Wa/2063/2019 Of Cognizant Technology Solutions v. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Judgment Reserved on : 28.08.2019 Judgment Delivered on : 6.09.2019 CORAM THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M.SUNDRESHandTHE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NIRMAL KUMARW.A.No. 2063 of 2019& CMP No.13893 of 2019 Cognizant Technology Solutions India Pvt. Ltd.,No.165, Eternity Building,6[th] Floor, St. Mary's Road,Chennai-600 018.... Appellant Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,Large Tax Payer Unit,7[th] Floor, Wanaparthy Block, Aayakar Bhavan, Nungambakkam,Chennai-600 034. ... Respondent Writ Appeal is filed under Clause 15 of the LettersPatent against the order dated 25.06.2019 made in W.P.No.7354 of2018. Prayer in WP No. 7354 of 2018 : Petition filed under Article 226of the constitution of India praying to issue a writ ofcertiorare to call for the records pertaining to F NO.Recovery / DCIT (LTU) - 1/2017-18 dated 22.3.18 on the file ofthe respondent herein and quash the same. For Respondent : Mr.G.Rajagopalan, A.S.G., assisted by Mr.Karthik Ranganathan M.M.SUNDRESH,J. The appellant sought for an approval of the Scheme underSections 391 to 393 of the Companies Act, 1956, involvingpurchase of shares from its shareholders in C.P.No.102 of 2016. 2. The Scheme filed by the appellant was approved by thisCourt on 18.04.2016. In pursuant to the same, the appellantbought back the shares from its shareholders and accordingly, itwas treated as capital gains. Thus, a sum of Rs.898.01 croreswas withheld as TDS for the amount paid to its shareholders asper the return filed by it. 3. The respondent sought for certain details of theremittances made by the appellant to its overseas shareholders.The appellant sent its reply while furnishing the detailssought for. Anticipating that the respondent would treat thetransaction as that of the defendant, the appellant filed anapplication before the Authority of Advance Ruling ('AAR')under Section 245Q of the Income Tax Act, 1961, warranting aruling on the amount received by its shareholders in lieu of theshares bought back. 4. The respondent issued the impugned order dated22.03.2018 inter alia holding that the transactions made inpursuant to the buy back arrangement effected as consequence tothe approval of the Scheme requires to be taxed under Section115-O of the Income Act on the premise that it wouldconstitute dividend and not capital gain. As a consequencethereon, the bank accounts of the appellant were freezed.Challenging the order dated 22.03.2018, the appellant has fileda writ petition in W.P.No.7354 of 2018 raising various grounds.In pursuant to the conditional interim order granted, theappellant paid a sum of Rs.495 crores. Out of the payable demandof Rs.2806 crores. Thereafter, the writ petition filed wasdismissed with liberty to the appellant to file an appeal. Theoperative portion of the aforesaid order is apposite. “ 30. In the above referred decisions, theHon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courtshave held that the assessee has an appeal remedyunder Section 246 of the Act. In this case, anunsuccessful attempt has been made by thepetitioner to bypass the appeal remedy, but, Ifind no valid ground to entertain the WritPetition. In that view, the Writ Petition isdismissed as not maintainable at this stage. 31. It is also contended by the learnedSenior Counsel for the petitioner that IndianeedsForeignDirectInvestmentfordevelopmental activities and investments havebeen made by the foreign companies, based on theinvitation made by the Government of India andthe State Governments. While so, if they areharassed by the Officials by making unreasonabledemand, it would seriously affect the ForeignDirect Investment. Such situation does not arisehere and I find no such harassment in the matteron hand. 31. It is also contended by the learnedSenior Counsel for the petitioner that IndianeedsForeignDirectInvestmentfordevelopmental activities and investments havebeen made by the foreign companies, based on theinvitation made by the Government of India andthe State Governments. While so, if they areharassed by the Officials by making unreasonabledemand, it would seriously affect the ForeignDirect Investment. Such situation does not arisehere and I find no such harassment in the matteron hand. 32. For the foregoing reasons, the WritPetition fails and the same is dismissed.However, liberty is given to the petitioner toprefer an appeal within a period of four weeksfrom today. If such an appeal is filed withinthe stipulated time, the Appellate Authorityshall dispose of the same on merits, afterproviding sufficient opportunity of hearing tothe petitioner. It is needless to mention thatthe above observations have been made only toreach a prima facie conclusion. 33. It is to be noted that the petitionerin compliance of the order of this Court, dated03.04.2018, in W.M.P.No.9135 of 2018 inW.P.No.7354 of 2018, deposited Rs.495 Crores.Since this Writ Petition is dismissed, directingthe petitioner to avail the appeal remedy, theAppellate Authority shall take into account theamount deposited in pursuance of the orderreferred supra, while entertaining the appeal.With regard to Fixed Deposits, the respondentshall maintain status-quo as on date for aperiod of two weeks. There is no order as tocosts. Consequently, connected miscellaneouspetition is closed.”Aggrieved over the same, the present writ appeal has been filedbefore us. 5.Heard Mr.Gopal Subramanian, learned Senior Counsel forMr.Srinath Sridevan, learned Counsel appearing for theappellant and Mr.G.Rajagopalan, Additional Solicitor General ofIndia, assisted by Mr.Karthik Ranganathan, for the respondent-State and perused the records. 6.The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellantmade the following submissions: The order impugned cannot be sustained in the eye of law,Section 115-O of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be invokedunilaterally and without adjudication by treating thetransactions as that of dividend, which would not come withinthe purview of Section 2(22)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961(hereinafter referred to “the Act”). As the buy backArrangement of Scheme was approved by the Court that it is notopen to the respondent to review it. There has to be aharmonious construction of Sections 2(22)(d) and 10(34A), 46Aand 115QA of the Act. There was no prior notice issued to theappellant before passing the impugned demand and therefore,there is a violation of the principles of natural justice. Thetransactions would come within the purview of Section 46A of theAct alone. Section 115-O of the Act could only be appliedwhen the facts are admitted. The respondent itself has taken acontrary stand in the counter affidavit on the question as towhether the impugned communication is one of show cause noticeor a final order. If it is show cause notice, then there is noneed to freeze the accounts. The proper course for therespondent is to fall back on Section 143 of the Act. Thus,there cannot be a direct coercive action resulting in theimpugned order. The appellant cannot be asked to avail thealternative remedy by way of an appeal. Such an order only canbe passed after due notice, in which case alone an appeal wouldlie. In any case, there is no bar for this Court to entertainthe writ petition and interfere with the order passed, if itfinds that it involves violation of principles of naturaljustice and non following of the procedure required. 7.It is further submitted that the learned single Judgeought not to have gone into the merits of the case and renderedan adverse finding and thereafter asked the appellant to file anappeal. Thus, the order passed by the learned single Judgerequires to be interfered with. To buttress his submissions,the learned Senior Counsel has made reliance on the followingjudgments. (i) Union of India and another Vs. AzadiBachao Andolon and another ((2004) 10 SupremeCourt Cases 1);(ii) The Commissioner of Income-Tax, MumbaiVs. Walfort Share and Stock Brokers PrivateLimited ((2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 137);(iii) Taxman Circular No.3/2016(F.No.225/29/2016/ITA.II) dated 26.02.2016;(iv) ((2012) 6 Supreme Court Cases 613);(v)Genpact India (P) Ltd., V. DeputyCommissioner of Income Tax ((2019) 108Taxmann,.com. 340 (Delhi));(vi) The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi Vs. S.Teja Singh ((1959) Suppl.(1) SCR 394); and (vii)The Assistant Commissioner of Income-TaxCircle-1, Trichy Vs. M/s Dalmia Power Limited (W.A.(MD) Nos.566 and 569 of 2019). 8.The learned Additional Solicitor General of Indiaappearing for the Revenue would submit that Section 115-O ofthe Act does not mandate any prior notice. It is a specialprovision coming under Chapter XII-D of the Act. The provisionalso contains the non-obstante clause. This provision willhave to be read along with 115Q of the Act which speaks of adeemed default. It is a mandate of law. As admittedly theappellant has bought back more shares than the one permissibleunder law, Section 115-O of the Act stands attracted. Theapproval of the Scheme will not bind the respondent. ThisCourt was only acting as a Company Court. There is no need togo through the process involved under Section 143(1) of theAct. The affidavit filed by the respondent will have to beseen in the context and that is order not the show cause noticebut a final one. The order only mandates the appellant to paythe requisite amount. That is the reason why it was followed byfreezing of the accounts. One has to see the over all conductof the appellant. Certainly, the provision 2(22)(d) wouldattract as this involves reduction of capital. The learnedsingle Judge was pleased to hold that the appeal if filed wouldbe disposed of after affording opportunity of sufficient hearingand the observation made are only prima facie in nature.Therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed, especially whenthe statutes provide for alternative remedy, which is to beexhausted. In support of his contention, the learned AdditionalSolicitor General relied upon the following decision. (i)Sharif-ud-Din Vs. Abdul Gani Lone (AIR 1980 Supreme Court 303) 9.After hearing the learned counsel appearing for theparties, we deem it appropriate to decide as to whether theappeal requires to be decided on merit or not. In other words,this Court will have to render a finding as to whether thedecision of the learned single Judge by directing the appellantto exhaust the statutory remedy is legally correct or not?Incidentally, it is also to be decided as to whether the learnedsingle Judge is right in going into the merits of the case. 10. Discussion: 10.1. It is trite that in issues involving fiscal statutes,extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction of this Courtavailable under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiarequires to be exercised with greater caution and verysparingly. The learned single Judge has given two findings 10. Discussion: 10.1. It is trite that in issues involving fiscal statutes,extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction of this Courtavailable under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiarequires to be exercised with greater caution and verysparingly. The learned single Judge has given two findings against the appellant while holding that it is open to him tofile an appeal. Though it is observed that the observationsare only prima facie in nature, the writ petition was dismissedon the reasons assigned. Therefore, the findings renderedcannot be termed as prima facie as they were not mereobservations. As the learned Senior Counsel appearing for theappellant submits they might militate against the appellant assubstantive findings on merit. If that is the case, theappeal to be filed would be of a mere formality. 10.2. Thus, the learned single Judge, in our consideredview, ought not to have gone into the merits of the case. Thefirst finding rendered by the learned single Judge is to theeffect that the transactions are not mere buying back of sharesbut granting dividend to the shareholders. 10.3. Secondly, it was held that there is no need tofollow any procedure towards adjudication while invokingSection 115-O of the Act. We place on record the followingparagraphs, in which, the aforesaid findings have been given. “20.The only difference between the regularassessment and Special Provisions is thatunder the regular assessment, the Authoritiesare required to verify the Returns submittedby the assessee and the materials to ascertainthe income escaped from assessment. However,under the Special Provisions, there is nodispute with regard to quantum of distributionof profit made by the Company. Hence, in myopinion there is no need for issuance ofnotice before making a demand under Section115 O of the Act. It is to be noted thatunless the law requires, the Assessing Officerneed not issue notice before making a demandunder Section 115 O of the Act. The parliamentin its wisdom brought amendments to theFinance Act and inserted Section 115 O to 115Q with effect from 01.06.1997 (SpecialProvisions) to achieve an object. If anyother view is taken, then the SpecialProvisions under Chapter XIV would becomeredundant and it would be opening a pandorasbox. ............28. In the light of the decisions referredsupra and the order passed by this Court inC.P.No.102 of 2016, and also the reasonsstated for purchasing the shares under theScheme of Arrangement under Sections 391 to 393 of the Companies Act, prima-facie I findno merit in the contention of the learnedSenior Counsel for the petitioner that theshares purchased pursuant to the order of theCompany Court would be a capital gain and notto be treated as dividend.” 10.4. Having given the aforesaid findings, the writpetition was accordingly dismissed. This is in our consideredview cannot be sustained in the eye of law. They are not mereobservations but findings on merit both on fact and law. Insuch view of the matter, we are of the view that the learnedsingle Judge was not right in going to the merit while grantingliberty to file an appeal. 393 of the Companies Act, prima-facie I findno merit in the contention of the learnedSenior Counsel for the petitioner that theshares purchased pursuant to the order of theCompany Court would be a capital gain and notto be treated as dividend.” 10.4. Having given the aforesaid findings, the writpetition was accordingly dismissed. This is in our consideredview cannot be sustained in the eye of law. They are not mereobservations but findings on merit both on fact and law. Insuch view of the matter, we are of the view that the learnedsingle Judge was not right in going to the merit while grantingliberty to file an appeal. 10.5. A submission is also made raising doubt over themaintainability of the appeal under Section 246-A of the Act.We have no hesitation in holding that the appeal ismaintainable. The very case of the respondent is that theappellant ought to have shown its return the transactions asdividend and not capital gain. Therefore, it is a case of animproper return having been filed. Considering some whatsimilar objection raised on a slightly different fact involvinga demand raised under Section 115Q of the Act, a Division Benchof Delhi High Court in Genpact India (P) Limited Vs. DeputyCommissioner of Income-Tax ((2019) 108 Taxmann.com 340(Delhi)was pleased to hold that the appeal would certainly bemaintainable. Therefore, any order involving civil consequencehas to be termed as final, entitling an assessee in challengingthe same before the appellate forum. Certainly, a purposiveinterpretation is required to be adopted. In a procedural lawwhich provides for an appeal, a technical interpretation isrequired to be eschewed. Interestingly, the revenue has notraised any issue over the maintainability of the appeal. Ithas also accepted the order of the learned Single Judge. Thus,we do not find any error in the order of the learned singleJudge in placing reliance upon Section 246A of the Act inholding that the remedy open to the appellant is to file anappeal. 11. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellantwould submit that it is not known as to whether the impugnedorder dated 22.03.2018 is a show cause notice or final order.Though there appears to be some element of contradiction in thecounter affidavit filed, the said order appears to be a finalone. Now it is also the contention of the learned AdditionalSolicitor General that it is only a final order. We are alsoof the view that the further action taken would also indicatethat the order under challenge was a final one. If it is only a show cause notice, then there is no need to challenge it andinstead the consequential freezing alone requires to bequestioned. The further question as to whether the order underchallenge violates the principles of natural justice orrequisite procedure contemplated under the Act is a matter forconsideration before the Appellate Authority. The learnedsingle Judge has rightly observed that the appeal can beentertained and decided on merit as the appellant has alreadydeposited a sum of Rs.495 crores. 12.We would like to reiterate the legal position involvinginvocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court byplacing reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of thisCourt in the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Media Range andothers Vs. Kalanithi Maran and another (2014 (3) Law Weekly 846)in in which one of us is a party (MMSJ) wherein law laid downby the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and others Vs.Chhabil Dass Agarwal, ((2014) 1 SCC 603), has been noted of.The following paragraphs would be apposite. 12.We would like to reiterate the legal position involvinginvocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court byplacing reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of thisCourt in the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Media Range andothers Vs. Kalanithi Maran and another (2014 (3) Law Weekly 846)in in which one of us is a party (MMSJ) wherein law laid downby the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and others Vs.Chhabil Dass Agarwal, ((2014) 1 SCC 603), has been noted of.The following paragraphs would be apposite. “12. While holding so, we are quite aware thatthe jurisdiction vested with High Court underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India can beexercised in a given case. In other words, therestriction is self-imposed and nothing else.There may be a case, where an assessment issought to be reopened by an Officer, who is notcompetent to do so. Similarly, there may becases, where on the face of it would appear thatthe reopening is barred by limitation or lacksinherent jurisdiction. To put it differently, ina case, where no adjudication is required onfacts, then certainly jurisdiction of this Courtunder Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiacan very well be invoked. Therefore, to such alimited extent, we are inclined to hold that thejurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India can be exercised. 13. Considering the said principle, theSupreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax andothers Vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, ((2014) 1 SCC603), was pleased to hold as under: “15. Thus, while it can be said thatthis Court has recognized some exceptionsto the rule of alternative remedy, i.e.,where the statutory authority has not actedin accordance with the provisions of theenactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicialprocedure, or has resorted to invoke theprovisions which are repealed, or when anorder has been passed in total violation ofthe principles of natural justice, theproposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmalcase, (AIR 1964 SC 1419), Titagarh PaperMills case ((1983) 2 SCC 433) and othersimilar judgments that the High Court willnot entertain a petition under Article 226of the Constitution if an effectivealternative remedy is available to theaggrieved person or the statute under whichthe action complained of has been takenitself contains a mechanism for redressalof grievance still holds the field.Therefore, when a statutory forum iscreated by law for redressal of grievances,a writ petition should not be entertainedignoring the statutory dispensation.'' We do not find any of the circumstances aslaid down by the Supreme Court available beforeus. As discussed earlier, such a situation hasnot arisen in these cases, as the stage ispremature, where the rights and liabilities areyet to be crystallised. 14. Ratio laid down in Commissioner ofIncome Tax and others Vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal,((2014) 1 SCC 603):- The entire issues framed, in our consideredview, are covered by the recent judgment of theSupreme Court referred above. Considering thejurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India, it has been heldtherein in the following manner: “10. In the instant case, the onlyquestion which arises for our considerationand decision is whether the High Court wasjustified in interfering with the orderpassed by the assessing authority underSection 148 of the Act in exercise of itsjurisdiction under Article 226 when anequally efficacious alternate remedy wasavailable to the assessee under the Act.” 15. The Supreme Court, while considering thesaid issue, has also taken into consideration thedecision rendered in G.K.N.Driveshafts (India)Limited Vs. Income-tax Officer, ((2003) 1 SCC 72= 259 ITR 19(SC)). In this connection, it isapposite to refer paragraph No.12 of the saiddecision, which reads as follows:- “10. In the instant case, the onlyquestion which arises for our considerationand decision is whether the High Court wasjustified in interfering with the orderpassed by the assessing authority underSection 148 of the Act in exercise of itsjurisdiction under Article 226 when anequally efficacious alternate remedy wasavailable to the assessee under the Act.” 15. The Supreme Court, while considering thesaid issue, has also taken into consideration thedecision rendered in G.K.N.Driveshafts (India)Limited Vs. Income-tax Officer, ((2003) 1 SCC 72= 259 ITR 19(SC)). In this connection, it isapposite to refer paragraph No.12 of the saiddecision, which reads as follows:- “12. The Constitution Benches of thisCourt in K.S. Rashid and Sons vs. Income TaxInvestigation Commission, (AIR 1954 SC 207);Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah,(AIR 1955 SC 425); Union of India vs. T.R.Varma, (AIR 1957 SC 882); State of U.P. vs.Mohd. Nooh, (AIR 1958 SC 86) and K.S.Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State ofMadras, (AIR 1966 SC 1089) have held thatthough Article 226 confers a very wide powersin the matter of issuing writs on the HighCourt, the remedy of writ is absolutelydiscretionary in character. If the High Courtis satisfied that the aggrieved party canhave an adequate or suitable reliefelsewhere, it can refuse to exercise itsjurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinarycircumstances, may exercise the power if itcomes to the conclusion that there has been abreach of principles of natural justice orthe procedure required for decision has notbeen adopted. (See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs.G. Raja Nainar, (AIR 1959 SC 422); MunicipalCouncil, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, ((1965) 2SCR 653); Siliguri Municipality vs. AmalenduDas, ((1984) 2 SCC 436); S.T. Muthusami vs.K. Natarajan, ((1988) 1 SCC 572); RajasthanSRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75;Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, ((2000) 6SCC 293); A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S.Chellappan, ((2000) 7 SCC 695); L.L. SudhakarReddy vs. State of A.P., ((2001) 6 SCC 634);Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (MoingiriMaharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs.State of Maharashtra, ((2001) 8 SCC 509);Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, ((2002) 7SCC 484) and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs.ITO, ((2003) 1 SCC 72).” 16. Statutory remedy:- When in a fiscal statute, hierarchy ofremedy of appeals are provided, the party has toexhaust them instead of seeking relief byinvoking the jurisdiction of this Court underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India and asheld in Commissioner of Income Tax and others Vs.Chhabil Dass Agarwal, ((2014) 1 SCC 603), theCourt will have to take into consideration of thelegislative intent enunciated in the enactment insuch cases. It is not as if the alternativeremedy is neither efficacious nor effective. Inthe above said judgment, the Supreme Court heldas under: “13. In Nivedita Sharma vs. CellularOperators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337,this Court has held that where hierarchy ofappeals is provided by the statute, party mustexhaust the statutory remedies beforeresorting to writ jurisdiction for relief andobserved as follows (SCC pp.343-45, paras 12-14) “12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. ofTaxes, (AIR 1964 SC 1419), this Courtadverted to the rule of self-imposed restraintthat the writ petition will not be entertainedif an effective remedy is available to theaggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423,para 7). “13. In Nivedita Sharma vs. CellularOperators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337,this Court has held that where hierarchy ofappeals is provided by the statute, party mustexhaust the statutory remedies beforeresorting to writ jurisdiction for relief andobserved as follows (SCC pp.343-45, paras 12-14) “12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. ofTaxes, (AIR 1964 SC 1419), this Courtadverted to the rule of self-imposed restraintthat the writ petition will not be entertainedif an effective remedy is available to theaggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423,para 7). “7. … The High Court does not thereforeact as a court of appeal against thedecision of a court or tribunal, to correcterrors of fact, and does not by assumingjurisdiction under Article 226 trench uponan alternative remedy provided by statutefor obtaining relief. Where it is open tothe aggrieved petitioner to move anothertribunal, or even itself in anotherjurisdiction for obtaining redress in themanner provided by a statute, the High Courtnormally will not permit by entertaining apetition under Article 226 of theConstitution the machinery created under thestatute to be bypassed, and will leave theparty applying to it to seek resort to themachinery so set up.” 13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v.State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) “11. … It is now well recognised thatwhere a right or liability is created by astatute which gives a special remedy forenforcing it, the remedy provided by thatstatute only must be availed of. This rule wasstated with great clarity by Willes, J. inWolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford,141 ER 486 in the following passage: (ER p.495) ‘… There are three classes of casesin which a liability may be establishedfounded upon a statute. … But there is athird class viz. where a liability notexisting at common law is created by astatute which at the same time gives aspecial and particular remedy forenforcing it. … The remedy provided bythe statute must be followed, and it isnot competent to the party to pursue thecourse applicable to cases of the secondclass. The form given by the statute mustbe adopted and adhered to.’ The rule laid down in this passage wasapproved by the House of Lords in Neville v.London Express Newspapers Ltd., 1919 AC 368and has been reaffirmed by the Supreme TodayWith All High Courts Page 4 of 6 PrivyCouncil in Attorney General of Trinidad andTobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd., 1935 AC532 (PC) and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co.,AIR 1940 PC 105 It has also been held to beequally applicable to enforcement of rights,and has been followed by this Courtthroughout. The High Court was thereforejustified in dismissing the writ petitionsin limine.” 14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v.Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 B.P.JeevanReddy, J. (speaking for the majority of thelarger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para77) “77. … So far as the jurisdiction ofthe High Court under Article 226—or for that 14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v.Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 B.P.JeevanReddy, J. (speaking for the majority of thelarger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para77) “77. … So far as the jurisdiction ofthe High Court under Article 226—or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court underArticle 32—is concerned, it is obvious thatthe provisions of the Act cannot bar andcurtail these remedies. It is, however,equally obvious that while exercising thepower under Article 226/Article 32, theCourt would certainly take note of thelegislative intent manifested in theprovisions of the Act and would exercisetheir jurisdiction consistent with theprovisions of the enactment.” (See: G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman &Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192; CCE v. DunlopIndia Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260; RamendraKishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1SCC 472; Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State ofMaharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5; C.A. Abraham v.ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765; Titaghur Paper MillsCo. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC433; H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992Supp (2) SCC 312; Whirlpool Corpn. v.Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1; TinPlate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar,(1998) 8 SCC 272; Sheela Devi v. JaspalSingh, (1999) 1 SCC 209 and Punjab NationalBank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569) 14. In Union of India vs. Guwahati Carbon Ltd.,(2012) 11 SCC 651, this Court has reiterated theaforesaid principle and observed: (SCC p.653, para 8) “8. Before we discuss the correctnessof the impugned order, we intend to remindourselves the observations made by thisCourt in Munshi Ram v. MunicipalCommittee, Chheharta, (1979) 3 SCC 83. Inthe said decision, this Court was pleasedto observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23). “23. … when a revenue statuteprovides for a person aggrieved by anassessment thereunder, a particularremedy to be sought in a particularforum, in a particular way, it must besought in that forum and in that manner,and all the other forums and modes ofseeking [remedy] are excluded.” 13. We also do not find any error in the order of thelearned single Judge with respect to the deposit made during thependency of the interim order as erroneous. It is only aninterim arrangement directed to be made pending the appeal. Insuch view of the mater, while upholding the direction of thelearned single Judge with respect to the deposit and the libertygranted to file an appeal are accordingly upheld. However, thefindings rendered on the nature of transaction and the scopeunder Section 115-O of the Act are accordingly set aside. Theissue as to whether the impugned order should be preceded by aprocedure involving adjudication and the requirement ofviolation of principles of natural justice are also left opento be decided in the appeal. Accordingly, the writ appealstands allowed in part as indicated. As granted by the learnedsingle Judge, we are inclined to grant a period of four weeksfrom the date of receipt of a copy of this order to file anappeal before the Appellate Authority. No costs. As and whensuch an appeal is filed, the same will have to be disposed ofwithin a period of eight weeks thereafter. Consequently,connected miscellaneous petition is closed. 06/09/2019 for Being Spoken to This matter having been listed for “Being Spoken to” dated12/09/2019, pursuant to the order of this Court Dated06/09/2019, made herein to the presence of the aforesaidCounsels on either side the Court order the following order: The above writ appeal is listed today i.e., on 12.09.2019,under the caption "for being spoken to" as a mention has beenmade by both the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 06/09/2019 for Being Spoken to This matter having been listed for “Being Spoken to” dated12/09/2019, pursuant to the order of this Court Dated06/09/2019, made herein to the presence of the aforesaidCounsels on either side the Court order the following order: The above writ appeal is listed today i.e., on 12.09.2019,under the caption "for being spoken to" as a mention has beenmade by both the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 2. The learned counsels submitted that the first threesentences in paragraph 13 of the judgment require clarificationto the effect that the interim protection and the deposit asordered by the learned single Judge will have to continuepending disposal of the statutory appeal. 3. Accordingly, by consent, the first three sentences inparagraph 13 of the order are replaced as under:"We also do not find any error in the order ofthe learned single Judge with respect to theinterim order as erroneous. It is only aninterim arrangement directed to be made pendingthe statutory appeal. In such view of thematter, while upholding the direction of the learned single Judge with respect to the interimorder and the liberty granted to file an appealare accordingly upheld." Sd/-Assistant Registrar(CCC) //True copy// Sub Assistant Registrar raaToThe Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,Large Tax Payer Unit,7[th] Floor, Wanaparthy Block, Aayakar Bhavan, Nungambakkam,Chennai-600 034. +2cc to Mr.Srinath Sridevan, Advocate SR.No.77332, 78587 W.A.No. 2063 of 2019BP(CO)GMY(04/10/2019)