeal against the order of theHigh Court. 36.After the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the SLP on05.07.2013, the first communication was sent on 19.11.2013and called upon the petitioner to participate in theproceedings. He therefore prays for dismissal of the presentwrit petition. 37.Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and thelearned counsel for the respondent. 38.The only question that arises in the present case iswhether the delay in implementing the order dated 03.09.2007of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in T.C.A.No.150 of2004, after a lapse of six years, on 09.12.2013 can beconstrued as an unreasonable period and therefore whether theentire proceedings initiated by the respondent was to bequashed. 39.It is the case of the petitioner, that the periodcovered under the block Assessment order is for the year 1986-1987 to 1996-1997. Block Assessment order was passed on31.01.1998. The said proceedings were initiated and whichculminated in the order of the Hon'ble High Court on03.09.2007. Therefore it was incriminating on the part of theIncome Tax Department to complete the proceedings. Thepetitioner cannot be accepted to participate in theproceedings by vesting different place of the licensee who hadallegedly given the cross examination to the petitioner duringthe period between 1986-1987 to 1996-1997. 40.It is further submitted that for the seized materialsrelating to 345 applicants, no dates have been mentioned. Inrespect of the same, the Assessing Officer totalled the amountand made the additions of Rs.20,31,99,350/- in the year ofsearch, i.e., for the assessment year 1996-1997. The Revenueobtained statement only from 23 applicants and left out 971applicants who applied for license. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 41.It is noted that out of 971 names found in the notebook one to one correlation cannot be made. Out of 971 onlyfor 23 persons will be called upon for cross examination.This will not sub serve or comply with the order of remand.The procedure sought to be adopted is also wrong as theassesse cannot be directed to go with his consultant tovarious part of this country to cross examining any of thewitnesses. 42. I have considered arguments advanced by the SeniorCounsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for theIncome Tax Department. 41.It is noted that out of 971 names found in the notebook one to one correlation cannot be made. Out of 971 onlyfor 23 persons will be called upon for cross examination.This will not sub serve or comply with the order of remand.The procedure sought to be adopted is also wrong as theassesse cannot be directed to go with his consultant tovarious part of this country to cross examining any of thewitnesses. 42. I have considered arguments advanced by the SeniorCounsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for theIncome Tax Department. 43.There are no disputes as far as the facts areconcerned. The petitioner was a senior Indian AdministrativeService officer and was serving as the Chairman Cum,Managing Director of the Tamil Nadu Minerals Ltd,(TAMIN) TamilNadu State Government Undertaking when a search wasconducted under section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 invarious places of the petitioner and his associates on19/20.1.1996. He was accused of having amassed wealth beyondhis known source of income by receiving bribe whilegiving mining licence to various applicants. 44.During the search, several incriminating documentsand evidence were recovered including unaccounted cash and jewellery. They were seized and recovered. Substantial cashis said to have been recovered from his residential house fora sum of Rs.15.59 lakhs and Rs. 1.48 crore from his officeroom in TAMIN apart from several valuable goods in the form ofjewellery and valuables which were not disclosed by him inany of the returns during any of the preceding assessmentyears. The petitioner was therefore remanded to judicialcustody. 45.Under these circumstances, proceeding under section158-BC read with Section 158-BB and other provisions of theIncome Tax Act, 1961 was initiated against thepetitioner for the block period between 1.4.1985 to 20.1.1996as it stood then under Chapter XIV B of the Income Tax Act,1961. 46.The said notice was served on the petitioner whilehe was under incarceration in the central prison. Thepetitioner thereafter filed his return on 29.11.1996 admitting“nil” undisclosed income. 47.Under these circumstances, a notice dated 13.12.1996was also issued under section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act,1961. It was the defence of the petitioner that the cash thatwere recovered from his office and house belonged to theTamil Nadu Basketball Association of which he was the president. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 48.Records also indicate that the petitioner hadattempted to stymie income tax proceedings by filing writpetitions and contempt proceedings. 49.The block assessment order dated 31.1.1997 wasthereafter passed by the Assistant Commissioner of IncomeTax which records several shenanigans of the petitioner. Thepetitioner therefore filed an appeal before the Income TaxAppellate Tribunal, at Chennai. 50.Be that as it may, as mentioned above, the petitionergot a favourable verdict from the Income Tax AppellateTribunal vide order dated 29.10.2003. The Respondent IncomeTax Department thereafter filed Tax Case (Appeal) No. 150 of2004 before the Division Bench of this Court which came tobe disposed on 3.9.2007. 51. As mentioned above elsewherein this order, aDivision Bench of this Court granted substantial reliefand remanded the case back to the respondent. In thisconnection, it will be useful to refer to few passages from the decision of the Division Bench which are reproducedbelow:- “ Question No. 1—Additions made on account ofmoney received by the assessee from personsseeking mining licences from TAMIN. 50.Be that as it may, as mentioned above, the petitionergot a favourable verdict from the Income Tax AppellateTribunal vide order dated 29.10.2003. The Respondent IncomeTax Department thereafter filed Tax Case (Appeal) No. 150 of2004 before the Division Bench of this Court which came tobe disposed on 3.9.2007. 51. As mentioned above elsewherein this order, aDivision Bench of this Court granted substantial reliefand remanded the case back to the respondent. In thisconnection, it will be useful to refer to few passages from the decision of the Division Bench which are reproducedbelow:- “ Question No. 1—Additions made on account ofmoney received by the assessee from personsseeking mining licences from TAMIN. 9.The most important set of documentsseized from the brief cases of the assesseeduring the search are those numbered NGN/B &D/LS-1 to 18 from the Anna Nagar residence. Thedocuments referred to above were kept in threebrief cases and the same is related to grant ofmining licences. They contain the names andaddresses of various persons who had soughtallotment of mining lease, the place (s) of thequarry, survey number of the lands where thequarry was situated, denominations of somecurrency etc. The documents seized from thebrief cases of the assessee, can by and large,be classified into three categories of sourcematerial:“(a) The first category is the slips of paperfrom the applicants and/or their representativesin the handwriting of either the applicant or arepresentative containing the name and at times,the address of the applicant, the location ofthe land for which mining licences is requested(details of such as the name of the village,taluk, district, survey number and extent ofland). Some slips contain the quality of granitesuch as black, paradiso, kashmiri etc. and someslips contain certain denominations of money. (b) The second category of data is handwrittenhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/notes, prima facie, in the handwriting of Shri Dyaneswaran on his own letter heads and theletter heads of the TAMIN (confirmed to be hishandwriting by the Govt. Examiner of questioneddocuments). Each of the entries contain detailssuch as serial number, name of the applicant,name of the place, survey number and extent andthe amount. Generally, this amount is shown in acoded form that too decimal places. Apparently,the whole number stood for lakhs and thedecimals stood for thousands. Some of theentries have been rounded off and/or tick-marked. In respect of some others, another codednumber is written below that, probablyindicating the amount received or receivable.(c) The third set of documents are typed sheetswith details of the name and brief address ofthe applicant, the details of the mine, viz.,the village, taluk and survey number, the natureof granite and extent. These were probablyprepared by the staff who prepared papers forconsideration of the High Level Committee orthose who prepared the minutes of the meetingsof the High Level Committee. Against most of thetimes, in a coded form some handwritten numberswith two decimal places have been recorded.These handwritten numbers are prima facie in thehandwriting of Shri. Dyaneswaran. In fact, onsome of the typed sheets where some columns areleft blank, they are seen to have been filled upby him in his hand. The coded numbers in thelast column in their list and the list referredto above at (b) cannot be just wished away asinconsequential or meaningless numbers as theyhave been totalled and certain calculations havealso been made based on such numbers.” 52. After discussion, the Court observed asunder:- 52. After discussion, the Court observed asunder:- 13. From the above, it is clear that outof the seized materials, only 23 cases wereexamined as against 994 licensees. In this case,the Assessing Officer selected only 23 mininglicensees out of 994 licensees and obtained thestatements from the said 23 mining licensees.Based on the statements given by them, he cameto the conclusion that the assessee receivedillegal money and the same is treated asundisclosed income of the assessee. In respectof remaining 971 mining licensees, there was nofurther enquiry or no statements were obtainedby the Assessing Officer, and without furtherenquiry and investigation into the matter, thehttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Assessing Officer came to the conclusion thatthe assessee would have received illegal moneyand the same is treated as undisclosed income.Here, it is seen that even though he obtainedstatements from 23 persons, no opportunity wasgiven to the assessee to cross-examine. Further,in respect of others, no statement was obtainedor no cross-verification was done. Also, noother evidence were produced by the Revenue.When the assessee asked for cross-examining inrespect of 23 persons, the Assessing Officer hasnot given any opportunity to cross-examine.Besides, no opportunity is given by the Revenueto cross-examine the remaining persons. Thepapers seized from the brief cases had beendivided into three, one prepared by theapplicants or their representatives in theirhandwriting with their addresses, location, etc.in which there is no mention of any of theassessee's alleged handwriting. The secondcategory is written notes, which according tothe Revenue, prima facie, by the assessee in hisletter head or that of TAMIN, which is in thehandwriting of the assessee, which fact had beenconfirmed by the handwriting expert. Thesepapers contain coded numbers with two decimalswhich apparently stand for lakhs and thousands,according to the Revenue. In the same papers,another coded number is written below the firstcoded figures which, according to the Revenue,probably indicate the amount received orreceivable and the third set of papers is saidto be prepared by the staff who prepare suchpapers for the High Level Committee for itsmeeting. Again, in these papers there were codedhandwritten number with decimals which againprima facie, according to the Revenue, is in thehandwriting of the assessee. From the above, itis clear that regarding first set of papers,there is no claim even by the Revenue that it iswritten in the assessee's handwriting and onlyin some papers there is mention of somedenominations of money. It is not clear how theAssessing Officer arrived at the conclusion thatthe coded figures are standing for lakhs andthousands. It is again not certain whether it isa receipt or payment. The Revenue was of theview that it stands for receipt. There is nocorroborative evidence to hold that it isactually receipt. But, in this case,