Wa/1912/2021 Of M/S.madras Race Club v. The Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS The Honourable Mr.Justice T.S.SIVAGNANAMand The Honourable Mr.Justice SATHI KUMAR SUKUMARA KURUP Judgment Reserved On Judgment Pronounced On 16.08.202131.08.2021 M/s.Madras Race Club,Rep., by its Secretary, S.Nirmal Prasad,P.O.Box No.2639, Race Course Road,Guindy, Chennai-600 032... Appellant in both Appeals [Cause title accepted vide Court order dated05.07.2021 made in C.M.P.Nos.9646 & 9650 of 2021in W.A.SR Nos.53707 & 53706 2021] The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,Company Circle IV(1),Room No.430, 4[th] Floor Main Building,'Ayakar Bhavan', 121, Nungambakkam, High Road,Chennai-600 034... Respondent in both Appeals Appeals under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against thecommon order dated 23.04.2021 made in W.P.Nos.28434 of 2014 and3005 of 2013 respectively. Prayer in W.P.Nos.3005 of 2013 & 28434 of 2014: Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitutionof India praying for issuance of Writ of Certiorari to call forthe records in PAN: dated 11.01.2013 and 24.10.2014relating to Assessment Year 2007-08 on the file of therespondent and quash the same. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ For Appellant:Mr.R.V.Easwar,(In both Appeals)Senior Counselfor Mr.G.BaskarFor Respondent:Ms.Hema Muralikrishnan,(In both Appeals)Senior Standing Counsel COMMON JUDGMENT T.S.Sivagnanam, J. The appellant, in these appeals, is the writ petitioner inW.P.Nos.3005 of 2013 and 28434 of 2014, which were dismissed bycommon order dated 23.04.2021. 2.In this judgment, the appellant shall be referred to as“the assessee” and the respondent as “the Revenue”. 3.In W.P.No.3005 of 2013, the assessee prayed for issuanceof Writ of Certiorari to quash the order passed by therespondent dated 11.01.2013, by which the respondent rejectedthe objections filed by the assessee to the reopening of theassessment for the assessment year 2007-08. 4.The prayer sought for in W.P.No.28434 of 2014 was to quashthe order of assessment passed by the respondent-Revenue dated24.10.2014, under Section 143(3) read with Section 147 of theIncome Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”)along with a notice of demand under Section 156 and notice underSection 247 read with Section 271(1)(c) of the Act for theassessment year 2007-08. 5.The learned Single Bench dismissed both the writ petitionsand in W.P.No.28434 of 2014, granted liberty to the assessee tofile statutory appeal against the order of the assessment dated24.10.2014. 6.The assessee is a company incorporated under Section 25 ofthe Indian Companies Act, 1956. The assessee filed theirreturns of income for the assessment years 2005-06, 2006-07,2007-08 and 2008-09 and the assessments were completed by ordersdated 19.12.2007, 26.12.2008 and 29.12.2009 under Section 143(3)of the Act and 11.12.2010 under Section 143(1) of the Act. 7.The assessee would contend that in the course ofassessment proceedings, the Assessing Authority had consideredall the issues arising out of the returns of income filed andthe computation of tax, there upon had sought variousparticulars from the assessee, which were furnished and after https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ seeking necessary clarification, the assessments were completed. 6.The assessee is a company incorporated under Section 25 ofthe Indian Companies Act, 1956. The assessee filed theirreturns of income for the assessment years 2005-06, 2006-07,2007-08 and 2008-09 and the assessments were completed by ordersdated 19.12.2007, 26.12.2008 and 29.12.2009 under Section 143(3)of the Act and 11.12.2010 under Section 143(1) of the Act. 7.The assessee would contend that in the course ofassessment proceedings, the Assessing Authority had consideredall the issues arising out of the returns of income filed andthe computation of tax, there upon had sought variousparticulars from the assessee, which were furnished and after https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ seeking necessary clarification, the assessments were completed. 8.It is submitted that one of the issues, which was raisedby the Assessing Officer, related to the classification ofinterest income from deposits with banks that were returned bythe assessee for the assessment under the head 'business'. TheAssessing Officer was of the view that the said income frominterest was liable to be assessed under the head 'income fromother sources' and not under the head 'business' as returned bythe assessee. Notwithstanding the stand taken by the assessee,the Assessing Officer completed the assessments for theassessment years 2005-06 to 2007-08 bringing to tax the incomefrom interest under the head 'other sources' as against theincome claim made by the assessee under the head 'business'. 9.The assessee challenged the assessments by filing appealbefore the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-VI, Chennai (forbrevity “the CIT(A)”). An alternate submission was made beforethe CIT(A) stating that in the event, the income earned frominterest was brought to tax under the head 'income from othersources', the loss returned by the assessee would be liable tobe set off against the same. The CIT(A) called for a remandreport from the Assessing Officer on this alternate submission,which was submitted by remand report dated 15.02.2012. The CIT(A) rejected the stand taken by the assessee and confirmed theorder passed by the Assessing Officer. On the alternate claimof set off of the income against the loss, accepted the groundand directed the Assessing Officer to set off the income frominterest from the loss incurred. The said order of the CIT(A)pertaining to the assessment years 2005-06 and 2006-07 weregiven effect to by order dated 21.06.2012. 10.So far as the assessment year 2008-09 is concerned, theassessee submitted that it is only an intimation under Section143(1) of the Act thereby, the return of income submitted by theassessee stood accepted. While so, the assessee received anotice from the respondent dated 20.04.2011, under Section 148of the Act stating that he has reason to believe that there isescapement of income in relation to the assessment year 2007-08and called upon the assessee to file their return of income.The assessee by letter dated 28.04.2011, requested the returnfiled originally be treated as a return in response to thenotice under Section 148 of the Act and requested for furnishingthe reasons for reopening and by communication dated 30.05.2011,the reasons for reopening were furnished. Along with thereasons for reopening, the respondent issued notice underSection 143(2) of the Act. The assessee would contend that thisprocedure is incorrect, as the assessee was entitled to filetheir objections to the reopening of the assessment pointing outthat the income from interest has been offered to tax under the head 'business' by the assessee whereas, the Assessing Officerbrought it under the head 'income from other sources', which wasaffirmed by the CIT(A) and the alternate submission made by theassessee was considered and relief was granted to the assesseeand therefore, there is no escapement of income, as the issue,proposed to be reassessed, was already part of the assessmentorder passed at the first instance. 11.With regard to the second issue, pertaining to thereceipt of lease rent amounting to Rs.3.9 Crores, the assesseestated that a specific query was raised by the AssessingAuthority at the first instance and the assessee has given theirresponse vide letter dated 18.12.2009, and it is onlythereafter, the assessment was completed. Therefore, theassessee contended that the assumption of jurisdiction underSection 148 of the Act was wholly incorrect and it amounted toreview of the order of assessment and it is impermissible inlaw. The respondent by order dated 11.01.2013, rejected theobjections stating that the income cannot be set off against thebusiness losses and referred to the Lease Deed entered intobetween the assessee with M/s.DLF Properties Ltd., for a periodof 66 years and proposed to treat the transaction of lease as asale and tax the deposits received from the lessee under thehead 'capital gains'. 12.The assessee would contend that the order rejecting theobjections did not deal with the issues pointed out by theassessee which were, in fact, discussed during the originalassessment. This order dated 11.01.2013, was impugned inW.P.No.3005 of 2013, which writ petition was admitted and anorder of interim stay was granted on 06.02.2013. The order ofinterim stay was extended from time to time till 08.06.2014 byorder dated 08.04.2014. According to the assessee on and after08.06.2014, since there was no interim order, the limitation forcommencing reassessment proceedings would start soon after theexpiry of the date on which the order of interim stay stoodexpired, i.e., 08.06.2014. 13.It is submitted that the said writ petition inW.P.No.3005 of 2013 was tagged along with the batch of cases anddismissed by order dated 04.07.2014 on the ground that it wasnot maintainable. The assessee filed Special Leave Petitionbefore the Hon'ble Supreme Court challenging the order dated04.07.2014 and the matter was pending before the Hon'ble SupremeCourt. While so, the respondent issued notice dated 12.09.2014proposing to proceed with the reassessment. This was rejectedby the assessee vide letter dated 22.09.2014, not only on theground of Special Leave Petition was pending, but on othergrounds as well. The respondent issued another notice dated17.09.2014, which is stated to have been received by the 13.It is submitted that the said writ petition inW.P.No.3005 of 2013 was tagged along with the batch of cases anddismissed by order dated 04.07.2014 on the ground that it wasnot maintainable. The assessee filed Special Leave Petitionbefore the Hon'ble Supreme Court challenging the order dated04.07.2014 and the matter was pending before the Hon'ble SupremeCourt. While so, the respondent issued notice dated 12.09.2014proposing to proceed with the reassessment. This was rejectedby the assessee vide letter dated 22.09.2014, not only on theground of Special Leave Petition was pending, but on othergrounds as well. The respondent issued another notice dated17.09.2014, which is stated to have been received by the assessee on 20.10.2014 proposing to proceed with thereassessment and in the interregnum, an order was passed on17.10.2014 rejecting the objections to reassessment on theground of lack of jurisdiction. It is submitted that the letterdated 17.09.2014 has been pre-dated. On 24.10.2014, theassessee addressed the Assessing Officer stating that the noticeis beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under Sections153(2), 153(4), Explanation (ii) and the proviso thereunder.This was explained by the assessee stating that the time limitfor completion of assessment of 60 days had expired andtherefore, the proceedings are barred by limitation. Therespondent did not accept the stand taken by the assessee and byorder dated 24.10.2014, completed the assessment stating thatthe copy of the order passed by the Court was received by theDepartment only on 28.08.2014 and was communicated to therespondent-Assessing Officer only on 04.09.2014. The assessmentwas also completed on merits and this order of assessment dated24.10.2014 was impugned in W.P.No.28434 of 2014. Since thechallenge to the reassessment proceedings is the substantivechallenge, the arguments were advanced on either side largely onthe grounds, which were raised in W.A.No.1912 of 2021 as well asas to how the order rejecting the objections of the assesseedated 11.01.2013, is not in accordance with law. 14.Mr.R.V.Easwar, learned Senior Counsel appearing forMr.G.Baskar, learned counsel for the appellant-assesseesubmitted that the order of assessment dated 24.10.2014, for theassessment year 2007-08 is barred by limitation and liable to beset aside. It is submitted that the notice under Section 148 ofthe Act was issued on 20.04.2011. The limitation for completionof the reassessment under Section 153(2) is one year from theend of the year when the notice under Section 148 of the Act wasserved on the petitioner and that is on or before 31.03.2013. 15.It is submitted that the assessee had filed W.P.No.3005of 2013 challenging the order rejecting the objections filed bythe assessee to the reopening and an order of interim stay wasgranted on 06.02.2013 and the interim order was in force till08.06.2014. It is submitted that the period of stay has to beexcluded as per Explanation (i) to Section 153(2) and suchperiod would be from 06.02.2013 to 08.06.2014. In terms of theproviso to Section 153, after excluding the period of stay, thelimitation referred to in Section 153(2) is less than 60 days,the limitation stand extended to 60 days. Therefore, it issubmitted that the order of reassessment ought to have beenpassed within 60 days from 08.06.2014, i.e., on or before07.08.2014. However, the reassessment order was passed on24.10.2014. 16.It is further submitted that even as on the date when theAssessing Officer issued the first notice proposing to pass anorder of reassessment, vide notice dated 12.09.2014, theproceedings had already become time barred. Therefore, it issubmitted that the reassessment proceedings is barred by timeand wholly without jurisdiction. Further, it is submitted thatthe writ petition was dismissed on 04.07.2014, the Revenue wasrepresented by their Standing Counsel and they had clearknowledge of the dismissal of the writ petition and the closingof the connected miscellaneous petitions. Therefore, the standtaken by the Assessing Officer stating that he had received thecopy of the order passed in the writ petition only on 04.09.2014cannot be accepted. 17.The learned Senior Counsel also referred to the circularissued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) with regardto the role of the Standing Counsel for the Department andsubmitted that the Department having been represented by acounsel are aware of the fact that there was no interim orderbeyond 08.06.2014 and that the writ petition was dismissed on04.07.2014. 18.It is further submitted that the assessee, in the writpetition, had also challenged the reassessment proceedings onmerits and referred to the order passed by the CIT(A) dated28.03.2012 and the remand report, which was called by the CIT(A), dated 15.02.2012 and submitted that the reassessment is achange of opinion, which is impermissible in law. Similar isthe submission with regard to the issue of assessability ofinterest as well as the lease income of M/s.DLF Properties Ltd.Further, it is submitted that the Assessing Officer not broughton record any material to justify that the reassessmentproceedings are nothing but review. Further, it is submittedthat the proposed assessment amount of Rs.3.9 Crores under thehead 'other sources' would not result in any escapement ofRevenue even if the income is assessed under the head 'othersources' and therefore, there was no occasion to invoke Section148 of the Act. Further, it is submitted that the order dated28.03.2012 passed by the CIT(A) had attained finality and theproceeding, reopening the assessment, has the effect ofreviewing the order passed by the appellate authority, which isimpermissible in law, as the Assessing Officer is bound by theorder passed by the CIT(A) on the principle of judicialdiscipline. 19.Further, it is submitted that the principle ofconsistency was required to be followed, which had not been doneby the Assessing Officer. Further, it is submitted that theAssessing Officer erred in applying Section 50C to the leasetransaction, when there was no sale of land. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisionof the High Court of Allahabad in CIT vs. Chandra Bhan Bansalreported in (2014) 46 taxmann.com 180 (Allahabad)] for theproposition that in terms of the provisions of Explanation 1(i)to Section 153(3), period of limitation for assessment can bestayed only by an order or injunction of any Court and as soonas the said order or injunction of Court is vacated, the periodof limitation shall re-start even though order vacatinginjunction is not communicated to department. 20.Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of SahebRam Om Prakash Marketing (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT reported in [(2017)86 taxmann.com 155 (Delhi)]. In the said case, reassessmentnotice was issued on 27.03.2012, but the High Court had stayedall proceedings qua the said notice and stay had been vacated on09.12.2016, and the order of reassessment has to be necessarilypassed within 60 days, that is, on or before 08.01.2017, and thesame having not been passed within the said time, it is theorder which is time barred. 20.Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of SahebRam Om Prakash Marketing (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT reported in [(2017)86 taxmann.com 155 (Delhi)]. In the said case, reassessmentnotice was issued on 27.03.2012, but the High Court had stayedall proceedings qua the said notice and stay had been vacated on09.12.2016, and the order of reassessment has to be necessarilypassed within 60 days, that is, on or before 08.01.2017, and thesame having not been passed within the said time, it is theorder which is time barred. 21.The learned Senior Counsel referred to the decision ofthe Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life AssuranceCorporation, Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim reported in AIR 1941PC 6. 22.On the above grounds, the learned Senior Counsel soughtfor setting aside the order rejecting the objections filed bythe assessee to the reassessment as well as the order ofreassessment dated 24.10.2014. 23.Ms.Hema Muralikrishnan, learned Senior Standing Counselappearing for the respondent submitted that the writ petitionchallenging the order of reassessment is not maintainable, asthe assessee has an effective alternate remedy of filing anappeal before the CIT(A) and without exhausting the same, theassessee may not be permitted to question the correctness of thereassessment proceedings by way of a writ petition. Further, itis submitted that the objections raised by the assessee for thereopening had been properly construed by the Assessing Officerand a speaking order has been passed on 11.01.2013 andthereafter, reassessment proceedings were commenced andconcluded by order dated 24.10.2014 and therefore, the assesseecannot, now, question the order rejecting the objections to thereopening proceedings and therefore, nothing survives foradjudication in W.A.No.1913 of 2021. 24.It is further submitted that the objections raised by theassessee were properly dealt with by the Assessing Officer bystating that once the income from lease rental is assessed underthe head 'income from other sources', as the same does not fall either under the head 'business' or under the head 'income fromproperty', along with interest income, the loss incurred by theassessee on account of conducting of horse races cannot be setoff against these income in view of the provisions of Section74A of the Act, although the loss from the racing activity canbe carried forward for four subsequent years to be set offagainst any income from the same activity. Further, theAssessing Officer pointed out that the Lease Deed with M/s.DLFProperties Ltd., is for a period of 66 years and the assesseehas raised Rs.60 Crores as non-interest bearing deposit, thephysical possession of the property has been handed over to thelessee and by placing reliance on the decision in the case ofR.K.Palshikar (HUF) vs. CIT [(1998) 172 ITR 311], held that thelease in question would fall within the definition of "deemedsale" and the income earned out of the said lease/deemed sale istaxable under the head 'capital gains'. 25.Further,the Assessing Officer pointed out that in thedocument, the lease amount has been mentioned asRs.1,37,96,32,000/- and the same is proposed to be adopted assale consideration and Rs.4,39,811/- is taken as the indexedcost of purchase in accordance with Section 50C of the Act andcapital gains has to be computed on the same. It is furthersubmitted that while passing the order of reassessment dated24.10.2014, the Assessing Officer has elaborately dealt with theissue regarding limitation and it was pointed out that theassessee was issued with notice dated 17.10.2014, proposing themethod of computing the income under various heads of income andcompleting the reassessment proceedings and thereby, providedwith an opportunity to file their objections, if any. 25.Further,the Assessing Officer pointed out that in thedocument, the lease amount has been mentioned asRs.1,37,96,32,000/- and the same is proposed to be adopted assale consideration and Rs.4,39,811/- is taken as the indexedcost of purchase in accordance with Section 50C of the Act andcapital gains has to be computed on the same. It is furthersubmitted that while passing the order of reassessment dated24.10.2014, the Assessing Officer has elaborately dealt with theissue regarding limitation and it was pointed out that theassessee was issued with notice dated 17.10.2014, proposing themethod of computing the income under various heads of income andcompleting the reassessment proceedings and thereby, providedwith an opportunity to file their objections, if any. 26.The assessee had not filed their objections either withregard to the method of computing the income or about assessingthe income under various heads exist, but submitted a letterstating that the limitation of 60 days needs to be computed fromthe date of the Court order, i.e., from 04.07.2014 in view ofthe provisions of Section 153(2) of the Act and the time limitexpired on 03.09.2014. The Assessing Officer pointed out thatthis submission is not tenable, as if the Court order is notreceived by the Revenue for a period of 60 days from the date ofthe order. It is not practicable for any order to be passedwithin 60 days in the absence of knowledge as to what is thefinding rendered by the Court. Therefore, the assessee wouldcontend that unless and until the order is received by theAssessing Officer, it cannot be stated that the stay granted hasnot been vacated. Further, the Assessing Officer pointed outthat if any attempt is made by the Assessing Officer to proceedwith the matter is stayed by the Court without the knowledge ofthe contents of the order, it would lead to a situation wherecontempt proceedings may be initiated and therefore, it was submitted that the intention of the legislature as laid down inthe proviso should be understood as 60 days from the date ofreceipt of the Court's order not on the date on which the Courtorder was pronounced. 27.The Assessing Officer further stated that the order ofthe Court was received in the office of the CIT(Judicial) on28.08.2014, which was communicated to the office of therespondent on 04.09.2014 and in this regard, referred to theseal fixed by the Registry of this Court in the certified copyof the order. It is submitted that the copy application wasfiled on 04.07.2014, i.e., the date on which the order waspassed, the copy was made ready on 26.08.2014 and delivered tothe counsel on 27.08.2014 which in turn was received by theoffice of the CIT(Judicial) on 28.08.2014 and received by theAssessing Officer on 04.09.2014. 28.The learned Senior Standing Counsel referred to thescanned copy of the endorsement in the certified copy of theorder, which was reproduced in the assessment order. Further,the Assessing Officer pointed out that it is not practicablypossible for an order to be passed on 03.09.2014 after providingan opportunity of hearing to the assessee to fulfil theprinciples of natural justice. Therefore, it was contended thatthe time limit of 60 days should be reckoned from the date ofreceipt of the order by the Revenue and the contends thereon areknown to the Assessing Officer, who is required to act as perthe directions in the said order. 29.It is further submitted that the assessee subsequent to03.09.2014, had submitted letters dated 22.09.2014 and23.10.2014, but had not raised any objection with regard to thelimitation, but only pleaded to keep the proceedings inabeyance, as they have filed Special Leave Petition before theHon'ble Supreme Court against the order passed by the HighCourt. Therefore, it is submitted that the plea of limitationraised by letter dated 24.10.2014 is a new plea. 29.It is further submitted that the assessee subsequent to03.09.2014, had submitted letters dated 22.09.2014 and23.10.2014, but had not raised any objection with regard to thelimitation, but only pleaded to keep the proceedings inabeyance, as they have filed Special Leave Petition before theHon'ble Supreme Court against the order passed by the HighCourt. Therefore, it is submitted that the plea of limitationraised by letter dated 24.10.2014 is a new plea. 30.With regard to the merits of the reassessment, thelearned Senior Standing Counsel submitted that the AssessingOfficer has elaborately considered all the issues and hasrecorded reasons in paragraphs 4 to 8 of the reassessment orderdated 24.10.2014 and if the assessee is aggrieved by thereassessment on its merits, they should file an appeal beforethe first appellate authority and the writ petition is notmaintainable. In support of her contention, the learned counselplaced reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inJeet Singh and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in[(2011) 13 SCC 534] and Housing Board Haryana vs. Housing BoardColony Welfare Association reported in [(1995) 5 SCC 672]. 31.On the above grounds, the learned Senior Standing Counselsought to sustain the order in both the writ petitions and alsopointed out that the learned Writ Court had granted liberty tothe assessee to file an appeal, if so advised. 32.We have elaborately head the learned counsels for theparties and carefully perused the materials placed on record. 33.The challenge to the reassessment proceedings isprimarily and largely on the ground of limitation. Thechallenge to the order rejecting the objections filed by theassessee to the reopening proceedings has merged with theimpugned order of reassessment dated 24.10.2014 in which, notonly with regard to the justifiability of the reopening has beenmentioned, coupled with the fact as to how in the opinion of theAssessing Officer, the order of reassessment is not time barred.After referring to the finding on the aforementioned two points,the Assessing Officer proceeded to complete the assessment underSection 143(3) read with Section 147 of the Act on merits. 34.So far as the challenge to the order of reassessment onthe ground of merits is concerned, consistently the Hon'bleSupreme Court and this Court has been slow to exercise itsjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India byexamining the order of assessment/reassessment on the merits ofthe case as objected by the assessee, as it has been found thatthe remedy by way of appeal before the CIT(A) is not only aneffective, but efficacious remedy. Furthermore, it has beenpointed out that the first appellate authority is entitled tore-appreciate the facts and he is entitled to call for a remandreport from the Assessing Officer, he is also entitled to admitadditional documents after following the procedure under theAct. Thus, the assessee would have an effective remedy beforethe CIT(A) which authority will not only be entitled to examinethe aspect as to whether the Assessing Officer was right onfacts, but also as to whether the Assessing Officer was right onlaw for having formed an opinion while completing theassessment. Therefore, we are not inclined to go into thecorrectness of the order of reassessment on the merits and thelearned Single Bench was right in its observation that theassessee has to agitate all the issues before the appellateauthority and not before the Writ Court. 35.As mentioned earlier, the primordial and pivotal point onwhich the writ petitions have been filed is on the ground thatthe reassessment proceedings is barred by limitation. TheAssessing Officer has given his reasons as to why the order ofreassessment is not barred by limitation. It cannot be disputedby the assessee that the limitation is not purely a question oflaw, it is a mixed question of fact and law. Therefore, we would be well justified in making an observation that theassessee would be entitled to raise the question of limitationalso before the appellate authority as well as on the merits ofthe reassessment. In fact, the assessee would be well withinits jurisdiction to claim that the appellate authority shoulddecide the issue of limitation as first among the several issuesthat may be raised before the appellate authority. 36.The entire argument of the learned Senior Counsel for theassessee hinges upon as to how the time limit prescribed underproviso to Section 153(2) read with Explanation 1(ii) is to becomputed. The notice under Section 148 of the Act for reopeningthe assessment for the assessment year 2007-08 is dated20.04.2011. The assessee submitted their objections dated08.06.2011, which were rejected by order dated 11.01.2013. Thesaid order was subject matter of challenge in W.P.No.3005 of2013. It is not in dispute that an order of interim stay wasgranted on 06.02.2013 staying all further proceedings pursuantto the order dated 11.01.2013, relating to the assessment year2007-08 on the file of the respondent. The order of interimstay continued to remain in force. 37.It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for theassessee that the order of interim stay was extended from timeto time and till 08.06.2014. It is the submission that beyond08.06.2014, the order of interim stay was not extended. Thewrit petition was dismissed by order dated 04.07.2014. The copyof the reported decision in the case of Joint Commissioner ofIncome-tax vs. Kalanithi Maran reported in [(2014) 366 ITR 453(Madras)] shows that there were writ appeals as well as writpetitions, which were heard as a batch by the Hon'ble DivisionBench. In the preamble of the said order, the category of caseshave been spelt out from which, we find that the writ petitionswere filed challenging the assessment order, those filedchallenging the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act orspeaking order or show cause notice issued under Section 143(2),there were cases where writ petitions were filed challenging theassessments completed pursuant to intimation under Section 143(1) and reassessment notices issued within 4 or 6 years. Theother category of cases were challenging the notices issued forreassessment within 4 years from the relevant assessment yearswhere assessment orders were passed under Section 143(3)/147 ofthe Act. The next category of cases were those filedchallenging the speaking orders of reassessment issued after 4years, but within 6 years. The writ appeals filed by theRevenue challenging the interim orders granted in the writpetitions were also tagged along with the batch. Thus, we findthat there are six category of cases, which were clubbedtogether and heard by the Hon'ble Division Bench. The writpetition filed by the assessee in W.P.No.3005 of 2013 was clubbed with the fourth category of cases, which are cases wherethe writ petitions were filed challenging the speaking orderwhere notices of reassessment were issued within 4 years fromthe relevant assessment year where original assessment ordershave been passed under Section 143(3)/147 of the Act. TheHon'ble Division Bench framed two issues for consideration,which are as hereunder:- “(1) Whether an order passed by theassessing officer on the objections of anassessee can be assailed before the Court underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India? clubbed with the fourth category of cases, which are cases wherethe writ petitions were filed challenging the speaking orderwhere notices of reassessment were issued within 4 years fromthe relevant assessment year where original assessment ordershave been passed under Section 143(3)/147 of the Act. TheHon'ble Division Bench framed two issues for consideration,which are as hereunder:- “(1) Whether an order passed by theassessing officer on the objections of anassessee can be assailed before the Court underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India? (2) Whether an assessment/re-assessmentorder passed under Section 147 read with 143(3)of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is to be tested by aCourt of law under Article 226 of theConstitution of India?” 38.On a perusal of the above issues, which were framed forconsideration, it is vividly clear that the Hon'ble DivisionBench did not deal with the facts on each of those cases, whichwere clubbed to be heard together. In other words, the issueswere legal issues as to whether the assessees can assail theorder of the Assessing Officer rejecting the objections byfiling writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia. The ultimate conclusion of the Hon'ble Division Benchwas that the writ petitions were not maintainable and all theissues involved are adjudicatory issues. Accordingly, all thewrit petitions were dismissed. Consequently, the writ appealsfiled by the Revenue against the interim orders were allowed andtime was granted to the assessee to file statutory appeal beforethe appellate authority. Thus, we find that the Hon'bleDivision Bench did not examine the merits of each and everycases, as the issues framed for consideration were purelyquestions of law. 39.As mentioned above, the lead cases before the Hon'bleDivision Bench were writ appeals filed by the Revenuechallenging the interim orders granted in the writ petition.There were writ appeals also viz., W.A.Nos.347 to 349 of 2014,those writ appeals obviously did not pertain to the appellant,but pertained to others and the writ petitions were tagged alongwith the writ appeals. Therefore, the situation is very clear,which has been understood not only by the assessee as well asthe Revenue that not only the correctness of the interim ordersgranted in the writ petitions to be decided by the Hon'bleDivision Bench, but also the maintainability of the writpetitions. Therefore, it would be impermissible for theassessee to take a stand that the interim orders granted in the writ petitions stood expired on 08.06.2014 and beyond that,there was no interim order and therefore, limitation commencedfrom the said date is an argument, is not tenable. 40.The cases referred to by the learned Senior Counsel forthe assessee more particularly, in the case of Chandra BhanBansal (supra) and Saheb Ram Om Prakash Marketing (P.) Ltd.(supra) are all individual cases, where the Court was calledupon to interpret the period of limitation. The litigationbefore us is quite distinct and different. We say so becausethe Hon'ble Division Bench was dealing with a batch of cases ofwhich, there were three writ appeals and more than 51 writpetitions, which were filed during 2012, 2013 and 2014. writ petitions stood expired on 08.06.2014 and beyond that,there was no interim order and therefore, limitation commencedfrom the said date is an argument, is not tenable. 40.The cases referred to by the learned Senior Counsel forthe assessee more particularly, in the case of Chandra BhanBansal (supra) and Saheb Ram Om Prakash Marketing (P.) Ltd.(supra) are all individual cases, where the Court was calledupon to interpret the period of limitation. The litigationbefore us is quite distinct and different. We say so becausethe Hon'ble Division Bench was dealing with a batch of cases ofwhich, there were three writ appeals and more than 51 writpetitions, which were filed during 2012, 2013 and 2014. 41.As mentioned above, the writ appeals were intra-courtappeals before the Hon'ble Division Bench against the interimorder granted in the writ petitions. On a perusal of thejudgment/order passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench dated04.07.2014, it is not clear as to whether there was any interimorder granted by the Hon'ble Division Bench staying the order ofinterim stay granted in those writ petitions. Nevertheless,the assessee as well as the Revenue reconciled with the factthat the entire batch was clubbed together and heard.Therefore, we are convinced to state that the stand taken by theassessee before us as well as before the learned Single Bench isunacceptable. 42.As mentioned, there was no adjudication done by theHon'ble Division Bench on the merits of each of the assessee'scase. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jeans Knit Private Ltd. vs.Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2017) 390 ITR0010 (SC), had set aside the judgment of the Hon'ble DivisionBench. The judgment/order reads as follows:- “We have heard learned counsel for theparties at length and all these matters can bedisposed of by a short order. We find that the High Courts in all thesecases have dismissed the writ petitionspreferred by the appellant/assessee hereinchallenging the issuance of notice under Section148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the reasonswhich were recorded by the Assessing Officer forreopening the assessment. These writ petitionsare dimsissed by the High Courts as notmaintainable. The aforesaid view taken iscontrary to the law laid down by this Court inCalcutta Discount Limited Company vs. Incom TaxOfficer, Companies District I, Calcutta & Anr. [(1961) 41 ITR 191 (SC)]. We, thus, set asidethe impugned judgments and remit the cases tothe respective High Courts to decide the writpetitions on merits. We may make it clear that this Court has notmade any observations on the merits of thecases, i.e. the contentions which are raised bythe appellant challenging the move of the IncomeTax Authorities to re-open the assessment. Eachcase shall be examined on its own merits keepingin view the scope of judicial review whileentertaining such matters, as laid down by thisCourt in various judgments. We are conscious of the fact that the HighCourt has referred to the Judgment of this Courtin Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs.Chhabil Dass Agarwal, [(2013) ITR 357 (SC)]. Wefind that the principle laid down in the saidcase does not apply to these cases. During the pendency of these appeals, stayof re-assessment was granted, which shallcontinue till the disposal of the writ petitionsbefore the High Courts. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaidterms.” We are conscious of the fact that the HighCourt has referred to the Judgment of this Courtin Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs.Chhabil Dass Agarwal, [(2013) ITR 357 (SC)]. Wefind that the principle laid down in the saidcase does not apply to these cases. During the pendency of these appeals, stayof re-assessment was granted, which shallcontinue till the disposal of the writ petitionsbefore the High Courts. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaidterms.” 43.To be noted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observedthat during the pendency of the appeal before it, stay ofreassessment was granted, which was directed to be continuedtill the disposal of the writ petitions before the High Court.Assuming the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant iscorrect, after the order was passed by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt, the order of stay stood revived, which would mean thateven after, the order of stay was not extended beyond08.06.2014, which is deemed to have been extended from09.06.2014 pursuant to the judgment/order of the Hon'ble Supremecourt dated 08.12.2016. In fact, the assessee was basking underthe said interim order and therefore, it would not lie in themouth of the assessee to now contend that the proceedings arebarred by limitation. That apart, the stay petition filed bythe assessee in W.P.No.3005 of 2013 was pending on the file ofthe Hon'ble Division Bench and only by order dated 04.07.2014,the miscellaneous petitions were closed. The learned SingleBench had taken note of certain practical difficulties which alitigant would face be it a private person or the Government,when matters are not listed before court. The argument on behalf of the appellant wants us to adopt a laser edge approachand if such proposition is to be accepted, it would result ingreat prejudice to the litigant, who approaches the Court.There are several decisions which hold that even if the interimorders are not extended, as long as the matters are pendingbefore the Court, the authorities, who are bound by the interimorders, though initially granted for a limited period, wouldalways be guided by the fact that the main case is still pendingand would await the decision of the Court. The AssessingOfficer while completing the reassessment proceedings, hasrightly made an observation that had he proceeded furtherwithout knowing as to what was the nature of the order passed bythe Court, there is every likelihood that he would be hauled upfor contempt. Thus, we find that the argument as projected bythe appellant is wholly unacceptable and in the facts andcircumstances of the case as we have elaborated above, such anargument can never be advanced by the appellant. 44.The appellant having enjoyed the benefit of the interimorder passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 08.12.2016,restoring the position, which stood as on 08.06.2014, are notentitled to maintain a challenge to the reopening/reassessmenton the ground of limitation. 44.The appellant having enjoyed the benefit of the interimorder passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 08.12.2016,restoring the position, which stood as on 08.06.2014, are notentitled to maintain a challenge to the reopening/reassessmenton the ground of limitation. 45.As mentioned above, the Hon'ble Division Bench dismissedthe writ appeals and writ petitions by judgment/order dated04.07.2014. The writ petition in W.P.No.28434 of 2014 was filedon 28.04.2014. As pointed out by the Assessing Officer, theassessee in their letters dated 22.09.2014 and 23.10.2014, didnot raise any objection regarding limitation, their prayer wasto keep the proceedings in abeyance as they have filed SpecialLeave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is only on24.10.2014, the date on which the reassessment order was passed,the assessee raised a plea regarding limitation. Simultaneouslythey were pursuing the matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Courtand as could be seen from the judgment/order of the Hon'bleSupreme Court dated 08.12.2016 reported in (2017) 390 ITR 0010(SC), the appellant-assessee had the benefit of an order of stayof reassessment proceedings. Therefore, the assessee's pleathat the proceedings are barred by limitation is absolutelyfrivolous and cannot be entertained and rightly rejected by theAssessing Officer as well as by the learned Single Bench.Therefore, the assessee has to necessarily avail the appellateremedy as against the order of reassessment dated 24.10.2014 andagitate all issues on merits except the contentions with regardto the limitation, which we have rejected in this appeal. 46.For all the above reasons, the writ appeals fail and theyare dismissed. We sustain the liberty granted to the assesseeby the learned Single Bench and permit the assessee to file an appeal to the statutory appellate authority within four weeksfrom the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. No costs.Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. Sd/- Assistant Registrar(CS IV) //True Copy// abrTo Sub Assistant Registrar The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,Company Circle IV(1),Room No.430, 4[th] Floor Main Building,'Ayakar Bhavan', 121, Nungambakkam, High Road,Chennai-600 034. +1cc to Mrs.Hema Muralikrishnan, Advocate Sr No.43745+2ccs to Mr.G.Baskar, Advocate Sr No.43465 W.A.Nos.1912 and 1913 of 2021 PA (CO)PR (15/09/2021)