Case LawHigh Court › Umesh Chandra Dalakoti v. Assistant Comm...

Umesh Chandra Dalakoti v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, Haldwani, District Nainital

High Court 27 Aug 2012 In favour of: Assessee
Forum / Bench
High Court · ukhcucis_pg
Parties
Umesh Chandra Dalakoti v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, Haldwani, District Nainital
Date of order
27 Aug 2012
Assessment year(s)
Outcome
Allowed

Case summary

In Umesh Chandra Dalakoti v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, Haldwani, District Nainital, the High Court (2012) allowed the appeal. The decision went in favour of the assessee.

Decision: The appeal, accordingly, fails and the same is dismissed.

Summary auto-generated from the order below — read the full judgment for the complete reasoning.

Sections referenced in this judgment

The order — as passed by the High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Income Tax Appeal No. 07 of 2012 [ …. …..Appellant. Umesh Chandra Dalakoti Versus Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Haldwani, District Nainital. …. Respondent Mr. Chetan Joshi, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Hari Mohan Bhatia, Advocate for the respondent. Coram : Hon’ble Barin Ghosh, C. J.Hon’ble U.C. Dhyani, J. Barin Ghosh, C.J. (Oral) Section 80AC of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is as follows: “Where in computing the total income of an assessee of the previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on the 1[st] day of April, 2006 or any subsequent assessment year, any deduction is admissible under section 80-IA or section 80-IAB or section 80-IB or section 80-IC [or section 80-ID or section 80-IE], no such deduction shall be allowed to him unless he furnishes a return of his income for such assessment year on or before the due date specified under sub-section (1) of Section 139.]” 2. Admittedly, the return in the instant case was filed after the due date specified under sub-section (1) of Section 139 of the Act. In the circumstances, the deductions, admissible under Section 80IB and 80IC, as claimed by the appellant, were denied. Having had lost before the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal, the present appeal has been preferred. 3. It is the contention in the appeal that by reason of the provisions contained in Section 139 (4) of the Act, the time to furnish return under Section 139 (1) stands extended and, within the extended period, admittedly, the return was filed. Section 139(4) of the Act is as follows: “Any person who has not furnished a return within the time allowed to him under sub-section (1), or within the time allowed under a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 142, may furnish the return for any previous year at any time before the expiry of one year from the end of the relevant assessment year or before the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier : Provided that where the return relates to a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on the 1[st] day of April, 1988, or any earlier assessment year, the reference to one year aforesaid shall be construed as a reference to two years from the end of the relevant assessment year.]” 4. In view of Section 139(4) of the Act, the due date specified under sub-section (1) of Section 139 of the Act is not extended, although the assessee gets an extension of time to discharge his obligation under Section 139 (1) of the Act. In the circumstances, in view of Section 139(4), the due date specified under sub-section (1) of Section 139 is not extended and, accordingly, appellant was not entitled to the deductions admissible under Section 80IB or under Section 80IC of the Act, as were claimed by him. 5. Learned counsel submitted that Sections 80IB and 80IC, being beneficial statute, Section 80AC must be construed liberally and, having regard to what has been provided in Section 139(4), in the event compliance thereof, the assessee must be accorded the benefits of Sections 80IB and 80IC of the Act. In the matter of construction of a fiscal statute, one is required to read the words used by the Legislature rather than go into the question of reasonableness, rationality and beneficialness of a part of the statute. In the event, within the plain words used in the statute, a person is entitled to the benefit granted by the statute, he would be entitled to the same, but, if not, he would not be entitled to the benefit, thus, given. The fact remains, while the due date of furnishing return has been specified under sub-section (1) of Section 139 of the Act, in sub-section (4) of Section 139 permission has been granted to furnish the return even after expiry of the due date for furnishing return specified under sub-section (1) of Section 139 of the Act; and at the same time, in Section 80AC, it has been provided that only when the return has been furnished on or before the due date specified under sub-section (1) of Section 139, the assessee concerned will be entitled to the deductions admissible under Section 80IB or Section 80IC of the Act. 6. We are, accordingly, unable to take a different view than one taken in the instant case by the Tribunal. The appeal, accordingly, fails and the same is dismissed. (U.C. Dhyani, J.) (Barin Ghosh, C.J.) 27.08.2012 27.08.2012 Rathour
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