South Pvt. Limited v. The Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax,Company Circle Iv (1),Chennai

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 12.11.2018 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE T.S.SIVAGNANAMandTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.SATHISH KUMAR Tax Case (Appeal) No.17 of 2009 Marine Container Services South Pvt. Limited,No.18 Swami Sivananda Salai,Chennai-600005. .. Appellant -vs- The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,Company Circle IV (1),Chennai-600034. .. Respondent Tax Case Appeal filed under Section 260A of the Income TaxAct, 1961, against the order of the Income Tax AppellateTribunal“B”Bench,Chennai,dated18.07.2008inITA.No.384/Mds/2008 for the assessment year 2004-2005. Against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals-IX, Chennai, dated 26.12.2007 in I.T.A.No.697/06-07 against theorder of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Company Circle IV(I), Chennai-34, dated 27.12.2006 in PAN/GIR NO. /MA-4for the Assessment Year 2004-05. For Appellant: Mr.R.Shankaranarayanan Senior Counsel for Ms.Harshini Jothi Raman For Respondent : Mr.Karthik Ranganathan Senior Standing Counsel (Delivered by T.S.Sivagnanam, J.) This appeal, by the assessee filed under Section 260A of theIncome Tax Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) isdirected against the order passed by the Income-tax Appellate https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Tribunal 'B' Bench, Chennai, (“the Tribunal” for brevity) dated18.07.2008, in I.T.A.No.384/Mds/2008 for the assessment year2004-2005. 2. This appeal has been admitted on the followingsubstantial questions of law, vide order dated 28.01.2009.“(i) Whether the Income Tax AppellateTribunal is right in holding that Section 94(8)that dividend stripping in buying and selling ofshares and units is akin to bonus stripping andthat they should be treated equally and thatwould render Section 94(8) retrospective inoperation? (ii) Whether the Income Tax AppellateTribunal committed an error in law in holdingthat Section 94(8) is to operate retrospectivelywhen the statute did not expressly so declare orimpliedly so refer?” 3. Though we find that there are two substantial questionsof law which have been admitted essentially, the only issue tobe decided is whether Section 94(8) of the Act is retrospectivein operation or prospective. 4. Mr.Karthik Ranganathan, learned Senior Standing Counselappearing for the respondent/Revenue contended that the Revenueshould be permitted to canvas other points other than thesubstantial questions of law, which have been entertained bythis Court. 5. It is the submission of the learned counsel that theAssessing Officer while completing the assessment, vide orderdated 27.12.2006, had taken a decision without reference to sub-Section (8) of Section 94, which was inserted with effect from1[st] April 2005 by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 and therefore, theRevenue should be permitted to sustain the assessment order oncertain other grounds. In this regard, the learned counselreferred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in thecase of CIT vs. India Discount Company Limited reported in[1970] 75 ITR 191 (SC), which was also referred to by theAssessing Officer. Further, the learned counsel referred to thedecision of the Larger Bench of this Court in the case ofSmt.S.Valliammai vs. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in[1981] 6 Taxman 240 (Madras) (FB). 6. This appeal has been filed by the assessee under Section260(A) of the Act, and in terms of the said section, an appealshall lie to this Court against every order passed in the appealby the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the case involves a substantial question of law.6.1. Sub-Section (2) of Section 260A would be relevant,which empowers the Principal Chief Commissioner or the ChiefCommissioner or an assessee aggrieved by any order passed by theAppellate Tribunal to file an appeal before this Court. 6. This appeal has been filed by the assessee under Section260(A) of the Act, and in terms of the said section, an appealshall lie to this Court against every order passed in the appealby the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the case involves a substantial question of law.6.1. Sub-Section (2) of Section 260A would be relevant,which empowers the Principal Chief Commissioner or the ChiefCommissioner or an assessee aggrieved by any order passed by theAppellate Tribunal to file an appeal before this Court. 6.2. In terms of sub-Section (4) of Section 260A, an appealshall be heard only on the question so formulated, and therespondents shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed toargue that the case does not involve such a question. 6.3. In terms of the proviso under sub-Section (4) ofSection 260A, nothing in sub-Section (4) shall be deemed totakeaway or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasonsto be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question oflaw not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the caseinvolves such question. Therefore, essentially a person has to be aggrieved by anorder passed by the Appellate Tribunal to prefer an appeal underSection 260A of the Act. 7. Admittedly, the Revenue has not preferred any appealagainst the order passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, at thisjuncture, that too, after a period of over nine years, duringwhich the appeal was admitted and pending before this Court, wedo not propose to permit the Revenue to canvas any other pointbefore us, more so when, the Revenue is not on appeal before us.In other words, the Revenue was never aggrieved by the orderpassed by the Tribunal. Thus, the present attempt of the Revenueto make an alternative plea, in case, they are unable to sustainthe order of the Tribunal, is to be treated as an afterthought.Thus, we proceed to decide the substantial questions of law asframed for consideration and noted above. 8. The assessee had claimed Short Term Capital Loss (STCL)for Sundaram Bond Saver against other Short Term Capital Gains. 9. The assessee contended that in case of shares, the bonusshares are distributed out of the benefit earned during the yearand then, when there are no profits, bonus shares can beallotted out of accumulated results. However, at the time ofpurchase of shares, the primary/secondary market, there is noguarantee when bonus shares will be allotted at a later date.The Assessing Officer disagreed with the contentions raised bythe assessee and held that, for the purpose of computation ofcapital gains/loss on purchase and sale of units within a shortperiod, the purchase cost shall be deemed to include the cost ofthe unit “ex-bonus” plus the cost of bonus units and only thepurchase cost of the units 'ex-bonus' shall have to be taken into consideration in computing the loss, if any, on transfer,under the head 'Capital gains'. Before rendering the abovefinding, the Assessing Officer noted Section 94(8) of the Act,which was inserted with effect from 1[st] April, 2005 and qualifiedhis finding that, even in the absence of Section 94(8), for thereasons assigned by him, the assessee's case cannot be accepted. into consideration in computing the loss, if any, on transfer,under the head 'Capital gains'. Before rendering the abovefinding, the Assessing Officer noted Section 94(8) of the Act,which was inserted with effect from 1[st] April, 2005 and qualifiedhis finding that, even in the absence of Section 94(8), for thereasons assigned by him, the assessee's case cannot be accepted. 10. The assessee preferred appeal to the Commissioner ofIncome Tax(Appeals)-IX, Chennai. The CIT(A), after noting thefinding of the Assessing Officer, held that the AssessingOfficer had applied Section 94(8) of the Act, which is effectivefrom the assessment year 2005-2006 and the assessment year underconsideration relates to 2004-2005. Further, it was pointed outthat the Assessing Officer has not considered Section 94(7) ofthe Act and in view of the same, the addition made by theAssessing Officer was deleted and the Assessing Officer wasdirected to apply Section 94(7) of the Act on the Short TermCapital Loss claimed by the assessee and give effect to theorder, accordingly. On the above lines, the appeal was decidedin favour of the assessee subject to provisions of Section 94(7)of the Act. 11. The Revenue carried the matter by way of Appeal to theTribunal and the Tribunal, by the impugned order, held that theinsertion of Section 94(8) with regard to bonus stripping can besaid to be a clarificatory amendment in order to bring bonusstripping at par with dividend stripping. Therefore, in theopinion of the Tribunal, Section 94(8) can very well be said tooperate retrospectively i.e., with effect from 1[st] April, 2002,when sub-Section (7) was inserted in Section 94. 12. Firstly, we may point out that the Tribunal is denudedof jurisdiction to grant a declaratory relief declaring astatute as prospective or retrospective, which precisely theTribunal has done. Nevertheless, we are entitled to examine asto whether sub-Section (8) can be given retrospective effectivei.e., with effect from the date on which sub-Section (7) wasinserted in Section 94. 13. If we examine the relevant Notes on Clauses for FinanceAct 2004, we would be in a position to find an answer the abovequestion. Clause 23 of the Bill seeks to amend Section 94 ofthe Income-tax Act relating to avoidance of tax by certaintransactions in securities, which reads as follows: “Under the existing provisions of sub-section (7) of said section, where a person buyssecurities or unit within a period of threemonths prior to the record date and thereaftersells the same within a period of three months https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ after such date, and the dividend received onsuch securities or units is exempt, then, theloss arising on account of such purchase andsale of securities or unit to the extent of theexempt dividend income shall be ignored for thepurpose of computing his income chargeable totax. Sub-clause (a) seeks to amend sub-section(7) of the aforesaid section so as to extend thetime, limit in relation to sale of units fromthree months to nine months after record date. “Under the existing provisions of sub-section (7) of said section, where a person buyssecurities or unit within a period of threemonths prior to the record date and thereaftersells the same within a period of three months https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ after such date, and the dividend received onsuch securities or units is exempt, then, theloss arising on account of such purchase andsale of securities or unit to the extent of theexempt dividend income shall be ignored for thepurpose of computing his income chargeable totax. Sub-clause (a) seeks to amend sub-section(7) of the aforesaid section so as to extend thetime, limit in relation to sale of units fromthree months to nine months after record date. Sub-clause (b) seeks to insert a new sub-section (8) in the aforesaid section so as toprovide that, where a person buys or acquiresany units within a period of three months priorto the record date and he is allotted or isentitled to additional units on the basis ofsuch units without making any payment, andthereafter sells all or any of such units whilecontinuing to hold all or any of the additionalunits within a period of nine months after suchdate, then, the loss, if any, arising to him onaccount of such purchase and sale of units shallbe ignored for the purposes of computing hisincome chargeable to tax and the amount of lossso ignored shall, notwithstanding anythingcontained in any other provision of the Income-tax Act, be deemed to be the cost of purchase ofacquisition of such additional units as are heldby him on the date of such sale or transfer. Under the existing provisions of clause (aa)of the Explanation to the said section, “recorddate”, for the purposes of said section, meanssuch date as may be fixed by a company of aMutual Fund or the Administrator of thespecified undertaking or the specified companyfor the purposes of entitlement of the holder ofthe securities or the unit-holder, to receivedividend or income, as the case may be. Sub-clause (c) seeks to amend clause (aa) ofthe Explanation to the aforesaid Section so asto provide that “record date” also includes suchdate on which a unit-holder is allotted or isentitled to additional units without any payment. This amendment will take effect from 1[st]April 2005, and will, accordingly, apply in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ relation to the assessment year 2005-2006 andsubsequent years”. 14. Clause 22 of the Bill, which also amended Section 90 atthe same time, would also be relevant and it reads as follows: “Clause 22 of the Bill seeks to amendsection 90 of the Income-tax Act, relating toagreement with foreign countries. Under the existing provisions contained inthe Explanation to section 90, it is declaredthat the charge of tax in respect of a foreigncompany at a rate higher than the rate at whicha domestic company is chargeable, shall not beregarded as less favourable charge or levy oftax in respect of such foreign company, wheresuch foreign company has not made the prescribedarrangement for declaration and payment withinIndia, of the dividends (including dividends onpreference shares) payable out of its income inIndia.It is proposed to omit the portion “wheresuch foreign company has not made the prescribedarrangement for declaration and payment withinIndia, of the dividends (including dividends onpreference shares) payable out of its income inIndia” occurring in the Explanation as the samehas become redundant. Thisamendmentwilltakeeffectretrospectively from 1[st] April, 1962, and will,accordingly, apply in relation to the assessmentyear 1962-1963 and subsequent years”. Thisamendmentwilltakeeffectretrospectively from 1[st] April, 1962, and will,accordingly, apply in relation to the assessmentyear 1962-1963 and subsequent years”. 15. On a reading of above two Clauses namely, Clauses 22 and23, it is clear that the amendment to Section 90 wasretrospective from 1[st] April, 1962, and accordingly, madeapplicable in relation to the assessment year 1962-1963 andsubsequent years. 15.1. Clause 23 of the Bill, which amended Section 94, hadtwo amendments, namely, extension of the time in relation tosale of units from three months to nine months after recorddate and this amendment was brought to sub-Section (7) ofSection 94 and a new sub-Section (8) was inserted. Both theamendments to sub-Section (7) and sub-section (8) weresubsequently ordered to take effect from 1[st] April, 2005 andaccordingly, made applicable in relation to the assessment year2005-2006 and subsequent years. 16. Furthermore, the Central Board of Direct Taxes hasclarified with regard to the date on which such amendments wouldtake effect and in explicit terms, it has been stated that theamendment by way of insertion of sub-Section (8) in Section 94will take effect from 1[st] April, 2005 and apply in relation tothe assessment year 2005-2006 and subsequent years. If this isthe factual position, we have to consider as to whether thearguments of the Revenue that it should be retrospective isacceptable or not. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Zile Singh vs. State ofHaryana, (2004) 8 SCC 1, explained that a cardinal principle ofconstruction of statutes is that every statute is prima facieprospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implicationmade to have retrospective operation. The rule in general isapplicable where the object of the statute is to affect vestedrights or to impose new burdens or to impair existingobligations. It was held that, unless there are words in thestatute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature toaffect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only.Further, it was pointed out that the presumption againstretrospective operation is not applicable to declaratorystatutes. Further, it was held that, if it is a necessaryimplication from the language employed that the legislatureintended a particular section to have a retrospective operation,the Courts will give it such an operation and in the absence ofa retrospective operation having been expressly given, theCourts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answerthe question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressedthe intention giving the statute retrospectivity. The followingfour factors were suggested to be relevant, viz., (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated. The ruleagainst retrospectivity does not extend to protect from theeffect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accruedright. The above referred decision was referred to by the Hon'bleSupreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Gold Coin Health Food (P)Ltd., (2008) 9 SCC 622. 18. As pointed out earlier, the Notes on Clauses clearlystate that the amendments are to take prospective effect i.e.,with effect from 1[st] April, 2005. Therefore, considering thegeneral scope and purview of the Income Tax Act, the remedysought to be applied and the former state of the law and whatthe legislature contemplated, we are of the clear view that sub- Section (8) of Section 94 was intended to be prospective. (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated. The ruleagainst retrospectivity does not extend to protect from theeffect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accruedright. The above referred decision was referred to by the Hon'bleSupreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Gold Coin Health Food (P)Ltd., (2008) 9 SCC 622. 18. As pointed out earlier, the Notes on Clauses clearlystate that the amendments are to take prospective effect i.e.,with effect from 1[st] April, 2005. Therefore, considering thegeneral scope and purview of the Income Tax Act, the remedysought to be applied and the former state of the law and whatthe legislature contemplated, we are of the clear view that sub- Section (8) of Section 94 was intended to be prospective. 19. The Revenue would contend that the argument of theassessee may apply to sub-Section (7) of Section 94 when it wasfirst introduced with effect from 1[st] April, 2002, but sub-Section (8) was inserted to block the Revenue leakage and thelanguage of sub-Section (8) clearly shows it is clarificatory innature, clarifying what was already in existence in sub-Section(7) and omitted to be specifically stated. We are not impressedwith the submission made by the Revenue for more than onereason. 19.1. Firstly, the legislature intended in no uncertainterms that the insertion of sub-Section 8 was to be prospective.Furthermore, sub-Section (8) was inserted in the statute for thefirst time and it is not a substitution of an existing sub-section or a provision. 19.2. Secondly, sub-Section (8) is a new sub-section and itis not an explanation to sub-Section (7) of Section 94.Therefore,byapplyingtheprincipleofstatutoryinterpretation, sub-Section (8) of Section 94 is neithercurative nor declaratory of the previous law, which has to beheld to be prospective in operation. 20. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. WalfortShare and Stock Brokers P. Ltd. reported in (2010) 326 ITR 0001(SC), held that sub-Section (7) was to be prospective witheffect from 1[st] April, 2002 and not earlier. The operativeportions of the judgement read as follows:- “20. The real objection of the Departmentappears to be that the assessee is getting tax-free dividend; that at the same time it isclaiming loss on the sale of the units; that theassessee had purposely and in a planned mannerentered into a pre-meditated transaction of buyingand selling units yielding exempted dividends withfull knowledge about the fall in the NAV after therecord date and the payment of tax-free dividendand, therefore, the loss on sale was not genuine.We find no merit in the above argument of theDepartment. At the outset, we may state that wehave two sets of cases before us. The lead mattercovers assessment years before insertion ofSection 94(7) vide Finance Act, 2001 w.e.f.1.4.2002. With regard to such cases we may statethat on the facts it is established that there wasa “sale”. The sale-price was received by theappears to be that the assessee is getting tax-free dividend; that at the same time it isclaiming loss on the sale of the units; that theassessee had purposely and in a planned mannerentered into a pre-meditated transaction of buyingand selling units yielding exempted dividends withfull knowledge about the fall in the NAV after therecord date and the payment of tax-free dividendand, therefore, the loss on sale was not genuine.We find no merit in the above argument of theDepartment. At the outset, we may state that wehave two sets of cases before us. The lead mattercovers assessment years before insertion ofSection 94(7) vide Finance Act, 2001 w.e.f.1.4.2002. With regard to such cases we may statethat on the facts it is established that there wasa “sale”. The sale-price was received by the assessee. That, the assessee did receive dividend.The fact that the dividend received was tax-freeis the position recognized under Section 10(33) ofthe Act. The assessee had made use of the saidprovision of the Act. That such use cannot becalled “abuse of law”. Even assuming that thetransaction was pre-planned there is nothing toimpeach the genuineness of the transaction. Withregard to the ruling in McDowell & Co. Ltd. v.Commercial Tax Officer [(1985) 154 ITR 148(SC)],it may be stated that in the later decision ofthis Court in Union of India v. Azadi BachaoAndolan [(2003) 263 ITR 706(SC)] it has been heldthat a citizen is free to carry on its businesswithin the four corners of the law. That, mere taxplanning, without any motive to evade taxesthrough colourable devices is not frowned uponeven by the judgment of this Court in McDowell &Co. Ltd.’s case (supra). Hence, in the casesarising before 1.4.2002, losses pertaining toexempted income cannot be disallowed. However,after 1.4.2002, such losses to the extent ofdividend received by the assessee could be ignoredby the AO in view of Section 94(7). The object ofSection 94(7) is to curb the short term losses.Applying Section 94(7) in a case for theassessment year(s) falling after 1.4.2002, theloss to be ignored would be only to the extent ofthe dividend received and not the entire loss. Inother words, losses over and above the amount ofthe dividend received would still be allowed fromwhich it follows that the Parliament has nottreated the dividend stripping transaction as shamor bogus. It has not treated the entire loss asfictitious or only a fiscal loss. After 1.4.2002,losses over and above the dividend received willnot be ignored under Section 94(7). If theargument of the Department is to be accepted, itwould mean that before 1.4.2002 the entire losswould be disallowed as not genuine but, after1.4.2002, a part of it would be allowable underSection 94(7) which cannot be the object ofSection 94(7) which is inserted to curb taxavoidance by certain types of transactions insecurities. There is one more way of answeringthis point. Sections 14A and 94(7) weresimultaneously inserted by the same Finance Act,2001. As stated above, Section 14A was insertedw.e.f. 1.4.1962 whereas Section 94(7) was insertedw.e.f. 1.4.2002. The reason is obvious. Parliament realized that several public sector undertakingsand public sector enterprises had invested hugeamounts over last couple of years in the impugneddividendstrippingtransactionssoalsodeclaration of dividends by mutual fund are beingvetted and regulated by SEBI for last couple ofyears. If Section 94(7) would have been broughtinto effect from 1.4.1962, as in the case ofSection 14A, it would have resulted in reversal oflarge number of transactions. This could be onereason why the Parliament intended to give effectto Section 94(7) only w.e.f. 1.4.2002. It isimportant to clarify that this last reasoning hasnothing to do with the interpretations given by usto Sections 14A and 94(7). However, it is the dutyof the court to examine the circumstances andreasons why Section 14A inserted by Finance Act2001 stood inserted w.e.f. 1.4.1962 while Section94(7) inserted by the same Finance Act as broughtinto force w.e.f. 1.4.2002. 21. The next question which we need to decideis about reconciliation of Sections 14A and 94(7).In our view, the two operate in different fields.As stated above, Section 14A deals withdisallowance of expenditure incurred in earningtax-free income against the profits of theaccounting year under Sections 30 to 37 of theAct. On the other hand, Section 94(7) refers todisallowance of the loss on the acquisition of anasset which situation is not there in casesfalling under Section 14A. Under Section 94(7) thedividend goes to reduce the loss. It applies tocases where the loss is more than the dividend.Section 14A applies to cases where the assesseeincurs expenditure to earn tax free income butwhere there is no acquisition of an asset. Incases falling under Section 94(7), there isacquisition of an asset and existence of the losswhich arises at a point of time subsequent to thepurchase of units and receipt of exempt income. Itoccurs only when the sale takes place. Section 14Acomes in when there is claim for deduction of anexpenditure whereas Section 94(7) comes in whenthere is claim for allowance for the businessloss. We may reiterate that one must keep in mindtheconceptualdifferencebetweenloss,expenditure, cost of acquisition, etc. whileinterpreting the scheme of the Act. 22. Before concluding, one aspect concerningPara 12 of Accounting Standard AS-13 relied uponby the Revenue needs to be highlighted. Para 12indicates that interest/ dividends received oninvestments are generally regarded as return oninvestment and not return of investment. It isonly in certain circumstances where the purchaseprice includes the right to receive crystallizedand accrued dividends/ interest, that have alreadyaccrued and become due for payment before the dateof purchase of the units, that the same has got tobe reduced from the purchase cost of theinvestment. A mere receipt of dividend subsequentto purchase of units, on the basis of a personholding units at the time of declaration ofdividend on the record date, cannot go to offsetthe cost of acquisition of the units. Therefore,AS-13 has no application to the facts of thepresent cases where units are bought at the rulingNAV with a right to receive dividend as and whendeclared in future and did not carry any vestedright to claim dividends which had already accruedprior to the purchase. 23. For the above reasons, we find noinfirmity in the impugned judgment of the HighCourt and, accordingly, these Civil Appeals filedby the Department are dismissed with no order asto costs.” 21. Further, as pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court ofIndia in the case of Gold Coin Health Food (P) Ltd. (supra),that the law is well settled that the applicable provision wouldbe the law as it existed on the date of filing of the return andwhen any loss is returned in any return, it need not necessarilybe the loss, as the previous year is concerned. Therefore, theapplicable law on the date of filing of the return cannot beconfined only to the losses of the previous accounting years. 22. Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we are ofthe clear view that the Tribunal committed error in reversingthe order passed by the CIT(A). 23. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee isallowed, the order passed the Tribunal is set aside,consequently, the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals)-IX, Chennai, dated 06.12.2007, is restored and the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ substantial questions of law framed for consideration areanswered in favour of the assessee. No costs. Sd/- Assistant Registrar(CS IV) //True Copy// Sub Assistant Registrar nsd/abr 22. Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we are ofthe clear view that the Tribunal committed error in reversingthe order passed by the CIT(A). 23. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee isallowed, the order passed the Tribunal is set aside,consequently, the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals)-IX, Chennai, dated 06.12.2007, is restored and the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ substantial questions of law framed for consideration areanswered in favour of the assessee. No costs. Sd/- Assistant Registrar(CS IV) //True Copy// Sub Assistant Registrar nsd/abr To1. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “B” Bench, Chennai.2. The Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals-IX,121, Mahatma Gandhi Road,Chennai 600 034.3. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,Company Circle IV(1), Chennai 34.+1 cc to Mr.Karthik Ranganathan, Advocate Sr.No.77927T.C.(A) No.17 of 2009SPD(CO)CSL/19.12.2018