Wp(Md)/5225/2020 Of S.gurushankar v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax (Appeals-19, Chennai)

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURTDATED : 12.03.2020 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.V.KARTHIKEYANW.P(MD)No.5225 of 2020andW.M.P(MD).No.4568 of 2020 Dr.S.Gurushankar ... Petitioner 1.The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals-19, Chennai) Office of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal-19) 304, Investigation Building, Mahathma Gandhi Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai 600 034. 2.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-1, Madurai. Central Circle-1, Madurai. 3.The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle-1, Madurai -1.... Respondents PRAYER: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitutionof India praying for the issuance of a Writ of CertiorarifiedMandamus, to call for the records of the third respondent in hisassessment order dated 31.12.2019 in No.ITBA/AST/S/143(3)/2019-20/1023534727(1) insofar as the computation made under Clause 18 to21 of the computation sheet (No.ITBA/AST/S/213/2019-20/1023534824(1)attached to the said assessment order passed by the third respondentfor the assessment year 2017-2018. For Petitioner : Mr.K.Subramaniam Senior Counsel for Mr.S.RameshFor Respondents: Mrs.S.SrimathySenior Standing Counsel ORDER The petitioner is the Chairman of the Meenakshi MissionHospital and Research Centre,Madurai. He had stated in the affidavitthat the then Finance Minister, Government of India, on 29.02.2008,in the budget speech, had announced that a new sub Section (11C) isproposed to be inserted under Section 80-1B to grant five years' taxholiday to encourage hospitals to be set up anywhere in India,except certain specified urban areas and to be particularly set upin Tier-2 and Tier-3 towns to serve the rural people. It was statedthat the window will be open from 01.04.2008 to 31.03.2013 andduring that period, the hospital must commence operation. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 2.The petitioner claims that he had set up a hospital inNilgiri Therku Thottam Village, Thanjavur Taluk and District, tohelp the rural people. He purchased land for a total considerationof Rs.1,20,79,000/-, under registered sale deeds. He also obtaineda loan for a sum of Rs.7,00,00,000/- at the rate of 11% interest forconstruction of the hospital from HDFC Limited, Madurai. Overdraftamount of Rs.20,00,000/- at the rate of 9.7% interest was alsosanctioned for purchasing the infrastructure required for the saidhospital. He also obtained a further loan of Rs.7,21,64,000/- atthe rate of 12.5% interest on 11.09.2013 from HDFC Bank, Chennai,for purchase of Elekta Linac, infrastructure fund and OD facility.The hospital was constructed in accordance with the approvedbuilding plan. It commenced to function from 05.01.2013 in the nameof “Meenakshi Hospital”. 3.The petitioner claimed that he filed his original written ofincome admitting an income of Rs.1,30,98,160/- on 30.09.2014. Asearch under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act was conducted at thepetitioner's residence on 26.11.2014. The return of income filed bythe petitioner was processed under Section 143 (1) of the Income TaxAct, 1961 and on 26.10.2015, the case was centralized to the 3[rd]respondent herein. Notice under Section 153A was issued to thepetitioner by the 3[rd] respondent. A further notice under Section 143(2) was issued on 29.07.2016 and notices under Section 142 (1) wereissued on 23.08.2016 and 29.09.2016. 3.The petitioner claimed that he filed his original written ofincome admitting an income of Rs.1,30,98,160/- on 30.09.2014. Asearch under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act was conducted at thepetitioner's residence on 26.11.2014. The return of income filed bythe petitioner was processed under Section 143 (1) of the Income TaxAct, 1961 and on 26.10.2015, the case was centralized to the 3[rd]respondent herein. Notice under Section 153A was issued to thepetitioner by the 3[rd] respondent. A further notice under Section 143(2) was issued on 29.07.2016 and notices under Section 142 (1) wereissued on 23.08.2016 and 29.09.2016. 4.The 3[rd] respondent passed an assessment order for theassessment year 2013-2014 under Section 143 (3) r/w Section 153A ofthe Income Tax Act, 1961, disallowing exemption under Section 80-1B(11C) for the assessment year 2013-2014 to 75% and fixing thetaxable income at Rs.4,33,09,254/-. For the assessment year 2014-2015, the 3[rd] respondent disallowed exemption under Section 80-1B(11C) to 50% and fixed the taxable income at Rs.7,94,04,287/-. Forthe assessment year 2015-2016, the 3[rd] respondent disallowedexemption under Section 80-1B(11C) to 25% and fixed the taxableincome at Rs.17,42,32,078/-. 5.The petitioner claimed that he filed three appeals underSection 246-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, against the assessmentorders for the assessment years 2013-2014, 2014-2015 and 2015-2016.The Appellate Authority, 1[st] respondent, passed final orders on14.09.2018 and directed the Assessing Officer to allow 100%deduction under Section 80-1B(11C), as claimed by the petitioner inhis return of income filed for the assessment years 2013-2014, 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. 6.The petitioner claimed that the 2[nd] respondent, thereafter,passed a revised order of assessment for the said three assessmentyears, invoking Section 115-JC of the Income Tax Act. Questioningthat, the petitioner filed three writ petitions before this Court inhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/W.P.(MD) Nos.107, 108 and 109 of 2019. 7.In W.M.P.(MD) Nos.80, 81 and 82 of 2019, in the said threewrit petitions, a learned single Judge of this Court had granted anorder of interim stay on 04.01.2019. The said three writ petitionsare still pending. Subsequently, the 3[rd] respondent passed an orderof assessment, without invoking Section 115-JC of the Income TaxAct, 1961 in respect of the assessment year 2016-2017. 8.The present writ petition has been filed with respect to theorder of assessment for the assessment year 2017-2018, since the 3[rd]respondent had invoked Section 115-JC of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 9.Heard arguments advanced by Mr.K.Subramaniam learned SeniorCounsel for Mr.S.Ramesh learned counsel for the petitioner andMrs.S.Srimathy learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents. 10.The learned Senior Counsel stated that for the assessmentyears 2013-2014, 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, the petitioner havinggrievance over the order of assessment made by the AssessingOfficer, namely, the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, ChennaiCircle-1, Madurai, had filed appeals under Section 246 (A) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961, before the Appellate Authority, namely, theCommissioner of Income Tax (Appeals-19, Chennai), Chennai. 9.Heard arguments advanced by Mr.K.Subramaniam learned SeniorCounsel for Mr.S.Ramesh learned counsel for the petitioner andMrs.S.Srimathy learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents. 10.The learned Senior Counsel stated that for the assessmentyears 2013-2014, 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, the petitioner havinggrievance over the order of assessment made by the AssessingOfficer, namely, the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, ChennaiCircle-1, Madurai, had filed appeals under Section 246 (A) of theIncome Tax Act, 1961, before the Appellate Authority, namely, theCommissioner of Income Tax (Appeals-19, Chennai), Chennai. 11.The learned Senior Counsel stated that the said authorityhad examined the assessment order and had passed a detailed orderallowing the said appeal. The Appellate Authority had also statedthat the Assessing Officer was not justified in restricting theassessee’s claim of deduction under Section 80-1B(11C) of the IncomeTax Act to the extent of 75%, 50% and 25% with respect to theassessment years 2013-2014, 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 respectively.The Appellate Authority had directed that the Assessing Officershould give 100% deduction, on the basis of the announcement by theFinance Minister that five years' tax holidays would be given tosuch of those Hospitals, which are established in backward areas. 12.It is claimed that the Hospital in the instant case wasestablished at Nilgiri Therku Thottam Village in Thanjavur Taluk,which is claimed to be a backward place. The matter was,thereafter, remanded back to the Assessing Officer for the saidthree assessment years. The Assessing Officer, while reworking thecommutation, had invoked the provisions of Section 115JC of theIncome Tax Act. Invoking Section 115JC of the Act had once againbeen a cause of grievance for the petitioner and after theassessment orders were passed, the same were challenged before thisCourt in W.P(MD).Nos.107, 108 and 109 of 2019 (S.Gurushankar Vs.,The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals-19, Chennai and two others).It must be mentioned that only an interim order of stay has beengranted in the said writ petitions and the writ petitions are stillpending. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 13.The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placedreliance on the interim order dated 04.01.2019 granted in the saidwrit petitions. In this connection, reference had been made to(2011) 5 SCC 305, State of Uttar pradesh and others Vs. HirendrapalSingh and others, wherein, the Honourable Supreme Court had referredto two earlier judgments in paragraphs 16 and 17 viz., AIR1987 SC1345, Bir Bajrang Kumar Vs., State of Bihar and 1995 supp (1) SCC461, Vishnu Trader Vs., State of Haryana and stated that, when casesinvolving identical points come up for consideration, the Courtsshould give identical treatment. Otherwise, it would create ananomalous position, since there would be a possibility ofcontradictory orders being passed in similar type of cases. TheHon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vishnu Traders vs. State ofHaryana, (referred supra) had stated that all similar matters shouldreceive similar treatment except where factual differences requiredifferent treatment. It is seen that the discretion vested with theCourt to examine each case on its facts and to decide accordinglyhas not been taken away or eroded by said pronouncement. 14.The learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on paragraphNos.11 and 12 of the judgment of a Division Bench of the MadhyaPredesh High Court reported in (2005) 1 MP LJ 400,S.M.P.Sharma vs.,State of M.P and another. It is seen in paragraph No.11 that theDivision Bench had actually stated that an order admitting a writpetition for hearing or granting an interim order on the facts andcircumstances of the case, is not a final decision. It has alsobeen stated that it does not lay down any principle of law which isbinding. In paragraph No.12, reference has been made to AIR 1987 SC1345 (Bir Bajrang Kumar Vs., State of Bihar), (referred supra). TheHon'ble Supreme Court had reiterated the necessity of givingidentical treatment, in cases involving identical points by theCourts and also stated that if the cases are before two differentseats of the same High Court and it is not practical to hear boththe cases together then if one of the cases is decided, then, thatdecision would act as the precedent to other case. 15.In the instant case, the earlier writ petitions have notbeen decided finally. Only interim order had been granted. Thelearned Senior Counsel stated that while granting interim order, thelearned single Judge of this Court had examined the issue ofviolation of principles of natural justice and also violation ofpromissory estoppel held over by the Finance Minister in his budgetspeech in the Parliament, pursuant to which, Section 80-1B(11C) ofthe Income Tax Act was inserted and therefore, stated that the saidinterim order has to be followed by this Court. 16.I do not agree. The facts in the present writ petition aretotally different from the facts canvassed while challenging theassessment orders for the assessment years 2013-2014, 2014-2015 andhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/2015-2016. The assessment orders in those years travelled a different path. After the assessment orders were passed, they weretaken up in appeal before the Appellate Authority. Even whilepassing the assessment order, instead of granting 100% deduction,the Assessing Officer had granted different rates of deduction,namely, 75% for the assessment year 2013-2014, 50% for theassessment year 2014-2015 and 25 % for the assessment year 2015-2016. The Appellate Authority held that such restriction of thepercentage for deduction was unreasonable and was not called for andthat 100% deduction should have been given and on that singleground, had remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer. 17.The Assessing Officer had then taken up an entirelydifferent stand. He invoked the provision under Section 115 JC ofIncome Tax Act. Therefore, the assessment orders were thenchallenged before this Court by stating that when Section 115 JC wasnot at all invoked in the first instance in the orders in theoriginal, the order of the Assessment Officer invoking the sameafter the matters had been remanded, was not proper and notjustified. The other grounds raised were with respect to the issuesof promissory estoppel and with respect to violation of principlesof natural justice. 18.A reading of interim order passed by this Court asaforesaid, shows that the learned Judge in paragraph No.4 hadrecorded as follows:- ‘….. 4.Yet another contention that is raised is that the petitionerwas granted tax holiday for five years and acting on the saidrepresentation, the petitioner had altered his position. He wouldassail the correctness of the impugned order on the ground ofpromissory estoppel also. …...’ 19.The learned Judge had not interfered with the assessmentorders on the ground of promissory estoppel. He merely referred tothe issues raised. 18.A reading of interim order passed by this Court asaforesaid, shows that the learned Judge in paragraph No.4 hadrecorded as follows:- ‘….. 4.Yet another contention that is raised is that the petitionerwas granted tax holiday for five years and acting on the saidrepresentation, the petitioner had altered his position. He wouldassail the correctness of the impugned order on the ground ofpromissory estoppel also. …...’ 19.The learned Judge had not interfered with the assessmentorders on the ground of promissory estoppel. He merely referred tothe issues raised. 20.The ground of violation of principles of natural justiceseems to have been examined by the learned Judge. The learned Judgehad relied on a decision reported in 1995 (6) SCC 396,ModiIndustries Limited and others Vs., Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhiand another, wherein, a principle was laid down that if an appealhad been preferred against the order of assessment passed by theIncome Tax Officer under Sections 143 and 144 and the order had beenmodified pursuant to the assessment order, that will clearly not bean order under Sections 143 and 144 simpliciter. A regularassessment is completed as soon as the Income Tax Officer passes anorder assessing the total income or loss of the assessee anddetermining the sum payable by him or refundable to him within theperiod prescribed by sub-Section (1) of Section 153. There is nohttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ provision for making modification or variation pursuant to an orderof the higher authority in Sections 143 or 144 of the Act.Therefore, the learned Judge observed that invoking Section 115 JCof the assessment order it had violated the principles of naturaljustice and granted stay. 21.In the instant case, the assessment order has been straightaway challenged before this Court. The writ petitioner had notfiled any appeal, even though the law provides him opportunity to doso. He had chosen the alternate method of coming before this Court.It is, however, pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel that arectification application was filed as against the assessment orderand the same has also been rejected by the Assessing Authority. It has been stated by thelearned Senior Counsel that the rejection order was passed beforethe writ petition was filed. However, for reasons best known to thewrit petitioner and to the learned counsel for the writ petitioner,the said fact has been suppressed before this Court. 22.The learned Senior Counsel also stated that invoking Section115 JC of the Act without giving proper notice to the petitionerherein is a clear violation of principal of natural justice. Inthis connection, reliance has been placed on AIR 1977 SC 1627, Stateof Kerala vs K.T.Shaduli. The learned Senior Counsel placedspecific reference to paragraph 2, where it had been stated that thelaw is well settled that the tax authorities are entrusted with thepower to make assessment of tax and to discharge quasi-judicialfunctions and they are bound to observe principles of naturaljustice in reaching their conclusions. The learned Senior Counseltherefore stated that when the Assessing Officer had invoked theprovision under Section 115 JC of the Act, he should have put thepetitioner on prior notice that he is going to invoke Section 115 JCof the Income Tax Act, particularly, since the earlier writpetitions are pending. 23.The said argument is rejected by me, because those writpetitions were filed challenging the assessment order passed onremand and invoking Section 115-JC was contrary to the terms of theremand. In the present case, Section 115 JC of the Act has beeninvoked in the first instance itself. Section 115 JC of the Actcomes under chapter XII-BA of the Income Tax Act. It relates tospecial provisions. The very Section starts with the word“notwithstanding anything contained in the Act”. It also statesthat “where a regular income tax payable for the previous year bythe person, other than a company, is less than the alternate minimumtax payable for such previous year, the adjusted total income shallbe deemed to be the total income of that person for such previousyear and he shall be liable to pay income tax of such total incomeat the rate of eighteen and one half percent”. This provision canhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ always be invoked when there are materials to hold that the assesseehas indulged in what can be loosly termed as fraudulenttransactions. 24.In the assessment order, the Assessing Officer had examinedthe returns of the petitioner herein. The returns of income for theyear 2017-2018 was filed on 28.09.2017. When it was taken up forscrutiny, notice under Section 143 (2) was issued and was alsoserved. There was a search of the place of the assessee also. Afterthe search, it was found that one M/s.Sowdambika Traders ADV havingoffice at 47, Trichy Bye Pass Road, Sukkaliyur Post, Karur were saidto have supplied medical equipments/instruments to MeenakshiHospital, Thanjavur, for a sum of Rs.2,32,79,760/-. This wasdebited in the accounts of the hospital in the name of SowdambikaTraders. It was found that the payment for the purchase of the saidmedical equipments was paid by demand draft. It was however notedthat though payment had been made for a huge sum ofRs.2,32,00,000/-, the details of the medical equipments were notdisclosed by the assessee. Statements were recorded from theOfficials in the Financial Department. It was also found afterenquiry that M/s.Sowdambika Traders, whose address was given asNo.47, Trichy Bye Pass Road, Sukkaliyur Post, Karur, had disclosed abank account in Canara bank, Karur. But no such customer was foundby Assessing Officer. It was found that the account was maintainedby one S.Sivasamy of Karur. Further attempts were made to identifythe existence of M/s.Sowdambika Traders and the name of anotherindividual came up, called C.P.Anbunathan. He was examined and hestated that he did not know anything about the transaction and hedid not know how the said amount was reflected in the bank accountin his name as Proprietor of M/s.Sowdambika Traders. He disownedall knowledge about the transaction. 25.It has to be pointed out that any tax holiday can be grantedto a person who declares a truthful return. It cannot and shouldnot be granted to the person who claims that he purchased medicalequipments in the guise of treating poor persons for a sum ofRs.2,32,79,760/- and it is subsequently found that the entiretransaction is bogus. 26.I find every justification in the order of the AssessmentOfficer invoking Section 115JC which provision is squarelyapplicable. 27.It is also seen that C.P.Anbunathan had further stated inhis statement that the demand draft drawn in the name ofM/s.Sowdambika Traders was received by Meenakshi Mission Hospital and ResearchCenter, Madurai and in turn cash was handed over by him to thepetitioner Dr.S.Gurushankar after deducting commission of onehttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/percentage. Naturally, when commercial trade is indulged in the guise of serving the poor and needy and seeking tax holiday, thiscourt can never come to the rescue of the petitioner. 26.I find every justification in the order of the AssessmentOfficer invoking Section 115JC which provision is squarelyapplicable. 27.It is also seen that C.P.Anbunathan had further stated inhis statement that the demand draft drawn in the name ofM/s.Sowdambika Traders was received by Meenakshi Mission Hospital and ResearchCenter, Madurai and in turn cash was handed over by him to thepetitioner Dr.S.Gurushankar after deducting commission of onehttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/percentage. Naturally, when commercial trade is indulged in the guise of serving the poor and needy and seeking tax holiday, thiscourt can never come to the rescue of the petitioner. 28.The account books of Meenakshi Hospital, Thanjavur were alsoverified and it was seen that the demand draft was never reflectedin the accounts and only cash payment has been made for a sum ofRs.2,32,79,760/-. 29.I am examining the assessment order in detail, in view ofthe fact that it has been insisted by the learned Senior Counselthat there has been violation of the principles of natural justice.It must be kept in mind that the Honourable Supreme Court has alsoexpanded the principles of natural justice. 30.In (2000) 7 SCC 529, Aligarh Muslim University and OthersVs. Mansoor Ali Khan, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an ocassion toconsider the effect of a “ useless formality” - a theory, which isan exemption to the principles of natural justice. “21.As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India (1999(6) SCC 237), there can be certain situations in which an orderpassed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where noprejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference underArticle 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of theorder which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result inrevival of another order which is in itself illegal as in GaddeVenkateswara Rao vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1966 (2) SCR 172= AIR 1966 SC 828], it is not necessary to quash the order merelybecause of violation of principles of natural justice. 22.In M.C.Mehta {1999} 6 SCC 237 it was pointed out that atone time, it was held in Ridge vs. Baldwin ( 1964 AC 40) that breachof principles of natural justice was in itself treated as prejudiceand that no other 'defacto' prejudice needed to be proved. But,since then the rigour of the rule has been relaxed not only inEngland but also in our country. In S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan ( 1980(4) SCC 379), Chinnappa Reddy, J. followed Ridge vs. Baldwin and setaside the order of supercession of the New Delhi MetropolitanCommittee rejecting the argument that there was no prejudice thoughnotice was not given. The proceedings were quashed on the ground ofviolation of principles of natural justice. But even in that casecertain exceptions were laid down to which we shall presently refer. 23.Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L.Kapoor's case [(1980) 4 SCC 379],laid two exceptions (at p.395) namely, " if upon admitted orindisputable facts only one conclusion was possible", then in such acase, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itselfprejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusionwas possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessaryto quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice.Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken inhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/applying this exception. 23.Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L.Kapoor's case [(1980) 4 SCC 379],laid two exceptions (at p.395) namely, " if upon admitted orindisputable facts only one conclusion was possible", then in such acase, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itselfprejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusionwas possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessaryto quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice.Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken inhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/applying this exception. 24.The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice,prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases.In K.L. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India ( 1984(1) SCC 43),Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. ( as he then was) also laid down theprinciple that not mere violation of natural justice but de factoprejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved. It wasobserved: quoting Wade Administrative Law, (5th Ed.PP.472-475) asfollows: ( para 31) "....it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to whenprinciples of natural justice are to apply, nor as their scope andextent ....There must have been some real prejudice to thecomplainant; there is no such thing as a merely technicalinfringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justicemust depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the natureof the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, thesubject matter to be dealt with and so forth". Since then, this Court has consistently applied the principleof prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various otherrulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to inState Bank of Patiala Vs. S.K. Sharma ( 1996(3) SCC 364). In thatcase, the principle of 'prejudice' has been further elaborated. Thesame principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh Vs. Stateof M.P. ( 1996(5) SCC 460). 25.The 'useless formality' theory, it must be noted, is anexception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted orindisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred toabove,- there has been considerable debate of the application ofthat theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regardto this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court inM.C. Mehta referred to above. This Court surveyed the viewsexpressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, LordWilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and StraughtonL.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leadingwriters like Profs. Garner, Craig, De. Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc.Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must alwaysbe quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue.Some others have said, that there is no such absolute rule andprejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via-mediarules. We do not think it necessary, in this case to go deeper intothese issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the factsof a particular case.” 31.The same position had been reiterated in 2006 (8) SCC 647[Punjab National Bank and Others]: “In an industrial dispute referred to by the CentralGovernment which has an all-India implication, individual workmanhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 31.The same position had been reiterated in 2006 (8) SCC 647[Punjab National Bank and Others]: “In an industrial dispute referred to by the CentralGovernment which has an all-India implication, individual workmanhttps://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ cannot be made parties to a reference. All of them are not expectedto be heard. The Unions representing them were impleaded as parties.They were heard. Not only the said Unions were heard before the HighCourt, as noticed hereinbefore from a part of the judgment of theHigh Court, they had preferred appeals before this Court, Theircontentions had been noticed by this Court. As the award was made inpresence of the Unions, in our opinion, the contention ofRespondents that the award was not binding on them cannot beaccepted. The principles of natural justice were also not requiredto be complied with as the same would have been an empty formality.The court will not insist on compliance of the principles of naturaljustice in view of the binding nature of the award. Theirapplication would be limited to a situation where the factualposition or legal implication arising thereunder is disputed and notwhere it is not in dispute or cannot be disputed. If only oneconclusion is possible, a writ would not issue only because therewas a violation of the principles of natural justice.” 32.A Division Bench of this Court in a Judgement reported in2006 4 LLN 358[Dr.C.Chendroyaperumal Vs. National Institute ofPort Management] had also expressed their views on this aspect. “9. Coming to the legal aspects canvassed by the learnedcounsel for the appellant, it is seen that they revolve aroundviolation of the principles of natural justice. Even at the outset,we are not impressed with the said argument, since in our opinion,“Principles of natural justice is for thoroughbred horses and notwild horses.” Wild horses understand only the language of the whipand hence there is no use trying to tame them with persuasion. Theprinciples of natural justice themselves have traversed a long wayfrom the stage at which they were treated as a “tharaka manthra” orpanacea for all diseases, to the present stage where the Courts havestarted looking at the credentials of the person using them as ashield or sword and accepting the fact that they are notindispensable.” 33.I hold that the petitioner cannot complain about violationof any principle relating to natural justice. An assessment orderhas been passed. An appellate remedy is available. The petitionerhas consciously decided to forego that remedy. 34.If the assessment order is examined further, it also revealsthat during the demonetisation period, the petitioner had depositeda total sum of Rs.7,54,77,619/- in cash, and when the assessee wasasked to explain the source, he stated that he was running MeenakshiMission Hospital at Thanjavur, for which, the tax holiday is nowbeing sought. The hospital has been the source for a huge cashholding of Rs.7,54,77,619/-. It is a wonder that the petitioneractually seeks tax holiday. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 35.In view of all these facts, I hold that this Writ Petitionhas to suffer an order of dismissal. It is accordingly dismissed.No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. // True Copy // Sd/- Assistant Registrar (AS) / /2020Sub Assistant Registrar(CS) To 1.The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals-19, Chennai) Office of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal-19) 304, Investigation Building, Mahathma Gandhi Road, Nungambakkam, Chennai 600 034. 2.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-1, Madurai. 3.The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle-1, Madurai -1. +1 CC to M/s.S.RAMESH, Advocate ( SR-11409[F] dated 12/03/2020 ) +1 CC to M/s.S.SRIMATHY, Advocate ( SR-11638[F] dated 13/03/2020 ) rmk/mmSDS (21.05.2020) 11P-6C W.P(MD)No.5225 of 202012.03.2020