Shrikant Vasudev Naik v. The Assistant Commissioner Of Income Taxcircle 1(1), Panaji Goa. Having His Office At Aayakar Bhavan,1[St] Floor, 5 Edc Complex, Patto Plaza,Panaji Goa

Amrut IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA WRIT PETITION NO.47 OF 2022 Shrikant Vasudev Naik,S/o Vasudev Naik, 70 years of age,Retired, Indian National,Resident of H.No.956/A, Vasudeo Smruti Tarachi Bhat,Siolim, Bardez 403 517… Petitioner Versus 1. The Assistant Commissioner of Income TaxCircle 1(1), Panaji Goa. Having his office at Aayakar Bhavan,1[st] Floor, 5 EDC Complex, Patto Plaza,Panaji Goa. 2. Principal Commissioner of Income TaxHaving his office at Aayakar Bhavan,1[st] Floor, 5 EDC Complex, Patto Plaza,Panaji Goa. …Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION NO.48 OF 2022 Indirabai Shrikant Naik, W/o Shrikant Naik, 70 years of age, Housewife, Indian National, Resident of H.No.956/A, Vasudeo Smruti Tarachi Bhat, Siolim, Bardez 403 517...PetitionerVersus1. The Assistant Commissioner of Income TaxCircle (1), Panaji Goa. Having his office at Aayakar Bhavan,1[st] Floor, 5 EDC Complex, Patto Plaza,Panaji Goa. 2. Principal Commissioner of Income TaxHaving his office at Aayakar Bhavan,1[st] Floor, 5 EDC Complex, Patto Plaza,Panaji Goa. ...Respondents Mr Shivan Desai, Advocate for the Petitioners. Ms Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for the Respondents. CORAM: M. S. SONAK &BHARAT P. DESHPANDE,JJ DATED: 26[th] SEPTEMBER 2022 ORAL JUDGMENT ( Per M. S. Sonak, J) 1.Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2.The learned counsel agree that a common judgment and ordercan dispose of both these petitions because the issues of law and factare almost identical. The Petitioner in Writ Petition No.48 of 2022 isthe wife of the Petitioner in Writ Petition No.47 of 2022. GivenSection 5A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, separate returns were filedby the wife and the husband for the Assessment Year 2016-2017.Therefore, the issues of law and facts raised in both these petitions areidentical. Accordingly, writ Petition No.47 of 2022 is taken the leadpetition. 3.The Petitioners filed their income tax returns under Section139(1) for the Assessment Year 2016-2017. This was followed by arevised return of income on 18.01.2017, declaring a total income of ₹1,17,69,130/-. On 11.08.2017, their cases were considered forlimited scrutiny, and a notice under Section 143(2) was issued tothem. 4.Notice dated 11.08.2017 stated that the following issues havebeen identified for examination: "i. Whether value of consideration for computation of capital gains has been correctly shown in the return of income. ii. Whether deduction from capital gains has been claimedcorrectly. iii. Whether investment and income relating to properties areduly disclosed." 5.The Petitioners claim to have responded to the above noticedated 11.08.2017 by submitting all documents about the income forAssessment Year 2016-2017. In particular, the Petitioners claim thatthey furnished the documents relating to the sale transaction of theproperty, including the MOU dated 30.08.2007, the sale deed dated14.07.2015, and the MOU dated 30.03.2016. 6.The Assessing Officer vide his order dated 19.12.2018 acceptedthe Petitioners returned income and consequentially the explanationfurnished by the Petitioners that were backed with the relevantdocuments as aforesaid. In particular, the computation sheet appendedto the Assessment Order dated 19.12.2018 shows that the deductions to the extent of 1,64,45,000/- claimed by the Petitioners under₹Section 48 of the I.T. Act, were allowed by the Assessing Officer. 7.On 27.03.2021, the Petitioners were served with impugnednotices under Section 148 of the I.T. Act seeking to reopen theassessment for the Assessment Year 2016-2017. By communicationdated 01.04.2021, the Petitioners sought reasons for reopening ofassessment after enclosing a copy of the return of income forAssessment Year 2016-2017. 6.The Assessing Officer vide his order dated 19.12.2018 acceptedthe Petitioners returned income and consequentially the explanationfurnished by the Petitioners that were backed with the relevantdocuments as aforesaid. In particular, the computation sheet appendedto the Assessment Order dated 19.12.2018 shows that the deductions to the extent of 1,64,45,000/- claimed by the Petitioners under₹Section 48 of the I.T. Act, were allowed by the Assessing Officer. 7.On 27.03.2021, the Petitioners were served with impugnednotices under Section 148 of the I.T. Act seeking to reopen theassessment for the Assessment Year 2016-2017. By communicationdated 01.04.2021, the Petitioners sought reasons for reopening ofassessment after enclosing a copy of the return of income forAssessment Year 2016-2017. 8.On 23.12.2021, the Petitioners received the impugned noticesunder Section 143(2) read with Section 147 of the I.T. Act. Thereasons for reopening of the assessment accompanied the impugnednotices, and the same read as follows:- "Reasons for reopening of the assessment in case ofShrikant Vasudev Naik A.Y. 2016-17 u/s. 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 1. The assessee is a Individual. It has filed return of income forthe assessment year 2016-17 on 18-01-2017 declaring incomeof Rs. 1,17,69,130/-. The case is selected for scrutinyassessment which is completed on 19.12.2018 declaringassessed income of Rs. 1,17,69,130/-. 2. It is brought to the notice of the assessing officer that assesseehad received a total sales consideration of Rs. 9,93,60,000/-from the sale of ancestral property. He paid an amount ofRs. 1,64,45,000/- being damages & compensation and samehas been reduced from the full value of consideration. Out ofthis, the assessee share is Rs. 82,22,500/-. After claiming expenses like brokerage, indexation compensation anddeductions u/s 54F & 54EC, the assessee declared net capitalgain of Rs.93,40,387/-. 3. It is observed from the records that the assessee has claimedexpenditure of Rs.1,64,45,000/- by way of compensation andreduced from total consideration received. The assessee hadreceived an advance towards creation of right/actionable claimsin the immovable property from two companies viz. ResicomHomes pvt. Itd and M/s. DSouza.. The purchases weresupposed to complete the contract of sale within a reasonabletime and pay balance consideration. However, the buyer couldnot make remaining payments which prompted the assessee tosearch of alternate buyers. Finally the assessee identified analternative buyer viz Kiran Thakur who offered a better pricefor the said property and the assessee canceled the sale deedagreement of earlier buyers viz Resicom Homes pvt Itd andD Souza estate Holdings Pvt Ltd by paying compensation forbreach of agreement. Accordingly, the assesee had paidRs. 91,95,000/- and Rs.72,50,000/- to the earlier buyer, ascompensation. The compensation amount cannot be linkedwith the sale of the impugned property. Further, the asset iscapital asset and taxed under the head capital Gains but notbusiness income while computing the capital gain the assesseehas reduced the same from full value of sales consideration bytreating it as expenditure. 4. However, the compensation should not be treated asexpenditure for the purpose of acquiring the property and samecannot be allowed as deduction. Under the head capital gainsonly direct expenses relatable to transfer of property are allowedas deduction. Therefore, Cancellation/compensation expensesshould not be held to be incurred either for acquiring theproperty of for transfer of property. Moreover the damages/compensation cancellation charges paid by assessee is only byway of penalty for breach of terms and conditions of theagreement. The penalty in nature and penalty cannot beallowed as deduction. Hence the assessee is not entitled to get 4. However, the compensation should not be treated asexpenditure for the purpose of acquiring the property and samecannot be allowed as deduction. Under the head capital gainsonly direct expenses relatable to transfer of property are allowedas deduction. Therefore, Cancellation/compensation expensesshould not be held to be incurred either for acquiring theproperty of for transfer of property. Moreover the damages/compensation cancellation charges paid by assessee is only byway of penalty for breach of terms and conditions of theagreement. The penalty in nature and penalty cannot beallowed as deduction. Hence the assessee is not entitled to get deduction of Rs. 1,64,45,000/- from the full value ofconsideration. In assessee' case only 50 % of compensation(Rs.82,22,500/-) paid has to be disallowed and brought to taxunder the head capital Gain. Remaining 50% of expenditure(Rs.82,22,500/-) claimed has to be disallowed and tax in theassessee's spouse name i.e. Smt. Indira Bai Shrikant. 5. In view of the above facts, the Assessing Officer is of thebelief that income chargeable to tax amounting to Rs82,22,500/-has escaped the assessment, within meaning ofprovision of section 147 of tax act, 1961. Accordingly, aproposal for the sanction/ approval to issue notice u/s 148 ofthe I. T. Act, 1961 from the Hon'ble Addl. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Panaji is hereby solicited as per the provisions ofsec.151 of the I.T. Act, 1961. Yours faithfully, AAKANKSHA KULSHRESTHA CIRCLE 1(1), PANAJI" 9.The Petitioners filed detailed objections/representation to theimpugned notices dated 23.12.2021 in terms of procedure in GKNDriveshafts (India) Ltd. Vs Income Tax Officer and others[1]. TheRespondents vide communication dated 07.03.2022 disposed of thePetitioners objections maintaining that the impugned notices werecorrectly issued. Hence, the present petitions. 10.Mr Desai, learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits that therewas no tangible material for reopening the assessment under Section147 of the I.T. Act. He presents that this is a mere "change ofopinion" because the Petitioners disclosed all material facts. Upon12002 Supp(4) SCR 359 considering the same, the Assessing Officer made the AssessmentOrder inter alia permitting the deductions as claimed. He submits thatthe Respondents were bound by the reasons they stated when issuingimpugned notices. Such reasons could not be supplemented, or nofresh reasons could be introduced while rejecting the Petitioners'objections or by filing an affidavit. He submits that the impugnednotices have been issued in excess of jurisdiction vested in theRespondents, and therefore, the same ought to be quashed and setaside. 11.Mr Desai relies on NYK Line (India) Ltd. Vs DeputyCommissioner of Income Tax[2], Zuari Foods and Farms Pvt. Ltd.,Vs Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax[3], Jainam Investment VsAsst. Commissioner of Income Tax[4], Idea Cellular Ltd. VsDeputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors.[5], GKN SinterMetals Ltd., Vs Ramapriya Raghavan & Ors.[6], Commissioner ofIncome Tax Vs Kelvinator of India Ltd. (now known asWhirlpool of India Ltd.)[7], Oracle Systems Corporation Vs Asst.Director of Income Tax[8] in support of his contentions. 2 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 195 3 MANU/MH/0902/2018 4 MANU/MH/2533/2021 5 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1445 6 MANU/MH/1482/2015 7 2002 SCC OnLine Del 15158 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13013 26[th] September 2022 12.Ms Linhares, learned counsel for the Respondents, submits thatthere is no infirmity in the issue of impugned notices. She offers thatthe Petitioners never disclosed the sale deed and the MOU at the timeof initial assessment under Section 143(3) by the Assessing Officer.She submits that these two documents constitute fresh or tangiblematerial sufficient for reopening the assessment under Section 147 ofthe I.T. Act. 2 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 195 3 MANU/MH/0902/2018 4 MANU/MH/2533/2021 5 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1445 6 MANU/MH/1482/2015 7 2002 SCC OnLine Del 15158 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13013 26[th] September 2022 12.Ms Linhares, learned counsel for the Respondents, submits thatthere is no infirmity in the issue of impugned notices. She offers thatthe Petitioners never disclosed the sale deed and the MOU at the timeof initial assessment under Section 143(3) by the Assessing Officer.She submits that these two documents constitute fresh or tangiblematerial sufficient for reopening the assessment under Section 147 ofthe I.T. Act. 13.Ms Linhares submits that the clauses of the sale deed and theMOU make it clear that there was no liability on the property sold;therefore, the compensation of 1,64,45,000/- was not some₹expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with thesale or transfer. She submits that during the initial assessment, theAssessing Officer was unaware of the sale deed and the MOU and, inany case, had no occasion to apply his mind to these aspects. She,therefore, submits that there is no legal infirmity in the issue ofimpugned notices. She relies on Gruh Finance Ltd. Vs JointCommissioner of Income Tax (Assessment)[9] in support of hercontentions. 14.The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 15.The record clearly bears out that the Petitioners had claimed adeduction of ₹1,64,45,000/- in Section 48 of the I.T. Act. After thePetitioners' cases were selected for limited scrutiny, it appears that the9(2000) 243 ITR 482 Petitioners filed necessary documents supporting their claim fordeductions. As noted earlier, limited scrutiny was precisely to considerwhether the deductions from capital gains had been claimed correctlyby the Petitioners. 16.Upon consideration of disclosures made by the Petitioners andthe documents produced by the Petitioners, the Assessing Officer, by aspeaking order, accepted the returns filed by the Petitioners. Thismeans that the Assessing Officer accepted the Petitioners' claim fordeductions to the extent of 1,64,45,000/- from the capital gains.₹Section 48 of the I.T. Act inter alia provides that the incomechargeable under the head "capital gains" shall be computed bydeducting from the full value of the consideration received or accruingas a result of the transfer of the capital asset the expenditure incurredwholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer. 17.The Petitioners' case was that they had agreed with ResicomHomes Pvt. Ltd. and D'Souza Estate Holdings Pvt. Ltd. to sell theproperty in question. However, the sale did not fructify, and therefore,by a memorandum of understanding, the agreement was cancelledafter returning the amount received from the above two parties. Inaddition, the Petitioners paid to the said two parties by compensationa further amount of 1,64,45,000/-. This latter amount was claimed₹as a deduction under Section 48 of the I.T. Act. The Assessing Officerduly accepted this deduction after the Petitioners' case was taken upfor limited scrutiny under Section 143(3) of the I.T. Act. 18.In the reasons accompanying the impugned notices,significantly, there was not even an allegation about suppressing orconcealing the deed of sale or MOU. The reasons referred to recordand based on the records suggested that the Assessing Officer mayhave erred in deducting ₹1,64,45,000/- because there was no reasonto pay Resicom Homes Pvt Ltd. and D'Souza Estate Holidays Pvt.Ltd., any compensation. From the reasons furnished, it is apparentthat this is a case of change of opinion and not a case of anyconcealment or suppression of material facts. 18.In the reasons accompanying the impugned notices,significantly, there was not even an allegation about suppressing orconcealing the deed of sale or MOU. The reasons referred to recordand based on the records suggested that the Assessing Officer mayhave erred in deducting ₹1,64,45,000/- because there was no reasonto pay Resicom Homes Pvt Ltd. and D'Souza Estate Holidays Pvt.Ltd., any compensation. From the reasons furnished, it is apparentthat this is a case of change of opinion and not a case of anyconcealment or suppression of material facts. 19.However, after the Petitioners raised the objections, theobjections were disposed of by order/communication dated07.03.2022. In this order/communication, there was a reference madeto the Petitioners concealing the fact of the sale deed. Theorder/communication claim that the Assessing Officer had notconsidered para 7, page 17 of the sale deed before allowing thedeductions under Section 48 of the I.T. Act. 20.Ms Linhares contended that where material concealmentresulted in a mistake, the Assessing Officer is always entitled to reopenthe assessment by invoking Section 147/148 of the I.T. Act. Shesubmitted that the original assessment order does not show anyconscious application of mind by the Assessing Officer to thePetitioners' claim for deductions under Section 48 of the I.T. Act. 26[th] September 2022 21.In GKN Sinter Metals Ltd. (supra), the Division Bench of thisCourt took note of the catena of decisions beginning with HindustanLever Limited Vs R. B. Wadkar (268 ITR 332 ) that the notice forreopening of assessment would stand or fall based on the reasonsrecorded at the time of issuing a notice for reopening of assessment.The reasons cannot be improved by substitution, addition, or deletion.The reasons cannot be supplemented by filing an affidavit or makingan oral submission. Otherwise, the reasons lacking in the materialparticulars would get augmented by the time the matter reaches theCourt on the strength of the affidavit or oral submissions. Thus, thevalidity of the notice for reopening is to be examined based on thereasons recorded at the time of issuing the notice for reopening anassessment. The impugned notice cannot be supported by anyadditional material which does not find a place in the reasons recordedat the time of issuing the impugned notice. 22.Applying the above well-settled principles to the facts of thepresent case, the Respondents will have to stand or fall based on thereasons recorded by the Assessing Officer at the time of issuingimpugned notices for the reopening of the assessment. Those reasonsnowhere referred to any concealment of documents by the Petitionersor concealment of sale deed by the Petitioners. The record fairly bearsout that there was no concealment. After taking up the Petitioners'cases for limited scrutiny, the Assessing Officer considered the materialon record and allowed the deductions under Section 48 of the I.T. Act.Therefore, the Respondents cannot now be permitted to add to thePage 11 of 1726[th] September 2022 reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer at the time of issuing noticesfor reopening the assessment. 23. Even otherwise, there appears to be no merit in the claim of theconcealment of documents like the sale deed or MOU. After thePetitioners' cases were selected for limited scrutiny, particularly on theaspect of the claim for deductions on capital gains, the Petitioners havestated on oath that all documents, including the sale deed and theMOU, were produced before the Assessing Officer in response to hisquestionnaire. The record shows that the deductions were grantedafter considering the relevant documents. This is possibly why, at thetime of issuing notice for reopening the assessment, the reasons do notrefer to any alleged concealment of documents or suppression ofdocuments. reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer at the time of issuing noticesfor reopening the assessment. 23. Even otherwise, there appears to be no merit in the claim of theconcealment of documents like the sale deed or MOU. After thePetitioners' cases were selected for limited scrutiny, particularly on theaspect of the claim for deductions on capital gains, the Petitioners havestated on oath that all documents, including the sale deed and theMOU, were produced before the Assessing Officer in response to hisquestionnaire. The record shows that the deductions were grantedafter considering the relevant documents. This is possibly why, at thetime of issuing notice for reopening the assessment, the reasons do notrefer to any alleged concealment of documents or suppression ofdocuments. 24.In NYK Line (India) Ltd. (supra), the Division Bench speakingthrough D. Y. Chandrachud, J ( as His Lordship then was ) hasexplained that the power of the Assessing Officer to reopen anassessment within four years of the relevant assessment year isundoubtedly wider than where four years have elapsed. Once fouryears have elapsed, the proviso to Section 147 stipulates that theremust be a failure on the assessee's part to disclose fully and truly allmaterial facts necessary for assessment as a result of which incomechargeable to tax has escaped assessment. But, that is not to say thatwithin four years, the power of the Assessing Officer to reopen anassessment is untrammelled. Even within four years, it is now a settled principle of law that an assessment cannot be reopened based on amere change of opinion. The Supreme Court has emphasized that theAssessing Officer has no power to review, but his power is the power toreassessment. If a mere change of opinion cannot furnish a ground forreopening an assessment, then, under the garb of reopening anassessment, a review would not equally be permissible. Consequently,the test is that there should be tangible material to conclude that thereis an escapement of income from assessment. 25.In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Kelvinator of IndiaLtd.[10], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that post 01.04.1989,the power to reopen is much broader. However, one needs to give aschematic interpretation to the words "reason to believe", failingwhich section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officerto reopen assessments based on "mere change of opinion", whichcannot be per se reason to reopen. There is a conceptual differencebetween the power to review and reassess. The Assessing Officer hasno power to review; he has the power to reassess. But reassessment hasto be based on the fulfilment of certain preconditions, and if theconcept of "change of opinion" is removed, a review would take place.One must treat the concept of "change of opinion" as an in-built testto check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after01.04.1989, the Assessing Officer has the power to reopen, providedthere is "tangible material" to conclude that there is escapement of 10 (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC) 26[th] September 2022 income from assessment. The reasons must have a live link with theformation of the belief. 26.In the present case, it is apparent that reassessment is based on amere change of opinion. The reassessment based on a mere change ofopinion is nothing but a review. Admittedly, no such powers of reviewhave been conferred on the Assessing Officer when purporting toexercise powers under Sections 147 and 148 of the I.T. Act. 10 (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC) 26[th] September 2022 income from assessment. The reasons must have a live link with theformation of the belief. 26.In the present case, it is apparent that reassessment is based on amere change of opinion. The reassessment based on a mere change ofopinion is nothing but a review. Admittedly, no such powers of reviewhave been conferred on the Assessing Officer when purporting toexercise powers under Sections 147 and 148 of the I.T. Act. 27.Ms Linhares's contention about there being no consciousapplication of mind by the Assessing Officer when the Petitioners'returns were scrutinized and accepted under Section 143(3) cannot beaccepted in the facts of the present case. As noted earlier, the limitedscrutiny was to determine whether the deductions from capital gainswere correctly claimed or not. Upon scrutiny, the Assessing Officerconcluded that the same were claimed correctly. This is sufficient toindicate the conscious application of mind on the deduction issueunder Section 148(1) of the I.T. Act. That apart, even otherwise, suchcontention was considered and rejected by the Division Bench of ourCourt in Idea Cellular Ltd. (supra). A similar argument was alsorejected in NYK Line (India) Ltd. (supra) after relying upon theobservations in paragraph 10 of Idea Cellular Ltd. (supra). 28.The Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Kelvinator of IndiaLtd. (supra) also rejected an identical contention by observing thus inparagraph 42:- "42.................When a regular order of assessment is passed interms of the said sub-section (3) of Section 143 a presumptioncan be raised that such an order has been passed on applicationof mind. It is well known that a presumption can also be raisedto the effect that in terms of clause (e) of Section 114 of theIndian Evidence Act, judicial and official acts have beenregularly performed. If it be held that an order which has beenpassed purportedly without application of mind would itselfconfer jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to reopen theproceeding without anything further, the same would amountto giving a premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicialfunction to take benefit of its own wrong." 29.The Full Bench of Delhi High Court also considered the natureof jurisdiction conferred by Section 147 in the claim of the I.T. Act. Itheld that the Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to review his ownorder. Therefore, the powers under Section 147 cannot be used, likethe powers of review to reopen the reassessment. The observations ofthe Full Bench of Delhi High Court were approved and accepted by atleast two Benches of this Court in Asteroids Trading & InvestmentP. Ltd. Vs Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax[11]and Asian.Paints Ltd. Vs Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax[12] 30.Gruh Finance Ltd. (supra), relied upon by Ms Linhares in thefirst place, refers to peculiar facts and special circumstances emergingfrom the record where depreciation was claimed in respect of non-existing assets. That apart, the broader proposition in Gruh FinanceLtd. (supra) is based on the previous ruling of the Division Bench of 11 (2009) 308 ITR 1 9012 (2008) 308 ITR 195 the Gujarat High Court in Praful Chunilal Patel Vs M. J.Makwana, Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax[13]. 31.Praful Chunilal Patel (supra) was explicitly considered by theFull Bench of Delhi High Court in Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra).Still, the Full Bench did not agree with its reasoning. The observationsfrom Praful Chunilal Patel (supra) have been quoted in paragraph 25.After that, paragraphs 26, 27, and 28 of the Full Bench of Delhi HighCourt read as follows:- 11 (2009) 308 ITR 1 9012 (2008) 308 ITR 195 the Gujarat High Court in Praful Chunilal Patel Vs M. J.Makwana, Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax[13]. 31.Praful Chunilal Patel (supra) was explicitly considered by theFull Bench of Delhi High Court in Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra).Still, the Full Bench did not agree with its reasoning. The observationsfrom Praful Chunilal Patel (supra) have been quoted in paragraph 25.After that, paragraphs 26, 27, and 28 of the Full Bench of Delhi HighCourt read as follows:- "26. We are, with respect, unable to subscribe to theaforementioned view. If the contention of the Revenue isaccepted the same, in our opinion, would confer an arbitrarypower upon the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer whohad passed the order of assessment or even his successor officeronly on slightest pretext or otherwise would be entitled toreopen the proceeding. Assessment proceedings may befurthermore reopened more than once. It is now trite thatwhere two interpretations are possible, that which fulfills thepurpose and object of the Act should be preferred. 27. It is a well settled principle of interpretation of statute thatthe entire statute should be read as a whole and the same has tobe considered thereafter chapter by chapter and then section bysection and ultimately word by word. It is not in dispute thatthe Assessing Officer does not have any jurisdiction to reviewits own order. His jurisdiction is confined only to rectificationof mistakes as contained in Section 154 of the Act. The powerof rectification of mistake conferred upon the Income TaxOfficer is circumscribed by the provisions of Section 154 of theAct. The said power can be exercised when the mistake isapparent. Even a mistake cannot be rectified where it may be amere possible view or where the issues are debatable. Even the 13 (1999) 236 ITR 832 Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has limited jurisdiction underSection 254(2) of the Act. Thus when the Assessing Officer orTribunal has considered the matter in detail and the view takenis a possible view the order cannot be changed by way ofexercising the jurisdiction of rectification of mistake. 28. It is a well settled principle of law that what cannot bedone directly cannot be done indirectly. If the Income TaxOfficer does not possess the power of review, he cannot bepermitted to achieve the said object by taking recourse toinitiating a proceeding of reassessment or by way ofrectification of mistake. In a case of this nature the Revenue isnot without remedy. Section 263 of the Act empowers theCommissioner to review an order which is prejudicial to theRevenue." 32.Thus, for all the above reasons, the impugned notices issued inexcess of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Respondents are liable tobe quashed and set aside. They are, accordingly, quashed and set aside. 33.The rule is made absolute in terms of the prayer clauses (a) and(b) in both the petitions. 34. There shall, however, be no order for costs in both thepetitions. BHARAT P. DESHPANDE, J M. S. SONAK, J TARI AMRUT NAGESHDigitally signed by TARI AMRUT NAGESH Date: 2022.09.27 18:48:04 +05'30'