Worldpart Ltd.,Julia House,3 Themistocles Dervis Street,Cy-1066, Nicosia, Cyprus v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income-Tax,International Taxation 2(2),4[Th] Floor, Bsnl Bhavan, Tower-I

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASRESERVED ON : 14.08.2019 CORAM THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE M.SUNDARW.P.Nos.7135 and 7138 of 2019andW.M.P.Nos.15658, 7859, 7860, 7861 and 7862 of 2019 Worldpart Ltd.,Julia House,3 Themistocles Dervis Street,CY-1066, Nicosia, Cyprus,represented by its Authorized SignatoryMr.Zulfikar Mustaqbhai Trivedi..Petitioner inboth writ petitions Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax,International Taxation 2(2),4[th] Floor, BSNL Bhavan, Tower-I,No.16, Greams Road,Chennai-600 006. .. Respondent in both writ petitions W.P.No.7135 of 2019 is filed under Article 226 of theConstitution of India praying to issue a Writ of CertiorarifiedMandamus calling for the records of the respondent contained inits impugned final assessment order dated 25.2.2019 bearingOrder No.ITBA/AST/S/143(3)/2018-19/1015158673(1) passed undersub-section (3) of section 144C read with section 143(3) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961 for the Assessment Year 2015-16 and toquash the same as being without jurisdiction and void ab initioand to consequently direct the respondent to accept the returnof income as filed by the petitioner for the assessment year2015-16 and process the refunds accordingly and pass such otheror further orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in thefacts and circumstances of the case. W.P.No.7138 of 2019 is filed under Article 226 of theConstitution of India praying to issue a Writ of CertiorarifiedMandamus calling for the records of the respondent contained inits impugned draft assessment order dated 24.12.2018 bearingOrder No.ITBA/AST/F/144C/2018-19/1014525544(1) passed undersection 144C read with section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the Assessment year 2015-16 and to quash the same asbeing without jurisdiction and void ab initio and toconsequently direct the respondent to accept the return ofincome as filed by the petitioner for the Assessment year 2015-16 and process the refunds accordingly and pass such other orfurther orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the factsand circumstances of the case. For Petitioner : Mr.Kamal Sawhney COMMON ORDER This common order will dispose of both these writ petitions.Writ petitioner is a company incorporated in Cyprus and istherefore, a foreign company, but inter-alia has madeinvestments in India and is an Assessee qua ‘Income TaxAct, 1961’ (‘IT Act’ for brevity). 2This case was originally reserved on 8.8.2019 andthereafter, it was listed again for clarification on 14.8.2019on a request made by learned counsel for writ petitioner. Afterhearing both learned counsel, the matter was reserved onthat day. 3Assessment under IT Act for writ petitioner company forthe assessment year 2015-16 (hereinafter ‘said AY’ for clarity)is the subject matter of instant writ petitions. 4For said AY, writ petitioner company filed returns on10.02.2016 showing gross total income of Rs.22,89,76,090.00,admitted that it is liable to pay income tax at 10% of grosstotal income, but vide the return, claimed a refund ofRs.4,57,95,220.00 on the ground that writ petitioner company isa deductee qua ‘Tax Deducted at Source’ (‘TDS’ for brevity) tothe tune of Rs.6,86,92,827.00. 5The case of writ petitioner Assessee was selected forscrutiny and a notice under section 143(2) of IT Act beingnotice dated 28.7.2016 was issued to writ petitioner assessee.Thereafter, on 26.11.2018, a notice under section 142(1) of ITAct calling for details was also sent. Writ petitioner assesseesubmitted details called for. Personal hearings were also heldon 3.8.2016, 3.12.2018 and 19.12.2018. After considering thereturns, replies and the submissions made in the personalhearings, the respondent passed an order dated 24.12.2018 being order No.ITBA/AST/F/144C/2018-19/1014525544(1) (this order shallhereinafter be referred to as’ impugned draft assessment order’for the sake of convenience and clarity). 5The case of writ petitioner Assessee was selected forscrutiny and a notice under section 143(2) of IT Act beingnotice dated 28.7.2016 was issued to writ petitioner assessee.Thereafter, on 26.11.2018, a notice under section 142(1) of ITAct calling for details was also sent. Writ petitioner assesseesubmitted details called for. Personal hearings were also heldon 3.8.2016, 3.12.2018 and 19.12.2018. After considering thereturns, replies and the submissions made in the personalhearings, the respondent passed an order dated 24.12.2018 being order No.ITBA/AST/F/144C/2018-19/1014525544(1) (this order shallhereinafter be referred to as’ impugned draft assessment order’for the sake of convenience and clarity). 6Post impugned draft assessment order, petitionercompany sent communications dated 21.1.2019 and 19.2.2019raising certain objections, but a final assessment order beingorder dated 25.2.2019 bearing order No.ITBA/AST/S/143(3)/2018-19/1015158673(1) (hereinafter ‘impugned final assessment order’for the sake of convenience and clarity) came to be passed. 7To be noted, in W.P.No.7138 of 2019, impugned draftassessment order has been assailed and in W.P.No.7135 of 2019,impugned final assessment order has been assailed. 8Notwithstanding very many contentions raised in theaffidavits filed in support of writ petitions, counter affidavitfiled by respondent Revenue in W.P.No.7135 of 2019 and commonrejoinder affidavit filed by writ petitioner, the submissionsmade by learned counsel on both sides in the hearing turns onone pivotal point and that is jurisdictional fact qua impugneddraft and final assessment orders. 9It is the specific submission of learned counsel forwrit petitioner that impugned draft assessment order has beenmade under section 144C of IT Act, that for invoking powersunder section 144C of IT Act, it is imperative that respondentshould propose to make variations in the income or loss returnedby the Assessee and that such variations in income or lossshould be prejudicial to the interest of Assessee. 10In the instant case, there is no disputation ordisagreement that respondent has not made any variation inincome returned by writ petitioner Assessee. 11In response to this lone and pivotal submission,learned counsel for Revenue submitted that while no variationhas been made by the respondent qua income returned by writpetitioner Assessee, variation has been made qua tax payable bywrit petitioner assessee. Writ petitioner assessee whilesubmitting returns for said AY, has computed tax at 10% of thegross total income, but vide impugned draft assessment order andimpugned final assessment order, writ petitioner now has to paytax at 20%. Saying so, learned Revenue counsel submitted that asassessee has to pay tax at a higher rate, it is prejudicial tothe interest of assessee and therefore, Revenue had thought itfit to give an opportunity to writ petitioner assessee bysending the impugned draft assessment order. It was also pointed out that an alternate remedy is available to the writ petitionerassessee by way of an appeal under section 246A of IT Act andwrit petitioner could have taken dispute resolution route andgone to the DRP. 12This court now first embarks upon the exercise ofexamining whether there is any jurisdictional fact qua Section144C being invoked by the respondent. Learned counsel for writpetitioner pressed into serviceSouthern PetrochemicalIndustries Corporation Ltd. Vs. Income tax Officer reported in[2009] 224 CTR 90 (Madras)judgment and submitted thatrespondent cannot resort to section 144C when there is novariation in income returned by writ petitioner assessee. out that an alternate remedy is available to the writ petitionerassessee by way of an appeal under section 246A of IT Act andwrit petitioner could have taken dispute resolution route andgone to the DRP. 12This court now first embarks upon the exercise ofexamining whether there is any jurisdictional fact qua Section144C being invoked by the respondent. Learned counsel for writpetitioner pressed into serviceSouthern PetrochemicalIndustries Corporation Ltd. Vs. Income tax Officer reported in[2009] 224 CTR 90 (Madras)judgment and submitted thatrespondent cannot resort to section 144C when there is novariation in income returned by writ petitioner assessee. 13Per contra, learned Revenue counsel emphaticallysubmitted thatSouthern Petrochemicalcase is clearlydistinguishable. It was submitted by learned Revenue counselthat Southern Petrochemical case was in a regular tax caseappeal under section 260A of IT Act and a perusal of thesubstantial question of law on which the appeal was decided willreveal that the issue before the Court was whether the Tribunalwas right in holding that provisions of section 144B of IT Actare attracted and as to whether reference to IAC was inaccordance with section 144B of IT Act on the facts andcircumstances of the case. It was further submitted by learnedRevenue counsel that the facts and circumstances of SouthernPetrochemical case is completely different and distinguishable.It was submitted that, it was a case where the Assessee declaredtotal assessable income as nil, after adjusting carry forwardbusiness loss, unabsorbed depreciation that was carried forwardsubject to disallowances and claim under section 80J of IT Act.Saying so, it was argued that Southern Petrochemical caseturned on the principle that depreciation cannot be thrust onany assessee. 14This Court carefully considered the rival submissionsin this regard. A perusal of Southern Petrochemical casereveals that relevant substantial question of law as can beculled out from the CTR case journal placed before this Courtreads as follows : “(i)Whether on the facts and in thecircumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right inholding that the provisions of section 144B of the ITAct, 1961 are attracted and the reference to the IACwas in accordance with the provisions of section144B?” (Underlining made by this Court to supplyemphasis and highlight) 15Paragraph 2 of Southern Petrochemical case which givesfacts in a nutshell reads as follows : “2.The assessee is engaged in the manufacture andmarketing of fertilizers etc. The return of income forthe assessment year, 1980-81 was filed on 27[th] June, 1980showing an income of Rs.10,91,22,540 subject todisallowances and the claim under s.80J of the IT Act,and after adjusting the carry forward business loss tothe extent of Rs.10,86,03,271 and the unabsorbeddepreciation carried forward to the extent ofRs.5,19,269, declared its total assessable income as'nil'. Subsequently, on 11[th] Dec, 1980, it filed arevised return, again showing 'nil' income, but thedifference between the original return filed and therevised return filed on 11[th] Dec, 1980 related towithdrawal of depreciation claimed under various headsand by carrying forward the loss of the earlier years toa greater extent.” 16The principle that depreciation cannot be thrust on anyassessee is contained in paragraph 5 and relevant portion ofparagraph 5 is as follows : 16The principle that depreciation cannot be thrust on anyassessee is contained in paragraph 5 and relevant portion ofparagraph 5 is as follows : “5.Mrs.Pushya Sitaraman, learned senior standing counselappearing for the Revenue, while conceding thatdepreciation cannot be thrust on any assessee wouldsubmit that at the time when the assessment order waspassed and the proposal was made which is dated 29[th]Aug, 1982, the law had not been settled and therefore,there is nothing wrong in the reference made undersection 144B and it was always subject to the IACaccepting the explanation given by the assessee. ....” 17This court after a careful analyse of rival submissionsand the case law is convinced that the submission of learnedRevenue counsel that Southern Petrochemicalcase isdistinguishable deserves to be accepted for more than onereason, as Southern Petrochemical case turns on section 144Bwhich is different from section 144C which we are now concernedwith, more importantly the facts scenario is completelydifferent and the substantial question of law itself makes itclear that answer to substantial question of law is on the factsand circumstances of the case. In this regard, this courtreminds itself of the celebrated Padma Sundara Rao case beingPadma Sundara Rao Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2002) 3SCC 533, the relevant paragraph is paragraph 9 and the samereads as follows : “9......... There is always peril in treating the wordsof a speech or judgment as though they are words in alegislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of thefacts of a particular case, said Lord Morris inHerrington v. British Railways Board [(1972) 2 WLR537 : 1972 AC 877 (HL) [Sub nom British Railways Boardv.Herrington, (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)]].Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or differentfact may make a world of difference between conclusionsin two cases.“ 18Further more, Southern Petrochemical case is a matterwhere Revenue counsel conceded that depreciation cannot bethrust on any assessee. There is no such scenario in theinstant case. 19As far as argument predicated on jurisdictional fact isconcerned, jurisdictional fact should be such that, absent aparticular fact, the authority should be completely denuded ofits powers to make impugned proceedings. This court remindsitself that unlike Southern Petrochemical case which is aregular tax case appeal, this is a case under writ jurisdictionwherein there is no disputation that writ petitioner has analternate remedy. Therefore, jurisdictional fact should be sostriking that it strikes at the very root of the exercise of thepower by the authority making the impugned order. To be noted,there is further discussion regarding alternate remedy in thelatter part of this order infra. Be that as it may, suffice tosay that this court is unable to convince itself that (from areading of the language in which section 144C of IT Act iscouched) respondent is completely denuded of powers to makedraft and final assessment orders in cases where the rate atwhich tax is to be paid by the assessee is put in issue. In anyevent, as this court agrees with the submission of learnedRevenue counsel that Southern Petrochemical case is clearlydistinguishable on facts, it may not be necessary to delvefurther into this aspect of the matter. 20This takes us to the next limb of the argument which ispredicated on limitation. It was submitted by learned counselfor writ petitioner that proper course for the respondent wouldhave been to pass an assessment order under section 143(3) of ITAct, limitation for the same had elapsed and therefore, section144C route has been taken to circumnavigate limitation.Responding to this, learned Revenue counsel pointed out thatsaid AY being 2015-16, it is prior to 01.06.2016 when limitationwas two years. Thereafter, in the clarificatory hearing on14.08.2019, by placing reliance on section 153(1) of IT Act, itwas argued by learned counsel for writ petitioner that it is 21months. This makes it important to look into the manner in which writ petitioner has projected / articulated limitation ground inthe affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. Relevantparagraph is paragraph 20(M) and the same reads as follows :“M.That no further action shall be taken in the caseof the Petitioner since the limitation to pass anorder under sub-section (3) of Section 143 of theAct has already expired. Since Section 144C of theAct is not applicable in the Petitioner's case, thelimitation to pass an assessment order under sub-section (3) of Section 143 of the Act for theconcerned AY 2015-16 was 21 months as per Section153 of the Act and the same expired on 31.12.2017.However, the Respondent had intimated the Petitionervide email dated 15.12.2017 that a reference hasbeen sent to Foreign Authorities under the Exchangeof Information. It is submitted that in case of suchreference, as per clause (x) of Explanation 1 toSection 153 of the Act, the period from the date ofmaking reference for exchange of information to thedate of receipt of such information by theDepartment or one year whichever is less is excludedfrom the limitation period. Further as per the firstproviso to explanation 1 to Section 153 of the Act,if after exclusion of the above period, theDepartment is left with less than 60 days to passthe assessment order, such limitation is extended to60 days. While the Petitioner had requested for copyof order sheet to verify the application of theaforementioned provisions on limitation in thepresent case and the same has not been provided tothe Petitioner, it is submitted that, withoutprejudice, even if it is presumed that the referencewas made by the Respondent on 15.12.2017, i.e. thedate on which the Petitioner was intimated, afterexcluding the outer limit of one year, the periodavailable to the Respondent was merely 15 days from15.12.2018 which gets extended to 60 days by theapplication of the first proviso to Explanation 1 toSection 153 of the Act. Therefore, counting from15.12.2018, the limitation to pass the finalassessment order comes to 13.02.2019 which hasalready expired. Hence, the Respondent ought not totake any further action in the present case and anysuch further action taken shall be void for beingbarred by limitation.” 21A perusal of the manner in which limitation plea hasbeen projected or in other words, challenge to the impugneddraft and final assessment orders insofar as it is predicated onlimitation plea is concerned, it comes out clearly that it is amixed question of fact and law. It is not a pristine question of law. The aforesaid manner in which limitation plea has beenarticulated by writ petitioner in the affidavit filed in supportof the writ petition is clearly subjected to disputation anddisagreement by revenue. Therefore, this court has no hesitationin holding that on the facts and circumstances of the instantcase, as the plea of limitation turns on facts and as it isclearly not a pristine question of law and as it at bestqualifies as mixed question of law and facts, it would beappropriate to not to decide facts in a writ petition and leaveit to appellate authority to decide on facts. law. The aforesaid manner in which limitation plea has beenarticulated by writ petitioner in the affidavit filed in supportof the writ petition is clearly subjected to disputation anddisagreement by revenue. Therefore, this court has no hesitationin holding that on the facts and circumstances of the instantcase, as the plea of limitation turns on facts and as it isclearly not a pristine question of law and as it at bestqualifies as mixed question of law and facts, it would beappropriate to not to decide facts in a writ petition and leaveit to appellate authority to decide on facts. 22This takes us to another limb of the same argument.Learned Revenue counsel pointed out that with regard to previousassessment year, namely 2014-15, the same procedure of passing adraft assessment under section 144C was adopted with regard towrit petitioner assessee, writ petitioner asseessee did notassail the said procedure much less raise the jurisdictionalfact issue, on the contrary, filed a regular statutory appeal toappellate authority and the appellate authority also passed adetailed order on 25.6.2018 dismissing the writ petitionerassessee’s appeal. 23It was pointed out by learned Revenue counsel beforethe first appellate court that writ petitioner Assessee did notappear and though writ petitioner assessee did not appear in itscapacity as appellant, appellate authority has passed an orderon merits. In other words, order dated 25.6.2018 was on merits,is learned Revenue counsel’s say. This was contested by learnedcounsel for writ petitioner by saying that writ petitioner hasnot given legal quietus to this order and that the same is beingcontested in the Tribunal. It may not be necessary to delvefurther into this controversy, because in the considered view ofthis court, it is a fairly well settled legal principle thatassessee cannot be precluded from raising a particular issuemerely because it has not raised the issue in the previousassessment years. In this regard, this Court reminds itself ofDevilal Modi case. In Devilal Modi Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlamand others case, Hon'ble Mr.JusticeGajendragadkar, speaking for the Constitution Bench of Hon'bleSupreme Court, held that assessment orders passed under theSales Tax Act for successive assessment years can be assailed onnew points, though all assessment orders are passed under thesame provision of law. In this very judgment, the ConstitutionBench of Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that in cases of thisnature, doctrine of res judicata and constructive res judicataare not to be applied strictly to proceedings under Articles 226and 32 of the Constitution of India. 24Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid by Revenue counselthat the argument, more so an argument pertaining tojurisdictional facts cannot be raised by assessee merely becauseassessee had not raised it in the previous assessment year. 24Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid by Revenue counselthat the argument, more so an argument pertaining tojurisdictional facts cannot be raised by assessee merely becauseassessee had not raised it in the previous assessment year. 25Before proceeding further with discussion anddispositive reasoning in this regard, this court deems itappropriate to have a brief over view of what is the basis onwhich Revenue is contending that the rate of tax payable by writpetitioner assessee is 20% and not 10%. Writ petitioner assesseehas paid tax at the rate of 10% on the gross total income byplacing reliance on a Treaty between India and Cyprus. To statewith specificity, by placing reliance on Article 11 of IndiaCyprus Treaty. By going into the holding structure of writpetitioner assessee company and examining who the beneficialowner is, in the light of India Cyprus Treaty which is a ‘DoubleTaxation Avoidance Agreement’ (‘DTAA’ for brevity), Revenue'scase is, the beneficial owners and the holding structure of thewrit petitioner company is such that the Indian company in whichinvestment was made is only a company which acted as a conduitor an intermediary for the purpose of obtaining tax benefitswhich according to the Revenue is unjustified benefits. 26It may not be necessary to delve into these aspects ofthe matter any further. Suffice to say that the basis on whichRevenue is taking the stand that writ petitioner assessee isliable to pay tax at the rate of 20% and not at beneficial rateof 10% based on Indian Cyprus DTAA is after enquiry into theholding structure of writ petitioner assessee company and afterenquiry into the benefiticial owner aspect qua writ petitionercompany. 27Having answered the jurisdiction fact plea, thetrajectory of discussion now should necessarily move towardsalternate remedy. There is no disputation or disagreement thatalternate remedy is available to writ petitioner Assessee undersection 246A of IT Act. In this regard, a judgment of thisHon’ble Court made in Martech Peripherals (P.) Ltd. Vs. DeputyCommissioner of Income-tax, Company Circle IV(1), Chennaireported in [2017] 81 taxmann.com 73 (Madras) was pressed intoservice by learned counsel for writ petitioner. A Hon’ble SingleJudge of this court had held that not entertaining a writpetition when there is alternate remedy is only a matter of selfrestraint employed by Courts. Hon’ble Single Judge held thatalternate remedy by itself does not exclude the jurisdiction orpower of this court to entertain a writ petition. This courtcannot have any disagreement on this proposition. However, thisMartech case does not come to the aid of the writ petitioner, because the ground of absence of jurisdiction or jurisdictionalfact has been negatived by this court in this case. In Martechcase, Hon’ble Single Judge had held that writ petition can beentertained even when there is alternate remedy when challengeis on the ground of absence of jurisdiction and / or breach ofprinciples of natural justice. There can absolutely be nodisagreement on this proposition. In this case, there is nocomplaint of violation of principles of natural justice. Thecomplaint is only with regard to absence of jurisdiction, i.e.,jurisdictional fact, but that has been negatived as alluded tosupra. This therefore leads us to the conclusion that whileprinciple in Martech case is clearly indisputable, it does nothelp the writ petitioner in the instant case. because the ground of absence of jurisdiction or jurisdictionalfact has been negatived by this court in this case. In Martechcase, Hon’ble Single Judge had held that writ petition can beentertained even when there is alternate remedy when challengeis on the ground of absence of jurisdiction and / or breach ofprinciples of natural justice. There can absolutely be nodisagreement on this proposition. In this case, there is nocomplaint of violation of principles of natural justice. Thecomplaint is only with regard to absence of jurisdiction, i.e.,jurisdictional fact, but that has been negatived as alluded tosupra. This therefore leads us to the conclusion that whileprinciple in Martech case is clearly indisputable, it does nothelp the writ petitioner in the instant case. 28While on alternate remedy, this court deems itappropriate to make a short elucidation on alternate remedy andexercise of writ jurisdiction. This court is clear in its mindthat the rule of alternate remedy being a self imposed restraintqua writ courts, is clearly not a rule of compulsion, but only arule of discretion. In other words, alternate remedy rule is notan absolute rule. Though alternate remedy rule is not anabsolute rule, in a long line of authorities, Hon’ble SupremeCourt has repeatedly held that alternate remedy shall beexercised in cases of (a) absence of jurisdiction, (b) violationof principles of natural justice, and (c) order being passeddisregarding well settled laws of land, etc., To be noted, thisis not a comprehensive list, but only an illustrative list whichis set out only for the limited purpose of appreciating thisinstant order. 29This court reminds itself of a leading judgment ofHon’ble Supreme Court in Dunlop case being Assistant Collectorof Central Excise Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. reported in (1985) 1 SCC260. Relevant paragraph is paragraph 3 and the same reads asfollows :“3.In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa[(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131 : 1983 Tax LR2905 : (1983) 142 ITR 663 : (1983) 53 STC 315] A.P.Sen, E.S. Venkataramiah and R.B. Misra, JJ. held thatwhere the statute itself provided the petitioners withan efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appealto the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to thetribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to theHigh Court, it was not for the High Court to exerciseits extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of theConstitution ignoring as it were, the completestatutory machinery. That it has become necessary, evennow, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed amatter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutoryprocedures. It is only where statutory remedies areentirely ill-suited to meet the demands ofextraordinary situations, as for instance where thevery vires of the statute is in question or whereprivate or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed upand the prevention of public injury and the vindicationof public justice require it that recourse may be hadto Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Courtmust have good and sufficient reason to bypass thealternative remedy provided by statute. Surely mattersinvolving the revenue where statutory remedies areavailable are not such matters. We can also takejudicial notice of the fact that the vast majority ofthe petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution arefiled solely for the purpose of obtaining interimorders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by onedevice or the other. The practice certainly needs to bestrongly discouraged.“ (Underlining made by this court to supply emphasisand highlight) 30This court also reminds itself of Satyawati Tandon caserendered a quarter of a century later being United Bank ofIndia Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others reported in(2010)8 SCC 110. (Underlining made by this court to supply emphasisand highlight) 30This court also reminds itself of Satyawati Tandon caserendered a quarter of a century later being United Bank ofIndia Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others reported in(2010)8 SCC 110. 31Satyawati Tondon principle is to the effect that whenit comes to matters pertaining to Tax, Cess, revenue, etc., ruleof alternate remedy should be applied with utmost rigour. To benoted, Satyawati Tandon principle was reiterated by Hon’bleSupreme Court in K.C.Mathew case being Authorized Officer, StateBank of Travancore Vs. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85.Relevant paragraph in K.C.Mathew case is paragraph 10 and thesame reads as follows : “10.In Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v.Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ)260] the High Court had restrained [Satyawati Tondon v.State of U.P., 2009 SCC OnLine All 2608] furtherproceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon adetailed consideration of the statutory scheme under theSARFAESI Act, the availability of remedy to the aggrievedunder Section 17 before the Tribunal and the appellateremedy under Section 18 before the Appellate Tribunal,the object and purpose of the legislation, it wasobserved that a writ petition ought not to be entertainedin view of the alternate statutory remedy availableholding: (SCC pp. 123 & 128, paras 43 & 55) “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked thesettled law that the High Court will ordinarilynot entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is availableto the aggrieved person and that this Rule applieswith greater rigour in matters involving recoveryof taxes, cess, fees, other types of public moneyand the dues of banks and other financialinstitutions. In our view, while dealing with thepetitions involving challenge to the action takenfor recovery of the public dues, etc. the HighCourt must keep in mind that the legislationsenacted by Parliament and State Legislatures forrecovery of such dues are a code unto themselvesinasmuch as they not only contain comprehensiveprocedure for recovery of the dues but alsoenvisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies forredressal of the grievance of any aggrievedperson. Therefore, in all such cases, the HighCourt must insist that before availing remedyunder Article 226 of the Constitution, a personmust exhaust the remedies available under therelevant statute. *** 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despiterepeated pronouncement of this Court, the HighCourts continue to ignore the availability ofstatutory remedies under the DRT Act andthe SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction underArticle 226 for passing orders which have seriousadverse impact on the right of banks and otherfinancial institutions to recover their dues. Wehope and trust that in future the High Courts willexercise their discretion in such matters withgreater caution, care and circumspection.”“ 32It comes out clearly from the aforesaid judgment ofHon’ble Supreme Court that when it comes to fiscal law, rule ofalternate remedy should be applied with utmost rigour. 33Owing to all that have been set out thus far, thiscourt does not find any ground to interfere with the impugnedorders in writ jurisdiction. Both writ petitions fail and thesame are dismissed, albeit preserving the rights of the writpetitioner to pursue the case by resorting section 246A of ITAct. If such a course is adopted, it is made clear that allquestions in the instant writ petitions are left open. Thereshall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connectedmiscellaneous petitions are closed. Sd/- Assistant Registrar //True Copy// Sub Assistant Registrar To The Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax,International Taxation 2(2),4[th] Floor, BSNL Bhavan, Tower-I,No.16, Greams Road,Chennai-600 006. Sd/- Assistant Registrar //True Copy// Sub Assistant Registrar To The Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax,International Taxation 2(2),4[th] Floor, BSNL Bhavan, Tower-I,No.16, Greams Road,Chennai-600 006. +1 cc to M/s.Arun Karthik Mohan,Advocate Sr.No. 75834+1 cc to M/s.Hema Murali Krishnan, Advocate Sr.No.76052 AKM/30.09.19/13P-4C / AKM/31.10.19 order inW.P.Nos.7135 and 7138 of 2019