Wpt v. The Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax - 1, Raipur Centralrevenue Building Civil Lines, Raipur. Revenue Building Civil Lines, Raipur

-1- NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR WPT No. 108 of 2023 Raika Ispat Udyog Pvt. Ltd. A Private Limited CompanySituated At Ring Road No.20, Village Gondiya Urla IndustrialArea, Raipur (C.G.) Through Its Director Vikas Raika, S/o LateVijay Raika Aged About 44 Years, R/o 173, Sapphre Green,Vidhan Sabha Road, Aama Sivani, Raipur (C.G.) ---- Petitioner Versus 1. The Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax - 1, Raipur CentralRevenue Building Civil Lines, Raipur. Revenue Building Civil Lines, Raipur. 2. The Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, Circle-1(1),Raipur Central Revenue Building Civil Lines, Raipur (C.G.)Raipur Central Revenue Building Civil Lines, Raipur (C.G.) ---- Respondents (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Moolchand Jain, AdvocateFor Respondents :Mr. Ajay Kumrani, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Amit Choudhari, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan PandeyOrder on Board 18.07.2023 Heard. 1)By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the orderdated 19.03.2023 passed under Section 148A(d) of the IncomeTax Act, 1961 and notice dated 21.03.2023 issued under Section148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Income Tax Act’). dated 19.03.2023 passed under Section 148A(d) of the IncomeTax Act, 1961 and notice dated 21.03.2023 issued under Section148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Income Tax Act’). 2)The facts of the present case are that the petitioner is a manufacturer and trader of H.B. Wire and Steel Products. In thecourse of business, the petitioner purchased Steel from thefollowing three parties : 3)The notice was issued to the petitioner under Section 148A (a)of the Income Tax Act after getting information uploaded underHigh-Risk CRIU/VRU data that the petitioner has made boguspurchases of Rs.1,83,35,526/-, Rs.16,76,567/- and Rs.6,56,458/-from M/s. Abhishek Enterprises, M/s. Rajendra Ispat and M/s.Pratyush Steels respectively and it is also found that thepetitioner is indulged in issuing fake bills to certain parties.of the Income Tax Act after getting information uploaded underHigh-Risk CRIU/VRU data that the petitioner has made boguspurchases of Rs.1,83,35,526/-, Rs.16,76,567/- and Rs.6,56,458/-from M/s. Abhishek Enterprises, M/s. Rajendra Ispat and M/s.Pratyush Steels respectively and it is also found that thepetitioner is indulged in issuing fake bills to certain parties. 4)The petitioner submitted copies of bills and ledger accounts ofthe supplier for Financial Year 2018-19. Learned ACIT issuednotices under Section 148A (b) of the Income Tax Act on02.03.2023 and in response, the petitioner filed a reply on16.03.2023. The petitioner requested for cross-examination of thepersons whose statements have been relied on by thedepartment. Learned ACIT after taking into consideration thethe supplier for Financial Year 2018-19. Learned ACIT issuednotices under Section 148A (b) of the Income Tax Act on02.03.2023 and in response, the petitioner filed a reply on16.03.2023. The petitioner requested for cross-examination of thepersons whose statements have been relied on by thedepartment. Learned ACIT after taking into consideration the documents along with the reply filed by the petitioner passed anorder under Section 148A (d) of the Income Tax Act on19.03.2023 and issued notice under Section 148 of the IncomeTax Act on 21.03.2023. documents along with the reply filed by the petitioner passed anorder under Section 148A (d) of the Income Tax Act on19.03.2023 and issued notice under Section 148 of the IncomeTax Act on 21.03.2023. 5)Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that totalpurchases during the Financial Year 2018-19 were onlyRs.55,87,066/- and not Rs.1,83,35,526/-. He would also submitthat the petitioner had sold the entire purchases from the above-stated three parties to M/s. K.K. Construction, Raipur throughdirect delivery from the supplier’s premises through the sametrucks and confirmation letter has already been submitted beforethe learned ACIT on 06.03.2023. He would further submit that thelearned ACIT passed order under Section 148A (d) of the IncomeTax Act based on statements of some persons but the petitionerwas not permitted to cross-examine those persons anddocuments were also not supplied therefore, the order passedunder Section 148A (d) and notice issued under Section 148 ofthe Income Tax Act are required to be set aside. He would furthersubmit that the procedure adopted by the revenue is bad in lawand it vitiates the entire proceedings. He would also submit thatthe learned ACIT has obtained sanction from the Pr. C.I.T.whereas, the proposal for escaped income was for more thanRs.50 lacs, therefore, sanction was required to be taken from theChief C.I.T., who is the specified authority according to Section151(ii) of the Income Tax Act. He would next submit that the learned ACIT has wrongly assessed the escaped income. Thealleged escapement is in respect of ‘expenditure’ and not inrespect of ‘asset’. The word ‘expenditure’ has been inserted inSection 149 by the Finance Act, 2022 w.e.f. 01.04.2023. Thus,the learned ACIT has erred in law and on facts in treating theentire purchase as escaped income, which is perverse, wrongand bad in law. He has placed reliance on the judgments passedby the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of M/s. AndamanTimber Industries Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise,Kolkata-II passed in Civil Appeal No.4228 of 2006,thejudgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matterof Kishinchand Chellaram Vs. The Commissioner of IncomeTax Bombay City II, Bombay, reported in 1981 SCC (1) 720, thejudgment passed by the High Court of Delhi in the matterof Arise India Limited Vs. Commissioner of Trade and Taxes,Delhi and others passed in WPC No.2106 of 2015 and otherconnected matters, the order passed by the High Court ofGujaratat Ahmedabad in the matter of PR. Commissioner of IncomeTax, Surat-1 Vs. Tejua Rohitkumar Kapadia passed in TaxAppeal No.691 of 2017, the order passed by theBombay HighCourt in the matter of PR. Commissioner of Income Tax-20 Vs.Dhananjay Mishra passed in Income Tax Appeal No.971 of2017 and the judgment passed by the High Court ofTelangana inthe matter of Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. AssistantCommissioner Of Income Tax, reported in 2022 Latest Caselaw 2468 Tel. Caselaw 2468 Tel. 6)On the other hand, leaned counsel for the respondents wouldsubmit that an opportunity of being heard as per provisions ofSection 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act was provided to thepetitioner on 02.03.2023 wherein the assessee was given showcause as to why the bogus purchase of Rs.1,83,35,526/-,Rs.16,76,567/- and Rs.6,56,458/- during Financial Year 2018-19from M/s. Abhishek Enterprises, M/s. Rajendra Ispat and M/s.Pratyush Steels respectively should not be treated as incomechargeable to tax which has escaped the assessment within themeaning of provisions of Section 147 of the Income Tax Act forthe assessment year 2019-20. It is further submitted that inresponse to the notice, the petitioner submitted his reply on06.03.2023. It is further argued that from a perusal of the reply, itis apparent that the petitioner was fully aware of the documentsrelied upon by the department and in this regard, a detailed replywas filed by him. He would submit that based on similar nature ofbogus transactions in the immediately preceding year 2017-18,the case of the petitioner was reopened and an assessmentorder was passed by the faceless AO thereby making an additionto the impugned amount of bogus purchases. All related third-party statements were duly provided to the petitioner. He wouldfurther submit that according to the provision of Section 151(i) ofthe Income Tax Act specified authority i.e. Pr. CIT-1, Raipur hadaccorded approval vide order dated 19.03.2023. He has placed reliance on the judgments passedby the Hon’ble Supreme Courtin the matter of Raymond Woollen Mills Limited Vs. IncomeTax Officer, Centre XI, Range Bombay and Others, reportedin 2008(14) SCC 218, the judgment passed by the High Court ofPunjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in the matter of GianCastings Private Limited Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxesand others in CWP No.9142 of 2022 and the order passed bythe Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the matter of BarbrikProjects Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others in Writ AppealNo.473 of 2022. 7)I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused thedocuments carefully. documents carefully. 8)Section 148A has been introduced in the Income Tax Act from01.04.2021. This Section says that before issuing any notice theAssessing Officer shall conduct an inquiry and provide anopportunity of being heard to the assessee. After taking intoconsideration the reply filed by the assessee, the AssessingOfficer shall decide by passing an order, whether the case is fitfor issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Actand a certified copy of such order along with such notice have tobe served upon the assessee. The time limitation for issuance ofnotice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act is provided inSection 149 of the Income Tax Act. In normal cases, no noticeshall be issued if three years have elapsed from the end of therelevant assessment year. Notice beyond the period of three01.04.2021. This Section says that before issuing any notice theAssessing Officer shall conduct an inquiry and provide anopportunity of being heard to the assessee. After taking intoconsideration the reply filed by the assessee, the AssessingOfficer shall decide by passing an order, whether the case is fitfor issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Actand a certified copy of such order along with such notice have tobe served upon the assessee. The time limitation for issuance ofnotice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act is provided inSection 149 of the Income Tax Act. In normal cases, no noticeshall be issued if three years have elapsed from the end of therelevant assessment year. Notice beyond the period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year can beissued where the Assessing Officer would not be in possessionbooks of accounts or other documents or evidence which wouldreveal that the income chargeable to tax, represented in the formof asset, which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likelyto amount to fifty lakh rupees or more for that year. Then noticecan be issued beyond the period of three years but not beyondthe period of 10 years from the end of the relevant assessmentyear. Notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act can beissued when there is information with the Assessing Officerwhich suggests that the income chargeable to the tax hasescaped assessment in the case of an assessee for the relevantassessment year. The specified authority for approving inquiries,providing the opportunity to pass an order under Section 148 ofthe Income Tax Act and for issuance of notice under Section 148of the Income Tax Act is Principal Commissioner or PrincipalDirector or Commissioner or Director, if three years or less thanthree years have elapsed from the end of the relevantassessment year or Principal Chief Commissioner or PrincipalDirector General or Chief Commissioner or Director General ifmore than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevantassessment year. 9) From a perusal of the order passed under Section 148A(d) ofthe Income Tax Act, it is quite vivid that during the surveyproceedings of Abhishek Enterprises on 20.08.2020, it was foundthe Income Tax Act, it is quite vivid that during the surveyproceedings of Abhishek Enterprises on 20.08.2020, it was found that the Raika Ispat Udyog Pvt. Ltd. made bogus purchases ofRs.1,83,35,526/-, Rs.16,76,567/- and Rs.6,56,458/- during theFinancial Year 2018-19 from M/s. Abhishek Enterprises, M/s.Rajendra Ispat and M/s. Pratyush Steels respectively, werefound indulged in providing accommodation entries to thebeneficiaries. According to the provision of Section 151 of theIncome Tax Act, prior approval was taken from the specifiedauthority and notice was issued under Section 148A(a) of theIncome Tax Act to the petitioner to furnish its books of accountsetc. for FY 2018-19 and to explain the issues. The petitionersubmitted his reply on 06.03.2023 and stated that his total basicpurchase value is Rs.67,11,939/- and not Rs.2,06,68,551/-. Thedepartment found that M/s. Abhishek Enterprises, M/s. RajendraIspat and M/s. Pratyush Steels are ‘suspicious’ dealers i.e., aperson who is suspected of issuing fake bills without selling thegoods. A copy of the confirmation of K.K. Construction suppliedby the petitioner was also taken into consideration and thesubmission of the petitioner has been carefully perused andconsidered according to the provision of Section 148A(c) of theIncome Tax Act. The statement recorded on oath during theproceedings was also considered by the department where thereare admissions. The department based on the evidence in theform of documents, statements of entry operators and other keypersons involved, facts and other circumstantial evidence founda fit case to initiate proceedings and thereafter notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act was issued after recordingsatisfaction. Section 148 of the Income Tax Act was issued after recordingsatisfaction. 10) Now it would be advantageous to deal with the judgmentscited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the matterof M/s. Andaman Timber Industries (supra), the Hon’bleSupreme Court has held that not allowing the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority though thestatements of those witnesses were made the basis of theimpugned order is a serious flaw which makes the order nullitysince it amounted to a violation of principles of natural justicebecause of which the assessee was adversely affected.cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the matterof M/s. Andaman Timber Industries (supra), the Hon’bleSupreme Court has held that not allowing the assessee to cross-examine the witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority though thestatements of those witnesses were made the basis of theimpugned order is a serious flaw which makes the order nullitysince it amounted to a violation of principles of natural justicebecause of which the assessee was adversely affected. 11)In the matter of Arise India Limited and other connectedmatters (supra), the Constitutional Validity of Section 9(2)(g) ofthe Delhi Value Added Tax, 2004 was challenged on the groundthat the same is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of Indiaand Section 9(2)(g) of the Delhi Value Added Tax, 2004, theHon’ble Supreme Court in para 53, 54 and 55 observed thus:- matters (supra), the Constitutional Validity of Section 9(2)(g) ofthe Delhi Value Added Tax, 2004 was challenged on the groundthat the same is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of Indiaand Section 9(2)(g) of the Delhi Value Added Tax, 2004, theHon’ble Supreme Court in para 53, 54 and 55 observed thus:- “53. In light of the above legal position, the Court hereby holdsthat the expression dealer or class of dealers occurring inSection 9(2) (g) of the DVAT Act should be interpreted as notincluding a purchasing dealer who has bona fide entered intopurchase transactions with validly registered selling dealerswho have issued tax invoices in accordance with Section 50ofthe Act where there is no mismatch of the transactions inAnnexures 2A and 2B. Unless the expression dealer or classof dealers in Section 9(2) (g) is read down in the abovemanner, the entire provision would have to be held to beviolative of Article 14of the Constitution. 54. The result of such reading down would be that theDepartment is precluded from invoking Section 9(2) (g) of theDVAT to deny ITC to a purchasing dealer who has bona fideentered into a purchase transaction with a registered selling dealer who has issued a tax invoice reflecting the TIN number.In the event that the selling dealer has failed to deposit the taxcollected by him from the purchasing dealer, the remedy forthe Department would be to proceed against the defaultingselling dealer to recover such tax and not deny the purchasingdealer the ITC. Where, however, the Department is able tocome across material to show that the purchasing dealer andthe selling dealer acted in collusion then the Department canproceed under Section 40A of the DVAT Act. 55. Resultantly, the default assessment orders of tax, interestand penalty issued under Sections 32 and 33 of the DVAT Act,and the orders of the OHA and Appellate Tribunal insofar asthey create and affirm demands created against the Petitionerpurchasing dealers by invoking Section 9(2) (g) of the DVATAct for the default of the selling dealer, and which have beenchallenged in each of the petitions, are hereby set aside.” 55. Resultantly, the default assessment orders of tax, interestand penalty issued under Sections 32 and 33 of the DVAT Act,and the orders of the OHA and Appellate Tribunal insofar asthey create and affirm demands created against the Petitionerpurchasing dealers by invoking Section 9(2) (g) of the DVATAct for the default of the selling dealer, and which have beenchallenged in each of the petitions, are hereby set aside.” In the above referred matter, it was held that a purchasingdealer who in a bonafide manner entered into a purchasetransaction with a registered selling dealer who has issued a taxinvoice reflecting the TIN number, the department is precludedfrom invoking Section 9(2)(g) of the New Delhi Value Added Tax,2004. In the present case, there are admissions by the witnessesand the department has found certain documents in the nature ofbogus transactions and earlier also the petitioner was foundinvolved in similar activity therefore, the decision cited by thepetitioner is of no help. 12)In the matter of Tejua Rohitkumar Kapadia (supra), theHon’ble Supreme Court in para 3 held as under :- “3. It can thus be seen that the appellate authority as well asthe Tribunal came to concurrent conclusion that the purchasesalready made by the assessee from Raj Impex were dulysupported by bills and payments were made by Account Payeecheque. Raj Impacts also confirmed the transactions. Therewas no evidence to show that the amount was recycled back tothe assessee. Particularly, when it was found that the assesseethe trader had also shown sales out of purchases made fromRaj Impex which were also accepted by the Revenue, no question of law arises.” In the above referred matter, it was found that purchasesmade by the assessee from M/s. Raj Impex were duly supportedby bills and all the payments were made by account payeecheques. But in the present case, the department has found thatthere were purchase bills however actually no goods werepurchased to evade the tax, therefore, the facts of the case citedby the petitioner are different from the facts of the present case. 13) In the matter of Dhananjay Mishra (supra), the Hon’bleSupreme Court observed that the third-party statement reliedupon by the Assessing Officer was not supplied to the petitionerand none of those points were discussed in the assessmentorder. It was also observed that the assessee was not permittedto cross-examine the two persons whose affidavits; the AssessingOfficer had relied upon to conclude that respondent had madecertain purchases from those persons identified as HawalaTraders and consequently, the petition preferred by the Revenuewas dismissed whereas, in the present case, the persons whohave been examined, have admitted and further there aresufficient documents to demonstrate that in the business thebogus bills were issued, therefore, this judgment is alsodistinguishable from the facts of the present case.Supreme Court observed that the third-party statement reliedupon by the Assessing Officer was not supplied to the petitionerand none of those points were discussed in the assessmentorder. It was also observed that the assessee was not permittedto cross-examine the two persons whose affidavits; the AssessingOfficer had relied upon to conclude that respondent had madecertain purchases from those persons identified as HawalaTraders and consequently, the petition preferred by the Revenuewas dismissed whereas, in the present case, the persons whohave been examined, have admitted and further there aresufficient documents to demonstrate that in the business thebogus bills were issued, therefore, this judgment is alsodistinguishable from the facts of the present case. 14)In the matter of Kishinchand Chellaram (supra), theHon’ble Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by theHon’ble Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by the 14)In the matter of Kishinchand Chellaram (supra), theHon’ble Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by theHon’ble Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by the Tribunal on the ground that the Manager of the Bank on whoseevidence the order was passed was not permitted to cross-examine and documents produced by the assessee were notrelied upon. Further, it was held that there was no evidence atall before the Tribunal on the basis of which the Tribunal couldcome to the finding that the amount of Rs.1,07,350/- was remittedby the assessee from Madras and that it represented theconcealed income of the assessee. In the present case, there aresufficient documents like bogus bills, ledger, statements of thewitnesses, and bogus transactions, therefore, the facts of thepresent case are distinguishable from the case law cited by thepetitioner. 15)In the matter of Raymond Woollen Mills Limited (supra), theHon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Court had to see onlywhether there was prima facie some material on the basis ofwhich the Department could reopen the case. Sufficiency orcorrectness of the material is not a thing to be considered and itwas observed that it would be open to the assessee to prove thatthe assumption of facts made in the notice was erroneous. Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Court had to see onlywhether there was prima facie some material on the basis ofwhich the Department could reopen the case. Sufficiency orcorrectness of the material is not a thing to be considered and itwas observed that it would be open to the assessee to prove thatthe assumption of facts made in the notice was erroneous. 16)In the present case, there are other documentary materialswhich have been considered by the Adjudicating Authoritywhile passing the order under Section 148A (d) of the IncomeTax Act. The statements of the witnesses are not the solebasis for passing the order therefore; the facts of the presentwhich have been considered by the Adjudicating Authoritywhile passing the order under Section 148A (d) of the IncomeTax Act. The statements of the witnesses are not the solebasis for passing the order therefore; the facts of the present case are different from the facts of the cited cases. 17) In the matter of Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra), thenotices issued under the unamended provision of Section 148 ofthe Income Tax Act were set aside in terms of the judgmentpassed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union ofIndia and others Vs. Ashish Agrawal, reported in 2023 (1) SCC617, whereas, in the present case, facts are entirely different asnotice has been issued according to the amended provision ofSections 148 and 148A of the Income Tax Act. notices issued under the unamended provision of Section 148 ofthe Income Tax Act were set aside in terms of the judgmentpassed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union ofIndia and others Vs. Ashish Agrawal, reported in 2023 (1) SCC617, whereas, in the present case, facts are entirely different asnotice has been issued according to the amended provision ofSections 148 and 148A of the Income Tax Act. 18)Now coming to the judgments cited by learned counsel for therespondents. In the matters of Gian Castings Private LimitedVs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and others, CWP No.9142of 2022 dated 02.06.2022, and Anshul Jain Vs. PrincipalCommissioner of Income Tax and another, CWP 10219 of2022, the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh whiledealing with a similar issue held that where the proceedingshave not even been concluded by the statutory authority, the writCourt should not interfere at such a premature stage. It is furtherheld that it is not a case where from a bare reading of notice itcan be axiomatically held that the authority has clutched uponthe jurisdiction not vested in it. The correctness of order underSection 148A (d) of the Income Tax Act is being challenged onthe factual premise contending that jurisdiction though vestedhas been wrongly exercised. There is a vexed distinctionbetween jurisdictional error and error of law/fact within therespondents. In the matters of Gian Castings Private LimitedVs. Central Board of Direct Taxes and others, CWP No.9142of 2022 dated 02.06.2022, and Anshul Jain Vs. PrincipalCommissioner of Income Tax and another, CWP 10219 of2022, the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh whiledealing with a similar issue held that where the proceedingshave not even been concluded by the statutory authority, the writCourt should not interfere at such a premature stage. It is furtherheld that it is not a case where from a bare reading of notice itcan be axiomatically held that the authority has clutched uponthe jurisdiction not vested in it. The correctness of order underSection 148A (d) of the Income Tax Act is being challenged onthe factual premise contending that jurisdiction though vestedhas been wrongly exercised. There is a vexed distinctionbetween jurisdictional error and error of law/fact within the jurisdiction and for rectification or errors statutory remedy hasbeen provided. The order passed by the High Court of Punjaband Haryana has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court inSLP(C) No.10762 of 2022 order dated 17.06.2022 and SLP No.14823/2022 order dated 02.09.2022 respectively. 19)The Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh in thematter of Barbrik Projects Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others, passed in Writ Appeal No.473 of 2022, dated 15.12.2022whiledealing with a similar issue in paras. 31(12), 32 & 33 observedas under : “31(12). After considering the reply of the assessee anddata available on the record, it is well settled that theassessee has made transactions of Rs.2,20,00,275/-during the FY 2017-18 in form of bogus purchase fromthe M/s. Panveer Trading Private Limited who areinvolved in providing of accommodation entries in form ofbogus sale/purchase for commission. The assessee isthe beneficiary company in this case and the abovetransaction where no goods were transferred from theseller to purchaser. Only entries have been made in thebooks. By making accommodation entries the assesseehas raised bogus expenditure in terms of boguspurchase. Thus, the amount of purchase made from theabove parties of Rs. 2,20,00,275/- has escapedassessment during the AY 2018-19. The informationsuggests that the income chargeable to tax has escapedassessment by Rs. 2,20,00,275/-….” 32. There is, prima facie, some material on the basis ofwhich the Department could reopen the case. Thepetitioner had not even made an attempt to assert thatthe material facts relied on in the SCN is erroneous. 33. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that nointerference is called for with the order of the learnedSingle Judge. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.” 20) At the same time, the respondents have cited certain judgments passed by the various High Courts and some of them 32. There is, prima facie, some material on the basis ofwhich the Department could reopen the case. Thepetitioner had not even made an attempt to assert thatthe material facts relied on in the SCN is erroneous. 33. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that nointerference is called for with the order of the learnedSingle Judge. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.” 20) At the same time, the respondents have cited certain judgments passed by the various High Courts and some of them have been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court where it iscategorically held that if there is no procedural fault, the WritCourt should not interfere at such a premature stage when theproceeding initiated against the assessee is yet to be concludedby the statutory authority and in one of the decisions passed bythe Division Bench of this Court it was held that the boguspurchases can be made basis for issuance of notice underSection 148 of the Income Tax Act and the said writ petitionpreferred by the assessee was dismissed. 21)With regard to ground raised by the learned counsel for thepetitioner that the learned ACIT has obtained sanction from thePrincipal Commissioner of Income Tax, whereas, since theproposal for escaped income was for more than 50 lacs,sanction was required to be taken from the Chief Commissionerof Income Tax according to the provision of Section 151 (ii) of theIncome Tax Act. The ground raised by the petitioner is factuallyincorrect since the assessment year involved is Financial Year2019-20, provision of Section 151(i) of the Income Tax Act isapplicable and according to provision of Section 151(i) of theIncome Tax Act, the Principal Commissioner of Income Taxwould be the specified authority and same authority hasaccorded approval on 19.03.2023. 22) In view of the above, it is quite vivid that the documents have been supplied to the petitioner in pursuance of the order passedby the ACIT; thereafter notice was issued under Section 148A(b)of the Income Tax Act; the reply was filed by the petitioner;thereafter the order was passed under Section 148A(d) of theIncome Tax Act and at the same time, notice under Section 148of the Income Tax Act was issued; the matter is still pendingbefore the authority and the petitioner has sufficient opportunityto take all defences available to him, in that view of the matter, Ido not find any good ground to interfere with the order passed bythe authorities under Section 148A(d) and notice issued underSection 148 of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the presentpetition fails and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge