Philips India Limited v. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Circle 11(1),Kolkata &Ors

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTACONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTIONORIGINAL SIDE PRESENT:THE HON’BLE JUSTICE TIRTHANKAR GHOSH W.P.O. NO 500 of 2023 Philips India Limited -versus- Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 11(1),Kolkata &Ors. For the Petitioner : Mr. Percy Padriwala, Sr. Adv.,Mr. Niraj Seth, Adv.,Mr. Niraj Seth, Adv., Mr. A.K. Dey, Adv., Ms. Kamalika Mukherjee, Adv.,Mr. H. Chawla, Adv.Mr. H. Chawla, Adv. For the Respondents : Mr. Smarajit Roy Chowdhury, Adv.,Mr. Prithu Dudhoria, Adv.Mr. Prithu Dudhoria, Adv. Reserved On :24.12.2024:12.03.2025:12.03.2025 Judgement On Tirthankar Ghosh, J.: The present writ petition has been preferred challenging the legalityand/or validity of the Assessment Order dated 31[st]March, 2022, passed byRespondent No. 1 under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of theIncome Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) relating to theassessment year 2017-18,Notice of Demand issued under Section 156 of theAct and the Penalty Notice issued under Section 274 read with Section 270Aof the Act, dated 31[st]March, 2022. Learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner hasargued mainly on the following issues:- a) The Assessment Order dated 31[st]March, 2022, was passed manuallywithout mentioning the Document Identification Number (hereinafterreferred to as “DIN”) in its body and the same was passed in grossviolation of the departmental circular bearing no. 19/2019 datedAugust 14, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as “the said circular”) andthe said Assessment Order should be treated as invalid and shouldbe deemed to have never been issued as provided in the paragraph 4of the said circular.without mentioning the Document Identification Number (hereinafterreferred to as “DIN”) in its body and the same was passed in grossviolation of the departmental circular bearing no. 19/2019 datedAugust 14, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as “the said circular”) andthe said Assessment Order should be treated as invalid and shouldbe deemed to have never been issued as provided in the paragraph 4of the said circular. b) The assessment order dated 31[st]March, 2022, which has beenchallenged in the present writ petition is barred by limitation, andtherefore, respondent no. 1 has no jurisdiction to pass the saidorder.challenged in the present writ petition is barred by limitation, andtherefore, respondent no. 1 has no jurisdiction to pass the saidorder.c) The legality and/or validity of the Assessment Order dated 31[st]March, 2022, passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B ofthe Act has been challenged, and no order under Section 148A (d) ofthe Act has been challenged as mentioned in the Affidavit-in-Opposition, which shows lack of application of mind.March, 2022, passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B ofthe Act has been challenged, and no order under Section 148A (d) ofthe Act has been challenged as mentioned in the Affidavit-in-Opposition, which shows lack of application of mind. d) The time limit provided under the Act and as extended from time totime by TOLA for passing the assessment order for AY 2017-18, thetime expired on 21[st]January, 2022.As the orderwas uploaded on theportal only on 23rd January 2023, the same is barred by limitation.time by TOLA for passing the assessment order for AY 2017-18, thetime expired on 21[st]January, 2022.As the orderwas uploaded on theportal only on 23rd January 2023, the same is barred by limitation. Learned senior advocate in order to substantiate the issues, referred tothe annexures and documents enclosed along with the writ petition. It was d) The time limit provided under the Act and as extended from time totime by TOLA for passing the assessment order for AY 2017-18, thetime expired on 21[st]January, 2022.As the orderwas uploaded on theportal only on 23rd January 2023, the same is barred by limitation.time by TOLA for passing the assessment order for AY 2017-18, thetime expired on 21[st]January, 2022.As the orderwas uploaded on theportal only on 23rd January 2023, the same is barred by limitation. Learned senior advocate in order to substantiate the issues, referred tothe annexures and documents enclosed along with the writ petition. It was pointed out by the petitioner that the assessment order dated 31[st]March,2022 for the assessment year 2017-18 as well as the computation sheetsand the demand notices issued along with the same do not bear any DIN.The absence of DIN according to the petitioner makes the order nullity asthe CBDT Circular No.19/2019 dated 14th August 2019, mandatorilyrequires generation, allotment and quoting of DIN in notices, orders,summons, letters and other correspondence issued by the Income TaxDepartment. Additionally, it was also canvassed that on 22nd November2022, the website of the Income Tax Department clearly showed that noassessment order was passed and on 23rd January 2023 also the websiteshowed that no assessment order was passed and the proceedings werestated to be open on these dates. On 6th February 2023, when the petitioneraccessed the portal,it found that the proceedings were shown as closed andthe option to download the closure order was provided. This according to thepetitionershowsthattheorderdated31[st]March,2022waspassedmanually and did not bear a DIN and was not uploaded in the system atleast till 23rd January 2023. The same was not either physically orelectronicallyservedonthepetitioneranditwasadmittedbytheRespondents in their communication received by the petitioner on 3rd July2023 issued pursuant to the directions of this Hon’ble Court.It was further submitted that the letter dated 23rd January 2023 wasissued by the Respondent No. 1 which purported to communicate the DIN oftheassessmentorderdated31[st]March,2022asbeingITBA/AST/S/91/2022-23/1049039617(1). Petitioner emphasized that as the year referred to in the DIN raises serious doubt for quoting incorrectfinancial year, interference of this Court is warranted. So far as the issuerelating to DIN is concerned, learned counsel referred to the judgement ofthis Hon’ble Court in PCIT vs. Tata Medical Centre Trust, [2023]154taxmann.com 600 (Cal),wherein the Hon’ble Court was pleased to dismissthe appeal filed by the Income Tax Department upholding the conclusion ofthe Tribunalthat the order passed under Section 263 of the Income Tax Actdid not satisfy the requirements mandated by CBDT circular,DIN not beingmentioned in the body of the order under Section 263 of the Income Tax Actand the order alsonot furnishing particulars of approval of higher authorityin the prescribed format as per para 3 of the circular.The finding of theTribunal was held to be correct and proper. In order to fortify the contentionon the aforesaid issues relating to absence of DIN in the assessment order,severalauthorities wereplacedby theLearned SeniorAdvocatewhichincluded the following:Ashok Commercial Enterprises vs. ACIT [2023] 154taxmann.com 144 (Bom);Hardik Deepak Salot and Ors vs. ACIT [WP No.2944 of 2023 (Bom)];CIT vs. Brandix Mauritius Holdings Ltd. [2023] 149taxmann.com 238 (Del);Kamlesh Kumar Jha vs. PCIT [2023] 156 taxmann.com622 (Del). The next issue which has been canvassed by the petitionerrefers to theassessment order being invalid and bad-in-law as it was passed beyond theperiod of limitation as provided under Section 153 of the Act.Atabular chartwas relied upon which furnished the following details: Due dateAY 17-18 It was submitted that as the order was uploaded on the portal only on23rd of January 2023, the same was barred by limitation. The next issue which has been canvassed by the petitionerrefers to theassessment order being invalid and bad-in-law as it was passed beyond theperiod of limitation as provided under Section 153 of the Act.Atabular chartwas relied upon which furnished the following details: Due dateAY 17-18 It was submitted that as the order was uploaded on the portal only on23rd of January 2023, the same was barred by limitation. It was further submitted that Section 153(1) of the Act provides that noorder of assessment shall be made under Section 143 at any time after theexpiry of the period specified therein. It is well settled that an assessmentorder can be regarded as“made” when it is signed and despatched and isoutof the control of the Assessing Officer. This is normally done,when the sameorder or decision is made public or notified in some form or when it can besaid to have left the office of the Assessing Officer.Reference was made toCollectorofCentralExcise,Madrasvs.M.M.Rubber(1992)1992taxmann.com 555(SC)andit was reiterated by the petitioner that since theorderwas not physically served and was uploaded in the portal on 23rd ofJanuary 2023, the assessment order was therefore barred by limitation.Reference was also made to State of AP vs. M. Ramakishtaiah& Co. (1994)SCC Online SC 3. A further issue which was canvassed before this Court in respect of theassessment order being invalid and bad-in-law is thatit was passed without complying with the mandatory procedure provided under Section 144C oftheIncomeTaxAct.Accordingtothepetitioner,thereviewoftheassessment order purportedly dated 31[st]March, 2022 for the assessmentyear 2017-18, reflected that the orders were accompanied by a demandnotice and a tax computation sheet and contained a direction for initiationof penalty under Section 270A of the Act, as such,the said order can be saidto be final assessment order. It was contendedthat Section 144C(1) of theAct provides that the Assessing Officershall, at the first instance forward adraft of the proposed order of assessment to the eligible assessee if heproposes to make any variation which is prejudicial to the interest of suchassessee. Again Section 144C(15)(b) defines “eligible assesse” to mean anyperson in whose case the variation referred to in sub-Section (1) arises as aconsequence of the order of Transfer Pricing Officer passed under sub-Section (3) of Section 92CA of the Act. A perusal of the assessment year 2017-18 shows that the variation tothe income declared in the return arises as a consequence of the TPO’s orderpassed under Section 92CA(3) of the Act. It was contended that petitionerbeing an eligible assessee, it was incumbent upon the Respondent No.1 topass a draft order in terms of Section 144C (1) of the Act. Reference was made to Section 144C of the Income Tax Act andattention was drawn to Sub-Section (2) which provides that, on receipt ofthe draft order, the eligible assesseewould forwardwithinthirty days ofreceipt of such draft order his acceptance of the variation to the AssessingOfficer or file his objections with the Dispute Resolution Panel and the A perusal of the assessment year 2017-18 shows that the variation tothe income declared in the return arises as a consequence of the TPO’s orderpassed under Section 92CA(3) of the Act. It was contended that petitionerbeing an eligible assessee, it was incumbent upon the Respondent No.1 topass a draft order in terms of Section 144C (1) of the Act. Reference was made to Section 144C of the Income Tax Act andattention was drawn to Sub-Section (2) which provides that, on receipt ofthe draft order, the eligible assesseewould forwardwithinthirty days ofreceipt of such draft order his acceptance of the variation to the AssessingOfficer or file his objections with the Dispute Resolution Panel and the AssessingOfficer.Sub-Section(3)accordingtothelearnedadvocate,provides that the Assessing Officer would complete the assessment on thebasisofthedraftorderiftheassesseeintimatestotheAssessing Officer the acceptance of the variation or no objections arereceived within the period specified in sub-Section(2). Also Sub-Section (4)provides that the order is to be passed within one month from the end of themonth in which the acceptance is received or the period of filing ofobjections under sub-Section(2) expires. Learned advocate also referred tosub-Section (5) which provides that the Dispute Resolution Panel shall,where the objection is received under Sub-Section (2), issue directions, as itthinks fit, for the guidance of the Assessing Officer to enable him tocomplete the assessment. Sub-Section (10) provides that every directionissued by the Dispute Resolution Panel shall be binding on the AssessingOfficer and Sub-Section (12) provides that no direction under Sub-Section(5)shall be issued after nine months from the end of the month in which thedraft order is forwarded to the eligible assessee. Sub-Section (13) providesthat on receipt of the directions issued under sub-Section (5), the AssessingOfficer shall in conformity with the directions, complete the assessmentwithout providing any further opportunity of being heard to the assesse,within one month from the end of the month in which such direction isreceived. It was contended that the assessment order dated 31[st]March,2022 for the assessment year 2017-2018 was not passed in conformity withthe mandatory procedure laid down in Section 144C of the Act. As such it isinvalid and bad-in-law. Reliance was placed upon the following judgments:- a) Vijay Television (P) Ltd. vs. DRP (2014) 46 taxmann.com 100 (Mad); (b) International Air Transport Association vs. DCIT (2016) 68 taxmann.com246 (Bom); (c)Durr India (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2021) 130 taxmann.com 491 (Mad); (d) Exxon Mobil Company (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT (2022) 138 taxmann.com 539(Bom); (e) Exxon Mobil Company (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT (2024) 162 taxmann.com 93 (Bom); (f)Sinogas Management Pte. Ltd. vs. DCIT (2023) 155 taxmann.com 379 (Del); (g)PCITvs.HyundaiMotorIndiaEngineering(P)Ltd.(2023)156taxmann.com 265 (Telangana); (h) CWT India P. Ltd. vs. ACIT (2023) 155 taxmann.com 450 (Bom). It was submitted that in view of the findings of the different HighCourts as also the provisions of the Income Tax Act, the assessment orderpassed for the assessment year 2017-18is in violation of the procedure laiddown in Section 144C of the Act. Mr.Chowdhury,learnedadvocateappearingonbehalfoftherespondent Income Tax Act authorities emphasized that as an alternativeremedy is available under Section 246(A) of Income Tax Act, 1961, thisCourtshouldnotexerciseitsjurisdictionunderArticle226oftheConstitution of India. In order to fortify his argument, he relied upon AnshulJain –versus- P.C.I.T. (2022/44A/ITR/251/3). Reference was also made toWhirlpool Corporation -versus- Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1and attention of the Court was drawn to the relevant observations ofthe Hon’ble Apex Court which is as follows: Mr.Chowdhury,learnedadvocateappearingonbehalfoftherespondent Income Tax Act authorities emphasized that as an alternativeremedy is available under Section 246(A) of Income Tax Act, 1961, thisCourtshouldnotexerciseitsjurisdictionunderArticle226oftheConstitution of India. In order to fortify his argument, he relied upon AnshulJain –versus- P.C.I.T. (2022/44A/ITR/251/3). Reference was also made toWhirlpool Corporation -versus- Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1and attention of the Court was drawn to the relevant observations ofthe Hon’ble Apex Court which is as follows: “Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, havingregard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not toentertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itselfcertain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficaciousremedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise itsjurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held bythis Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies,namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement ofany of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation ofthe principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings arewholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. Thereis a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle offorensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of theevolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” Respondent also relied upon HarbanstalSahnia-versus- Indian Oil Corpn.Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107and attention of the Court was drawn to theobservations of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is as follows: "In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternativeremedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in a leastthree contingencies (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any ofthe fundamentalrights (ii) where there is failure of principles of naturaljustice or (iii)where the orders or proceedings are wholly withoutjurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged". Learned advocate for the Respondent by relying upon the aforesaid twojudgments summarized the duties of the Hon’ble High Court under Article226 of the Constitution of India and submitted as follows: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can beexercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any otherpurpose as well. (ii)The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. Oneof the restrictions placed on the power of High Court is where an effectivealternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy arise where: (a) The writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of afundamental right protected by part III of the constitution;fundamental right protected by part III of the constitution; (b) There has been a violation of the principles of natural justice. (c) The order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or (d) The vires of a regulation is challenged, (iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of itspowers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case thoughordinarily, writ petition should not be entertained when an efficaciousalternate remedy is provided by law. (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes theremedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be made tothat particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedyunder Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutoryremedies is a rule of policy,convenience and discretion. (vi) In case there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court maydecide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exerciseof its writ jurisdiction, such a view should not readily be interfered. (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes theremedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be made tothat particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedyunder Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutoryremedies is a rule of policy,convenience and discretion. (vi) In case there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court maydecide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exerciseof its writ jurisdiction, such a view should not readily be interfered. Referringto Radha Krishna Industries -versus- State of HimachalPradesh 2021 SCC online SC 334, it was submitted that the Hon’ble ApexCourt was pleased to hold that while High Court can entertain applicationunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it must not do so when theaggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy available in law. It wasadditionally submitted that the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme CourtinRedChilliInternationalSales(2023/146/taxmen.com/224/SC)isnotapplicable in the present case as it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Courtthat the issue would be examined in depth by the High Court if and when itarises for consideration. In respect of non-mentioning of DIN it was submitted on behalf of therespondent that the same is not an illegality but is merely an irregularityand that is why the Hon’ble Apex Court in CIT -versus- BrandixManritiesHolding Ltd.2024/158/Taxman.com/247/SC granted stay upon the order ofthe Hon’ble Delhi High Court. It was also pointed out that the recentpronouncement in PCIT -versus- Tata Medical Centre Trust was stayed by theHon’ble Supreme Court in(SLP (C) D. No. 27852/24). It was emphasized that the writ petition has been filed to avoidpayment of 20% of the outstanding tax demand . Attention was also brought to the notice of the Court in respect ofSection 153 of the Income Tax Act including explanations referred to therein,where the Central Government by Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation andAmendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 extended the time limit for completion of Assessment under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961to 30[th]September 2021. Explanation 1 of Section 153 according to thelearned advocate states that the period commencing from the date on whicha reference or first of the references for exchange of information is made byan authority competent under an agreement referred to Section 90 orSection 90A and ending with the date on which the information requested islast received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or a period ofone year, whichever is less shall be excluded. As such as per explanation 1of Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, due date for completion of Assessmentgot extended by one year from the due date i.e. 30[th]September, 2021 asprescribed under TOLA, 2020 read with notification No. 93/2020dated31.12.2020, notification No.10/2021 dated 27.02.2021, notification No.38/2021 dated 27.04.2021, notification No. 74/2021 dated 25.06.2021 to30[th]September 2022.It was therefore, contended that the assessment orderwas passed on 31[st]March,2022 which is well within the limitation date asper the provisions of Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read withTaxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions)Act, 2020. By referring toUnion of India -versus- Rajeev Bansal &Ors., it wassubmitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to clarify thatafter April 01, 2021, the reassessment provisions of the Income Tax Actmust be read with the newly substituted provisions. TOLA continues toapply to extend the time limits for certain actions, but not beyond the newlaw’s requirements. The directions in Ashish Agarwal case (regarding noticetreated as show-cause-notices)apply to all reassessment notices issuedbetween April01 and June 30, 2021. Learned advocate also referred to the directions of the Hon’ble SupremeCourt during the COVID-19 outbreakin Suo-MotuWrit petition(C) No. 3 of2020 and submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to exclude theperiod of limitation as has been prescribed under any general or special lawsin respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. It was further clarifiedthat the limitation which would have expired during the period between15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall have a limitation period of 90 days from01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remainingwith effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, the longer period shallapply.As Income Tax proceedings are quasi-judicial proceedings, the timelimit for completion of Assessment was extended to 30[th]May, 2022. Theassessment order was passed on 31[st]March,2022 which is well within thelimitation date as per the provisions of Section 153 of the Income Tax Act1961. But the same was not visible in the Income Tax e-filing Portal due tocertain technical glitch. It was finally submitted that the writ petition shouldbe dismissed on the aforesaid grounds. I have taken into account the submission advanced on behalf of thepetitioneraswellasthatoftherespondentauthoritiesandonaconsideration of the various issues canvassed, I am of the view that thesame needs to be dealt with. Learned advocate on behalf of the petitionerstressedthatthejudgmentrelieduponinWhirlpoolCorporation(supra)referredbytheRespondentrelatetotheissueofjurisdiction.According to the learned advocate since limitation is a questionof jurisdiction, the petitioner is entitled to invoke the powers vested in the HighCourtunderArticle226oftheConstitutionofIndiawithoutapproaching the statutory authorities. I have consideredsuch submissionson the issue relating to limitationand is of the view that the question oflimitationinvolves mixed question of facts and law. As such, summarilyconsidering the same only on affidavits may not be appropriate in thebackground of the facts and circumstances of the case. Such propositionhas been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the followingjudgments:Charminar Cooperative Urban Bank Ltd. v. Mohan Reddy, (2008)17 SCC 743;Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, (2022) 17 SCC416;Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557. The next issue which has been canvassed by the petitioner relates toDIN being absent in the assessment order which has rendered the orderbad-in-law. To that effect a series of judgments have been placed by thelearned advocate appearing for the petitioner, howeverthe issue is tootechnicaland the judgment delivered in the PCIT -versus- Tata MedicalCenter Trusthas been interfered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and therehas been stay of the order wherein the proceedings were quashedby theHigh Court because of absence of DIN.Needless to state that in Tata MedicalCenter Trust (Supra) the order was passed by the appellate authority and theHon’ble High Court exercised its power under Section 260A of the IncomeTax Act and not under Article 226of the Constitution of India vested in theHigh Court. Another issue which requires consideration by this Court as has beencanvassed by the private respondent is that when an alternative and efficacious remedy is available whether the High Court should exercise itsjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Needless to saythat very recently in Bank of Baroda -versus- Farooq Ali Khan, (2025) SCCOnline SC 374ithasbeen observedthatthestatutory Tribunalsareconstituted to adjudicate and determine certain questions of law and fact,the High Court should not substitute themselves as the decision-makingauthority while exercising their powers of judicial review. Further, inPHR Invent Educational Society -versus- UCO Bank &Ors.(2024) 6 SCC 579the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to holdinparagraphs 22, 23 and 37 as follows: Another issue which requires consideration by this Court as has beencanvassed by the private respondent is that when an alternative and efficacious remedy is available whether the High Court should exercise itsjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Needless to saythat very recently in Bank of Baroda -versus- Farooq Ali Khan, (2025) SCCOnline SC 374ithasbeen observedthatthestatutory Tribunalsareconstituted to adjudicate and determine certain questions of law and fact,the High Court should not substitute themselves as the decision-makingauthority while exercising their powers of judicial review. Further, inPHR Invent Educational Society -versus- UCO Bank &Ors.(2024) 6 SCC 579the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to holdinparagraphs 22, 23 and 37 as follows: “22.The law with regard to entertaining a petition under Article226 of the Constitution in case of availability of alternativeremedy is well settled.226 of the Constitution in case of availability of alternativeremedy is well settled. “43. Unfortunately, the High Court [SatyawatiTondonv.State ofU.P., 2009 SCC OnLine All 2608] overlooked the settled lawthat the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition underArticle226oftheConstitutionifaneffectiveremedyisavailable to the aggrieved person and that this rule applieswith greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess,fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks andother financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with thepetitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery ofthe public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that thelegislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures forrecovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch asthey not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery ofthe dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodiesforredressalofthegrievanceofanyaggrievedperson.U.P., 2009 SCC OnLine All 2608] overlooked the settled lawthat the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition underArticle226oftheConstitutionifaneffectiveremedyisavailable to the aggrieved person and that this rule applieswith greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess,fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks andother financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with thepetitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery ofthe public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that thelegislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures forrecovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch asthey not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery ofthe dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodiesforredressalofthegrievanceofanyaggrievedperson. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist thatbefore availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, aperson must exhaust the remedies available under the relevantstatute. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist thatbefore availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, aperson must exhaust the remedies available under the relevantstatute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that thepowers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of theConstitution to issue to any person or authority, including inappropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writsincluding the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of anyof the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose arevery wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of thatpower but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of therules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, whichevery High Court is bound to keep in view while exercisingpower under Article 226 of the Constitution.powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of theConstitution to issue to any person or authority, including inappropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writsincluding the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of anyof the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose arevery wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of thatpower but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of therules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, whichevery High Court is bound to keep in view while exercisingpower under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is arule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult tofathom any reason why the High Court should entertain apetition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and passinterim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can availeffectivealternativeremedybyfilingapplication,appeal,revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailedmechanism for redressal of his grievance.”rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult tofathom any reason why the High Court should entertain apetition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and passinterim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can availeffectivealternativeremedybyfilingapplication,appeal,revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailedmechanism for redressal of his grievance.” 23. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that theHigh Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to theaggrieved person. It has been held that this rule applies withgreater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees,other types of public money and the dues of banks and otherfinancial institutions. The Court clearly observed that, whiledealing with the petitions involving challenge to the actiontaken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court mustkeep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament andHigh Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to theaggrieved person. It has been held that this rule applies withgreater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees,other types of public money and the dues of banks and otherfinancial institutions. The Court clearly observed that, whiledealing with the petitions involving challenge to the actiontaken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court mustkeep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code untothemselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensiveprocedureforrecoveryoftheduesbutalsoenvisageconstitutionofquasi-judicialbodiesforredressalofthegrievance of any aggrieved person. It has been held that,though the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of theConstitution are of widest amplitude, still the courts cannot beoblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by thisCourt. The Court further held that though the rule of exhaustionof alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one ofcompulsion, still it is difficult to fathom any reason why theHigh Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 ofthe Constitution. 37.It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved outcertain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of theConstitution could be entertained in spite of availability of analternative remedy. Some of them are thus:certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of theConstitution could be entertained in spite of availability of analternative remedy. Some of them are thus: (i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance withthe provisions of the enactment in question;the provisions of the enactment in question; (ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicialprocedure;procedure; (iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and (iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of theprinciples of natural justice.”principles of natural justice.” In the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court relied upona previousjudgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court inCommissioner of Income Tax &Ors. -versus- ChhabilDass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603,wherein it was deprecatedthat where efficacious alternative remedy is available in the statutory forumfor redressal of grievances, writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the said statutory dispensation. Paragraphs 15, 16 & 17 are relevant for thepresent case which is as follows:- “15.Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised someexceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutoryauthority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of theenactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principlesof judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions whichare repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation oftheprinciplesofnaturaljustice,thepropositionlaiddownin ThansinghNathmal case , Titaghur PaperMills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983)2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other similar judgments thatthe High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of theConstitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to theaggrieved person or the statute under which the action complainedof has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal ofgrievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum iscreated by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should notbe entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 16.In the instant case, the Act provides complete machinery for theassessment/reassessment of tax, imposition of penalty and forobtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by theRevenue Authorities, and the assessee could not be permitted toabandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the HighCourt under Article 226 of the Constitution when he had adequateremedy open to him by an appeal to the Commissioner of Incomeassessment/reassessment of tax, imposition of penalty and forobtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by theRevenue Authorities, and the assessee could not be permitted toabandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the HighCourt under Article 226 of the Constitution when he had adequateremedy open to him by an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The remedy under the statute, however, must beeffective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. In Ramand Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana [(1985) 3 SCC 267] this Courthas noticed that if an appeal is from “Caesar to Caesar's wife” theexistence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercisein futility. 17.In the instant case, neither has the writ petitioner assesseedescribedtheavailablealternateremedyundertheActasineffectual and non-efficacious while invoking the writ jurisdiction ofthe High Court nor has the High Court ascribed cogent andsatisfactory reasons to have exercised its jurisdiction in the facts ofthe instant case. In light of the same, we are of the consideredopinion that the writ court ought not to have entertained the writpetition filed by the assessee, wherein he has only questioned thecorrectness or otherwise of the notices issued under Section 148 ofthe Act, the reassessment orders passed and the consequentialdemand notices issued thereon.”describedtheavailablealternateremedyundertheActasineffectual and non-efficacious while invoking the writ jurisdiction ofthe High Court nor has the High Court ascribed cogent andsatisfactory reasons to have exercised its jurisdiction in the facts ofthe instant case. In light of the same, we are of the consideredopinion that the writ court ought not to have entertained the writpetition filed by the assessee, wherein he has only questioned thecorrectness or otherwise of the notices issued under Section 148 ofthe Act, the reassessment orders passed and the consequentialdemand notices issued thereon.” Having considered that the petitioner has directly approached thejurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India andcalled upon this Court to adjudicate issues relating to facts and theapplication of law on the said set of facts, I am of the opinion that thepresent writ petition is not maintainable as an alternative and efficaciousremedy is available to the petitioner. Accordingly, W.P.O. No.500 of 2023 is dismissed. Pending connected application(s), if any, are also disposed of. All parties shall act on the server copy of this judgment dulydownloaded from the official website of this Court. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, besupplied to the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities. (Tirthankar Ghosh, J.) Later: Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner prays for stayof the operation of the order. As from the inception there was no interimorder, I am not inclined to accede to the prayer advanced by the petitioner. (Tirthankar Ghosh, J.)