The Income Tax Officer Ito Mantribari Road Extension Dhaleswar Agartala Tripura Pin v. Chyawan Prakash Meena B
High Court
30 Apr 2025 In favour of: Assessee
Forum / Bench
High Court · asghccis
Parties
The Income Tax Officer Ito Mantribari Road Extension Dhaleswar Agartala Tripura Pin v. Chyawan Prakash Meena B
Date of order
30 Apr 2025
Assessment year(s)
—
Outcome
Dismissed
Case summary
In The Income Tax Officer Ito Mantribari Road Extension Dhaleswar Agartala Tripura Pin v. Chyawan Prakash Meena B, the High Court (2025) dismissed the appeal under Section 10 of the Income-tax Act. The decision went in favour of the assessee.
Issue: If a literal meaning is to be given to the expression“residing in any area specified”, in our view, section 10(26) is capable ofproducing a result that any member of a Scheduled Tribe irrespective of thefact whether such a Scheduled Tribe is a Scheduled Tribe, in relation to thoseterritories specified in the said sub-s...
Summary auto-generated from the order below — read the full judgment for the complete reasoning.
Sections referenced in this judgment
The order — as passed by the High Court
GAHC010108942023
2025:GAU-AS:5337-DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WA/342/2023
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 3 ORS.
REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE , DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE , NORTH BLOCK,NEW DELHI-01.
2: THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AAYAKAR BHAWAN 3RD FLOOR G.S.ROAD CHRISTIAN BASTI GHY-05
3: THE INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD NO-1 RANGE SILCHAR C-R BUILDING CIRCUIT HOUSE ROAD SILCHAR ASSAM PIN-788001
4: THE INCOME TAX OFFICER ITO MANTRIBARI ROAD EXTENSION DHALESWAR AGARTALA TRIPURA PIN-79900
VERSUS
CHYAWAN PRAKASH MEENA B S/O- SH ROOP CHAND MEEENA, R/O- VPO-SEWA , TEHSIL- GANGAPUR CITY, DIST- SAWAI MADHOPUR (RAJ) 322219 PRESENTLY POSTED DIG (OPS) OF BORDER SECURITY FORCE, MASIMPUR, SILCHAR , ASSAM
Advocate for the Petitioner : SC, INCOME TAX, MR. S C KEYAL Advocate for the Respondent : MR. A GOYAL, MR. A CHOUDHURY
BEFORE
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR
Date of hearing : 24.04.2025
Date of Judgment & Order : 01.05.2025
JUDGMENT & ORDER(CAV)
(N. Unni Krishnan Nair, J.)
Heard Mr. S. C. Keyal, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the
appellants. Also heard Mr. A. Goyal, learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe sole respondent.
2. The present intra-Court appeal has been instituted by the appellants,herein, assailing the order, dated 03.02.2023, passed by the learned SingleJudge in WP(c)404/2023, allowing the same by holding that the petitioner,therein, i.e. sole respondent, herein, was entitled to the benefits accruingto him under the provisions of Section 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961,with further direction to the appellants, herein, to process the request forrefund of income tax deducted from the salary of the sole respondent andto remit the same to him, forthwith.
3. The sole respondent, herein, belongs to the Meena Community whichis considered as a Scheduled Tribe under the Constitution Scheduled TribeState Order, 1951, in the State of Rajasthan. The sole respondent wasrecruited in the Border Security Force in the year 1991 as an AssistantCommandant.
4. The appellants, herein, having proceeded to make deductions towardsthe payment of income tax from the salary of the sole respondent, herein,the sole respondent by contending that being a member of recognizedScheduled Tribe community, is entitled to the benefits flowing from theprovisions of Section 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and that suchdeduction from his salary was not permissible; had approached the income
tax authorities at Silchar and Agartala where he was so posted, seekingrefund of the income tax so deducted from his salary in view of theexemption available to him under the provisions of Section 10(26) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961. The said income tax deducted from the salary of thesole respondent not having been refunded, he had approached the writCourt by way of instituting a writ petition being WP(c)404/2023, praying fora direction upon the respondent authorities to forthwith refund the incometax deducted from his salary by reckoning that he was entitled to theexemption provided under the provisions of Section 10(26) of the IncomeTax Act, 1961.
5. The learned Single Judge upon considering the matter and alsofollowing the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of PradipKr. Taye & ors. v. Union of India & ors., reported in 2010(2) GLR 367,proceeded to allow the said writ petition being WP(c)404/2023, by holdingthat the petitioner, therein, i.e. sole respondent, herein, was entitled to thebenefits accruing to him under the provisions of Section 10(26) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961. The learned Single Judge further proceeded to directthe income tax authorities to expeditiously process the request for refundof the income tax so deducted from the salary of the sole respondent andremit the same to him, forthwith.
5. The learned Single Judge upon considering the matter and alsofollowing the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of PradipKr. Taye & ors. v. Union of India & ors., reported in 2010(2) GLR 367,proceeded to allow the said writ petition being WP(c)404/2023, by holdingthat the petitioner, therein, i.e. sole respondent, herein, was entitled to thebenefits accruing to him under the provisions of Section 10(26) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961. The learned Single Judge further proceeded to directthe income tax authorities to expeditiously process the request for refundof the income tax so deducted from the salary of the sole respondent andremit the same to him, forthwith.
6.The operative part of the order, dated 03.02.2023, passed by thelearned Single Judge in WP(c)404/2023, being relevant, is extractedhereinbelow:
“8. In terms of the provisions of this Section, any member of a Scheduled Tribe asdefined in Clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution, residing in any of the areasprescribed under Section 10(26), is exempted from payment of income tax. This Courtin Pradip Kr. Taye (Supra) had elaborately dealt with this issue and had laid down
the law and had held that the expression under Section 10(26) “residing in any areaspecified” cannot be given a narrow and restricted meaning to imply that themembers of a Schedule Tribe migrating from their places of origin, which happens tofall in one of the areas specified in the said sub-section, to another area althoughonce again falling within the areas specified in the sub-section, would not get thebenefit of the exemption under Section 10(26) for exemption from payment of incometax. The relevant paragraphs from the said Judgment are extracted below:
the law and had held that the expression under Section 10(26) “residing in any areaspecified” cannot be given a narrow and restricted meaning to imply that themembers of a Schedule Tribe migrating from their places of origin, which happens tofall in one of the areas specified in the said sub-section, to another area althoughonce again falling within the areas specified in the sub-section, would not get thebenefit of the exemption under Section 10(26) for exemption from payment of incometax. The relevant paragraphs from the said Judgment are extracted below:
“28. Examined thus, the crucial expression “residing in any area specified”occurring under section 10(26), in our view, cannot be given a narrow andrestricted meaning to imply that the members of a Scheduled Tribe migratingfrom their place of origin, which happens to fall in one of the areas specified inthe said sub-section, to another area although once again falling within theareas specified in the sub-section, would not get the benefit of the exemptionunder section 10(26). If a literal meaning is to be given to the expression“residing in any area specified”, in our view, section 10(26) is capable ofproducing a result that any member of a Scheduled Tribe irrespective of thefact whether such a Scheduled Tribe is a Scheduled Tribe, in relation to thoseterritories specified in the said sub-section or not, is entitled to the benefit ofthe said subsection. It is not the case of either the petitioners or the revenuethat the Parliament, white enacting section 10(26) intended such result.Therefore, the expression “residing in any area specified” must be interpretedin the context of the said sub-section. The context of the sub-section is that it isa special provision with reference to the specified areas of the country, that is,the areas comprising North East and Jammu & Kashmir of the country, whichreceived a special treatment under the scheme of the Constitution in thevarious aspects of the application of the Constitution. It may also beworthwhile remembering that even in the matter of reservation of seats eitherin the Lok Sabha or the various Legislative Assemblies, the Scheduled Tribes ofthe State of “Assam” are treated exclusively under article 330(3) [ 330 (3)Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2), the number of seats reservedin the House of the People for the Scheduled Tribes in the autonomous districtsof Assam shall bear to the total number of seats allotted to that State aproportion not less than the population of the Scheduled Tribes in the saidautonomous districts bears to the total population of the State.] and 332(1)[ 332 (1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,except the Scheduled Tribes in the tribal areas of Assam, in Nagaland and inMeghalaya, in the Legislative Assembly of every State.] . Therefore, in our view,the expression “residing in any area specified”, occurring under section 10(26)is used by the Parliament synonymously with the expression “in relation to anyarea specified” under the said sub-section. In our view, the expression “residingin any area specified” is not meant to be restrictive of the benefit providedunder the said sub-section in the case of members of the Scheduled Tribes, who,otherwise, fall within the scope of the said section, but migrating to one of theplaces specified in the said subsection but only descriptive of the limitednumber of Scheduled Tribes, which are residents of the areas specified undersection 10(26) of the Income-tax Act.
29. It may also be kept in mind while interpreting the said sub-section that thebenefit contemplated therein is sought to be given to a specific class ofassessees with reference to the income arising or accruing out of a specifiedarea, i.e., areas specified in section 10(26)(a) or certain sources specified insection 10(26)(b). While clause (a) of section 10(26) restricts the benefit to theincomes arising or accruing out of various sources, such as, salaries, houseproperties etc., (which are some of the heads of income) so long they arise or
accrue within one of the territories/areas specified in the said sub-section,under clause (b) of section 10(26), such a restriction, regarding the territory(with reference to which the income arising out of dividend or interest onsecurities arise), is not applicable.
30. Yet another reason to reject the interpretation sought to be placed on thesaid sub-section by the revenue is the history of the sub-section. It is alreadynoticed earlier, originally the provision sought to exclude the employees of thegovernment from the purview of the benefit conferred by the said sub-section,which was found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as creating anunreasonable classification among the Scheduled Tribes. The Supreme Court inS.K. Dutta (supra) held such a classification to be illegal. At para-14 of the saidjudgment the Supreme Court held as follows:—
“It was the contention of the learned Solicitor-General that exemptionfrom income-tax was given to members of certain scheduled tribes due totheir economic and social backwardness; it is not possible to consider agovernment servant as socially and economically backward and, hence,the exemption was justly denied to him. According to the Solicitor-General, once a tribal becomes a government servant he is lifted out ofhis social environment and assimilated into the forward sections of thesociety and, therefore, he needs no more any crutch to lean on. Thisargument appears to us to be wholly irrelevant. The exemption inquestion was not given to individuals either on the basis of their socialstatus or economic resources. It was given to a class. Hence, individualsas individuals do not come into the picture. We fail to see in whatmanner the social, status and economic resources of a governmentservant can be different from that of another holding a similar positionin a corporation or that of a successful medical practitioner, lawyer,architect, etc. To over-paint the picture of a government servant as theembodiment of all power and prestige would sound ironical today hisposition in the society to put it at the highest is no higher than, that ofothers who in other walks of life have the same income. For the purposeof valid classification what is required is not some imaginary differencebut a reasonable and substantial distinction, having regard to thepurpose of the law.”
31. Once it is held that such a classification of the government servants fromthe scope of section 10(26) is violative of article 14 to say that a governmentservant or the employees of the “State” (within the meaning of article 12) losesthe benefit on the mere accident of his being posted out of his place of originbut within the areas specified under section 10(26) and entitled to the benefitof the said section if by an accident, he is posted in the same area of his origin.Such an interpretation, in our view, which is dependent upon pure accidentand exigencies of the service, would lead to wholly arbitrary results andundesirable consequences. We, therefore, find no substance in the submissionmade by the revenue. We are of the opinion that the case NEEPCO TribalEmployees’ Welfare Association (supra) is wrongly decided and we approve thedecision of this court Dipti Doley Basumatary (Supra) to the extent it isconsistent with the present judgment.”
9. Having perused the Judgment of this Court rendered by a full Bench in Pradip Kr.Taye (Supra) as well as in view of the Tax Exemption Certificates dated 10.12.2020
and 21.04.2021 issued by the respondent department; this Court is of the view thatthe prayers made by the petitioner will have to be allowed.
10. The petitioner is indeed entitled to the benefits accrued under Section 10(26) ofthe Income Tax Act, 1961. Accordingly, Mandamus is hereby issued to the respondent,more particularly, the Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS) as well as the concernedIncome Tax Officer of the ward to expeditiously process the request for refund ofincome tax deducted from the salary of the petitioner and remit to the petitionerforthwith.”
7. Mr. Keyal, learned counsel for the appellants, herein, has submittedthat the sole respondent, herein, being a member of a communityrecognized as Scheduled Tribe for the State of Rajasthan and the State ofRajasthan not being identified as a specified area under the provisions ofSection 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961; he would not be entitled toclaim the benefit of income tax exemption.
8. Mr. Keyal, learned counsel, has further submitted that the solerespondent, herein, did not satisfy the first condition for claiming theexemption of income tax under the provisions of Section 10(26) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961, and the learned Single Judge had failed toappreciate the said aspect of the matter while drawing his conclusions inthe order, dated 03.02.2023, passed in WP(c)404/2023.
9. Mr. Keyal, learned counsel, has submitted that the decision of the FullBench of this Court in the case of Pradip Kr. Taye & ors.(supra), wouldhave no application in the facts arising in the present proceeding.
10. In the above premises, Mr. Keyal, learned counsel, appearing for theappellants, has submitted that the impugned order, dated 03.02.2023,
passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(c)404/2023, would mandate aninterference from this Court.
11. Per contra, Mr. Goyal, learned counsel appearing for the solerespondent, herein, by referring to the provisions of Section 10(26) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961, has contended that the same was considered by theFull Bench of this Court in the case of Pradip Kr. Taye & ors.(supra), andhad reached a conclusion that even a government employee on beingposted out of his place of origin to a place falling within the area specifiedunder the provisions of Section 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, wouldbe entitled to the exemption flowing therefrom.
12. Mr. Goyal, learned counsel for the sole respondent, herein, has furthersubmitted that the learned Single Judge had drawn his conclusions in thematter vide order, dated 03.02.2023, in WP(c)404/2023, by relying uponthe decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Pradip Kr. Taye &ors.(supra), and accordingly; the said decision would not mandate anyinterference from this Court.
13. We have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties andalso perused the materials available on record.
14. It is not disputed that the sole respondent, herein, belongs to anotified Scheduled Tribe community of the State of Rajasthan. Therespondent, during his service career, had been posted out of the State ofRajasthan and had also rendered service in areas specified under theprovisions of Section 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
13. We have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties andalso perused the materials available on record.
14. It is not disputed that the sole respondent, herein, belongs to anotified Scheduled Tribe community of the State of Rajasthan. Therespondent, during his service career, had been posted out of the State ofRajasthan and had also rendered service in areas specified under theprovisions of Section 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
15. Although Mr. Keyal, learned counsel for the appellants, herein, had,earlier in the course of consideration of the present proceeding, raised anissue as to whether the sole respondent, herein, would be entitled to claimsuch income tax exemption for the period he was posted at Silchar, Assam;the said position was clarified by Mr. Goyal, learned counsel for the solerespondent, by contending that the respondent is not claiming income taxexemption for the period he was posted at Silchar, Assam, which is not aspecified area under the provisions of Section 10(26) of the Income TaxAct, 1961, but, the respondent, herein, is claiming income tax exemptionrelating to the period he was posted at Agartala, Tripura, which is aspecified area under the provisions of Section 10(26) of the Income TaxAct, 1961. The said aspect of the matter was recorded by this Court in itsorder, dated 20.02.2024, passed in the present proceeding.
16. In view of the said position and it not being disputed that the solerespondent, herein, while being posted at Agartala, Tripura; was so postedin a specified area in terms of the provisions of Section 10(26) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961, it is to be held that he would be entitled to thebenefits of exemption from income tax flowing from the provisions ofSection 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
17. The above aspect of the matter, is no longer res integra, and hasbeen laid to rest by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the caseof Pradip Kr. Taye & ors.(supra).
18. The learned Single Judge having drawn his conclusions in the matterafter appreciating the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of
Pradip Kr. Taye & ors.(supra); the conclusions drawn by the learned SingleJudge in the order, dated 03.02.2023, in WP(c)404/2023, to the effect thatthe respondent was entitled to the benefits accruing to him under theprovisions of Section 10(26) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and that, hewould be entitled to the exemption from income tax flowing therefrom; weare of the considered view that given the facts and circumstances involvedin the matter as well as the Scheduled Tribe status of the sole respondent,herein, the order, dated 03.02.2023, passed by the learned Single Judge inWP(c)404/2023, would not mandate an interference from this Court.
19. Accordingly, the directions passed by the learned Single Judge, videorder, dated 03.02.2023, in WP(c)404/2023, for refund of the income taxdeducted from the salary of the sole respondent, herein, cannot also besaid to be erroneous.
20. In view of the above discussions, we are of the considered view thatthe instant writ appeal is devoid of any merit and the same, accordingly,stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGECHIEF JUSTICE
Comparing Assistant
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