Wp/7056/2024 Of Hrishikesh v. The Principal Commissioner Of Income-Tax-I, Nagpur And Others

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. WRIT PETITION NO. 7056 OF 2024 2) Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax- Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Circle-1, Nagpur, having an address at BSNL Building, Seminary Hills, Nagpur. 3) The National Faceless Assessment Centre, New Delhi, through its Director General.…. RESPONDENTS ________________________________________________________________ Mr. A.A. Naik, Senior Counsel a/b. Mr. Atharva S. Manohar, Counsel forthe petitioner,Mr. Anand Parchure with Mr. B.N. Mohta, Counsel for the respondents. ________________________________________________________________ CORAM: AVINASH G. GHAROTE &ABHAY J. MANTRI, JJ. DATE : 09-05-2025 JUDGMENT: (Per : ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.) Heard. RULE. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. A.A. Naik, for the petitioner and the learned Counsel, Mr.Anand Parchure, for the respondents. 2.The petition questions the issuance of the notice dated 22-03-2024and passing of the consequential order dated 30-03-2024 by respondentNo.2 against the petitioner under Section 148A (b) and 148A (d) of theIncome-Tax Act, 1961 (for short, “IT Act”) respectively. It also seeks toquash the notice dated 30-03-2024 issued under Section 148 of the IT Actby respondent No.2 and the show cause notice dated 08-11-2024 issuedby respondent No.4 to the petitioner against the proposed variation inincome. Similarly, it challenges the order dated 27-11-2024 and the noticedated 28-11-2024 issued and passed by respondent No.3, therebyrejecting the objections raised by the petitioner to the notice dated08-11-2024 as well as proposing a variation in his assessment for theassessment year 2020-21. 3.The facts relevant for considering the challenge raised in the writpetition are that : (a)On 11-09-2019, the petitioner and his wife had jointlypurchased the agricultural land bearing Khasra No.90, admeasuring 03.64H.R., Mouza Khumari, Tahsil Ramtek for a consideration ofRs.14,40,000/- ( for short,- ‘the land’). However, the petitioner had paidthe stamp duty as per the ready reckoner value of the said land ofRs.21,03,000/-. (b)Respondent No.2-Deputy Commissioner of IncomeTax/Assessing Officer had received the information which suggests that the income chargeable to tax for the assessment year 2020-21 to thepetitioner had escaped assessment, which can be deduced from the sale-deed dated 11-09-2019 and, therefore, respondent No.2 issued notice on22-03-2024 under Section 148A (b) of the IT Act to the petitioner callingupon him to submit his reply to the notice. (c)On 30-03-2024, an order under Section 148A of the IT Actwas passed by respondent No.2 with prior approval of PrincipalCommissioner-I, Nagpur, but the said order of approval by the PrincipalCommissioner was not supplied to the petitioner. On the same day, anotice under Section 148 of the IT Act was also issued to the petitioner byrespondent No.2. (d)In response to the notice dated 30-03-2024, the petitionerfiled his return on 09-05-2024 along with the relevant documents.Thereafter, notices under Section 142(1) came to be issued to thepetitioner on 22-05-2024, 24-06-2024 and 25-10-2024, which were dulyreplied to by the petitioner. (e)On 08-11-2024, a show cause notice was issued to thepetitioner as to why the difference of Rs. 6,63,000/- between the purchaseprice and stamp duty value of agricultural land/property should not beadded to the tax to his total income. The petitioner replied the same on11-11-2024, raising a principal objection that the notice issued by theJurisdictional Assessing Officer (for short, “JAO”) on 22-03-2024 iswithout jurisdiction and insofar as the notice under Section 148A of the IT (d)In response to the notice dated 30-03-2024, the petitionerfiled his return on 09-05-2024 along with the relevant documents.Thereafter, notices under Section 142(1) came to be issued to thepetitioner on 22-05-2024, 24-06-2024 and 25-10-2024, which were dulyreplied to by the petitioner. (e)On 08-11-2024, a show cause notice was issued to thepetitioner as to why the difference of Rs. 6,63,000/- between the purchaseprice and stamp duty value of agricultural land/property should not beadded to the tax to his total income. The petitioner replied the same on11-11-2024, raising a principal objection that the notice issued by theJurisdictional Assessing Officer (for short, “JAO”) on 22-03-2024 iswithout jurisdiction and insofar as the notice under Section 148A of the IT Act can be issued in a faceless manner. Secondly, it was contended thatagricultural land is not a capital asset and, therefore, the deemingprovisions of Section 56(2)(x) of the IT Act cannot be invoked. Thesimilar notice issued to his wife was discharged, considering that the landin question is agricultural land and no tax could be levied on it. However,the petitioner’s objection was rejected by the order dated 27-11-2024. (f)On 28-11-2024, another show cause notice regarding theproposed variation was issued to the petitioner, who was directed to filehis reply by 05-12-2024. Aggrieved by the aforesaid notices and orders, the petitioner hasapproached this Court. 4.Mr. A.A. Naik, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, vehementlyargued that considering the provisions of Section 2(14) of the IT Act, theproperty in question cannot be termed as a ‘capital asset’. Therefore, theissuance of notices and the passing of orders by the respondent authoritiesare contrary to the settled provisions of law and cannot be sustained inthe eyes of the law. He further canvassed that the JAO has no jurisdictionto issue a notice under Section 148A of the IT Act, since the Law to thateffect has been settled by this Court in the decision of HexawareTechnologies Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & others in WritPetition No.1778/2023,by judgment dated 03-05-2024. Therefore, furtherproceedings based on the said notice deserve to be quashed and set aside. 5.He further argued that the order dated 27-11-2024 passed byrespondent No.3, relying upon the judgments of the Delhi High Court andthe Calcutta High Court, while failing to consider the judgment of thisCourt in Hexaware Technologies Ltd., is erroneous. 6.He drew our attention to the notice issued to the petitioner’s wifeunder Section 137(6) of the IT Act and the observation of respondentNo.4 in the order dated 05-06-2024. He submitted that the authoritieshave not considered the said order and passed an order contrary to it,which cannot be sustained in the eyes of the law. 7.Lastly, he propounded that the agricultural land was located beyond8 km from the municipality's limits. The population of the villageKhumari, where the land is situated, was 1518 at the time of the lastcensus. Therefore, the land in question is not a taxable capital asset, and,therefore, the impugned order dated 27-11-2024 is liable to be quashedand set aside. 8.To buttress his submissions, he has relied on the judgments of thisCourt in Arvind Sahdeo Gupta v. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1, Akola and Ors.,(2023) 6 Mh.L.J. 587, (Pointed out paragraph Nos.6 to 10); GandhibagSahakari Bank Ltd. v. Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors., (2023) 458ITR 157, particularly paragraph Nos.5(b), 5(c) and 8 to 12; Commissioner of 7.Lastly, he propounded that the agricultural land was located beyond8 km from the municipality's limits. The population of the villageKhumari, where the land is situated, was 1518 at the time of the lastcensus. Therefore, the land in question is not a taxable capital asset, and,therefore, the impugned order dated 27-11-2024 is liable to be quashedand set aside. 8.To buttress his submissions, he has relied on the judgments of thisCourt in Arvind Sahdeo Gupta v. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1, Akola and Ors.,(2023) 6 Mh.L.J. 587, (Pointed out paragraph Nos.6 to 10); GandhibagSahakari Bank Ltd. v. Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors., (2023) 458ITR 157, particularly paragraph Nos.5(b), 5(c) and 8 to 12; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chandan Magraj Parmar, (2022) 445 ITR 674 {pointed outpara 5(b)& (c) and 8 to 12} and emphasized that ‘capital asset’ means theproperty of any kind held by the assessee whether or not connected withhis business or profession but does not include the agricultural land inIndia, not being the land situated in any area within such distance, notbeing more than 8 km., from the local limits of any municipality orcantonment board referred to in item (a) as the Central Government may,having regard to the extent of, and scope of, urbanization of that area andother relevant considerations specifying in this behalf by notification inthe Official Gazette, and pointed out paragraph Nos.4 to 7 of the same.Therefore, he urged that issuance of the impugned notices and passing oforders are contrary to the settled position of law and the law laid down bythis Court in the above judgments. 9.Per contra, Mr. Anand Parchure, learned Counsel for therespondents, opposes the petition on the ground that the petitioner haspurchased the property for consideration of Rs. 14,40,000/-, of which themarket value as per the ready reckoner was Rs. 21,03,000/-. Thus, thepetitioner gains an amount of Rs. 6,63,000/-. However, he failed to paythe tax on the said amount for the assessment year 2020-21, andtherefore, the issuance of notices and passing of orders by the respondentauthorities are just and proper. 10.He further argued that the information received by the AssessingOfficer was covered under Explanation (i) to Section 148 of the IT Act.Therefore, a notice dated 22-03-2024 under Section 148A (b) of the ITAct was issued to the petitioner calling upon him to submit his reply by29-03-2024. However, the petitioner did not submit his reply to the saidshow cause notice within the stipulated time. Therefore, as per thematerial available on record, the respondent authorities held that thepetitioner failed to declare the aforesaid income of Rs. 6,63,000/- underthe provisions of Section 56(2)(x) of the IT Act, which was chargeable totax, and had escaped assessment for the Assessment year 2020-21. Healso pointed out the provisions of Sections 148 and 56(2)(x) of the IT Act.He further contended that in the assessment order, in respect of thepetitioner’s wife, it was observed that though the sale deed was executedin the joint name of petitioner and his wife her name was included in theregistered sale deed, but as the petitioner had paid the considerationamount his case was re-opened for assessment. Therefore, it was observedthat property is not a capital asset of the petitioner’s wife, but it wascertainly of the petitioner. Therefore, the relief granted to the petitioner'swife is hardly of any assistance in supporting his submission. Furthermore,he propounded that the petitioner had not established with thedocumentary evidence that the property in question could not be termed a‘capital asset’. Therefore, the passing of the orders by the authorities is justand proper. Lastly, he argued that Section 263 of the IT Act is not applicable. Therefore, the contentions of the petitioner are on the wrongfooting. In view of Explanations 1 and 2 of Section 148 of the IT Act, theJAO has jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 148A. Hence, theground raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is without anybasis. Thus, the JAO is statutorily obliged to assess and evaluateinformation gathered from the assessment at the first instance. To substantiate his submissions, he has relied on the judgment ofDelhi High Court in Writ Petition (C) No.1968/2023 (T.K.S. Builders Pvt Ltd. v.Income Tax Officer, Ward 25(3), New Delhi; judgment of Gujarat High Court inR/Special Civil Application No.13198/2024 with R/Special Civil ApplicationNo.13225/2024 (Talati and Talati LLP v. Office of Assistant Commissioner of IncomeTax, Circle 4(1)(1), Ahmedabad; as well as the judgment of Punjab andHaryana High Court in Anshul Jain v. Principle Commissioner of Income Tax andAnr. dated 02-6-2022,which was confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court inPetition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 14823 of 2022 and IA No. 121106 of2022 & IA No. 121109 of 2022, on 02.09.2022; and Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v.ITO, Centre Circle XI, Range Bombay & Ors. (2008) 14 SCC 218, and submitted thatin view of the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, the issuance ofnotices and passing of the orders by the respondent authorities are justand proper, and the correctness of the order under Section 148A (d)cannot be challenged in writ jurisdiction. Hence, he urges dismissing thepetition. 11.We have appreciated the rival contentions of Mr. A.A. Naik, learnedSenior Counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Anand Parchure, learnedCounsel for the respondents and perused the record and the judgmentsrelied upon by the parties in support of their submissions. We have alsogone through the relevant provisions of the Law. 12.At the outset, it appears that the petitioner with his wife havejointly purchased the land by sale deed dated 11-09-2019 for aconsideration of Rs.14,40,000/- and as per the ready reckoner, theGovernment valuation of the said land was shown as Rs.21,03,000/- andthe petitioner failed to pay the tax on the said difference of the amount ofRs.6,63,000/- for the assessment year 2020-21. The Assessing Officer hadinformation which suggested that the petitioner had not paid the tax onthe said difference amount, which was chargeable to tax, and, therefore,the notice under Section 148A (b) of the IT Act was issued to thepetitioner. According to the petitioner, the agricultural land was locatedbeyond 8 km. aerial distance from nearest municipality and thepopulation of the village Khumari was below 10000 and, therefore, theland in question cannot be termed as the ‘capital asset’ as contemplated interms of Section 2(14) of the IT Act and, therefore, the petitioner is notliable to pay the tax on the said difference amount of Rs.6,63,000/-. 13.To ascertain the said controversy, it would be proper to reproduceSection 2(14) of the IT Act as under : “2(14). “Capital Asset” means - (a) property of any kind held by an assessee,whether or not connected with his business orprofession;whether or not connected with his business orprofession; (b) --------- (c) ------- but does not include - (i) ------ (ii) ------ (iii)agricultural land in India, not being land situated (a) in any area which is comprised within thejurisdiction of a municipality (whether known as amunicipality, municipal corporation, notified areacommittee, town area committee, town committee,or by any other name) or a cantonment board andwhich has a population of not less than ten thousand;or (b) in any area within the distance, measuredaerially,— (I) not being more than two kilometres, fromthe local limits of any municipality or cantonmentboard referred to in item (a) and which has apopulation of more than ten thousand but notexceeding one lakh; or (b) --------- (c) ------- but does not include - (i) ------ (ii) ------ (iii)agricultural land in India, not being land situated (a) in any area which is comprised within thejurisdiction of a municipality (whether known as amunicipality, municipal corporation, notified areacommittee, town area committee, town committee,or by any other name) or a cantonment board andwhich has a population of not less than ten thousand;or (b) in any area within the distance, measuredaerially,— (I) not being more than two kilometres, fromthe local limits of any municipality or cantonmentboard referred to in item (a) and which has apopulation of more than ten thousand but notexceeding one lakh; or (II) not being more than six kilometres, fromthe local limits of any municipality or cantonmentboard referred to in item (a) and which has apopulation of more than one lakh but not exceedingten lakh; or (III)not being more than eight kilometres, fromthe local limits of any municipality or cantonmentboard referred to in item (a) and which has apopulation of more than ten lakh. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-clause,"population" means the population according to the lastpreceding census of which the relevant figures have beenpublished before the first day of the previous year; (iv) to (vi) ----------” A bare perusal of the definition of ‘capital asset’ means the propertyof any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with hisbusiness or profession. However, it does not include agricultural land inIndia, situated beyond 8 km from the local limits of any municipality orcantonment board referred to in item (a), as the Central Government mayspecify in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette and which hasa population not exceeding ten thousand. Hence, in view of the aforesaidposition of the law, certainly the land which is the subject matter of thisproceeding does not fall within the ambit of ‘capital asset’ as it is locatedbeyond 8 km from the local limits of municipality or cantonment boardwhich has a population of not more than ten thousand, which factuality isnot disputed by the respondents. 14.The petitioner along with reply to notice under Section 133(6) ofthe IT Act submitted the Certificate issued by the Sarpanch of the Gram-Panchayat Khumari, certifying that as per the census of 2011, thepopulation of the village Khumari was 1518. The certificate denotes thatthe population of the village of Khumari was less than ten thousand, andthe land is located in the village. Therefore, as contemplated underSection 2(14) of the IT Act, the said land does not fall in the ambit of‘capital asset’. Hence, the dictum laid down in the Commissioner of IncomeTax (supra) case would apply to the case at hand regarding determiningthe question of ‘capital asset’. 15.In Arvind Sahdeo Gupta (supra), this Court, after considering thevarious judgments of this Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court, hasheld that :-- “No statutory remedy is available to challenge the notice U/s148 of the Act, so it can be challenged in writ jurisdiction. Also, if the statutory authority has not acted in accordancewith the provisions of the enactment in question, extraordinaryjurisdiction could be exercised”. 16.Similarly, in Gandhibag Sahakari Bank Ltd. (supra), this Court, afterconsidering various judgments of this Court as well as the Hon’ble ApexCourt, has observed as under : 15.In Arvind Sahdeo Gupta (supra), this Court, after considering thevarious judgments of this Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court, hasheld that :-- “No statutory remedy is available to challenge the notice U/s148 of the Act, so it can be challenged in writ jurisdiction. Also, if the statutory authority has not acted in accordancewith the provisions of the enactment in question, extraordinaryjurisdiction could be exercised”. 16.Similarly, in Gandhibag Sahakari Bank Ltd. (supra), this Court, afterconsidering various judgments of this Court as well as the Hon’ble ApexCourt, has observed as under : “While the objection to ‘maintainability’ goes to the root ofthe matter, and if such objection is found to be of substance,the Court would be rendered incapable of receiving the lisfor adjudication. On the other hand, the question of‘maintainability’ is within the realm of discretion of the HighCourt since writ remedy is discretionary in nature. Thedismissal of the writ petition on the ground that thepetitioner has not availed of the alternate remedy withoutexamining as to whether an exceptional case has been madeout for such entertainment would not be proper. If ajurisdictional issue is raised and controversy is purely a legalone that does not involve any disputed question of fact, thenthe writ petition does not deserve to be thrown out at thethreshold.” (emphasis supplied) It further summarises the principles that emerge from thevarious decisions. “Existence of the reason to believe that income chargeable totax has escaped assessment is a jurisdictional condition forinvoking the power under Section 147of the IT Act, 1961,both within and beyond a period of four years from the endof the relevant assessment year. The Assessing Officer isenjoined to record reasons before a notice to reopen theassessment under Section 148of the Act is issued. In case,the assessment was completed under Section 143(3)of the Act, an additional condition that the income must haveescaped assessment on account of failure on the part of theassessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessaryfor assessment is required to be fulfilled. The existence ofreason to believe is further qualified by the fact that it shouldbe based on tangible material. Firstly, it cannot be the productof mere ipse dixit of the Assessing Officer. Secondly, it shouldnot partake the character of a mere change in opinion asregards the same material and facts, which were consideredat the time of original assessment, for the power is ofreassessment and not review. Once the primary factsnecessary for assessment are fully and truly disclosed and theAssessing Officer takes a conclusive view thereon, it is notpermissible to reopen the assessment based on the very samematerial on the premise that it is susceptible to a differentopinion favourable to the Revenue." (emphasis supplied) 17.On perusal of the notice dated 22-03-2024 (Page No.66) issuedunder Section 148A of the IT Act coupled with the reasons assigned by therespondents for seeking to reopen the proceedings, it becomes clear that itis based on information uploaded in insight portal about the saletransaction has prompted to the Assessing Officer to observe that “thepetitioner failed to pay the tax on the difference amount of Rs.6,63,000/-chargeable to the tax under the provisions of the IT Act and thereby hadescaped assessment for the year 2020-21.” Except for stating that suchinformation was available on the insight portal, no material has beenbrought on record to show the existence of a reason to believe by theAssessing Officer that the income of Rs. 6,63,000/- had escapedassessment in respect of the petitioner. The reasons disclosed by theassessing office do not indicate that any exercise of independent verification thereafter was undertaken, resulting in consideration of thesame with due application of mind by the Assessing Officer so as toreopen the completed assessment. Similarly, the Assessing Officer did notverify whether the agricultural land, i.e., the property in question, can betermed as ‘capital asset’ or not in view of Section 2(14) of the IT Act. Onlyby stating that information was available on the insight portal did theAssessing Officer form a belief that the indicated amount had escapedassessment at the hands of the petitioner. This Court in Gandhibag Sahakari Bank Ltd., has considered themandate inPrincipal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shodiman Investments (P) Ltd,(2020) 422 ITR 337 (Bom.), whereby it was held that: “The words ‘reason to believe' would mean cause orjustification. It can only be the basis of forming such abelief. However, the belief must be independently formed inthe context of the material obtained that there wasescapement of income.The facts in the said decisionindicate that the reasons made available to the assesseesuggest that the information was received from the Directorof the Income Tax about a particular entity entering intosuspicious transactions. Hence, it was held that ‘such actionwas in breach of the settled position of law that thereopening notice was required to be issued by the AssessingOfficer on his own satisfaction and not on borrowedsatisfaction'. In view of the above mandate, this Court in Gandhibag SahakariBank Ltd. held that: “Except for referring to the information available onthe insight portal, the Assessing Officer has proceeded to reopen the assessment without indicating any independentapplication of mind to the said information that wasavailable on the insight portal for satisfaction to berecorded. It would thus be a case of issuing the reopeningnotice on borrowed satisfaction, which is not permissible.Hence, quashed and set aside the impugned notice andorder.” 18.The dictum laid down in the above cases covers the controversythat arises in this petition. Therefore, the mandate in the said casesapplies to the case at hand. 19.In the case of Anshul Jain (supra), the Punjab and Haryana HighCourt has held as under : “Thus, the consistent view is that where theproceedings have not even been concluded by the statutoryauthority, the writ court should not interfere at such apremature stage. Moreover, it is not a case where, from a barereading of the notice, it can be axiomatically held that theauthority has clutched upon the jurisdiction not vested in it.The correctness of the order under Section 148A(d) is beingchallenged in the factual premise contending thatjurisdiction, though vested, has been wrongly exercised. Bynow, it is well settled that there is a vexed distinctionbetween jurisdictional error and error of law/fact withinjurisdiction. For rectification of errors statutory remedy hasbeen provided. In the said case, the petitioner therein has notchallenged the authenticity of the notice issued under Section148-A of the IT Act. Therefore, the Court has held that thereis no reason to warrant interference by this Court in exerciseof jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution ofIndia at this intermediate stage.” 20.However, as discussed above, it is evident that the Assessing Officer, without satisfying himself and applying his mind, issued the impugned In the said case, the petitioner therein has notchallenged the authenticity of the notice issued under Section148-A of the IT Act. Therefore, the Court has held that thereis no reason to warrant interference by this Court in exerciseof jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution ofIndia at this intermediate stage.” 20.However, as discussed above, it is evident that the Assessing Officer, without satisfying himself and applying his mind, issued the impugned notices and, therefore, the law laid down in Anshul Jain (supra) is of hardlyany assistance to the respondents in support of their contentions.However, it does not appear that the Assessing Officer independentlyobtained the material and formed his opinion based on said material thatthere was escapement of the income. While drawing only inference, hehas to know the connotation of ‘capital asset’ as per Section 2(14) of theIT Act, of which clause (iii) excludes the ‘agricultural land’ which islocated beyond 8 km in aerial distance from the municipality and thepopulation of the village is less than ten thousand does not fall within thepurview of capital asset. Thus it is apparent that the Assessing Officerwithout applying his mind to the information that was available at theinsight portal or recording his satisfaction to be recorded issued theimpugned notice under Section 148A of the Act and thereby reopened theassessment. Therefore, in our view, the mandate in Gandhibag Sahakari BankLtd. and Arvind Sahdeo Gupta is applicable in the case at hand, rather thedecisions in the Anshul Jain and Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. as the facts in thesaid judgments are distinct than the case at hand. So, the mandate in thesaid judgments is not applicable. 21.For the reasons above, we find that the Assessing Officer in absenceof verification of the information available on the insight portal hasproceeded to reopen the completed assessment without indicating thebasis for having a reason to believe that the difference of Rs.6,63,000/- between the purchase price and the stamp duty value is chargeable to taxunder the provisions of the IT Act and the tax paid by the petitioner hadescaped assessment. Further reopening is based on grossly incorrect factsthat the assessment had been completed under Section 143(1) of the Actand was hence no assessment under Section 2(40) of the IT Act of 1961,when in fact the assessment had been completed under Section 143(3) ofthe IT Act. The reopening was thus merely an outcome of a change ofopinion of the Assessing Officer. Thus, the notice dated 22-03-2024 issuedunder Section 148A(b) of the IT Act and consequential order dated 30-03-2024 by respondent No.2; notice dated 30-03-2024 under Section 148 ofthe IT Act issued by respondent No.2, show cause notice dated 08-11-2024 issued by respondent No.4, and consequential order dated 27-11-2024 passed by respondent No.3, and notice dated 28-11-2024 issued byrespondent No.3 would not survive and are liable to be quashed and setaside. They are accordingly quashed and set aside, having been issued inthe absence of statutory jurisdiction in that regard. Consequently, stepstaken in pursuance of the said notice issued under Section 148A(b) of theAct would not survive. As a result, the writ petition is allowed in theabove terms. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. (ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.) (AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.)