Thecommissionerof Incometax,Raipur, Central Revenuebuilding,Civillines,Raipur v. Iss"

IN_THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WRIT APPEAL No.__^_/2013 (Arising out of order dated 09.10.2012 passed by thelearned Single Judge in W.P. (T) No. 39/2012) APPELLANT€£^s-^0-^-'\e^C,.„ \[^..^\--""•R-lla* 'iusts-^- .^'n....',l,se^l>^""^.,.\.<.12.....-V" TheCommissionerof IncomeTax,Raipur, Central RevenueBuilding,CivilLines,Raipur VERSUS RESPONDENTS 1.Unionof India,throughthesecretary, Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance of Finance Finance(Department of Revenue), New of Revenue), New Revenue), New NewDelhi.secretary, Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance of Finance Finance(Department of Revenue), New of Revenue), New Revenue), New NewDelhi. ^.espyvoi^.secretary, Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance of Finance Finance(Department of Revenue), New of Revenue), New Revenue), New NewDelhi.Per/r/'c'/v^-^2.Vidyasagar Agrawal, S/o LateShri Ganeshi Lal Agrawal, agedabout 80resident of years,IndustrialWard,Dhamtari(C.G.) WRITAPPEALUNDERSECTION2dtOFTHECHHATTISGARHHIGHCOURT (APPEAL TODIVISIONBENCHl. ACT. 2006. READ WITH RULE -158(10l(iHb(QFLTHE HIGHCOURTLOFCHHATTISGARH RULES,2007CHHATTISGARHHIGHCOURT (APPEAL TODIVISIONBENCHl. ACT. 2006. READ WITH RULE -158(10l(iHb(QFLTHE HIGHCOURTLOFCHHATTISGARH RULES,2007 iSS"--/ ^? HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Appearance:Shri Anand Dadariya, counsel for the Appellant.Shri Vivek Shrivastava and HS Ahluwalia, counsel for the Union of India.Shri BP Sharma, counsel for Respondents-2 and 3. JUDGEMENT(14th March, 2013) 1.These writ appeals are against the order of the single judge dated09.10.2012, quashing transfer of search assessment proceeding of theAssessees to the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,CentralCircle-1 Visakhapatnam (the ACIT-Visakhapatnam) under sub-section (2)of Section 127(2) {127 (2)} ofthe Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act). THE FACTS 2.A search was conducted in the premises of M/s Maa MahamayaGroup of Companies (the Mahamaya group), as well as residential andofRcial premises of its directors, partners, and employees on 19.08.2011at different places, namely at Dhamtari, Visakhapatnam and Kolkata.Itwas at the instance of the Director of Investigation, Hyderabad (the DIT,Hyderabad) 3. In the present batch of writ appeals, the assessment[of]the[Assessees]are being done at Dhamtari and Raipur in the State of Chhattisgarh. Asuggestion, in form of a letter dated 27.12.2011, was received by the Commissioner, Income Tax, Raipur from the Commissioner of IncomeTax, Hyderabad for centralisation of cases for post search and seizureoperationsfortheco-ordinatedinvestigationwiththeACIT-Visakhapatnam. 4.Later,ashow-causenotice wasissuedon18.01.2012to theAssessees asking them to show cause against the transfer.TheAssessees filed their obj'ections.Assessees asking them to show cause against the transfer.TheAssessees filed their obj'ections. 5.After considering the objections, initially, five cases were transferredon 02.04.2012.Thereafter,a further suggestion was received forre-consideringnineothercasesforcentralisationfor co-ordinatedinvestigation. Another order was passed on 31.05.2012, centralisingthose cases as well. 6.The Assessees in the aforesaid cases, filed different writ petitions.These petitions were consolidated and were allowed by the single judgeon 09.10.2012, basically on the ground that the word 'co-ordinatedinvestigation' was vague and no opportunity can be said to have beengiven to the Assessees. Hence, the present writ appeals by Income TaxDepartment (the Department). POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 7. We have heard counsel for the parties. The following two points arise for determination in the case: (i) Whether the present appeals are maintainable; (ii) In case the answer to the aforesaid question is in affirmative, thenwhether the transfer orders are invalid.whether the transfer orders are invalid. 6.The Assessees in the aforesaid cases, filed different writ petitions.These petitions were consolidated and were allowed by the single judgeon 09.10.2012, basically on the ground that the word 'co-ordinatedinvestigation' was vague and no opportunity can be said to have beengiven to the Assessees. Hence, the present writ appeals by Income TaxDepartment (the Department). POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 7. We have heard counsel for the parties. The following two points arise for determination in the case: (i) Whether the present appeals are maintainable; (ii) In case the answer to the aforesaid question is in affirmative, thenwhether the transfer orders are invalid.whether the transfer orders are invalid. 1st POINT: TRANSFER ORDER IS ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER8.The counsel for the Assessees placed reliance on WA-1006 of 2012SKS Ispat Vs Union of India decided on 12.12.2012 (the SKS-lspat case)and submits that: The transfer order under Section 127(2) of the Act is a quasi-judicial order as it has to indicate the reasons and it cannot bejudicial order as it has to indicate the reasons and it cannot be passedunlessareasonableopportunityisgiventotheAssessees; The writ petitions were filed for quashing of the quasi judicialorders and they have been quashed by the single judge;orders and they have been quashed by the single judge; The order passed by the single judge was under Article 227 andno writ appeal is maintainable against the order of the singlejudge under section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appealto Division Bench) Act, 2006 (the 2006-Act).no writ appeal is maintainable against the order of the singlejudge under section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appealto Division Bench) Act, 2006 (the 2006-Act). 9.In order to decide this point, it is necessary to decide whether theimpugned orders of transfer were quasi-judicial orders or not. 10.In AK Kraipak and others Vs Union of India and others, AIR 1970 SC150 (the AK-Kraipak case) (paragraph 13), the Supreme Court observedthatthedividinglinebetweenanadministrativepowerandaquasi-judicial power was thin.And in order to determine the nature ofpower, the point to consider is—thenature of the power, to whom it wasconferred,theframeworkofthelawconferringthatpower,th?consequencesfrom the exercise ofthat power, and the manner in whichthat power was expected to be exercised. 11.In the AK-Kraipak case, the Supreme Cburtdid not decide thequestion, whether the power of selection/ appointment was administrativeor judicial but went on to say that the principles of natural justice werenothing but to ensure fairness and were applicable to the administrativeproceedings as well. 12.Section 127(2) of the Act provides that transfer can only be done ifopportunity is afforded to an assessee and after recording reasons.Butmerely for this reason it cannot be said to be quasi judicial in nature. 13. A transfer order has civil consequences; especially when the casesare transferred from one city to another. Even if there was no suchstatutory provision, the transfer, beyond a city could not be effected unless an opportunity was given and was for relevant considerations.This was required to be done to ensure fairness. The fact that there is astatutory provision, does not by itself, make the function to be a judicial.It is not conclusive ofthis fact. 14. The transfer order does not decide the rights of the parties in theassessment.The ultimate order deciding the right is the order of theassessment; it decides the basis and the tax to be paid: this order is ajudicial order. The transfer order is merely for administrative reason andit cannot be said that nature of power is judicial. 15. In Kashiram Aggarwalla Vs Union of India and other3(1965) 56 ITR14 (SC) (the Kashiram case), the transfer order was under 127(1) of theAct; unlike the present cases, where the transfer orders are underSection 127 (2) of the Act.The question involved was, whether thetransferorder in that case was invalid as no reasons were recorded. 14. The transfer order does not decide the rights of the parties in theassessment.The ultimate order deciding the right is the order of theassessment; it decides the basis and the tax to be paid: this order is ajudicial order. The transfer order is merely for administrative reason andit cannot be said that nature of power is judicial. 15. In Kashiram Aggarwalla Vs Union of India and other3(1965) 56 ITR14 (SC) (the Kashiram case), the transfer order was under 127(1) of theAct; unlike the present cases, where the transfer orders are underSection 127 (2) of the Act.The question involved was, whether thetransferorder in that case was invalid as no reasons were recorded. 16.In the Kashiram case, the Supreme Court held that the mandatoryrequirement of recording reasons was not to be applicable, as thetransfer orders were in the same city and only wards were changed buttheCourtdidobserve about thenature of transfer ordersundersection 127. 17.The Supreme Court, in the Kashiram case, observed that transfereare made on grounds of administrative convenience and are in nature ofadministrative order. 18. Similar views were expressed by a division bench of the Gujrat HighCourt in Arti Ship Breaking vs DIT (2000) 244 ITR 33, where transferorder was upheld though reasons were not indicated[on][ the]ground[that]transfer was on administrative reasons. 19.In this case, a search was held at different places and documentswere seized.It is necessary to see them together before passing the orderofassessment.Thetransferorderisforadministrativeconvenience for making co-ordinated investigation.The. authority isexercising administrative and not judicial power. The judicial power is tobe exercisedafter co-ordinatedinvestigation, while passingsearchassessment orders. 20. In our opinion, the authority while passing the transfer orders, did notexerciseItisan administrative order andnota judicialpower.quasi judicial order. The SKS-lspat case is not applicable. 21. It is not disputed that in case the order was not a quasi judicial, thenthe writ appeal would be maintainable. We have already held that powerto transfer the assessment cases is not a quasi judicial in nature; noJudicial power is exercised: the writ appeal is maintainable. 2nd POINT:TRANSFER ORDER IS EQUATED 22.The counsel for the Assessees placed reliance on decisions (seebelow)1 and submits that:below)1 and submits that: (i) The order of transfer is not in consonance which the notice givento the Assessee;to the Assessee; (ii)[No][ opportunity][ was]given[about][ the][ reasons][ mentioned][ in][ the]transfer order;transfer order; (iii)The word 'co-ordinate investigation' is vague;and 'The counsel for the Assessees relied upon: Vinay Kumar Jaiswal & Others VsCommissioner of Income Tax & Others reported in (1996) 136 CTR (All) 486;Vijayasanthi Investments (P) Ltd., Vs Chief Commissioner of Income Tax andOthers reported in (1991) 91 CTR (AP) 36; VK Steel Industries (P) Ltd., VsAssfetant Commissioner of Income Tax & Others reported in (1991) 187 ITR403 (AP); Sagarmal Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., Vs Central Board of DirectTax & Others reported in (1972) 83 ITR 130 (MP); Commissioner of Income TaxVs British India corporation Ltd., reported in (2011) 245 CTR (All) 424; PKPehuja Vs Central Board of Direct Taxes & Another reported in (1978) 1978CTR (All) 414; MK Industries & Others Vs Union of India and others reported in(1979) 119 ITR 286 (Bom); Bansal Sharevests ServicesLtd., and another VsCommlssioner of Income Tax reported in (2006) 283 rTR 332 (All); RK Agarwaland Others Vs Commissioner of Income Tax and others reported in (2006) 201CTR (All) 520; Vijay Kumar Gauri Shanker and others Vs Commissioner ofIncome Tax and another reported in (2006) 203 CTR (All) 463; Shivajirao VsCommissioner of Income Tax and others reported in (1985) 47 CTR (MP) 54;Saptagiri Enterprises Vs Commissioner of Income Tax and others (1991) 189ITR 705 (AP)— (iv) The single judge has rightly quashed the transfer orders. (iv) The single judge has rightly quashed the transfer orders. ia and ii"" Submissions: Reason indicated in the Notice23. We have seen the notice issued to the Assessees.Apart fromothers, it states that transfer is required for centralisation of cases forco-ordinated investigation.Ultimately the transfer orders were passedforthis reason namely, co-ordinated investigation ofthe cases. 24. The notice was given indicating the reason as centralisation forco-ordinated investigation and it is for this reason that the transfer orderswere passed.The fact that in the order, the words co-ordinatedinvestigation was further explained neither vitiates the transfer orders norcan it be said that no notice was given.The reasons were indicated inthe notice and the Assessees had opportunity to reply the same. 25. In ouropinion, It cannot be said that no reasons were communicated or orderwas without any opportunity;was without any opportunity; The first two submissions have no merit. Let us consider ifthe words 'co-ordinated investigation' are vague or not. iiirdand ivthSubmissions: Coordinated tnvestigation—NotVague26.It is not disputed that the search took place in the premises ofMahamaya group of companies, as wellas residential and officialpremises of its directors and its employees.It was at different places atDhamtari, Visakhapatnam, and Kolkata: where incriminating[documents]were seized. 27. The documents are inter-connected and affect the assessment of theparties.It is necessary to see their effect together on the assessments.It can only be done after analysing and investigating the documents-found at different places together and not separately at different places: aco-ordinated investigation is necessary. 28.The word 'co-ordinated' means harmonious in action. As documents"ihave been seized at different places, it is necessary that all the casesshouldbeconsideredtogether at oneplacesothatharmoniousinvestigation be undertaken to arrive at just assessment. The words 'co-ordinated investigation' ofthe case is not vague. Cases holding 'Coordinated Investigation'not vague 29. We would like to point out that transfer orders for co-ordinatedinvestigation or transfer orders using similar words have been upheld byalmost all High Courts in the country, namely, TheAllahabadHighCourtinRadicoKhaitanLtd.,VsCommissioner of Income-Tax and others 2007(292) ITR 507 (All)and Bhatia Minerals Vs Commissioner of Income Tax and others200 ITR 591;Commissioner of Income-Tax and others 2007(292) ITR 507 (All)and Bhatia Minerals Vs Commissioner of Income Tax and others200 ITR 591; The Calcutta High Court in Sahara India Commercial CorporationLtd., Vs Commissioner of Income-tax and others (2009) 310 ITR372(paragraph12&15);Ltd., Vs Commissioner of Income-tax and others (2009) 310 ITR372(paragraph12&15); The Delhi High Court in ATS Infrastmcture Ltd & others VsCommissioner of Income Tax(2009) 318ITR 299(Delhi)(paragraph 11);Commissioner of Income Tax(2009) 318ITR 299(Delhi)(paragraph 11); The Gauhati High Court in Rathi and Company Vs Union of Indiaand others (2004) 267 ITR295 (Gauhati) (paragraph 17 to 19);and others (2004) 267 ITR295 (Gauhati) (paragraph 17 to 19); The Patna High Court in Mukti Morcha Vs Commissioner ofIncome Tax and others (1997) 225 ITR 284 (paragraph 16);Income Tax and others (1997) 225 ITR 284 (paragraph 16); The Punjab & Haryana High Court[in]Charan[Pal][ Singh][ Vs]Commissioner of Income Tax and another 2008 307 ITR 132.Commissioner of Income Tax and another 2008 307 ITR 132.Let us consider therelevant cases citedby thecounsel for theAssessees.Assessees. Relevant Decisions cited by the counsel for the Assessees 30.Most of the cases relied upon[by][ the][ counsel][ for][ the][ Assessees][ are]not applicable on the facts ofthe cases in hand. A gist ofthe cases citedis as follows:1not applicable on the facts ofthe cases in hand. A gist ofthe cases citedis as follows:1 The Patna High Court in Mukti Morcha Vs Commissioner ofIncome Tax and others (1997) 225 ITR 284 (paragraph 16);Income Tax and others (1997) 225 ITR 284 (paragraph 16); The Punjab & Haryana High Court[in]Charan[Pal][ Singh][ Vs]Commissioner of Income Tax and another 2008 307 ITR 132.Commissioner of Income Tax and another 2008 307 ITR 132.Let us consider therelevant cases citedby thecounsel for theAssessees.Assessees. Relevant Decisions cited by the counsel for the Assessees 30.Most of the cases relied upon[by][ the][ counsel][ for][ the][ Assessees][ are]not applicable on the facts ofthe cases in hand. A gist ofthe cases citedis as follows:1not applicable on the facts ofthe cases in hand. A gist ofthe cases citedis as follows:1 In Vinay Kumar Jaiswal & others v Commissioner of Income Tax &others (1996) 221 ITR 568 (All), the transfer order was setasideas no opportunity was afforded to the assessee. This is nota casehere.In the cases before us, the order has been passed afteraffording opportunity to the Assessees;others (1996) 221 ITR 568 (All), the transfer order was setasideas no opportunity was afforded to the assessee. This is nota casehere.In the cases before us, the order has been passed afteraffording opportunity to the Assessees; In VK Steel Industries (P) Limited v Assistant Commissioner ofIncome Tax & others (1991) 187 ITR 403 (AP); MK Industries andothere v Union of India and others (1979) 119 ITR 286 (Bom); PKPehuja v Central Board of Direct Taxes and another (1978) 1978CTR (All) 414; Bansal Sharevests Services Limited and another vCommissioner of Income Tax (2006) 283 ITR 332 (All); VijayKumar Gauri Shanker and others v Commissioner of Income Taxand another (2006) 283 ITR 524 (All), the transfer orders were setaside as either the reasons were not communicated, or they werenot indicated or recorded.This is not a case here.In the casesbefore us, reasons have been indicated and communicated to theAssessees;Income Tax & others (1991) 187 ITR 403 (AP); MK Industries andothere v Union of India and others (1979) 119 ITR 286 (Bom); PKPehuja v Central Board of Direct Taxes and another (1978) 1978CTR (All) 414; Bansal Sharevests Services Limited and another vCommissioner of Income Tax (2006) 283 ITR 332 (All); VijayKumar Gauri Shanker and others v Commissioner of Income Taxand another (2006) 283 ITR 524 (All), the transfer orders were setaside as either the reasons were not communicated, or they werenot indicated or recorded.This is not a case here.In the casesbefore us, reasons have been indicated and communicated to theAssessees; In RK Agrawal and others v Commissioner of Income Tax andothers (2006) 283 ITR 532 (All), the transfer order was set asideas the objection of the assessee was that he was not connectedwith the group involved there was not dealt.This is not a casehere.Here, admittedly the Assessees are either MahamayaGroup of companies or their directors or their employees; therewas also no such objection.others (2006) 283 ITR 532 (All), the transfer order was set asideas the objection of the assessee was that he was not connectedwith the group involved there was not dealt.This is not a casehere.Here, admittedly the Assessees are either MahamayaGroup of companies or their directors or their employees; therewas also no such objection. 31.The Andhra Pradesh (AP) High Court and Madhya Pradesh (MP)High Court have taken acontrary view that the words 'co-ordinatedHigh Court have taken acontrary view that the words 'co-ordinated•investigation' are not vague. These cases are as follows: The AP High Court in Vijayasanthi Investments (P) Ltd., Vs ChiefCommissioner of Income Tax and Others reported in (1991) 187ITR 405 (the Vijayasanthi case) and in Saptagiri Enterprises VsCommissioner of Income Tax and others reported in (1991) 189ITR 705 (AP) (the Saptagiri case);Commissioner of Income Tax and Others reported in (1991) 187ITR 405 (the Vijayasanthi case) and in Saptagiri Enterprises VsCommissioner of Income Tax and others reported in (1991) 189ITR 705 (AP) (the Saptagiri case); 31.The Andhra Pradesh (AP) High Court and Madhya Pradesh (MP)High Court have taken acontrary view that the words 'co-ordinatedHigh Court have taken acontrary view that the words 'co-ordinated•investigation' are not vague. These cases are as follows: The AP High Court in Vijayasanthi Investments (P) Ltd., Vs ChiefCommissioner of Income Tax and Others reported in (1991) 187ITR 405 (the Vijayasanthi case) and in Saptagiri Enterprises VsCommissioner of Income Tax and others reported in (1991) 189ITR 705 (AP) (the Saptagiri case);Commissioner of Income Tax and Others reported in (1991) 187ITR 405 (the Vijayasanthi case) and in Saptagiri Enterprises VsCommissioner of Income Tax and others reported in (1991) 189ITR 705 (AP) (the Saptagiri case); The MP High Court in Sagarmal Spinning & Weaving Mills LimitedVs Central Board of Direct Tax and others reported in (1972) 83ITR130(MP)(theSagarmalcase)andShivjiraoVsCommissioner of Income Tax and others reported in (1985) 158ITR 162 (MP) (the Shivjirao case).Vs Central Board of Direct Tax and others reported in (1972) 83ITR130(MP)(theSagarmalcase)andShivjiraoVsCommissioner of Income Tax and others reported in (1985) 158ITR 162 (MP) (the Shivjirao case). 32. The basis of the aforesaid four cases of the AP and MP High Court isthe Sagarmal case decided by the MP High Court. This is clear from thefollowing clarification: The Saptagiri case was decided by the AP High Court on the basisof the Vijayasanthi case, which was decided on the basis of theShivajirao case and the Sagarmal case;of the Vijayasanthi case, which was decided on the basis of theShivajirao case and the Sagarmal case; The Shivjirao case was decided by the MP High Court on the basisof the earlier decision in the Sagarmal case.of the earlier decision in the Sagarmal case. 33.In the Vijayasanthi and Saptagiri cases that were decided by the APHigh Court as well as the Shivjirao case decided by the MP High Court,the transfer orders were for co-ordinated investigation.It was set asidebasically on the reasoning given in the Sagarmal case. Let us consider, What the Sagarmal case was about; and Whether the law laid down by it was the correct law or not; and Could it be the basis for holding that the words['co-ordinated]investigation' are vague and setting aside the transfer orders.Could it be the basis for holding that the words['co-ordinated]investigation' are vague and setting aside the transfer orders. The Sagarmal Case 34.In the Sagarmal case, the transfer was sought from Indore toBombayfor'facilityofinvestigation'andnotfor'co-ordinatedinvestigation'.It was not a case of search, where documents wereseizedatdifferentplacesandit wasnecessarytoconsider thedocuments together to arrive at a just conclusion. It is for this reason thatWP High Court had held the words 'facility of transfer' to be vague andthe transfer order was set aside. But this was not the fact in the othercases.i r 35.The reason of transferin theSagarmal case was 'facility ofinvestigation' and not 'centralisation' for 'co-ordinated investigation' in asearch case.The facts of the Sagarmal case and the reasons weredifferent. It cannot be made applicable to the cases, Where search takes place and documents are seized affectingassessment at other places;assessment at other places; Where the effect of seized documents is to be seen together ortransfer is for centralisation for coordinated investigation.transfer is for centralisation for coordinated investigation. 36. With due respects to the Judges in the Vijayasanthi, Saptagiri, andShivjirao .cases—theSagarmal case could not be relied upon to decidethose cases; it was not applicable.We differ from the views taken bythem and prefer not to apply the Sagarmal case to the case in hand. Where search takes place and documents are seized affectingassessment at other places;assessment at other places; Where the effect of seized documents is to be seen together ortransfer is for centralisation for coordinated investigation.transfer is for centralisation for coordinated investigation. 36. With due respects to the Judges in the Vijayasanthi, Saptagiri, andShivjirao .cases—theSagarmal case could not be relied upon to decidethose cases; it was not applicable.We differ from the views taken bythem and prefer not to apply the Sagarmal case to the case in hand. 37. It will not be out of place to mention that the MP High Court has itselfdistinguished the Sagarmal case.in Maheshwari Lime Works and othersVs Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (1984) 147 ITR 804 (MP)(the Maheshwari case). Unfortunately, the MP High Court in the Shivjiraocase and the AP High court in the Vijayasanthi case as well as theSaptagiri case, neither saw difference in facts of the cases and theSagarmal case, nor noticed the Maheshwari case, where the MP HighCourt itself had distinguished the Sagarmal case. 38.In any case, the aforesaid four cases decided by the AP and MPHigh Courts are merely persuasive and are not binding on us.Weprefer to be in the companyof rest of the High courts as mentioned"Casesunderheadingholding . 'co-ordinatedinvestigation'-notvague" 39. In our opinion, The facts of the Sagarmal case were different; its ratio cannot bemade applicable in the present case;made applicable in the present case; The AP High Court and MP High Court in the Vijaysanthi, Saptagiriand Shivjirao cases applied the Sagaral case without consideringthedifferenceaswellastheMaheshwaricasethathaddistinguished the case. Itwill not be properto rely upon them.and Shivjirao cases applied the Sagaral case without consideringthedifferenceaswellastheMaheshwaricasethathaddistinguished the case. Itwill not be properto rely upon them. No Prejudice 40. Writ jurisdiction under article 226 is discretionary. While exercisingwrit jurisdiction, it is also a relevant consideration, whether any prejudicehas been caused or not. Let us consider this aspect also. 41.We would like to mention here that the main factory of the flagshipcompany of Mahamaya group is situate at Visakhapatnam.They notonly have their offices and residences there but also guest house. Thereis no inconvenience to them. 42.The searchtook place at three different places at Dhamtari,Visakhapatnam and Kolkata. The interconnected documents were foundat these places.They have to be looked together in order to reach justassessment and cases of two places have to be transferred to thirdplace.[As][ the][ cases][ are][ at][ three]places,[the][ cases][ of][ two]places[have][ to]be transferred at third place for centralisation. 43.TheDepartmenthas transferredthecases to Visakhapatnamas—themain factory of flagship company was situate there; most ofdocuments were seized there; and it was under the DIT-Hyderabad,under whose supervision, the search took place. 44.Inthe transfer order,itis alsomentionedthat after search,assessment orders the assessee could seek de-centralisation[/e—after]the search assessment order is passed, they could seek de-centralisationand the further appeals may be filed in the same[way][ as][ they][ were][ filed]eariier. There is no prejudice to them. r"': Menaceof Black Money 45. Itis said that in our country, there is more black money than white:the black money market is as big if not bigger than white money.Ifefforts are made to unearth it, then court should not gag it, unless theaction runs fouls ofthe statutory provision. 46.In the present case, the statutory provision is that transfer can bemade for reasons recorded and after affording opportunity.This hasbeen done in the present case. There is no statutory violation. 47. In our opinion, The reason for transfer was given in the notice; The Assesses had reasonable opportunity; r"': Menaceof Black Money 45. Itis said that in our country, there is more black money than white:the black money market is as big if not bigger than white money.Ifefforts are made to unearth it, then court should not gag it, unless theaction runs fouls ofthe statutory provision. 46.In the present case, the statutory provision is that transfer can bemade for reasons recorded and after affording opportunity.This hasbeen done in the present case. There is no statutory violation. 47. In our opinion, The reason for transfer was given in the notice; The Assesses had reasonable opportunity; The words 'co-ordinated investigation' are not vague;The words 'co-ordinated investigation' are not vague; ThetransferorderstransferringthecasestotheACIT-Visakhapatnam are valid.Visakhapatnam are valid. SOME OBSERVATIONS 48. The submissions and points raised by a party should be consideredbefore arriving at a decision. But more often than not, there is[insistence]to deal with every case that is cited. Perhaps, such insistence—evenifthe decisions are inapplicableor irrelevant—ismisplaced. It may not beproper to record in the judgement that a counsel has cited irrelevant, orinapplicable, or overruled, or already distinguished case. 49.We would just like to point out some observations by a prominentlawyer Shri Fali S Nariman in his book 'lndia's legal system: Can it besaved?' At page 144, he observes: 'We are overburdened with excessive case law and this ispositively on the deficit side in our quest for the administrationof speedy justice. In a case law-oriented system like ours, if law is to bemeaningful and to be easily understood, judges must findmore time to write more briefly, more precisely.' 50. In the book, Shri Nariman had also explained (at page 143-144)about place of Restatement ofthe law in the US and regretted that it wasnot applicable in our country. He writes, 'ln the United States, these 'fact-cases' are likened to rail-road-tickets: 'valid for single journey only'.The Americansare not greatly enamoured (as we or the British are) aboutprecedent, and every ten or fifteen years they appoint a bodyof very learned and wise lawyers, who go into the hundredsof cases reported in all the decisipns across the UnitedStates and then come up with what is called a 'restatement'of the law on every possible topic. After the restatement, nocase can be cited of a period prior to the restatement, and alarge body of useless case law gets confined to the dustbin oflegal history.'road-tickets: 'valid for single journey only'.The Americansare not greatly enamoured (as we or the British are) aboutprecedent, and every ten or fifteen years they appoint a bodyof very learned and wise lawyers, who go into the hundredsof cases reported in all the decisipns across the UnitedStates and then come up with what is called a 'restatement'of the law on every possible topic. After the restatement, nocase can be cited of a period prior to the restatement, and alarge body of useless case law gets confined to the dustbin oflegal history.' 51. It is heartening to note that the Indian Law Institute has undertakenthe project for 'Restatement of Indian Law1.In the preface to the books the preface to the books preface to the books to the books the books booksalready printed, Justice RV Raveendran explains its purpose: printed, Justice RV Raveendran explains its purpose: Justice RV Raveendran explains its purpose: RV Raveendran explains its purpose: Raveendran explains its purpose: explains its purpose: its purpose: purpose: 51. It is heartening to note that the Indian Law Institute has undertakenthe project for 'Restatement of Indian Law1.In the preface to the books the preface to the books preface to the books to the books the books booksalready printed, Justice RV Raveendran explains its purpose: printed, Justice RV Raveendran explains its purpose: Justice RV Raveendran explains its purpose: RV Raveendran explains its purpose: Raveendran explains its purpose: explains its purpose: its purpose: purpose: for 'Restatement of Indian Law1. 'Restatement of Indian Law1. of Indian Law1. Indian Law1. Law1.In the preface to the books the preface to the books preface to the books to the books the books booksalready printed, Justice RV Raveendran explains its purpose: printed, Justice RV Raveendran explains its purpose: Justice RV Raveendran explains its purpose: RV Raveendran explains its purpose: Raveendran explains its purpose: explains its purpose: its purpose: purpose:'A Restatement of Indian Law is neither a commentary nor a'A Restatement of Indian Law is neither a commentary nor acatalogue of case-law.It is not opinion-based.It is intendedtobean authoritative neutral statement of thelaw onthe subject.The objects of a restatement are to statethe current law of the land by considering the relevantconstitutional/statutoryprovisionsandjudicialpronouncements, to identify and remove uncertainties andambiguities surrounding the legal principles, and to clarifyand simplify the law for its better adaptation to the needs ofthe society...It is intended to benefit the members of the Bar, Bench,Academia, Civil Servants and general public.A certaintobean authoritative neutral statement of thelaw onthe subject.The objects of a restatement are to statethe current law of the land by considering the relevantconstitutional/statutoryprovisionsandjudicialpronouncements, to identify and remove uncertainties andambiguities surrounding the legal principles, and to clarifyand simplify the law for its better adaptation to the needs ofthe society...It is intended to benefit the members of the Bar, Bench,Academia, Civil Servants and general public.A certain padma amount of uniformity and neutrality is sought to be achievedby ensuring that the restatement is restricted to statutoryprovisions, well settled legal principles and the authoritativepronouncement[ofthe][ Supreme][ Court.'] 52. Perhaps, it will be real help to our jurisprudence if we also adopt anapproach similar to the US, about 'Restatement of Indian law'. CONCLUSIONS53.Our conclusions are as follows: (a) The power of transfer under Section 127(2) of the Income Tax Act,1961 is not ajudicial power;1961 is not ajudicial power; (b) The writ appeal is maintainable against the order of the SingleJudge quashing the order passed under Section 127 of the Act;Judge quashing the order passed under Section 127 of the Act; (c) The notice had indicated the reason for transfer as 'centralisation'for 'co-ordinated investigation'.It is for this reason that order fortransfer weremade.Therewasnodenialof reasonableopportunity to the Assesses; (d) The word 'co-ordinated investigation' is not vague. It has a definitemeaning and the transfer order can not be set aside merely on theground that the transfer has been done on vague terms.In view of our conclusions, the writ appeals are allowed and the writpetitions[filed][ by][ the][ Assessees][ are][ dismissed.__—] Sd/-Pritinker[Diwakar] Chirf"rustice Jud8e 16 HEADLINES Assessment case can be transferred for coordinated investigation.