Tax Appeal v. M/S. Md Waddar And Co

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA TAX APPEAL NO.14 OF 2016 The Commissioner of Income Tax,Having office at Aaykar Bhavan, Sedam Road, Jayanagar, Kalaburagi 0 Karnataka -St.….Appellant V/s M/s. MD Waddar and Co.,C/o. Sri. Nagappa D. Waddar,Class-1 Contract, Friends Colony,Lingsugur – 584122, Dist: Raichur,Karnataka State.…. Respondent Ms. Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for the Appellant.Shri D. Pangam with Shri Parikshit Sawant, Advocate for theRespondent No.1. Coram :- M.S. SONAK & DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, JJ. Date : 27 October 2020 ORAL JUDGMENT : (Per Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.) Introduction: An Income Tax Appellate Tribunal exercises its jurisdiction overmore than one state, though it is located in one of those states. Its order issought to be challenged. Which High Court should have the jurisdictionto rule on the Tribunal's order? Is it the High Court in whose territorialjurisdiction that Tribunal is located? Or is it the High Court in whoseterritorial jurisdiction the authority that passed the preliminary orderoperates?Facts: 2. The respondent is a company located in Raichur District,Karnataka. Its registered office, too, is in Karnataka. For the income taxpurposes, the respondent company falls within the jurisdiction of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle–1, Belgaum,Karnataka. 3. As seen from the record, for the assessment year 2008-09, theA.O., Belgaum, reopened the assessment under section 147 of the IncomeTax Act, issued a notice under section 148, and completed thereassessment in March 2013. Assailing that Assessment Order, therespondent-assessee appealed to CIT (A), Bangalore. Eventually, both theAssessee and the Revenue further appealed to the Income Tax AppellateTribunal, Panaji Bench. Through the Order, dated 30/09/2014, theTribunal held in the Assessee's favour. So the Revenue filed this appealbefore us. Submissions: Preliminary Objection: 4. When the learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue began hersubmissions on the merits, Shri Devidas Pangam, the learned counsel forthe respondent, raised a preliminary objection: this Court has noterritorial jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. So we required both thelearned counsel to advance their arguments on this preliminary objection.The Respondent: 5. To begin with, Shri Pangam has submitted that the High Court’sjurisdiction in matters emanating from Tribunals depends on whether theTribunal is multi-state or uni-state. To elaborate, he has pointed out thatunlike the arrangement under CPC or under Article 226 of theConstitution, the High Court’s jurisdiction under the tax regime will havedifferent parameters applied. To support his contentions, Shri Pangam hasrelied on M/S. Ambica Industries v. Commissioner Of Central Excise[1]. Appellant: 6. Ms Linares, the learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue, hassubmitted that Ambica Industries has come to be rendered under a different factual scenario. According to her, a Division Bench of this Court inPrincipal Commissioner of Income Tax-3 v. Sungard Solutions (I) Pvt. Ltd[2]hasalready addressed that issue. So, as a co-equal Bench, we should be guidedby that. Discussion: 7. As we have already noted, to decide whether this Court hasjurisdiction to entertain this appeal, the following factors may matter: (a)The Assessee is located in Raichur District, Karnataka; (b) its registeredoffice, too, is in Karnataka; (c) for income tax purposes, the Assessee fallswithin the jurisdiction of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, CentralCircle–1, Belgaum, Karnataka; (d) the A.O., Belgaum, passed thepreliminary order; (e) the Assessee appealed to CIT (A), Bangalore; (f)against the appellate ruling, both the Assessee and the Revenue appealedto the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Panaji Bench, Goa. Discussion: 7. As we have already noted, to decide whether this Court hasjurisdiction to entertain this appeal, the following factors may matter: (a)The Assessee is located in Raichur District, Karnataka; (b) its registeredoffice, too, is in Karnataka; (c) for income tax purposes, the Assessee fallswithin the jurisdiction of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, CentralCircle–1, Belgaum, Karnataka; (d) the A.O., Belgaum, passed thepreliminary order; (e) the Assessee appealed to CIT (A), Bangalore; (f)against the appellate ruling, both the Assessee and the Revenue appealedto the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Panaji Bench, Goa. 8. If we reckon the jurisdiction based on the physical location of theTribunal, we will have jurisdiction. Instead, if we reckon the jurisdictionbased on the situs of the parties, we will not—for both the Assessee andthe Income Tax authority that passed the primary order are in Karnataka.Incidentally, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the whole of Goa and fewparts of Karnataka: Karwar, Belgaum, Mangalore, North Kanara. AndRaichur District falls within the jurisdiction of Central Circle–1, Belgaum. 9. So let us see how the jurisdictional tangle ought to be resolved:should it be based on the place of the parties or that of the Tribunal?(a) Ambica Industries: 10. In Ambica Industries, the appellant carried on business atLucknow; it was assessed there. The tax dispute, however, ultimatelycame up before the Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal(“the Tribunal”), New Delhi, in an appeal. But the Tribunal exercisedjurisdiction not only over Uttar Pradesh but also National Capital22019 SCC OnLine Bom 456 Territory of Delhi and Maharashtra. Aggrieved by the Tribunal’sdecision, the appellant carried the matter under Section 35G of theCentral Excise Act, 1944, to the Delhi High Court. A Division Bench ofthat Court relied on its earlier co-equal Bench judgment in Bombay SnuffPvt. Ltd. v. Union of India[3], and ruled that it had no territorial jurisdictionover the matter. 11. Further aggrieved, the appellant took the matter to the SupremeCourt. Sub-section (9) of Section 35G of the Act applies CPC to theproceedings under that Act if the proceedings concern “appeals to theHigh Court”. So the appellant contended that the Tribunal is subordinateto the High Court of Delhi, with its physical location in its territoriallimits. Then, the Delhi High Court alone must have the jurisdiction. Butthe Supreme Court, in an elaborate judgment, repelled that contention andruled that the High Court of Delhi has no jurisdiction. To its credit,Ambica Industries has surveyed the entire case law available on the issueuntil then. 12. Ambica Industries reminded itself that similar problems hadarisen in respect of the decisions rendered by Tribunals constituted underdifferent Acts, such as the Income Tax Act. It was also mindful of a catenaof High Court decisions holding that the Tribunal’s situs would determinewhich High Court the aggrieved should go to. Then, Ambica Industrieswent on to observe, on the facts, that the Tribunal exercised jurisdictionover three States. In all the three States, there are High Courts. Supposethe aggrieved person is treated to be the dominus litus, and he elected tofile the appeal before one or another High Court. In that case, that HighCourt’s decision shall be binding only on the authorities who are withinits jurisdiction. It will only be of persuasive value on the authoritiesfunctioning under a different jurisdiction. 13. In other words, if the binding authority of a High Court doesnot extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction, and the decision of one HighCourt would not bind as a precedent another High Court or Tribunalsoutside its territorial jurisdiction, some sort of judicial anarchy shall cometo prevail. An assessee, affected by order of assessment made at Bombay,may invoke the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court, the decidedcases of which might suit him. Thus, he could successfully evade the lawlaid down by the High Court at Bombay. As to the legislative intent,Ambica Industries has held that when an appeal remedy is provided forunder a statute, Parliament must have thought of a particular High Court.It is a different matter that, by way of necessity, a Tribunal may have toexercise jurisdiction over several States. Still, it does not appeal to anyreason that Parliament intended, despite providing for an appeal beforethe High Court, that appeals may be filed before different High Courts at aparty’s sweet will. 14. Then, Ambica Industries has turned to the provisions of the Actand acknowledged the appellant’s argument that in terms of sub-section(1) of section 100 of the CPC, the First Appellate Court’s order being adecree, a Second Appeal shall lie before the High Court to which it issubordinate. 15. In answer to the above contention, Ambica Industries has heldthat in terms of Article 227 as also Clause (2) of Article 226 of theConstitution of India, the High Court will exercise its discretionaryjurisdiction and also issue writs of certiorari over orders passed by thesubordinate courts within its territorial jurisdiction. Besides, if any causeof action arises within its territorial limits, it will exercise its jurisdiction.According to Ambica Industries "[T]he same tests cannot be applied when the appellate courtexercises jurisdiction over a Tribunal situated in more than oneState. In such a situation, in our opinion, the High Court locatedin the State where the first court is located should be consideredexercises jurisdiction over a Tribunal situated in more than oneState. In such a situation, in our opinion, the High Court locatedin the State where the first court is located should be considered to be the appropriate appellate authority. The Code of CivilProcedure did not contemplate such a situation. It provides for thejurisdiction of each court. Even a District Judge must exercise itsjurisdiction only within the territorial limits of a State. It isinconceivable under the Code of Civil Procedure that thejurisdiction of the District Court would be exercisable beyond theterritorial jurisdiction of the District, save and except in suchmatters where the law specifically provides therefor. 16. Then, Ambica Industries went on to cite the examples ofincongruity that might result if the jurisdictional theory under CPC wasapplied to the Tribunals. According to it, in a case of emergency, while theTribunal sitting at Allahabad or Bombay may entertain a matter thoughthe cause of action had arisen at Delhi. But that would not mean thatwhen the Tribunal decided at Allahabad or Bombay, although the cause ofaction had initially arisen at Delhi, that High Court would have nojurisdiction on the dispute. 17. In this context, Ambica Industries reasons that the situs of aTribunal may vary from time to time. It could be Delhi or some otherplace. Whether its jurisdiction would be extending to three or more orfewer States would depend upon the executive order which may be issued.The determination of the High Court’s jurisdiction on the touchstone ofsections 35G and 35H of the Act, in Ambica Industries opinion, should beconsidered only based on the statutory provisions and nothing else.“While defining the High Court in terms of Section 36B of the Act, theParliament never, in our opinion, contemplated [having] a situation ofthis nature”. 17. In this context, Ambica Industries reasons that the situs of aTribunal may vary from time to time. It could be Delhi or some otherplace. Whether its jurisdiction would be extending to three or more orfewer States would depend upon the executive order which may be issued.The determination of the High Court’s jurisdiction on the touchstone ofsections 35G and 35H of the Act, in Ambica Industries opinion, should beconsidered only based on the statutory provisions and nothing else.“While defining the High Court in terms of Section 36B of the Act, theParliament never, in our opinion, contemplated [having] a situation ofthis nature”. 18. In fact, the Supreme Court in Ambica Industries has quoted withapproval Madras High Court decision in Commissioner of Income Tax,Madras v. S. Sivaramakrishna Iyer[4]. The issue, in that case, arose under theIncome Tax Act, as is the case now. According to S. Sivaramakrishna Iyer,if a Tribunal has jurisdiction over more states than one, and it has got to make a choice, in the absence of a statutory provision, relating to thematter it must be guided by the principles of Section 64—that is, the placewhere the Assessee carries on his business, profession or vocation orresides. There is also another approach to the question: the subject-mattertest. Then, S. Sivaramakrishna Iyer, on the facts, observed that the penaltyproceedings were originally initiated by the Income-tax Officer atTrichur. But the penalty proceedings are but a continuation of the originalassessment orders. And the original assessment was in Kerala. On thatbasis too, S. Sivaramakrishna Iyer has held that the situs of the Tribunalcannot be determinative of the jurisdictional issue. 19. Finally, Ambica Industries has, on the facts, held that the case hasarisen from the State of Maharashtra. The appellant may have its factoryin the State of Haryana. But that is irrelevant. The adjudicating authorityis in Bombay. Obviously, that authority is bound by the law laid downunder the Customs Act or any other law—as interpreted by the HighCourt of Bombay. “For the purpose of the case at hand, the petitionermust be held bound by the law as applicable and as prevailing in the Stateof Maharashtra whereat the goods were to be imported and whereat theproceedings under the Act were concluded”. Kusum Ingots stands explained by Ambica Industrries: 20. We may as well note the dictum of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v.. Union of India[5]In that case, the Supreme Court has interpreted clause (2)of Article 226 of the Constitution. It has held that the place where anappellate order or a revisional order is passed may give rise to a part ofthe cause of action, although the original order was at a place outside thatarea. When a part of the cause of action arises within one or the otherHigh Court, it will be for the petitioner to choose his forum. 21. As to resolve the territorial tangle and the situs conflict, AmbicaIndustries notes the legislative changes wrought on Article 226. According to it, experiencing difficulties, Parliament introduced clause (1A) toArticle 226. Later, again, it inserted clause (2). And, then, AmbicaIndustries holds that in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd., the Court “was notdealing with a question of this nature”. Therefore, it is not an authorityfor the proposition that the High Court which is situated at the same placeas the situs of the Tribunal alone will have jurisdiction. “If the cause ofaction doctrine, as analysed hereinbefore is given effect to, invariably morethan one High Court may have jurisdiction, which is not contemplated”.(b) The Fallout of Ambica Industries: 21. As to resolve the territorial tangle and the situs conflict, AmbicaIndustries notes the legislative changes wrought on Article 226. According to it, experiencing difficulties, Parliament introduced clause (1A) toArticle 226. Later, again, it inserted clause (2). And, then, AmbicaIndustries holds that in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd., the Court “was notdealing with a question of this nature”. Therefore, it is not an authorityfor the proposition that the High Court which is situated at the same placeas the situs of the Tribunal alone will have jurisdiction. “If the cause ofaction doctrine, as analysed hereinbefore is given effect to, invariably morethan one High Court may have jurisdiction, which is not contemplated”.(b) The Fallout of Ambica Industries: 22. We may examine what comes out precedentially from AmbicaIndustries. In the context of inter-state Tribunals, it has disfavoured thejurisdictional justifications as provided under CPC. For the proceduralCode is vertical in its application and is, essentially, intra-state in itsterritorial application. Of course, sections 23 (3) and 25 of CPC do concerninter-state jurisdictional disputes. But under the CPC no court, in theconventional sense, subordinate to a High Court can have inter-statejurisdiction. Nor has Ambica Industries accepted as applicable to inter-stateTribunals the theory of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of theConstitution—that is, “the part of the cause of action” proposition. For“the determination of the appellate forum based upon the situs of theTribunal would lead to an anomalous result”. To exemplify, it says “anassessee affected by an assessment order in Bombay may invoke thejurisdiction of the Delhi High Court to take advantage of the law laiddown by it, which may be contrary to judgments of the High Court ofBombay. This cannot be allowed”. (c) Sungard Solutions (I) Pvt. Ltd: 23. In the face of Ambica Industries rendered by the Apex Court, wemust now examine the decision of our High Court in Sungard Solutions. Itis a co-equal Bench decision. In an appeal filed by the Revenue, therespondent objected to this Court’s territorial jurisdiction over the matter. The respondent has contended that the impugned order was passed by theBangalore Bench of the Tribunal. So, the appeal from the order of theTribunal’s Bangalore Bench should lie before the Karnataka High Courtand not this Court. To contend thus, he relied on Chapter XX of the Actand, in particular, sections 260A and 269 of the Act. In fact, the Tribunalat Bangalore passed an order under Section 127 of the Act, transferringthe respondent’s case from an Assessing Officer at Bangalore to anAssessing Officer at Pune. Assailing that order, the Revenue appealed tothis Court. According to the Revenue, this Court alone will havejurisdiction to deal with the respondent’s case because, now, theassessment proceedings are in Mumbai consequent to the Tribunal’s orderunder section 127 of the Act. 24. In the above factual backdrop, Sungard Solutions has analysedthe relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Rules. Then, inparagraph 17 of the judgment, it has held that Chapter XX of the Actdecides which High Court will hear appeals from the orders passed by theTribunal. It has a specific provision dealing with appeals, amongst others,to the High Court. According to it, 24. In the above factual backdrop, Sungard Solutions has analysedthe relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Rules. Then, inparagraph 17 of the judgment, it has held that Chapter XX of the Actdecides which High Court will hear appeals from the orders passed by theTribunal. It has a specific provision dealing with appeals, amongst others,to the High Court. According to it, [S]ection 260A and 269 of the Act, when read together, wouldmean that the High Court referred to in Section 260A of the Actwill be the High Court as provided/defined in Section 269 of theAct i.e. in relation to any State, the High Court of that State.Therefore, the seat of the Tribunal (in which State) would decidethe jurisdiction of the Court to which the appeal would lie underthe Act. Thus, in the present facts, the High Court which wouldhave jurisdiction over the place where the Tribunal (when notexercising jurisdiction over more than one State) is situated and passedthe order. Therefore, in the facts of this case, on the bareexamination of the provisions, it would be clear that in case oforders passed by the Banglore Bench of the Tribunal, appeal fromsuch orders would lie only to the Karnataka High Court atBangalore. (italics supplied) 25. Sungard Solutions went onto answer other contentions raised byeither the appellant or the respondent. The appellant contended that the seat of the Assessing Officer alone would decide the jurisdiction of theHigh Court under section 127 of the Act. But Sungard Solutions has feltthe argument is misplaced. According to it, a “bare reading of theprovisions shows that the Court to which appeal would lie is not governedby the seat of the Assessing Officer”. In this context, Sungard Solutionsrefers to Rule 4(i) of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) Rules.That Rule mandates that the President of the Tribunal shall hear theappeals filed before the Tribunal, in terms of Section 253 of the Act. Itstresses that the Tribunal is not an income tax authority under the Act. 26. Sungard Solutions also refers to the Standing Order No.63/97,dated 2.7.2013, issued by the President of the Tribunal under Rule 4(1) ofthe ITAT Rules. That standing order holds that the “jurisdiction of thebench depends upon the areas from where the impugned orders haveoriginated”. In the above standing order, Note 4 specifically states that“the jurisdiction of a bench will not be determined by the place of businessor residence of the assessee but by the location of the office of theAssessing Officer”. Eventually, Sungard Solutions has held that if anassessment proceeding has been transferred from one place to anotherunder Section 127 of the Act, “then the bench of the Tribunal beforewhich appeals would lie may shift with the seat of the Assessing Officerbefore the filing/hearing of the appeal”. 27. Finally comes into play the Bombay High Court Rules. SungardSolutions concludes, with reference to these Rules, that “the AppellateCourt to which an appeal would lie from the order of the Tribunal wouldnecessarily be the High Court exercising jurisdiction over the placeswhere the Tribunal which passed the order is situated”. 28. Summing up the statutory and precedential position, SungardSolutions has held that “the Tribunal which passes orders is bound by theorders passed by the jurisdictional High Court where the Tribunal issituated”. Then, on the facts, it has noted that the Tribunal which passed the impugned order is situated in Bangalore. Therefore, the Tribunalwould be bound by the orders passed by the Karnataka High Court atBangalore. 29. After holding as above, Sungard Solutions considers a fewhypothetical propositions. According to it, it is likely that there could be adivergence of opinion between two High Courts on a particular issue: oneview by the Court where the Tribunal is situated, say Bangalore; and theother view by the Court where the Assessing Officer is now situated, sayPune. It will, then, lead to an incongruous situation. the impugned order is situated in Bangalore. Therefore, the Tribunalwould be bound by the orders passed by the Karnataka High Court atBangalore. 29. After holding as above, Sungard Solutions considers a fewhypothetical propositions. According to it, it is likely that there could be adivergence of opinion between two High Courts on a particular issue: oneview by the Court where the Tribunal is situated, say Bangalore; and theother view by the Court where the Assessing Officer is now situated, sayPune. It will, then, lead to an incongruous situation. 30. To resolve this incongruity, Sungard Solutions gatherslegislative intent from section 260A read with 269 of the Act. And itconcludes that “the orders passed by the Tribunal are subject to an appealbefore the High Court under which it exercises jurisdiction”. According toSungard Solutions, if we accept the Revenue’s contention, then “[W]e would have a peculiar situation where the powers underArticles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, would be exercised bythe Court which exercises jurisdiction over the seat of theTribunal which is passing the order while for the purposes ofappeal under the Act, the Court which would entertain the appealwould be a Court different from the Court which would exercisejurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It isto be noted that, for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution,no part of the case of action would have arisen in Mumbai givingrise to the jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, harmonious reading ofthe various provisions of law would require that the appeal fromthe order of the Tribunal is to be filed to the Court whichexercises jurisdiction over the seat of the Tribunal. 31. Besides noting what it felt to be an incongruity, SungardSolutions has also referred to the Explanation to Section 127 of the Act.That explanation clarifies that once there is a direction under Section 127of the Act, all the pending assessment proceedings under the Act wouldstand transferred to the transferee assessing officer. But the words “allproceedings under this Act” would not cover appeals under the Act beforethe High Court. Any contrary assertion would run counter to sections 260A and 269 of the Act, which provide specifically for the High Courtthat should have jurisdiction over the orders of a Tribunal in its territoriallimit. Co-equal Benches and Precedential Propriety: 32. Indeed, we have a thorny task of considering whether a co-equalBench is correct in its dictum. That is the task best performed by itsavoidance. But compelled to answer, for us the prudent course is to put itto the scrutiny of better wisdom—a Bench of superior strength. That said,if there is a decision from the Supreme Court, then Article 142 of theConstitution comes into play: all decisions at all other levels yield to theSupreme Court's. Yet let us begin from the desired point of avoidance,later proceed to resolution by harmonisation or distinction, and finally--ifthe two methods remain unavailable—to the reference. Dicta v. Holding: 33. Under the caption “Dicta v. Holding”, Bryan A Garner et al. inThe Law of Judicial Precedent[6] say that the holding of an appellate courtconstitutes the precedent, as a point necessarily decided. Dicta do not: theyare merely remarks made in the course of a decision but not essential tothe reasoning behind the decision. To elaborate on this point, the learnedauthors hold that "not all text within a judicial decision serves as aprecedent. That's a role generally reserved only for holdings: the parts ofa decision that focus on the legal questions actually presented to anddecided by the court." A holding consists of the “court’s determination of amatter of law pivotal to its decision”. Everything else amounts to dicta—what Francis Bacon in 1617 called the “vapours and fumes of law”. 33. Under the caption “Dicta v. Holding”, Bryan A Garner et al. inThe Law of Judicial Precedent[6] say that the holding of an appellate courtconstitutes the precedent, as a point necessarily decided. Dicta do not: theyare merely remarks made in the course of a decision but not essential tothe reasoning behind the decision. To elaborate on this point, the learnedauthors hold that "not all text within a judicial decision serves as aprecedent. That's a role generally reserved only for holdings: the parts ofa decision that focus on the legal questions actually presented to anddecided by the court." A holding consists of the “court’s determination of amatter of law pivotal to its decision”. Everything else amounts to dicta—what Francis Bacon in 1617 called the “vapours and fumes of law”. 34. One of the age-old maxims of organic law is that “what is notjudicially presented cannot be judicially considered, decided, oradjudged[7]”. Garner et al. point out that the distinction between a holding6Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent (Thomson Reuters, USA, 2016) 447Ibid, 47 under dictum does not depend on whether the point was argued bycounsel and deliberately considered by the court, but instead on whetherthe solution of the particular point was more or less necessary todetermining the issues involved in the case[8]. According to them, no judgecan write opinions with mathematical precision. The meaning of theopinion, even the holding, must be read in context, with due regard for thedifficulty—the impossibility, really—of the court’s anticipating everycircumstance in which the language could be applied. 35. Chief Justice Marshall has stated a pivotal point of precedentwhen he held in Corbins v. Virginia[9]: If the dicta “go beyond the case, theymay be respected, but ought not to control the judgement and asubsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision”. Marshallfurther explained the “obvious” reasoning behind the maxim: “Thequestion actually before the court is investigated with care, and consideredin its full context. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, orconsidered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearingon all other cases is seldom completely investigated”. 36. Earlier, a Division Bench of this Court in Gaur Pratibha v. Stateof Maharashtra[10], drawing from the same commentary of Garner et al., hasheld that holding emerges when the ratio—the pure principle of law—isapplied to the facts of a case. That is, a holding is what the court decidesafter combining the facts of a case with the legal principles those factsattract. While holding might be thought to equate more nearly with thecourt’s determination of the concrete problem before it, ratio decidendi isnormally seen “as a genus-proposition of which the concrete holding isone species or instance.” Garner et al. admit that the distinction is a fineone, but it available for those who observe it. In the end, they declare thatratio requires adherence to the extent possible, but the holding compels 8Ibid, 51 919 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821), as quoted in (n6)10(2019) 4 Bom CR 100 compliance fully. Thus, stare decisis admits of no exception to a ‘case-holding’ in the adjudicatory hierarchy, but not to digressing dicta.What is the Holding of Sungard Solutions? 8Ibid, 51 919 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821), as quoted in (n6)10(2019) 4 Bom CR 100 compliance fully. Thus, stare decisis admits of no exception to a ‘case-holding’ in the adjudicatory hierarchy, but not to digressing dicta.What is the Holding of Sungard Solutions? 37. Sungard Solutions is a converse case. In that case, the BangaloreBench of the Tribunal passed the impugned order. In fact, the Tribunal atBangalore passed the order under Section 127 of the Act, transferring therespondent’s case from an Assessing Officer at Bangalore to one at Pune.Assailing that order, the Revenue filed the appeal before this Court.According to the Revenue, this Court alone will have jurisdiction to dealwith the respondent’s case because, now, the assessment proceedings arein Mumbai consequent to the Tribunal’s order under section 127 of theAct. Pertinently, the Revenue wanted this Court to determine theterritorial jurisdiction based on the very order that had been underchallenge as if it were final. That was not. 38. From the judgment we may discern that Sungard Solutions’scase-holding is this: An appeal should lie to that High Court which has thejurisdiction over the place where the Tribunal that passed the impugnedorder is “situated”. Sungard Solutions has been cautious enough to hedgeits declaration with “in the present facts”. Besides, another limiting factorin the pronouncement is that the jurisdictional assertion in SungardSolutions comes into play when the Tribunal was “not exercising[jurisdiction] over more than one State”. To contextualise thisproposition, Sungard Solutions has considered the problem in its myriadshades and discussed the issue in the alternative. Those alternatives andthe judicial assertions on those alternatives are polemical presentationswith no precedential force. 39. What should happen when the Tribunal exercises jurisdictionover more than one State? That is not the question that fell forconsideration in Sungard Solutions. In fact, precisely, that was the questionin Ambica Industries. Then, what is the case-holding of Ambica Industries? S. B. Sinha J, who authored Ambica Industries had an occasion to cull out itscase-holding in another case: Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd[11].There, his Lordship has held, with reference to Ambica Industries, that “indetermining as to whether a part of the cause of action has arisen withinthe territorial jurisdiction of the court vis-a-vis an appellate court a largenumber of factors may have to be taken into consideration.” In otherwords, whichever High Court can exercise its supervisory jurisdictionover a Tribunal, that High Court will have the corrective—say, appellate—jurisdiction over the Tribunal. That said, a Tribunal, as to its territorialjurisdiction, may cover more than one State, its physical location in oneparticular State notwithstanding. Then, it goes without saying that theHigh Courts in all those States will have jurisdiction over the Tribunal.But precedentially, each of these High Courts binds the parties located inits own territory. 40. In essence, though Ambica Industries has not been brought to itsnotice, Sungard Solutions has mirrored its assertion. It has consciouslyexcluded the Tribunals “exercising jurisdiction over more than one State”.And “situated” in Sungard Solutions has a figurative, rather than literal,meaning. An inter-state Tribunal, we may add, is deemed to have beensituated in all the States it covers. 41. So, we respectfully hold that Sungard Solutions does not fall foulof Ambica Industries. Even if it were, we stand, as we must be, guided byAmbica Industries.Conclusion: 42. To sum up, the mere physical location of an inter-state Tribunalcannot be determinative of the High Court's jurisdiction for an aggrievedparty to challenge that Tribunal's order. 43. Here, the Assessee is located in Karnataka, so are the IncomeTax authorities. The primary order, too, emanated from Karnataka; so112009(2) ALL MR 475 (S.C.) 41. So, we respectfully hold that Sungard Solutions does not fall foulof Ambica Industries. Even if it were, we stand, as we must be, guided byAmbica Industries.Conclusion: 42. To sum up, the mere physical location of an inter-state Tribunalcannot be determinative of the High Court's jurisdiction for an aggrievedparty to challenge that Tribunal's order. 43. Here, the Assessee is located in Karnataka, so are the IncomeTax authorities. The primary order, too, emanated from Karnataka; so112009(2) ALL MR 475 (S.C.) was the first appellate order. All challenges, including the appeal beforethe Tribunal, were in continuation of that primary adjudication orconsideration before the Assessment Officer at Belgaum, Karnataka.Therefore, Ambica Industries applies on all fours. Result: 44. We hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain thisAppeal. As a result, we return the Tax Appeal, to be presented to thejurisdictional High Court if the appellant desires. No order on costs. NH DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J. M.S. SONAK, J.