The Commissioner Of Income Tax , Tamil Nadu-Ii, Madras v. M/S.computer Graphics Ltd

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 06.02.2006 Coram : THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.D.DINAKARAN AND THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.P.S.JANARTHANA RAJA Tax Case (Appeal) Nos.427 to 434 of 2000(Appeal Nos.131 to 138/2000) The Commissioner of Income Tax ,Tamil Nadu-II, Madras. Vs ..Appellant in all appeals. M/s.Computer Graphics Ltd.,46, T.T.K. Road,Chennai-600 018. ..Respondent in all appeals. Appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against theorder of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, 'C' Bench in I.T.A.Nos.2829/Mds/92, 2223/Mds/93, 3069/Mds/92 for the assessment year 1989-90and I.T.A. Nos.2117/Mds/93, 278/Mds/95, 2454/Mds/96, 2455/Mds/96,867/Mds/98 dated 28.5.1999 for the assessment years 1990-91, 1991-92,1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95, respectively against the order of theCommissioner of Income tax (Appeals) I, Madras 34 dated 29.11.1994 madein IT Appeal Nos.65/1994-95 and IT Appeal No.53/1992-93 dated 28.8.1992 onthe file of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) VII, Madras 34,against the Order of the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Special RangeVII, Chennai 34 dated 23.4.1992 made in No.NIL against the Order of theAssistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle III(3), Madras dated29.4.1994 made in No.NIL respectively. For Appellant : Mrs.Pushya SitaramanFor Respondent : Mr.C.V.Rajan forM/s.Gladys Daniel JUDGMENT (Judgment of the Court was delivered by P.P.S.Janarthana Raja, J.) The present appeals are filed under Section 260A of the Income TaxAct, 1961 by the Revenue, against the order passed in I.T.A. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Nos.2829/Mds/92, 2223/Mds/93, 3069/Mds/92, 2117/Mds/93, 278/Mds/95,2454/Mds/96, 2455/Mds/96, 867/Mds/98 by the Income Tax AppellateTribunal, Madras, 'C' Bench. On 23.08.2001, this Court admitted theappeals and formulated the following substantial questions of law:-"1. Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that theassessee was entitled to relief under Section 32AB asthe item dealt with by the assessee did not fall underthe prohibited entry 10 to XI Schedule Viz.Photographic apparatus and goods. 2. Whether, the Tribunal was right in law that theassessee was entitled to relief under Section 80I asthere was manufacturing process in making the graphicart film of colour paper in Jumbo rolls into marketablecondition by the process of slitting. 3. Whether the Tribunal had material and was correct inupholding the claim for higher commission payment toassociated concerns at 5% as against 3% commission paidto other customers and hence the disallowance of 2%under Section 40A(2) by the assessing officer was notproper. 4. Whether the Tribunal had material to cancel theaddition made on account of undisclosed sales of scrap.5. Whether the Tribunal was right in holding thatproceedings under Section 154 could not be initiated asthe disallowances made were in respect of the claimsconsidered under Section 143(1)(a). 6. Whether the cancellation of interest under Section 234B is proper?" 2.The relevant assessment years are 1989-90 to 1994-95. I)Question No.2:It is stated by both the counsel that Question Nos.1 and 2 areinterconnected and therefore a request has been made by the counsel todeal with Question No.2, first. The counsel brought to our notice thatthis issue stands covered by a decision of this Court judgment reported in261 ITR 491 in the case of India Cine Agencies Vs. C.I.T. which held asfollows: 6. Whether the cancellation of interest under Section 234B is proper?" 2.The relevant assessment years are 1989-90 to 1994-95. I)Question No.2:It is stated by both the counsel that Question Nos.1 and 2 areinterconnected and therefore a request has been made by the counsel todeal with Question No.2, first. The counsel brought to our notice thatthis issue stands covered by a decision of this Court judgment reported in261 ITR 491 in the case of India Cine Agencies Vs. C.I.T. which held asfollows: "On the facts of the present case, the assessee bythe use of slitting machine slitted the jumbophotographic colour paper into smaller rolls and cutsize flats of the desired size. By this activity, nomanufacturing process has been done by the assessee.The assessee imported already manufactured colourpapers, which has been now reduced in size accordingto the needs of the assessee's customers. Theoriginal goods as well as the size reduced goods byslitting are all one and the same, i.e., they arephotographic colour paper. No new commercialcommodity emerged out of the activity carried on, onthe original goods – jumbo rolls, which could be considered as a manufacturing activity at the hands ofthe assessee. The assessee is only trading inphotographic colour papers as a wholesaler and slitthe already manufactured and produced photographicpaper into required sizes to suit the requirement ofits customers and in easily marketable sizes.Therefore, the slitting of the bigger roll intomarketable smaller rolls or sizes is an integral partof the trading activity of the assessee. In theabovesaid process, neither manufacture nor productionis involved nor a new product emerges even though thegoods handled by forklift and hoist and slit bycomputerised slitting machine and which process isrequired to be done in a dark air conditioned humiditycontrolled dust proof room. In view of the above discussion with particularreference to the activity carried on by the assessee,and in the light of the decisions above referred to,we are of the considered view that on the facts andcircumstances of this case, the assessee cannot beregarded as being engaged in the business ofmanufacture or production of an article or thing. Thequestion is answered in favour of the Revenue andagainst the assessee." The facts in the instant case are similar. Following the same, thequestion is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The learned counsel for the Revenue fairly stated that this questionhas to be answered in favour of the assessee in view of answering thesecond question against the assessee. In respect of second question, weheld that the assessee was not engaged in the manufacture or production ofan article or thing and hence, the assessee was also not engaged in themanufacture of item under the prohibited entry 10 to XI Schedule Viz.Photographic apparatus and goods. Hence, the question is answered infavour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 3)M/s.Print Systems and Products - Partnership firm Rs. 8,22,813/-(At 5% for sale of graphic paper) 4)Other parties(for both products at 2%)Rs.15,84,572/- The learned counsel for the Revenue fairly stated that this questionhas to be answered in favour of the assessee in view of answering thesecond question against the assessee. In respect of second question, weheld that the assessee was not engaged in the manufacture or production ofan article or thing and hence, the assessee was also not engaged in themanufacture of item under the prohibited entry 10 to XI Schedule Viz.Photographic apparatus and goods. Hence, the question is answered infavour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 3)M/s.Print Systems and Products - Partnership firm Rs. 8,22,813/-(At 5% for sale of graphic paper) 4)Other parties(for both products at 2%)Rs.15,84,572/- b) As can be seen from the above, out of Rs.54,72,173/-, payment ofRs.38.87 lakhs were made to the above first three concerns. The AssessingOfficer observed that for other assessee's concerns who rendered similarservices to the appellant company, sales commission was provided at 3%only and hence, he disallowed the balance amount of commission payment tothe above referred first three concerns. On appeal, the Commissioner ofIncome Tax (Appeals) agreed with the Assessing Officer and disallowed theclaim under Section 40A(2). Aggrieved by that order, the assessee filedan appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Income Tax AppellateTribunal allowed the appeal and directed the Assessing Officer to allowthe commission fully. We heard the counsel and perused the matter onrecord. Three directors of the assessee company had major financialinterest in the business of the above three firms. It was noticed thatthe said three firms were existing since 1970, nearly 20 years ago havinga network of their own field staff who were well experienced all overIndia and also had vast technical knowledge in the line of business.Secondly, the assessee company, started importing jumbo rolls of graphicart films and colour paper which were after processing, slitting, packingas per specifications needed by the customer, to be marketed. There werealready giants like Hindustan Photo Films, Northern Graphics, India CineHouse etc. who were competitors in the field and were all establishedconcerns. Since the company had to face this competition, it was thoughtwise to engage the above three concerns as agents to exploit theirexperience, technical knowledge and also having their own field staff whowere all well experienced. Consequently, specific agreements had beenentered into for agency. As per the agreement terms, the agents wereentitled to 6% commission on the listed price related to graphic art filmssales and 5% for colour paper. One of the conditions was that the agentsshould undertake and bear all the marketing expenses and also suchexpenses including sale depots, outlets, and branches as deemed necessary.The agents were also authorised to appoint sub dealers in the territorywith the consent of the assessee company. The agents were responsible forcollection of payments in respect of orders executed. Wherever money wasnot received from the customers to whom the supplies were made on thebasis of the orders procured by the agents, then the agents should recoverthe same from such customers and the assessee company would be entitled torecover such outstanding from the agent. In other words, there being anybad debts which resulted out of the sales canvassed by the agents, the same would be recoverable from the agent. It is also further brought toour notice that not only the business had gone up for the assessee butalso the payment of commission raised by the above three firms did notresult in loss of revenue to the Government. What the officer had done wasthat he had only alleged invoking Section 40A(2) and had totally ignoredthe merits of the assessee against resulting in increased sale by theassessee, further resulting in increased income in the hands of theassessee. He also further brought to our notice that the potentialcompetitors of the assessee company felt it necessary to market itsproducts through the firm which were established fully and accordinglyentered into agreements with the above three firms. The reasonableness ofthe expenditure for the purpose of business had to be adjudged from theview point of a businessman and not that of the Revenue, even whileinvoking section 40A(2). The Tribunal had given a finding that theexpenditure incurred was reasonable expenses towards its sole sellingagency having its own working force and also outlets as agents throughoutIndia, which had undoubtedly resulted in the assessee's gaining businessand on a consideration of all the facts it was held that the disallowancemade by the Assessing Officer was unjustified. Also, there was no proofof excessive unreasonable payment and hence, no disallowance could be madeunder Section 40A(2) of the Act. The reasons recorded by the Tribunal arebased on material evidence and not require interference. c) In view of the foregoing conclusions, the question is answered infavour of the assessee and against the Revenue. IV) Question No.4: a) It deals with cancellation of the addition made on account ofundisclosed sale of scrap. The assessee company imports jumbo colourpapers, graphic art films, medical x-rays and imaging films fromM/s.Konica Corporation, Japan and slits the same for the required size intheir factory at Ambattur. This process resulted in wastages of thevarious items as detailed below: Colour paper.... 0.4%Graphic Art film.... 3.8%Medical X-ray.... 3.8% b) These wastes were sold as scraps. This scarp comprises of edgewaste and full coat from X ray films and similarly edge waste and fullcost from graphic art film and also from colour paper. The edge wastereferred to the cuttings of the edge of the jumbo rolls and full coatreferred to the middle portion of the jumbo roll. The edge wastecontained very low film coating and hence contained very less silvercontent compared to that of full coat which was the middle portion. Theprocess certainly resulted in collection of these wastes as the cuttingswere made and rolled and supplied to the customers as per theirspecifications. The company sold the scrap to one Mr.Tippu Sultan. Asearch was conducted in the factory and office premises under Section 132on 5[th] and 6[th] November 1992. During the course of search, an unsigned chitwas found in the custody of Mr.Gopalakrishnan, General Manager of thefactory. In that chit, there were some rates of waste like waste of graphic art film and X-ray film, which was as under:Graphic art film - full costRs.110/- per Kg.Edge wasteRs. 70/- per Kg.Medical X-Ray – full costRs.120/- per Kg.Edge wasteRs. 80/- per Kg. graphic art film and X-ray film, which was as under:Graphic art film - full costRs.110/- per Kg.Edge wasteRs. 70/- per Kg.Medical X-Ray – full costRs.120/- per Kg.Edge wasteRs. 80/- per Kg. c) Based on this paper, Mr.Gopalakrishnan's statement was recorded. Asworn statement was also obtained from Mr.Tippu Sultan, scrap dealer on5.2.1993 and on 12.2.1993. Based on the above statements, the Departmentworked out the quantity of the scrap and also the value thereof for theaccounting years 1986-87 to 1992-93, upto the date of search. Thequantity was worked out on the basis of the percentage given byMr.Gopalakrishnan. However, the assessee did not challenge the quantityto mean that there was no dispute as regards the quantity finally assessedbetween the revenue and the assessee. As regards the rate, the Departmentrelying on the statement of Mr.Gopalakrishnan and the statement ofMr.Tippu Sultan adopted the highest rates disregarding the type of thescrap, i.e. edge waste or full coat. The rates adopted by the Departmentare as under: X-ray scrap at Rs.120/- per Kg.Graphic art film scrap at Rs.110/- per Kg. Colour paper scrap at Rs.6/- per Kg. d) Accordingly, the Assessing Officer made an addition of Rs.66,436/-to the returned income against the admitted figure by the assessee in asum of Rs.25,196/-. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to theCommissioner (Appeals), who sustained the addition in a sum of Rs.41,238/-Aggrieved by the order, the assessee filed an appeal to the Income TaxAppellate Tribunal. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal. e) We find that the scrap sales made by the assessee were supported byinvoices and they find a place in the scrap register, which was inspectedby the Sales Tax authorities and also there was no unaccounted cash by wayof sale of scrap. Whatever amount received by the employee from the scrapdealers outside the accounts could not be treated as the income of theassessee. The assessee had accounted for sale of scrap and admitted theincome from such sales and hence, the scrap generated was supported by theproduction and the scrap register. Hence, there was no room to infer anysuppression. The Tribunal had considered all the relevant materials andevidences. f) In view of the foregoing conclusions, the question is answered infavour of the assessee, against the Revenue. V)Question No.5: a) It deals with order under Section 154 wherein the order underSection 143(1)(a) dated 23.01.1990 had been rectified, for the assessmentyear 1989-90. The assessee had given two computations along with thereturn filed on 25.12.1989. The first computation was based on Section115J of Rs.12,66,760/- and another computation on total income under the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ provisions of Income Tax Act, 1961 was made declaring an income ofRs.11,54,211/- The Assessing Officer processed the return under Section143(1)(a) on 23.1.1990 accepting the returned income and adopting theincome under Section 115J which was higher as per the above details.Subsequently the Assessing Officer had issued notices with letters underSection 154 on 30.07.1990 and 11.11.1991 wherein he had proposed todisallow the following deductions:Deduction under Section 32ABRs.3,54,438/-Foreign exchange lossRs.4,57,998/-Deduction under Section 80IRs.3,84,737/- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ provisions of Income Tax Act, 1961 was made declaring an income ofRs.11,54,211/- The Assessing Officer processed the return under Section143(1)(a) on 23.1.1990 accepting the returned income and adopting theincome under Section 115J which was higher as per the above details.Subsequently the Assessing Officer had issued notices with letters underSection 154 on 30.07.1990 and 11.11.1991 wherein he had proposed todisallow the following deductions:Deduction under Section 32ABRs.3,54,438/-Foreign exchange lossRs.4,57,998/-Deduction under Section 80IRs.3,84,737/- b) Consequently interests under Section 234B and 234C were alsoimposed. The assessee objected to the above rectification. The AssessingOfficer had passed an order dated 16.03.1992 and disallowed all the abovethree items and also levied interest under Section 234B in a sum ofRs.97,657/- and under Section 234C in a sum of Rs.11,614/- respectively.Further he also levied additional tax under Section 143(1A). Aggrieved bythe order, the assessee filed an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals). The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had stated that sincethe issues were already covered in the regular order u/s 143(3), he was ofthe view that the appeal was infructuous and hence dismissed the appeal.Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunalallowed the appeal and held that the action of the Assessing Officer indisallowing the deductions claimed on all issues was clearly a debatableissue and therefore, the order under Section 154 was wrong and bad in law.The learned counsel for the Department supported that the order of theC.I.T. (A) was valid in law. The learned counsel for the assessee,submitted that the items proposed for rectification were not issues whichcould be the subject matter for rectification under Section 154. c) We heard the counsel. The legal requirement for makingrectification had been listed out in the proviso to Section 143(1)(a) andthe items which were rectified as aforesaid were totally beyond thejurisdiction for rectification. The three additions, such asdisallowances under Sections 32AB and 80I and foreign exchange fluctuationloss were highly debatable issues and there were two opinions possible,and in such situation, it was not possible to rectify by invoking Section154. Further it was also brought to our notice the Circular No.689 dated24.08.1994 reported in 209 ITR 75 statute, which held as follows: "The Board desires that no other prima faciedisallowance should be made except with the previousapproval of the Commissioner of Income Tax, who will,after according approval in suitable cases, bring thesame to the notice of the Board" d) On a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances ofthe case and in the light of the discussion above, it is clear that theaction of the Assessing Officer in disallowing the deductions claimed onall issues were clearly debatable. The Supreme Court judgment reported in82 ITR 50 in the case of T.S.Balaram, Income Tax Officer, Company Circle IV, Bombay Vs. Volkart Brothers and Others, held as follows: "A mistake apparent on the record must be an obviousand patent mistake and not something which can beestablished by a long drawn process of reasoning onpoints on which thre may be conceivably 2 opinions.A decision on a debatable point of law is not amistake apparent from the record." e) Therefore, the rectification order passed under Section 154 waswrong and bad in law. In view of the foregoing conclusions, the questionis answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. VI)Question No.6: IV, Bombay Vs. Volkart Brothers and Others, held as follows: "A mistake apparent on the record must be an obviousand patent mistake and not something which can beestablished by a long drawn process of reasoning onpoints on which thre may be conceivably 2 opinions.A decision on a debatable point of law is not amistake apparent from the record." e) Therefore, the rectification order passed under Section 154 waswrong and bad in law. In view of the foregoing conclusions, the questionis answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. VI)Question No.6: a) This question is directed against deletion of the interest chargedunder Section 234B of the Act, by the Tribunal. The only argumentcontended by the learned counsel of the assessee was that, in theassessment order, the officer did not pass order directing to chargeinterest under Section 234B. It was submitted that the requirement of lawis that the officer is supposed to apply his mind and pass order whichshould be a speaking order. In the assessment order, the AssessingOfficer had charged and calculated the interest under Section 234B. Theonly argument was that the interest was not leviable in the absence of thespeaking order. He also relied on the Patna High Court Judgment in thecase of Udya Mistanna Bhandar and Complex and 2 others Vs. Commissioner ofIncome Tax and others reported in 222 ITR 44. In that case, no specificorder levying of interest under Sections 234A, 234B and 234C was found inthe assessment order, and so it was held that the interest could not belevied through notice of demand. b) Section 234B is operative with effect from 01.04.1989 and it makesprovisions for charging of interest, for non-payment or short payment ofadvance tax and it is also mandatory in nature. It is only compensatoryin nature and has no element of penalty in it. It is sufficient thatlevying of interest is mentioned in the order of the assessment. It isnot necessary that it should be a speaking order. As in this case, theassessment order contained levy of interest under Section 234B of the Actand hence the levy of interest was valid in law. c) This provision is not appealable because the levy of interest isautomatic. Only the Board has given power to reduce or waive theinterest. The assessee has to make petition before the Central Board ofDirect Taxes or the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax for the purpose ofwaiver of interest. By virtue of the power vested in the Board, underSection 119(2)(a), the Board has issued a Circular for the purpose ofwaiver and the said Circular is reported in 225 ITR 101 (St.) As per theCircular, it had empowered that the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax andthe Director General of Income Tax can waive or reduce interest chargedunder Sections 234A, 234B and 234C of the Act. It is for the assessee tomake waiver petition before the concerned authority and satisfy theconditions enumerated in the Circular for the waiver of interest underSection 234B of the Act. d) The counsel for the assessee relied on the judgment of the PatnaHigh Court in the case of Uday Mistanna Bhandar and Complex and 2 othersVs. Commissioner of Income Tax and others, reported in 222 ITR 44, whichheld as follows, at Page No.50:- d) The counsel for the assessee relied on the judgment of the PatnaHigh Court in the case of Uday Mistanna Bhandar and Complex and 2 othersVs. Commissioner of Income Tax and others, reported in 222 ITR 44, whichheld as follows, at Page No.50:- "From the bare reading of section 156 it is clear thatnotice of demand claiming interest can be issued onlywhen there is order in the assessment order levyinginterest. Except in the cases of the assessee TejKumari Devi (C.W.J.C. No.2732 of 1995(R) and C.W.J.C.No.2780 of 1995(R)) there is no order in any of theassessment orders levying interest under any of thesections 234A, 234B or 234C. To use the expression"charge interest, if any" or "charge interest as perrules" cannot be read to mean that the AssessingOfficer has passed orders "charge interest under allthe aforesaid sections". The order to charge interesthas to be specific and clear, as for that matter anyorder to charge any tax, penalty or fine. It isdifferent thing as in the case of Tej Kumari Devi wherethere is an order levying interest but it left thecalculation to the office. The assessee must be madeto know that the Assessing Officer after applying hismind has ordered the charging of interest and underwhich of the sections of the Act. Interest is payableunder various provisions like for default or delay infurnishing the return of income [Sections 139(8) and139(9)] and also under the various sections for defaultin payment of advance tax (sections 215, 216, 217, 234Band 234C). A notice of demand is somewhat like adecree in a civil suit which must follow the order.When a judgment does not specify any amount to becharged under any particular section, the decree cannotcontain any such amount. Similarly when the assessmentorder is silent if any interest is leviable, the noticeof demand under section 156 of the Act cannot go beyondthe assessment order and the assessee cannot be servedwith any such notice demanding interest. We, therefore,do not feel any difficulty in coming to the conclusionthat the notices of demand in C.W.J.C. Nos.3609 of 1995(R), 3287 of 1995(R), 3562 of 1995(R), 3494(R) of 1995and 3527 of 1995(R), have to be quashed so far theserelate to charging of interest under section 234A, 234Bor 234C of the Act. We get support for the view whichwe have taken from the decisions of the Calcutta HighCourt in Monohar Gidwany v. CIT [1983] 139 ITR 498 andCIT v. Williard India Ltd. [1993] 202 ITR 423 and thatof the Gauhati High Court in CIT v. Namdang Tea Co.India Ltd. [1993] 202 ITR 414." e) From the above judgment, it is clear that there was no specificcharge of interest for the assessment order and hence the Patna High Courthad taken a view that the levy of interest under Sections 234A, 234B and234C is not valid in law. A similar view was also taken in the judgmentof Patna High Court reported in 217 ITR 72 in the case of Ranchi Club Ltd.Vs. C.I.T. and in the judgment of Delhi High Court reported in 276 ITR164 in the case of C.I.T. Vs. Gold Tex Furnishing Industries. The abovetwo decisions of the Patna High Court have been affirmed by the SupremeCourt judgment reported in 247 ITR 209, in the case of C.I.T. Vs. RanchiClub Ltd. These judgments have no relevance to the facts of the presentcase. In the present case, there is a specific charge of interest underSection 234B in the assessment order. In view of the above, the Tribunalis wrong in deleting the levy of interest under Section 234B of the Actand hence the question is answered in favour of the Revenue, against theassessee. 3.Thus the questions are answered as follows:First Question -in favour of assessee.-Second Questionin favour of Revenue.-Third Question in favour of assessee.-Fourth Questionin favour of assessee.-Fifth Questionin favour of assessee.-Sixth Questionin favour of Revenue.No costs. Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.km To1. The Assistant Registrar,The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal,III Floor, Rajaji Bhavan, Chennai. 3.Thus the questions are answered as follows:First Question -in favour of assessee.-Second Questionin favour of Revenue.-Third Question in favour of assessee.-Fourth Questionin favour of assessee.-Fifth Questionin favour of assessee.-Sixth Questionin favour of Revenue.No costs. Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.km To1. The Assistant Registrar,The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal,III Floor, Rajaji Bhavan, Chennai. 2. The Commissioner of Income Tax,Tamil Nadu II, Madras. 3. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,Special Range VII, Madras. 4. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) VII, Madras 34. 5. The Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals) I, Madras 34. 6. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,Central Circle III(3), Madras.Central Circle III(3), Madras. + 1 CC to Ms.Pushya Sitaraman, Senior Standing Counsel for Income Tax, SRNO 5108NO 5108 vc(co)gp/24.3. TC (Appeal) Nos.427 to 434 of 200006.02.2006